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This thesis analyses the Comité Régional d’Action Viticole (CRAV), an active force in the French 
wine industry since the mid-1960s that has consistently mobilised militant winegrowers in 
response to economic crisis. Their role has expanded to represent not only the Midi’s 
viticultural heritage, but also a peculiar brand of regional nationalism. They invoked the 
memory of the "Grande révolte" of 1907, which saw hundreds of thousands mobilise against 
foreign wine imports, financial speculation and ineffective regulation. The legacy of 1907 will be 
considered in the context of its regionalist significance and the development of political 
Occitanisme, binding Oc and Vine at the beginning of the century. 
 The prominent role of winegrowing since 1907 had seen a compact between 
winegrowers, local elites and the Socialist Party develop. Yet, this began to slowly disintegrate 
as government programmes targeted the amelioration of Languedoc wine from the early 1970s. 
Whilst this project embittered winegrowers, events like the shootout at Montredon in 1976 and 
the torching of a Leclerc store in 1984 saw the CRAV breach the frontiers of acceptability and 
alienate traditional supporters. Demographic change, economic development and the stain of 
violent protest all chipped away at the CRAV's rebellious appeal. This regional compact will be 
analysed both to gauge the impact of development upon regional identity and to understand 
changing conceptions of modernity in the agricultural South. 
  The CRAV's survival is testament to their continuing relevance, despite being painted 
variously as terrorists, revolutionaries and militant syndicalists. These labels were fleeting, but 
their identity as winegrowers, Languedociens and their desire to live and work their land for a 
living wage have remained their defining characteristics. This thesis will analyse the limits of 
these identities and answer broader questions about the tension between regional development 
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Tending Vines & Picket Lines: The CRAV and the 
Post-War ‘Languedoc Viticole’ 
 
 
Vignerons, nous vous appelons à vous révolter. Nous sommes au 
point de non retour. Soyez les dignes représentants des révoltes de 
1907 où déjà certains sont morts pour permettre aux générations 
futures de pouvoir vivre de leur labeur. Faisons en sorte que nos 
enfants puissent connaître la viticulture. 1 
 
When five masked men stood issuing threats of blood and chaos to the French 
establishment in March 2007, they called on the French public to support them in their 
violent crusade. This call to arms was issued in the vernacular of a cause a century old, 
invoking heritage, pride and a very classical interpretation of piety. Yet, these were 
men in balaclavas, recording in a secret location after having coerced a local journalist 
to cover the taping. Their threats were more reminiscent of an Al-Qaeda broadcast than 
something born of the French Republic. Unsurprisingly, they received wide coverage 
as newspapers discovered the Comité Régional d’Action Viticole (CRAV) for the first time 
in years, ending an unjustified obscurity outside of the Languedoc: in the New York 
                                                          
1 France3/AFP – News Report (Montpellier region), 20/05/2007. 
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Times an op-ed piece noted that “a new acronym [had] entered the lexicon of terror”2; 
the BBC spoke of “guerrilla” winemakers who were invoking the spirit of “the French 
Resistance”3 and in Paris, the Figaro warned that after this warning these hooded men 
could not back down, reminding readers that the group had killed before.4 Indeed they 
had, although this observation only touched upon the history of a group whose 
evolution is an interesting allegory of the Midi’s post-war experience.  
 
Image from the CRAV's 2007 video address5 
This thesis will attempt to dispel this amnesia, recounting the story of the 
CRAV and ultimately accounting for this strange forgetfulness. Put simply, the CRAV 
are an association of winegrowers who pursue radical tactics to promote what they see 
as the interests of their industry, specifically protectionism and market regulation 
within France. Using guerrilla style military tactics, the CRAV has surfaced to mobilize 
                                                          
2 ‘Make Wine Not War’, New York Times  26/08/2007 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/opinion/26boyd.html]. 
3 ‘French wine-growers go guerilla’, BBC News, 17/06/2007 
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6759953.stm]. 
4 'Le Midi viticole sous la menace d'extrémistes violents', Le Figaro, 14/10/2007. 
5
 France3/AFP – News Report (Montpellier region), 20/05/2007. 
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the aspirations of Languedocian winegrowers at moments of specific economic and 
social crisis throughout the twentieth century. The organisation is composed of 
ordinary winemakers from the region, who perpetrate direct action in line with a 
general strategy devised by vocal members who represent a leadership. Many of these 
actions take place outside of any coordinated plan, with examples of sympathetic 
winemakers taking action in the name of the CRAV and subscribing to their ideology 
and desires if not strictly their organisation. Their desires are the product of long-
standing cyclical market fluctuations, the effects of which have been felt keenly in a 
region where the vine predominates over any other crop or industry. 
This dynamic positioned the CRAV as an organised articulation of wider 
tendencies which had long simmered in the politically boisterous South. Its historical 
point of reference was the great eruption of 1907, the ‘Révolte du Midi’. An estimated 
600,000 protestors on the streets of Montpellier had provided the focal point of a turn 
of the century wave of unrest that witnessed the defection of the 17th regiment of the 
gendarmerie, which had been ordered to defuse the tension. The momentous nature of 
these demonstrations is difficult to overstate, with riots on such a scale in this area not 
recurring until 1968. Such a high watermark has coloured the political and cultural 
vocabulary of the region ever since, offering a historical founding myth and fostering a 
notional predisposition to direct action. Specifically, this legacy has been 
institutionalised by the continuing economic predominance of the wine industry in the 
region ensuring that it has retained a loud voice in political matters.  
 The CRAV therefore serves as a useful barometer for regional reactions to the 
modernisation of the Languedocian wine industry over the period studied, namely 
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1944-1992. During the early years of national reconstruction after the war, issues of 
identity, modernity and political engagement dogged the Languedoc, a heartland of 
both republican values and economic stagnation. As the wine industry rebuilt, so too 
its vocal spokesmen began to make themselves heard. Yet, the Languedoc’s post-war 
story is not dominated by recovery, rather by the wine crises of 1953, 1956, 1961, 1967 
and then throughout the 1970s. These repeated crises provided the backdrop to a story 
of radicalisation and direct action which provoked increasingly extreme rhetoric from 
the Défense du vin movement. It too came to symbolise the conflict between regional 
defence and regional development which fully arose in the 1980s. It was this conflict 
over the region’s trajectory which progressively isolated the CRAV, as its attacks 
became viewed as increasingly unacceptable.  By 1992, the end point of this study, the 
CRAV had been denounced as terrorists and their influence had shrunk markedly. Yet 
they were still able to mobilise protest and, more immediately, to direct attacks against 
representatives of authority. Their changing role mirrors the development of the 
Languedocian wine industry, as the cooperative mass production of the post-war gave 
way to a greater focus on quality and independence. Nevertheless, the process by 
which these changes took place was beset by challenges to regional identity and by an 
often divisive rhetoric of class politics in the context of an increasing influence of global 
markets. The CRAV’s story, therefore, is not simply one of industrial decline and offers 
insights into broader social and cultural issues in the region.  
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The Languedoc: This thesis will focus on the vitiultural deparments of Aude, Hérault and Gard. 
 
Historicising the ‘Défense du vin’ movement 
One of the most useful resources in chronicling public reactions to the CRAV is 
regional newspapers, whose circulation in the Languedoc was more significant than 
that of national publications. The stance adopted by the newspapers was capable of 
providing encouragement and validation to winegrowers, whose professional 
misgivings about the government’s role in regulating winegrowing were often echoed 
in local editorials. Likewise, this chimed with the self-image presented by the leaders of 
the Défense movement like Cases and Castéra, whose narrative of the Languedoc’s 
history and present circumstances was consistently reflected in the local press, 
encouraging widespread acceptance of the Défense movement’s rhetoric.6  
                                                          
6 L McFalls, In vino veritas: professional ideology and politics in viticultural Languedoc, 1907-87 
(Harvard University: Unpublished Thesis, 1989), p.121 n.98. 
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The three principal newspapers used throughout this thesis were the most 
influential in the region. They are: the Socialist leaning daily newspaper La Dépêche, 
founded in 1879, which enjoyed a circulation of around 280,000 in 1967;7 Midi-Libre, 
which started life as an organ of the Liberation council in Montpellier in 1944 and had 
an estimated circulation of 200,000 in 1976;8 and L'Indépendant, founded in 1846, a 
Perpignan publication with a turbulent history. Banned after the war for continuing to 
publish under both Vichy governance and German Occupation, it reappeared in 1950 
after being acquitted of the charges against it.9 These regional publications help to 
draw the boundaries of acceptability which the CRAV negotiated and, despite their 
usual support, could indicate when the CRAV transgressed. Many of these were 
obtained from the holdings of the Departmental Archives of the Aude, Gard and 
Hérault as well as the National Archives of France. As well as these regional journals, 
police records in Departmental and National Archives illustrate changing methods and 
messages of protests. In addition, these sources have been supplemented with 
interviews of those involved in the Languedocian wine industry, to analyse the extent 
to which perceptions have changed over time. 
These perceptions are an important consideration when analysing the role of 
the CRAV. The modes of action of the CRAV were governed by popular consensus and 
the Comité's own ability to communicate its message. This consensus was founded on 
a sense of inequity and a need to stand up for the marginalised Languedoc, whilst their 
message remained linked to the memory of 1907. These features formed a tradition of 
                                                          
7 E. Derieux; J.C. Texier, La presse quotidienne française (Paris: Librairie Arnaud, 1974), p.163. 
8 [URL: http://www.gazettedemontpellier.fr/presentation.html] [Accessed: 18/06/09]. 
9 Derieux; Texier, La presse quotidienne française, p.264. 
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militancy which kept the interests of winegrowers prominent amidst declining 
economic relevance. The regional historian Jean Sagnes does not pull his punches in 
ascribing this militant tendency to a desire to find an easy scapegoat for endemic 
problems. The rhetoric of the Défense du vin movement targeted imports and fraud 
rather than meaningfully addressing natural overproduction inherent in the market 
itself.10 This thesis will analyse this rhetoric of 1907, as well as reading into the event a 
focus on regionalist conflict using new archival evidence. Lawrence McFalls addressed 
the rhetoric of the winegrowers protest movement in his Harvard thesis of 1989, 'In 
vino veritas: Professional ideology and politics in viticultural Languedoc, 1907-87'. This 
work offers a useful insight into some of the by-products of economic modernisation in 
the 1970s and 1980s, with a full analysis enriched by copious local experience. 
McFalls' focus is very much on the interaction of the Socialist party with 
winegrowers, and he was able to interview some of the prominent winegrowers that 
feature in this thesis before they later passed away. His definition of “viticultural 
unity” underpins a sociological study of the relationship between wine and politics in 
the Aude and the ways in which professional ideology informed responses to change 
in the 1980s.11 This was a useful starting point for this study, and the interaction of the 
left with winegrowers was a key issue to be addressed. The supple attachment of the 
Socialists (the nascent SFIO, then PS, and the more radical PSU) to the winegrowers of 
the Languedoc has been a formative influence on the Défense movement. Their 
                                                          
10 J. Sagnes, Le movement ouvrier du Languedoc (Toulouse: Privat, 1980), pp.112-114. 
11 McFalls describes this ideology thus: “At the beginning of the century, they [Audois 
winegrowers] discovered a formula for freezing their professional ideology and values into 
place, and only in the last few years has their collective professional mind begun to thaw.” 
McFalls, In vino veritas, p.2. 
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endorsement and occasionally sanctions would help define the limits of CRAV actions. 
By identifying 1907 as the moment when this “professional ideology” was formed, 
McFalls locates the beginning of a preoccupation with fraud, imports and 
overproduction, yet places less importance on the influence of regionalism and the 
means by which it became a central fixture of that movement. This thesis moves 
beyond his analysis of viticultural politics to refocus on the importance of regionalism 
in this “professional ideology” as an explanation for its stubborn resilience in the face 
of profound economic change. By re-examining regional identity, one can better 
explain how the old ideology of 1907 was conflated with a narrative of struggle which 
pushed winegrowers towards odd alliances with Occitanistes and, eventually, 
altermondialistes. Political loyalties adapted and became more nuanced after the CRAV 
had begun to bear arms in 1976, when a shootout between the forces of public order, les 
Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), and militant vignerons left two dead and 
some 30 injured. 
Published in response to this turbulence, La révolte du Midi, an edited collection 
of essays written by prominent members of the organisation offers a rare glimpse of 
the CRAV presenting itself to the public on its own terms. 12 This Thesis will differ from 
the CRAV's self-presentation by analysing the divisions within the movement - 
especially regarding modernisation. These differences will be decoupled from issues of 
class, as reiterated with references to 1907 (and as seen in the work of Lem), and 
instead recognise the value of emergent and competing development models in the 
midts of a deleterious demographc reality. Dealing with the founding myths and 
                                                          
12 M. Le Bris (ed.), La Révolte du Midi (Paris: Grou-Radinez, 1976). 
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political realities of their movement, the authors of La Révolte du Midi acknowledge and 
attempt to address inherent criticisms and outline their central beliefs. The principal 
authors of that work were the Audois figureheads of the CRAV throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s: André Cases and André Castéra. The rhetoric of 1907 permeates their article 
‘Qui nous sommes’ which traces the birth of the CRAV from the syndicalist movement 
which arose in response to the 1907 crise du vin. Indeed, the article’s title quite 
deliberately echoes one published by the organisational committee headed by Marcelin 
Albert which coordinated much of the ‘Révolte du Midi’, the Comité d’Argeliers.13 This 
correlation is neither accidental nor insignificant, representing the extent to which 
memories of 1907 constituted the CRAV's founding myth and its constant recourse 
when it was challenged. This thesis will map the mythology of 1907, whilst 
acknowledging the political and cultural realities that changed the ways in which the 
CRAV consciously and unconsciously related it to contemporary issues. The CRAV 
was both a concrete political organisation – if an intermittent and loosely structured 
one – and the expression of a more diffuse regional tradition and regional memory 
which it sought to articulate in political form. 
Indeed, the 1976 gunfight at Montredon was a focal moment for the CRAV and, 
as such, is one of the most widely covered episodes in the historiography. Journalistic 
accounts of the events which led up to the shootings appeared in subsequent years. 
Both Pierre Bosc and Bernard Revel, of the ORTF (and then France 3 Sud) and the 
Indépendant respectively, focus on the prominent role of the leaders of the CRAV. Their 
studies have been useful in offering background information on the leading CRAV 
                                                          
13 J Sagnes, Le Midi Rouge: Mythe et Réalité (Paris: Anthropos, 1982), p.229. 
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protagonists.14 Michelle Zancarini-Fournel has, however, flagged up the poor sales of 
Bosc's book as indicative of a popular reluctance to engage with and relive the events 
of 1976.15 If before the shootings the CRAV had enjoyed a certain notoriety, they 
subsequently became infamous. However, Montredon challenged the role of the CRAV 
and changed their relationship with public opinion. The stain of spilt blood was not 
enough to disband the organisation, but neither did it help their cause. Their increasing 
isolation seemed to represent a lessening appetite for their particular brand of protest.  
Several scholars have discussed reactions to the developing Languedocian wine 
economy. Geneviève Gavignaud-Fontaine's work Le Languedoc viticole, la Méditerranée et 
l'Europe au siècle dernier (XXe), is the authoritative work on the winegrowing of the 
South.16 The work of Jean Clavel, a prominent actor in the Languedoc viticole who has 
been perennially close to reform, is also an important first step.17 Both these 
commentators’ analyses focus on the changing regulation which led the Languedoc 
from producing vin de la bibine18 to the independent artisanal produce represented by 
areas like Pic St Loup. The CRAV receives a fairly negative treatment in these works, 
and this thesis will attempt to more sympathetically extrapolate the motivation and 
methods of the group to understand their continued existence holistically. It is my 
intention to analyse the ways in which resistance to change was expressed and 
received, to help gauge the social and cultural impact of these economic reforms. In 
                                                          
14 B. Revel, Montredon, les vendanges du désespoir (Portet-sur-Garonne: Loubatières, 1996) and P. 
Bosc, Le vin de la colère (Paris: Galilée, 1976). 
15 M. Zancarini-Fournel, ‘Montredon, 4 mars 1976: l’événement comme révélateur’ 
[http://irice.univ-paris1.fr/IMG/pdf_Lettre_27_Zancarini.pdf]. 
16 G. Gavignaud-Fontaine, Le Languedoc viticole, la Méditerranée et l’Europe au siècle dernier 
(Montpellier: Presses de l’Université Paul-Valery, 2000). 
17 J. Clavel, Mondialisation des vins (Bordeaux, Féret, 2008). 
18 Bibine indicates simply a poor quality drink (principally wine), coming from the diminuitive 
form of the latin verb 'to drink'. 
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charting the core of this opposition in the 1980s and 1990s, it has been essential to look 
at the changing messages of the Défense movement since 1907. If we recall again the 
terrorist vocabulary of the 2007 video, produced by this same nucleus of CRAVistes, 
then this thesis must address the impact of regional heritage upon responses to 
external pressure.  
 
Historicising regional heritage 
Whilst the broad history of France’s viticultural South is well documented, 
there is a lack of any corresponding exploration of the CRAV in the English language. 
This thesis will document how the legacy of 1907 was mythologized, before moving on 
to examine the specific mechanisms of its transmission throughout the twentieth 
century. The widespread viticultural riots of 1907 represented a physical expression of 
the enduring issues of Southern political resistance and economic specificity. Works on 
1907 range from serious scholarship19 to exercises in historical myth-making20. These 
form a useful starting point for understanding the region’s enduring weaknesses and 
strengths. In particular it is becoming more important to view 1907 not only from a 
regional perspective but within a national and even international context, seeing in it a 
direct comparison with 1968 as a year of tumult. André Burgos highlights the extent to 
which 1907 was part of a national strike movement, in which March saw Paris, the ‘city 
of light’ of the 1900 Exposition Universelle, plunged into darkness by an electrician’s 
                                                          
19 F. Napo, 1907 : la révolte des vignerons (Toulouse: Privat, 1971); J. Sagnes (ed.), ‘La révolte du 
Midi viticole cent ans après: 1907-2007’ (Perpignan: Presses Universitaires de Perpignan, 2008); 
R. Pech, 1907 Les mutins de la République : La révolte du Midi viticole (Toulouse: Privat, 2007). 
20For example G. Bechtel, 1907, La Grande Révolte du Midi (Paris: Laffont, 1976). 
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strike.21 That the memory of 1907 remains centred on the South is indicative of the scale 
of the events that took place, as well as their importance to the regional population.  
Recent trends in scholarship have engaged more fully with French regionalism, 
especially in the late 19th century. The Félibrige and other cultural movements have 
emerged as serious topics of study and their relevance to organisations in Paris and 
national conceptions of regional differentiation have received some attention.22 Yet, the 
regionalism of the Félibrige remained, above all, intellectual and cultural. There were 
marked differences between Jean Charles-Brun in the Fédération Régionaliste Française 
and Frédéric Mistral in the Félibrige. Charles-Brun offered support to the protestors of 
1907, coordinating sympathetic publicity in Paris. Mistral, however, refused to 
associate himself with the movement, as we shall see. Their differing engagements 
with the events of 1907 constituted a formative moment for the Languedoc and 
specifically the way in which activists in the wine industry interacted with ideas of 
regionalism. The CRAV were labourers and small-holders motivated more by francs 
per hectolitre than romantic conceptions of the ‘genius’ of the South. This study is 
intended to bridge this gap between cultural identity and economic reality, reconciling 
the extremes of intellectual and cultural exceptionalism and mass demonstrations 
motivated by economic pressure. The CRAV are a useful key to decipher the process 
                                                          
21 A. Burgos, ‘Les événements de 1907 dans leur context national et international’ in J. Sagnes 
(ed.), ‘La révolte du Midi viticole cent ans après: 1907-2007’ (Perpignan: Presses Universitaires 
de Perpignan, 2008), p.13. 
22 C.F. J. Wright, The Regionalist Movement in France 1890-1914: Jean Charles-Brun and French 
Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); R. Zaretsky, Cock & Bull Stories: Folco 
di Baroncelli and the Invention of the Camargue (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); S. 
Peer, France on Display: Peasants, Provincials, and Folklore in the 1937 Paris World’s Fair (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1998); E. Storm, The Culture of Regionalism: Art, Architecture and International 




by which regional identity mutated and adapted to the pressures of a changing France. 
The CRAV placed itself as a traditional defender of the region’s body against a 
predatory state, a metaphor which often epitomised the attitudes of individual 
winegrowers in the region, whose recourse to protests came to colour perceptions of 
their identity. 
The Occitan resurgence of the 1960s centred around the work of writers like 
Robert Lafont23 and a new core of sociologists keener to attach Occitanisme to issues of 
class and social function than to the gilded cultural reserve of the Félibrige. This 
modern movement sought to forge alliances with other contestatory groups in the 
Languedoc. As a result, the convergence of the 'Défense du vin' movement with 
Occitanistes in the 1970s was representative of both their shared values, informed by 
the events of 1907, and also of a more functional expediency which united them in 
criticism of the government. One of the most striking aspects of Occitanisme has been 
its specifically Republican heritage. The connection of the Midi to Radicalism as well as 
Socialism ensured that the cooperative movement which arose around the wine 
industry was rooted not in revolutionary but republican traditions. In a radio 
interview, the prominent CRAViste, Emmanuel Maffre-Beaugé would clarify (and 
simultaneously complicate) his attachment to the Occitan movement by stating, "Je ne 
suis pas Jacobin et je ne suis pas séparatiste."24 
Both post-war regionalists and the CRAV shared these roots, and despite being 
characterised as left-wing movements, they had a nuanced relationship with socialism 
                                                          
23 R. Lafont, La révolution régionaliste (Paris: Gallimard, 1967); R. Lafont, Sur la France (Paris: 
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l'Occitanie (Paris: Seghers, 1971). 
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as an ideology. Le Midi Rouge, by Jean Sagnes, explores and extrapolates just such a 
traditional myth of Southern leftism. He is firmly aware throughout, however, of the 
fallacious potential of such myth-making and has led the field in plotting the transfers 
and interactions between opinion, inheritance and the tangible groups which govern 
the region. Indeed, Sagnes, far from throwing out the myth, recognises an abiding 
character within the Midi which motivates and directs revolts against the government. 
However, Sagnes is also at pains to point out that this is not bound to doctrinal 
adherence to any one political party, despite a historical tendency towards the left. In 
his analysis of the working class South, Le mouvement ouvrier du Languedoc, Sagnes plots 
the progression of grower radicalism, as noted by Southern historian Olivier Dedieu,25 
yet demonstrates that it was never effectively channelled into the Communist party. 
Instead, the extreme left chafed against democratic socialists, sacrificing unity to 
political jostling over class and land ownership. This struggle, embodied in the 
turbulent relationship between 1907’s leaders Marcelin Albert and Ernest Ferroul, 
would remain a prominent issue throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, Sagnes 
takes pains to highlight the extent to which all regional Socialists were overwhelmed 
by the maelstrom of 1907, washed along upon a tidal wave of activism upon which 
they had no purchase. 
After the challenges delivered to the centralised Gaullist state by the events of 
1968, a new wave of commentators engaged with the question of Southern regionalism 
and Occitanisme in particular. Indeed, Vera Mark describes engagement with Southern 
regionalism in the 1970s as “both an expression and a by-product of post-1968 
                                                          
25 O. Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’ in F. Nicholas (ed.), La 
Grappe au Poing (Nîmes: Champ Social, 2007), p.71. 
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regionalism.”26 The CRAV's relationship to the dynamics of the années 68 is a 
contentious topic which requires careful unpicking.27 This thesis will attempt to locate 
the winegrowers of the Languedoc within this period by understanding their 
relationship to the social pressures which motivated soixant-huitard activism and the 
after-images of the May-June events. Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, one of the central 
figures in any discussion on 1968's historical import, highlighted the CRAV as an 
embodiment of a certain regional aftershock which saw them involved in fatal violence 
in 1976.28 The focus on the années 68 within this thesis has very much been informed by 
her sympathetic understanding of the pressures which moulded regional responses to 
central authority. Although this thesis is not centrally concerned with the 
historiography of 1968, the events of this year could not do other than affect the 
                                                          
26 V. Mark, ‘In Search of the Occitan Village: Regionalist Ideologies and the Ethnography of 
Southern France’, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April, 1987), p.64. 
27 Of particular relevance to this study was the literature of the années 68, expanding the 
significance and history of the '68' movement beyond and before its immediate historical 
context. Likewise, scholars have recently moved to refocus analysis on political protest and the 
significance of industrial disputes as opposed to the self-publicised representations of student 
revolt. In particular, see M. Zancarini-Fournel, Le moment 68: Une histoire contestée (Paris: Seuil, 
2008); K. Ross, May '68 and its Afterlives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); P, Artières 
and M. Zancarini-Fournel, Le moment 68: une histoire collective 1962-1981 (Paris: Découverte, 
2008). Also important has been the increasing focus on the impact of the "Events" on French 
industry and syndicalism, which ties more readily into their relationship with the Midi. In 
particular, see X. Vigna, L'insubordination ouvrière dans les années 68: Essai d'histoire politique des 
usines (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007); B. Gobille, Mai 68 (Paris: Découverte, 
2008). Whilst, also focussing on industrial relations and the années 68, Vincent Porhel addresses 
the regionalist dimension of the Events in Brittany, which is of direct relevance to the 
experience of Occitanistes. See V. Porhel, Ouvriers bretons: Conflits d'usines, conflits identitaires en 
Bretagne dans les années 1968 (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2008). Springing from 
the processes which created the May-June events, the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) 
are a useful parallel to the CRAV at this moment in time. During the années 68 , they were both 
involved in violent protest linked to the political left and denounced as terroristic by the 
government. This comparison will be explored in later chapters, although the LCR are 
discussed in J.P. Salles, La Lige communiste révolutionnaire (1968-1981): Instrument du Grand Soir 
ou lieu d'apprentissage? (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2005). 
28 Zancarini-Fournel, ‘Montredon, 4 mars 1976: l’évenement comme révélateur’; M. Zancarini-
Fournel, ‘Récit: Le début de la fin’ in P. Artières; M. Zancarini-Fournel (ed.s), 68, une histoire 
collective (Paris: Découverte, 2007). 
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CRAVistes and Occitanistes. As such, its impact and its legacy form part of this 
analysis, although the student revolts which spearheaded a movement of millions 
involved in industrial action will play a peripheral role. This thesis will focus on the 
themes of the années 68 rather than the Evénements of May-June specifically. 
 
Thesis Structure and Methodology 
The first chapter will analyse the events of 1907 and the ways in which they 
crystallised a broad paradigmatic shift in the politics of the Midi. It was the sheer scale 
of the events which created new archetypes for regional expression, effectively writing 
the 'Myth of 1907'. The importance of mythology is paramount at this stage, as the 
broad themes of 1907 and their transferability helped to dictate the extent to which 
future discontent in the wine industry was channelled along similar lines. As a 
founding myth, 1907 symbolises an upheaval in which a whole region was mobilised 
for justice. Both the CRAV and the Occitan movement deployed this myth of 
continuity, depicting themselves as the vanguard of a struggle incarnated in the 
regional resistance narrative. After all, in the eyes of those most intent on servicing 
regional culture, the Languedoc was “le pays de révoltes, de Montmorency, des 
hommes de 1848, des hommes de 1851, des hommes de 1871, des révoltes de 1907, des 
maquisards de 40-45... "29 
 This chapter hence examines 1907 as a revelatory moment, imbued with many 
of the characteristics which would be redeployed throughout the twentieth century. 
                                                          
29 O. Dedieu, ‘Les élus locaux face à la crise du vignoble Languedocien’ in F. Nicholas (ed.), La 
Grappe au Poing (Nîmes: Champ Social, 2007), p.71. 
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The myth or legacy of 1907 is, in essence, the narrative of this redeployment. Its 
application to the history of the Midi involves teasing out the relationship between 
historical fact and its successive political re-interpretations, out of which developed a 
set of enduring ‘regional tendencies’.  I will outline the fundamentals of the Midi’s 
enduring mythology, analysing the ways in which it has been adapted to 
contemporary pressures and also the manner in which it has shaped regional 
responses to these pressures. From regional commemoration of 1907 to shootouts and 
fraud scandals, the same terms have dominated debate and ensured that the flexible 
and protean regional mythology of protest has remained central to its political 
discourse. Using the holdings on 1907 from the Departmental Archives of the Aude, I 
first establish the course of events before moving on to explore their political afterlife. I 
will also bring in archival evidence from the Paris archives of Jean Charles-Brun, the 
former head of the Fédération Régionaliste Française. Whilst the actual events of 1907 are 
well documented in existing historiography, I draw out new relevance from specific 
incidents in the context of 1907’s enduring impact for the Midi. The extent to which 
such inheritances from 1907 influenced subsequent moments of crisis is inextricably 
bound up with the mechanism of their transmission, and their embodiment in the local 
government structures of the Languedoc. The structural peculiarities of the Languedoc 
wine-region helped to forge a continuing lineage of political and cultural intransigence 
which stressed regional autonomy as a central feature of political vernacular.  
The second chapter will trace the development of the diffuse Défense du vin 
movement into an articulate and independent organisation possessed of its own 
membership and its own strategies. It focuses on the post-war period. Much existing 
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wine legislation had been modified under Vichy and then abandoned after the 
Liberation. 1944 therefore resulted in something of a tabula rasa. Economic recovery 
from the Second World War was spearheaded by cooperatives. Yet, as the volume of 
wine produced returned to pre-war levels, the consumption of wine in France was 
decreasing. The awareness and resentment of foreign imports was thus heightened. 
Suddenly, in the mid 1950s, the cooperatives which had been at the heart of recovery 
seemed to be part of the problem, as the government sought to decrease the volume of 
production and increase its quality. The first groups formed to represent the interests 
of winegrowers in this post-war period represented a return to the central ‘navel’ of the 
wine industry’s regional narrative. By reactivating the myth of 1907, they ensured that 
the rhetoric of previous generations could be deployed in the service of modern 
political issues. Throughout the 1950s, the Défense du vin movement was dominated by 
a pluralist dynamic as myriad groupuscules jostled for prominence. This created 
something of a crisis of representation, as winegrowers faced division and struggled to 
unite their message. By attempting to outflank each other, however, these 
representative groups also injected a degree of dynamism into the debate, forcing the 
Défense movement to reinvigorate itself at key points in its development. The resulting 
turbulence established many of the defining characteristics of the unified movement 
which would emerge in the 1960s. In the 1960s, the CRAV would become the ultimate 
embodiment of the Défense movement which opposed efforts to aggressively change 
the shape of the Languedoc’s traditional staple.  
The third chapter will analyse the development of the CRAV after 1961, when it 
emerged as a distinct group within the milieu of viticultural discontent in the Midi. 
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Piecing together their fragmented story into a coherent narrative will allow us to assess 
the evolving themes and significance of protest. In this way, ruptures and continuities 
can be seen in the message and demands of the CRAV. It skirted direct political 
allegiances, instead exhibiting an adaptive character which saw it form divergent 
attachments across its fissiparous development. Political currency won and lost by the 
CRAV and other regional movements was ultimately geared towards the improvement 
of their material condition, a factor which has been absolutely central to the motivation 
of direct action. Economic malaise and financial hardship have repeatedly filled the 
streets of Montpellier, Narbonne, Nimes and Carcassonne as the wages of 
modernisation have paid the Midi poorly. This chapter will end with a discussion of 
the most controversial moment of the CRAV’s existence: the disastrous confrontation 
at Montredon-les-Corbiѐres which led to the death of a winegrower and a CRS officer.  
Having outlined the emergence of the CRAV as an independent organisation, 
the fourth chapter will analyse the nature of the grand social alliance which allowed 
them to reach the heights they did in the 1970s. It will analyse the comparative strength 
of the ‘viticole’ and the ‘Occitan’ movements and trace their convergence. By 
recognising the fluctuating successes of both the Défense du vin and Occitaniste 
movements, it becomes possible to chart their respective influence in the region. 
Gauging the efficacy of government responses to demands from the winegrowers 
requires an understanding of the prevalence of viticultural politics in the region; their 
convergence with the politics of regionalism and ethnicity was an interesting and 
instructive passage which illustrated some of the core values of both movements.  
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Marxist sociologist Winnie Lem describes how the CRAV have frequently 
mobilised the vernacular of Occitanism in demonstrations, flying the Occitan cross as a 
means of mobilising distinct local dissatisfaction with central government.30 This thesis 
moves beyond Lem's village-level case study and its focus on class and gender to offer 
a broader view of the region and of the political development of Occitanisme, 
highlighting the importance of patrimoine. The potency of the Occitan movement has 
motivated political parties to court its endorsement, yet the regionalist movement has 
remained functionally aloof from either right or left. The political success of the Occitan 
movement in these social conflicts has been an emblem for broader discontent with the 
French state, prefixed on the economic hardship exacerbated by unequal development. 
As such, Occitanistes of the 1960s and thereafter engaged with industrial protests, like 
those surrounding the Decazeville pit closure. The later occupation of the Larzac step 
by protesters fed into this same dynamic, binding Occitanisme, regionalism and 
gauchisme in a popular movement which garnered global attention. When external 
pressures endangered the livelihood of the Languedocian winegrowers alongside 
reginoal activists, the events of 1907 provided a revolutionary handbook for the 
conduct of such a protest – with direct action at its heart. This chapter therefore 
examines the nature of this grand social alliance in the 1960s and 1970s.  
By delineating the issues on which these two social pressure groups converged, 
we are presented with a fuller picture of their developing agendas. The dual narratives 
of alienation elaborated by both Occitan and viticultural movements aligned to form a 
powerful social alliance based on emotive grievances. This revivalism relied on the 
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proliferation of ‘ethno-history’ and regional myth-making, in which kernels of regional 
heritage were extrapolated into myths of more contemporary relevance.31 By 
highlighting the themes of identity and progress in the rhetoric of the two movements, 
I intend to study both their compatibility and individuality in representing regional 
interests.  
The fifth chapter will continue the narrative of the CRAV from the dramatic 
turning point of 1976. This extended narrative will aim to probe the relevancy of the 
CRAV, emerging from the remnants of the once grand social alliance of the Midi. By 
analysing the continuity of both message and method, I will demonstrate its enduring 
qualities alongside its changing message. As the CRAV moved into opposition towards 
European integration – taking precedence over its earlier opposition to Parisian 
economic policy – the need to address these new challenges saw the nature of the 
organisation change. The expansion of the European Economic Community placed the 
regional economy under pressure from external regulation and different visions of 
modernity. Suddenly Italian wine became the new enemy, and suspicions of fraud 
found a new target. The names changed and yet the rhetoric and modes of protest 
continued in the vein established and adapted since the heady days of 1907. 
Likewise, the CRAV’s place at the top table of Languedocian representation was 
challenged by an ever shrinking support base. As the Giscardian model of 
modernisation pressured the region to embark on campaigns of uprooting and 
restructuring, the long-established principle of monoculture was slowly eroded. With 
that went the CRAV’s ability to rely on ‘l’unanisme viticole’ as they struggled to 
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maintain their traditional relevance. The Socialist victory in 1981 was celebrated in the 
Languedoc, where Mitterrand had been overwhelmingly favoured. Yet within a few 
years criticism of the PS began to rumble amongst the Défense movement as 
modernisation spread over the Midi and the traditional organs of Défense were 
diminished by government politicking. The actions of the CRAV became increasingly 
unacceptable thereafter and their rhetoric ever more brusque. The inability to draw the 
same numbers to mass demonstrations forced their hand towards more and more 
direct action, a trend which would continue throughout the later 1980s. 
The final chapter will focus on the changing economic realities of the Languedoc 
and the subsequent effects on the CRAV’s ability to speak for the winegrowers as they 
had done since the 1960s. The year of 1984 was a turning point for the CRAV, as long-
vaunted modernisation programs began to genuinely impact on the demographics of 
the milieu viticole. The FNSEA, likewise began to make advances in the Midi. Their 
conservative politics were alien to the historical identity of the Midi rouge, yet their 
national stature and closeness to government presented an alluring prospect for 
growers disenchanted with the lack of progress attained by traditional methods. 
Slowly, as they franchised their Departmental subsidiaries in the Languedoc, their 
influence grew. As ‘l’offensive moderniste’ increasingly scored victories in the 
Languedoc, the certainty of viticultural unity evaporated. The CRAV began to 
fragment as prominent leaders of la Défense were co-opted into the modernising 
project. Increasingly this pushed the CRAV towards methods which breached the 
boundaries of acceptability, drawing accusations of terrorism and a renewed resolve 
by the forces of order to combat the CRAV’s influence. Declining relevance in the 
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milieu viticole and the marginalisation of public opinion forced the CRAV ever further 
away from the political mainstream.32  
 By collating contemporary press reactions and CRAV communiqués with the 
emerging picture of the organisation and their movement to date I will analyse their 
relative success and opportunities for continued relevance alongside an interpretation 
of their role. Interviews play a part in building this picture of a historical organisation’s 
role in the Midi today, whilst indicating the extent to which it can be considered a 
formative force of regional identity. This thesis will draw upon a series of interviews 
conducted principally in the summer of 2010. From over 200 requests,33 17 respondents 
provided answers to a script containing 22 questions as a starting point.34  This sample 
of interviews is too small to draw any quantitative analysis, though they have helped 
add colour to the thesis. Responses came from a wide variety of participants: grape-
growers and independent winegrowers to local counsellors and cooperative managers. 
The CRAV remains an organisation which allegedly carries out criminal acts and some 
interviewees were reluctant to offer specific details, but rather furnished broad 
opinions and anecdotes which have been reproduced where necessary. These 
interviews proved a valuable insight into the divisions within the industry, the 
perception of government initiatives (such as the shame associated with uprooting 
vines) and perception of the region’s relationship with national identity.  
                                                          
32 For a very brief description of this process, see X. Crettier, I. Sommier, La France Rebelle (Paris: 
Michalon, 2006), p.221. 
33 Some of the prominent members of the CRAV who feature in this analysis, such as Jean 
Huillet, were contacted for comment both personally and through colleagues. They were 
unwilling to offer responses. 
34 A list of these questions is provided in the appendix. 
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The Epilogue to this piece will broaden the story to analyse the ways in which 
elements of the Défense movement became involved in the alter-mondialiste movement, 
combining regionalism, syndicalism and a focus on paysan values in a durable political 
context.35 The most striking examples of 'rural resistance' in the Midi have owed much 
to the anti-globalisation movement, drawing in figures such as Aimé Guibert in his 
resistance of Mondavi and José Bové's outspoken attacks on McDonalds, linking back 
to the Larzac protest of the 1970s.36 In this movement, prominent CRAVistes like Jean 
Huillet were natural allies of others fighting the external economic pressures facing the 
Midi. Such reactions were based on a rejection of globalisation and the belief that the 
region is the most fundamental unit of economic development. In this sense, they draw 
a straight line of continuity from regionalists like Jean Charles-Brun and even Charles 
Camproux, the supporters of Occitanisme who had engaged with the events of 1907.37 
The perpetuation of traditional messages has provided a red line of continuity which 
allows us to examine the role of the CRAV in an historical context.  
It will be necessary at this point to judge the extent to which the CRAV can be 
seen as successful in their avowed aims throughout the twentieth century. Did they, 
                                                          
35 For a broader discussion of peasant identity within France, see R. Hubscher, ‘Réflexions sur 
l’identité paysanne au XIX siècle: identité réelle ou supposée’, Ruralia, vol.1 (1997), pp.65-80. 
36 On the fusion of the 'peasant movement' with broader trends of left politics, see Jean-Phillippe 
Martin, Histoire de la nouvelle gauche paysanne (Paris: Découverte, 2005); Jean-Phillippe Martin, 
‘La Confédération paysanne et José Bové, des actions médiatiques au service d'un projet ?’, 
Ruralia no.6 (2000), pp.1-25; Jean-Phillippe Martin, 'José Bové un activiste sans projet?', Modern 
& Contemporary France, vol.11, no.3, (August, 2003) pp.307-321. For studies of the altermondialiste 
movement from a global perspective, see Nonna Mayer , Eric Agrikoliansky, Olivier Fillieule 
(eds.), L’altermondialisme en France: La longue histoire d’une nouvelle cause (Paris: Flammarion, 
2005); I, Sommier, O. Fillieule, E. Agrikolansky, Généalogie des mouvements altermondialistes en 
Europe (Paris: Karthala, 2008); Geoffrey Pleyers, Alter-Globalization (London: Polity, 2010); C. 
Aguiton, Le monde nous appartient (Paris: Plon, 2001); C. Bonfiglioli, S. Budgen (eds.), La Planète 
altermondialiste (Paris: Textuel, 2006). 
37 These figures will be further explored in Chapter 1. 
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indeed, make themselves redundant? Have they altered the framework of interaction 
with the government? The answers to these questions are a large part of assessing 
whether they have been an active force pressing for specific, tangible reforms at key 
points in the development of the modern wine industry or simply represent 
rambunctious wine growers interested only in a selfish protection of their own 
livelihoods. In a sense, these questions shoulder the potential justification of the often 
violent actions of the CRAV, allowing us to reflect on their successes and failures in the 




Chapter 1:  
1907: L’incident comme révélateur 
 
During the summer of 1907, France experienced one of its largest social disturbances 
since the Revolution. The demonstrations which swept over the Midi culminated in a 
gathering of some 600,000 people in Montpellier before the protests turned violent. As 
France’s periphery edged closer to sedition, protesters were shot dead, buildings were 
torched and a locally levied army regiment defected.38 Perhaps, then, it is of little 
surprise that such a momentous episode has remained prominent in the Languedoc’s 
history. However, whilst 1907’s influence is felt keenly in the Midi as a motivation for 
action and rhetoric it remains “mal intégrée dans la conscience nationale”.39 In French 
history more broadly, 1907 remains a strange moment, with the left supporting a 
seemingly anti-Jacobin uprising, Socialists, Monarchists and anti-Dreyfusards voting in 
unison, and the hero of the Revolt eventually forsaken by his own movement. At once 
integral and obscure, the role of this mythologised conflagration is one which is 
                                                          
38 This analysis of 1907 is drawn from a collection of archival and newspaper sources where 
stated and also more generally using: Guy Bechtel, 1907, la grande révolte du Midi, (Paris: Robert 
Lafont,1976); J. Sagnes, M. Pech & R. Pech, 1907 en Languedoc et en Roussillon, (Lunel-Viel: 
Espace Sud, 1997); F. Napo, 1907: La révolte des vignerons (Toulouse: Privat, 1971); J.R. Fontvielle, 
Paure Miejour, Pauvre Midi (Paris: Editions de la Courtille, 1977). 
39 Bechtel, 1907, La Grande Révolte du Midi, p.324. 
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defined along clearly regional lines. 1907 was the founding myth of viticultural 
radicalism in the Languedoc.  
This Chapter will analyse the ways in which Socialists attempted to engage 
with the Revolt of 1907, and the reasons that they failed to take ownership of it. The 
lessons from this Revolt would shape their continuing relationship with the Languedoc 
viticole, articulating a specific paradigm for Southern Socialist Deputies in these 
viticultural departments. The disparity between Marcelin Albert’s Comité d’Argeliers 
and Ernest Ferroul’s Socialist followers was washed away in an ‘inter-classiste’ 
movement which allowed temporary cooperation but would not survive the Revolt. 
The basis of this ‘inter-classisme’, however would constitute an important mobilising 
tool of later movements in the post-war period. Specifically, 1907 raised the spectre of 
the ‘union sacrée’ between local elites, smallholding winegrowers and the trade union 
movement. Achieving this ‘union’ in later protests would be the key to mass 
mobilisation, giving the 'Défense du vin' movement a blueprint for coordinating 
protest and direct action. The prominent role of specific Socialist officials also hinted at 
the potential for ‘Députés du vin’ to construct a specific mandate in the Midi. Yet by 
failing to take account of 1907's 'inter-classisme' at the time and not fully appreciating 
the regionalist potential of the Revolt, the Socialists laid the groundwork for the 
Défense movement's later political independence and the repeated crises of 





Phylloxera & Monoculture: The Pre-history of the Revolt 
 1907 was more than merely a “spontaneous jacquerie” and needs to be placed in 
the longer context of the economic evolution of the Midi.40 The modernisation of the 
national economy during the latter part of the nineteenth century had led to the 
‘peripherisation’ of the Midi. Suddenly the Languedoc, having previously played a 
central role in the Mediterranean economy, was drawn into a peripheral relationship 
with the Parisian centre.41 Long-thriving silk, cotton, and wool industries in the 
Languedoc shrivelled in the late nineteenth century. The textile industry which had 
employed 12,147 people in the Hérault in 1864, was reduced to less than 7,000 by 1896. 
As textile industries flourished in Alsace and Flanders, so the Languedoc’s industry 
declined.42 This industrial atrophy occurred during a broader French trend of de-
industrialisation in the countryside and the subsequent shift of industrial investment to 
urban centres. Dutch social scientist Nico Kielstra described the Languedoc as an 
example of a ‘relictual space’ or area almost forgotten by modern progress, having 
once played an important (if unequal) role in the national economy and now almost 
completely sidelined.43 In a further development of the processes described by the 
regional geographer Raymond Dugrand,44 Kielstra highlights the disintegration of 
regional capital and the failure of heavy industry to implant in the region as 
characteristic of the sidelining of the Languedoc. Lacking any discernible industry 
                                                          
40 J. Harvey Smith, ‘Agricultural Workers and the French Wine-Growers' Revolt of 1907’, Past & 
Present, No. 79 (May, 1978), p.101. 
41 N. Kielstra, ‘The Rural Languedoc: periphery to relictual space’ in R.Hudson & J. Lewis (ed.s),  
Uneven Development in Southern Europe (London: Methuen, 1985) p.249. 
42 Raymond Dugrand, Villes et Campagnes en Bas-Languedoc (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1963) p.391. 
43 Kielstra, ‘The Rural Languedoc: periphery to relictual space’, pp.246-252. 
44 He terms the process“[l]a destruction de l’appareil usinier et l’atrophie du grand capital 
urbain” in Dugrand, Villes et Campagnes en Bas-Languedoc, p.548. 
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which was capable of encouraging further integration into the national economy,45 the 
Midi had one obvious asset – the mass cultivation of the vine.  
The introduction of railroads stimulated the expansion of wine production and 
gave the Languedoc the ability to all but monopolise the national market for table 
wine.46 This convergence of factors further encouraged the cultivation of high-yielding 
vines in a climate which encouraged high-volume production.47 Fractured holdings, 
irregular quality and low profits meant that it was impossible to escape the grip of the 
vine on the Midi, so innovation was largely limited to profit-maximisation. Growers in 
Nîmes decided to take the initiative of importing sturdy American vines in 1867, 
expecting high-yields and healthy vines.48 Yet, with these imports came the Phylloxera 
Vastatrix louse, a tiny insect native to North America which burrowed into the roots of 
vines and ate the sap within. Whilst American vines had developed immunity, their 
European counterparts remained disastrously vulnerable.49  In the Midi, Phylloxera all 
but destroyed wine production as it spread unabated across the region. In the Hérault, 
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for example, a total planted vineyard area of 220,000HA in 1874 had dropped to 
47,000HA in 1883. Small and medium winegrowers were worst hit, with their 
vulnerability heightened by their size. 
This crisis established the context in which later strike movements formed. 
Throughout the period, the villages of the Bas-Languedoc lost some 10-25% of their 
population as those devastated by Phylloxera moved in search of better fortune 
elsewhere.50 Surviving small-holders were often unable to afford the costs of replanting 
or expanding into vacant plots and this period consequently witnessed “l’implantation 
du grand négoce d’origine externe”.51 This influx of capital altered the fragile setup of 
the Midi’s social compact, opening the chasse gardée to outside encroachment whilst 
reducing many former landholders to the status of an agricultural proletariat through 
bank-led land forfeitures. The spectre of grand capital would haunt the Languedoc 
viticole, and suspicion of those drawing huge profits from the depressed market would 
lead to accusations of fraud. By the time of recovery in 1890, widespread replanting 
ensured that an abundant crop flooded the market. This created an overheated regional 
economy leading to price drops and the establishment of a chronic cycle of boom and 
bust vintages.52 The Midi was drawn into truly large-scale viticulture, producing low 
quality, low-cost wine in vast quantities for a fixed market.53  
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Inter-classisme, Socialism and Cooperatives 
If industrialisation had bypassed the Languedoc, a form of agricultural 
industrialisation had taken hold in its stead. The end of the nineteenth century saw 
almost a third of the Aude under vine, with some villages having up to 70% of their 
population working in the vineyards or auxiliary industries.54 Within these 
communities, confluence of class, diversity of labour roles and strong occupational 
identity formed the boundaries which would come to define the Midi vignerons. The 
interpenetration of classes was encouraged by the predominance of extremely small 
land-holders who also laboured elsewhere to supplement their income.55 Outside 
investors had not disappeared, yet only 1.7% of the population in the Aude owned 
vineyards over 40HA and 78.8% owned under 5HA by the end of the nineteenth 
century.56 The social structure thus ranged from absentee owners who employed large 
numbers of local people to work on their 1,000 hectare estates, to independent small-
holders with 3 to 5HA and a corresponding need to take on extra paid labour.57 Indeed, 
the agricultural census of 1892 lists over a third of labourers as also being 
landholders.58 Traditional definitions of wage-earner and land-owner thus became 
skewed, as the predominance of wine meant that all classes in the region depended to 
some extent on the wine market. Indeed, these smallholders were not the isolated, 
unsophisticated peasantry of the 1870s described by Eugen Weber.59 The Aude’s 
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viticultural villages had, for some time, been strongly linked to the towns and forced to 
interact with urban merchants to sell their wine.  
These early years of the twentieth century were confusing for winegrowers and 
labourers alike as an unstable market undermined the optimism which had 
characterised the recovery from the blight of Phylloxera. Labourers who owned their 
own land tended to be the best paid, followed by non-landholding labourers and then 
the live-in workers who were often drawn from immigrant labour from Italy and 
Spain.60 Skilled workers also tended to be the most unionised, with the greatest ability 
to demand wage rises through the Fédération des Travailleurs agricoles du Midi (FTAM), 
whilst unskilled farmhands remained subject to market fluctuations.61 The table below 
highlights the volatility of prices between 1893 and 1913 in the Midi: 
 
Index of average annual prices of wine in the Languedoc (100% = 20yr average price)62 
The brief upturn between 1903 and 1904 saw 129 strikes taking place in the Aude, 
Hérault and Pyrénées-Orientales that year as viticultural labourers sensed that 
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concessions could be gained during the upturn and promptly mobilised.63  These 
strikes were coordinated by the FTAM which was formed in 1903 as a subsidiary of the 
national Confédération générale du travail (CGT).  In contrast to the region-wide ‘inter-
classisme’ of the 1907 demonstrations, this strike movement supported the wage 
demands of agricultural labourers and was therefore figured principally as a class-
based strike. This was important, as it would condition the Socialist response to 1907 
and, as we shall see, contributed to their inability to capitalise fully on the wave of 
unrest. 
 Although in 1903-1904 FTAM was initially successful, with close to 15,000 
members in 1904, its numbers waned after the failure of the strikes to produce tangible 
results.64The increasingly perilous state of the wine market conspired to diminish the 
validity of wage demands, as growing unemployment in the sector took the edge off 
strikes and saw many return to work wherever they could find it.65 The intensification 
of the ‘wine slump’ in 1905 and 1906 saw joblessness and wage-cuts rise, as vineyards 
became less financially viable.66 Moreover, the Midi's urban centres equally bore 
witness to the crisis years of 1904-1907 as unemployment rocketed to 50% in Beziers 
and Montpellier, with all commercial trade in Montpellier declining a corresponding 
50%.67 Such widespread hardship elicited a willingness to cooperate across classes and 
drew FTAM closer to engagement with landholders as a practical measure. 
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Between January and July 1905, a movement led by the winegrowing proprietor 
from Béziers, Antonin Palazy, tried to reconfigure the momentum of these recent 
labour strikes around a cross-class platform and a simpler message which cited fraud 
as the principal reason for the downturn. On 20 January, and with the help of Socialist 
Elie Cathala, Palazy held a consultative meeting in Béziers which drew 1,900 delegates 
from seven Departments to discuss the wine slump. This was perhaps the first time 
that the representatives of both workers organisations and proprietors had met, 
demonstrating that ‘inter-classisme’ could serve to unite the Languedoc viticole. 
Smallholders and labourers remained bound by a mutual suspicion of the large 
propriétaires,68 yet this suspicion alone was not enough to construct the 'union sacrée' 
between smallholders and labourers of which Palazy had dreamt. Cathala had 
experimented with his own ideas of class cooperation and these had been drawn from 
the function of cooperatives in the region, though not yet scrutinized in the political 
arena. 
The first cooperative created in the Languedoc was Les vignerons libres in 
Maraussan, Hérault, which formed a sales partnership in 1901 before constructing a 
fully cooperative winery in 1905. Elie Cathala was central in the formation of the 
cooperative, which received a visit from Jean Jaurès on its opening. In April, Jaurès had 
addressed a rally of around 15,000 people in Béziers to mark the establishment of the 
SFIO69 and paid specific tribute to Les vignerons libres. This organisation attempted to 
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employ landless labourers across their cooperative holdings, acting as a labour agency, 
union of proprietors and bulwark against regional instability. Jaurès celebrated how 
L’idée maîtresse des militants socialistes et coopérateurs qui, à 
Maraussan, ont créé tout un ensemble d’institutions socialistes, a été 
de grouper les petits propriétaires paysans, les petits producteurs 
vignerons, de les arracher à cet esprit d’individualisme outré et 
défiant, à cette habitude d’isolement qui a fait jusqu’ici la faiblesse 
du travail rural.70 
 
With the Musketeers' motto emblazoned above its door - "Tous pour chacun, chacun 
pour tous"71 - this cooperative was a working metaphor for Jaurès' social-democratic 
hopes for the SFIO. Yet it was also an example of how an 'inter-classiste' movement 
should be created in the Languedoc. The "union sacrée" would eventually be 
hamstrung by the FTAM, however, which sought to avoid ‘collaboration’ with 
proprietors. From this perspective, if the ideology of Les vignerons libres echoed a 
natural affinity in the region for the social-democratic stance of Jaurès, that is not to say 
that the competing rhetoric of his great rival Jules Guesde was absent. 72 
Palazy’s movement was a precursor to the events of 1907, yet failed to gain the 
same traction in the region. As arguments broke out over demands that proprietors 
should contribute to a strike fund, the united front began to collapse and the ‘union 
sacrée’ which Palazy had hoped to forge seemed illusory. When proprietors 
categorically refused to pay, workers’ organisations walked out, led by the Socialist 
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mayor of Narbonne, Ernest Ferroul.73 The controversial mayor was a Doctor to the poor 
and a former Guesdiste Deputy, who had ceded his seat at the formation of the Bloc des 
Gauches out of reluctance to leave the role of opposition.74 Whilst Palazy and Cathala, 
backed by Jaurès, had attempted to found a movement based on class cooperation, the 
Guesdiste Ferroul remained opposed to 'collaboration'. Ferroul would play an 
important part in the success of the 1907 revolt, and it is poignant that Palazy’s 
movement was destroyed by his reticence. In essence, Ferroul’s focus on the primacy of 
labourers would characterise the Socialist response to the problems of the Languedoc 
viticole.  
Southern Socialists had been engaged with the question of viticulture for some 
time. In a series of debates from 1901 to 1905, Justin Augé, the Radical-socialist Deputy 
for the Hérault, had called for the government to assume a monopoly over the 
distillation of alcohol and criticised the sugaring of wines.75 This campaign fed into a 
series of meetings in Béziers during the winter of 1905, culminating in a detailed 
programme of measures in February 1906. This programme proposed a ban on 
sugaring wines and greater regulation of négociants, a reduction of tariffs on the 
railways for transporting wine, controls on the flow of wines coming from Tunisia and 
Algeria, and the encouragement of the growing number of cooperatives in the region.76 
These issues would become the accepted script for Languedocian Socialist Deputies 
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throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Yet, at this juncture, the programme 
had a pronounced ouvriériste tone and included demands for a vineyard labourers’ 
minimum wage and that vineyards employ no more than 10% foreign workers. 
Following a drubbing in legislative elections in 1906, however, the Hérault socialists 
lacked the platform to push this programme77 until the national SFIO conference in 
Nancy (11-14 August, 1907).78 Furthermore, as the region had fallen further into decline 
and proprietors faced the same hardship as labourers, the gaps between the classes had 
dissolved and the Midi as a whole entered into a period of open revolt. The Socialist 
response to these economic difficulties failed to encapsulate this developing inter-
classisme, instead retaining a focus on the labour strikes which had preceded 1907. 
They engaged with the developing Revolt on the assumption that it had issues of class 
at its heart. 
Fostering inter-classisme was perhaps the greatest achievement of Marcelin 
Albert, the café-owner and small-holding winegrower who was to emerge as the leader 
of the 1907 events. Commonly nicknamed “the messiah” or “the redeemer”, 79 he 
gathered vast crowds of anxious winegrowers who were drawn to his rhetoric: he took 
the tension and grievances from the labour strikes of the early 1900s and translated 
them into a broader, unifying social movement, overcoming the difficulties which 
demolished Palazy’s united front. The demands for a right to employment in the 
vineyards became a more general, and much more saleable, demand to live from the 
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vine.80 This rhetorical shift was indicative of the opening up of the Défense movement, 
and the beginnings of what caused 1907 to become such a seminal event in the history 
of the Midi. By stressing their vulnerability as small-holders and petty producers, 
vineyard labourers overcame the potentially alienating focus on wage demands whilst 
retaining a tangible motivation to protest. This rapprochement formed a base for inter-
classisme to bridge the gap between urban and rural labourers and landowners, fuelling 
an apolitical mass movement.  
 
Marcelin Albert and the 1907 ‘Révolte du Midi’ 
The viticultural crisis was discussed in a series of debates in the National 
Assembly between January and June 1907. A member of Clemenceau’s own majority 
raised the issue, though a group of Southern Radicals rallied to support the 
government. They proposed a parliamentary commission to study the problems of the 
Languedoc. Investigations, however, were insufficient to satisfy the government’s 
vocal critics, who condemned them for protecting the interests of grand capital in the 
Midi.81 The turbulent political climate after the dissolution of the Bloc des Gauches left 
the dominant Radical party with enemies on the left and right of the Assembly, and in 
this climate every issue retained the potential for attacking the government.82 
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While discussions in the Assembly stalled, however, local movements in the 
Midi were to have a far greater influence. On 18 February, the café-owner Marcelin 
Albert sent a telegram to Clemenceau, detailing the plight of the Midi in the face of its 
economic difficulties. On 11 March, the Parliamentary commission arrived in 
Narbonne and received a delegation led by Albert. After this meeting reached an 
unsatisfactory outcome, Albert’s first major meeting took place in the village of 
Argeliers and a petition was signed by around 400 people demanding immediate 
government intervention.83 The signatories of this petition were to become central to 
the coordination of the 1907 riots, with the formation of the Comité de Salut Public de la 
viticulture. This was followed by the appearance of Le Tocsin on the 21 April, a news-
sheet which lasted for 22 editions and helped to mobilise and unify the protests for the 
next 5 months.84 Its influence was felt for many decades and its editorials and headlines 
were echoed in the banners and speeches of future protests.  
In its first issue, Le Tocsin outlined the identity of the Comité d’Argeliers, the 
group who would set the tone for the entire révolte. With Albert at their head, they 
were keen to validate their claims to represent the Languedocian masse viticole as a 
cross-class, apolitical movement reacting to grave economic pressure: 
Nous sommes ceux qui aiment la République, ceux qui détestent et 
ceux qui s'en foutent; nous sommes ses ardents défenseurs ou ses 
adversaires déclarés; radicaux ou conservateurs, modérés ou 
syndicalistes, socialistes ou réactionnaires, nous sommes ceux qui 
ont leur jugeote et aussi leur opinions. Mais nous avons un ventre et 
nous sommes ceux qui crèvent de faim.85 
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In this articulation of the group’s beliefs, Albert’s Comité stressed their independence 
from the dominant political parties of the day and their detachment from specific 
political demands. Yet, in reality, Albert’s Comité was composed of a rural bourgeoisie 
which was unrepresentative of agricultural labourers. Amongst their number, they 
counted Radicals, conservatives and some few who might be considered Socialists. In 
the words of Jean Sagnes: “Bref, le Comité d’Argeliers n’a rien de révolutionnaire. Il ne 
peut même pas être classé à gauche.”86 This makeup risked the same fate as Palazy’s 
forlorn ‘union sacrée’. Yet, Albert’s message relied simply on an appeal to defend the 
region, crack down on fraud and provide bread to the impoverished. The Comité’s 
ability to simplify this message into an apolitical and personal plea ensured that they 
avoided the divisive class entreaties of previous years. 
Albert’s apolitical rhetoric was to shape the relationship between the Midi 
vignerons and the government for a hundred years hence, as he spoke of the Midi as a 
patient in need of saving by Parisian doctors. The Socialist Deputy Justin Augé echoed 
this in the Assembly, quoting Albert in declaring “Vous êtes le médecin qui devez 
guérir le malade.” The derisive laughter and cries of “Buvez le vin!” which met his 
statement were, in turn, illustrative of the contempt many in the chamber felt for this 
negation of responsibility.87 Albert, as leader, took no responsibility for finding this 
cure, stating only the end result winegrowers wanted (wine sold above production cost 
and stricter regulations to eliminate fraud and sugaring) and that the government 
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should endeavour to make it a reality. Essentially Albert articulated a culture of 
dependency which would be inherited by the later Défense movement. 
Simplifying the causes of the crippling crise de mévente was an important step 
which would allow the Défense movement to articulate its cause more successfully. Of 
the many possible causes, (such as the over-planting of vines at the turn of the century, 
increasing yields or Algerian imports) the theme of fraud quickly became the dominant 
issue of the Comité d’Argeliers and the entire 1907 movement. Jean Sagnes highlights 
the role of the regional press in highlighting this primary cause.88 The Tocsin would 
play a pivotal role in distilling this message.  
 
Cartoon depicting the primacy of fraud as a cause of the 1907 downturn89 
Following the emergence of Le Tocsin, attendance at meetings rose 
exponentially. One in Capestang on 21 April attracted an estimated 12,000 
winegrowers. In the next week demonstrations in Lézignan attracted between 18-
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25,000 protestors doubling in the following week in Narbonne, which saw Dr Ernest 
Ferroul alongside Albert for the first time. They were unlikely allies, and the extreme-
leftist Ferroul’s distaste for Albert and his bourgeois Comité ensured that their rivalry 
would not be resolved. Ferroul began to assume the leadership of events, capitalising 
on Albert’s success in creating a simple, mobilising message and constructing a unified 
inter-classiste platform. This represented an attempt by the Socialists to take ownership 
of the Revolt, yet Ferroul, the man who had scuppered the 1905 movement, was unable 
to harness the resilient ‘inter-classisme’ and apolitical character of the protesters. 
Although the riots of 1907 found their full expression in the cities, their roots 
were strongly in the countryside. J. Harvey-Smith highlights the role of the urban 
Bourses de travail in motivating the radicalism which underpinned these 
demonstrations, but it was the interpenetration of city and village in the region which 
explained how it spread so far and so fast.90 It is rash to overstress the traditional ‘inter-
classisme’ model of 1907 without acknowledging the peculiar mixture of classes 
represented by the small-holding wine growers and their vineyard labouring 
employees (many of whom were also landowners, as mentioned). The large industrial 
growers remained a class enemy both of the urban working class and the rural wine-
workers. Although the streets were filled with urban workers, artisans and shop 
keepers, the subsidised trains which ferried wine-growers and labourers to the cities 
helped swell numbers and make the cause more immediate. If the organisational 
impetus fell to Ferroul and the adroit urban Socialists, mass support came from 
Albert’s newly consolidated rural disciples.  
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Regular Sunday protests became a fixture offering winegrowers an escape from 
the drudgery of their work (or, indeed, unemployment). The week of 12 May, 150,000 
met in Béziers, followed by 185,000 in Perpignan on 19 May, 200,000 in Carcassonne on 
24 May and 150,000 in Nîmes on 2 June. The movement took on the appearance of a 
genuine uprising. The climax came at a colossal meeting in Montpellier of an estimated 
600,000 people on 9 June.  During this time, Ferroul’s importance rose dramatically; 
with the protest movement becoming a fixture of the cities, he rallied the establishment 
in the Midi’s towns to support the cause and brought an end to the sequence of 
peaceful protests which had so far characterised the movement. On 10 June, he 
addressed around 20,000 protesters in front of Narbonne City Hall in a fiery meeting 
which issued an ultimatum for the government to eliminate fraud or face a tax strike.91 
This time the crowd did not disperse, however, and Narbonne's Theatre was set ablaze 
by rioters caught up in the spirit of the Revolt.92  
After 10 June, the sheer scale of the meetings which had swept across the Midi 
and the sudden ferocious turn of the movement prompted Radical, Socialist and 
Monarchist Deputies to appeal across the benches for a solution to the 
crisis. Felix Aldy, the Socialist Deputy for the Aude, spoke on behalf of this unlikely 
coalition, rejecting the focus on over-production and reiterating the role of fraud at the 
centre of the crisis.93 Aldy, Ferroul’s successor as Deputy for the Aude and a close ally, 
sensed an opportunity to use the Revolt as political capital against Clemenceau’s 
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government. After Aldy’s speech, however, another SFIO Deputy, André Dubois (of 
the Seine), took to the floor with a radically different approach, condemning the large 
land-holders of the Languedoc who had planted vines uncontrollably. Dubois blamed 
the crisis on the land-owners, separating the viticultural labourers as innocent victims 
of speculative greed.94 Jaurès, beset by the demands of his own party, declined to 
support Aldy’s statement without reservations. Despite having constantly supported 
the suppression of viticultural fraud (by sugaring) and the control of distillation (to 
ensure that unsalable wines could still be profitably disposed of), Jaurès criticised the 
winegrowers’ lack of coherent demands and constant recourse to the government for 
solutions.95 Although he was supportive of the movement, he refused to compromise 
the ideals of the SFIO in favour of the Midi. Instead, alongside his erstwhile Socialist 
rival Jules Guesde, Jaurès proposed the nationalisation of the wine industry as a 
solution to the crisis. This proposal failed to be taken seriously and debate reached an 
impasse, with Southern Socialists out of step with the SFIO.96 
The failure of the Assembly to arrive at a response did not obstruct the 
emergence of an increasingly punitive approach to events in the Midi. As Mayors and 
local councils resigned, the South lost many of its direct links to Paris and the tax strike 
which began on 13 June seemed to verge on secession.97 Whilst recognising the perilous 
economic state of the winegrowers, Clemenceau refused to sanction the non-payment 
of taxes, viewing it as an affront to public order and the cohesion of the state: “Je dis 
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que cela ne donne pas le droit aux paysans du Midi qui souffrent de déclarer qu’ils ne 
payeront pas l’impôt.”98 A particular worry for the government was that tax strikes 
would spread to neighbouring departments, a fear seemingly confirmed by similar 
threats made in Burgundy in August of 1907 by the Mayor of Paris-l’Hôpital.99 On 18 
June, Clemenceau ordered the arrest of Ferroul, the man apparently responsible for the 
intensification of the Revolt. The response was an immediate escalation of violence, 
with crowds setting wildfires and demanding the Mayor’s release. The military 
occupation on 19 June which followed the torching of Narbonne’s Theatre merely fed 
the tension in the troubled centres of the Midi’s colère.  
The day of the military’s arrival, rioters erected barricades and skirmishes 
during the night left many injured and the first of six protestors dead, Louis Ramon. As 
news of this filtered through the town, there were angry confrontations with troops. 
One besieged unit panicked, firing indiscriminately into the crowd and killing four 
more protesters, including a 20 year old girl.100 Fires burned the next night, as funeral 
pyres were erected on the streets of Narbonne and violence spread to Montpellier 
where rioters lamented the killing of innocents and the imprisonment of Ferroul. In 
Perpignan, an unfeeling local Prefect’s pronouncements on the Revolt had incensed the 
crowd. As the Prefect barricaded himself in the Prefecture, 2,000 rioters stormed the 
building, starting fires and ransacking property. After several cavalry charges from the 
military, the Prefecture was retaken and many protestors arrested.  
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Yet, many of those arrested confounded expectations, with important 
consequences. The presence of avowed royalists and one young anarchist changed the 
way the riots were perceived. Audois Radical Albert Sarraut, who had resigned his 
cabinet post when Clemenceau had used force in Narbonne, continued to warn that 
conservatives and revolutionaries were attempting to use the Revolt to topple the 
parliamentary regime.101 Shoot-outs in the streets of Montpellier over the following 
nights further increased the sense of violent confrontation. This proved too much for 
the soldiers of the 17th Regiment, drawn from young men of the region on military 
service. On 21 June, 500 men mutinied, seizing weapons and joining the ranks of 
protestors to blockade Béziers. Their mutiny was lauded in song and in protest, as 
barricades rang out with the newly composed ‘Gloire aux 17eme’. Protesters were 
buoyed by the gesture, which, in turn, convinced the government to give no quarter.  
The vote which endorsed the government’s ability to deal with the Revolt was 
passed with a large number of dissenters (327 to 223 against). The minority of 223 
brought together a curious alliance of left and right. The 65 Deputies of the SFIO 
(including Jaurès, Aldy and Guesde) combined with the dissenting Midi radicals 
aligned against Clemenceau (Lafferre, Pujade, Sarraut) in opposition. On the right, 
there were: monarchists like the Marquis of Rosanbo, the Barons of Reille and Fernand 
de Ramel; conservative republicans like Emmanuel Brousse and Pierre Leroy Beaulieu; 
and the anti-Dreyfusard right like Lasies.102 Count Henri du Périer de Larsan, a 
conservative Deputy from the Gironde, claimed it was unacceptable that fraudsters 
could escape punishment, whilst the Marquis de Rosanbo highlighted the 
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responsibility of the Republic itself in creating the crisis.103 The presence of the right in 
the protests and the strange alliance of left and right in the Assembly was enough to 
convince the Radicals that this was a potent threat to the Republic as they rallied to 
support an end to the Revolt.  
Following erroneous reports of his arrest carried by Reuters on 20 June, Albert 
secretly travelled to Paris, hoping that the Audois Deputy Aldy would rally to his aid 
and help campaign in the Assembly. Yet Aldy, a supporter of Ferroul, remained 
unconvinced of Albert’s suitability as leader. When the two finally met, Aldy coldly 
advised him to go back to Montpellier. Sensing a betrayal, Albert sought out the 
Premier himself. Their interview was stormy, with each accusing the other of fuelling 
the discord in the Midi. Clemenceau accused Albert of having contributed to “faire le 
lit du duc d’Orléans” in weakening the Republic, whilst Albert protested that his 
Republican credentials were not in question. Eventually, they agreed that they would 
do their part to quieten protests if fraud was more rigorously prosecuted, parting on a 
note of mutual sympathy. 
This reconciliation was an unexpected conclusion for those in the South who 
had heralded Albert as a 'redeemer'. Suspicions were raised when newspaper reports 
spoke of the winegrower’s ‘Apostle’ in tears before he surreptitiously set off back 
South. Accounts of the interview further related that Clemenceau had given Albert a 
100Fr note. The money was a subsidy to allow the penniless Albert the means with 
which to travel home yet, to the protestors of the Midi, this pocket money loomed like 
30 pieces of silver after Albert’s furtive capitulation in Paris. Clemenceau had 
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impeached the unassailable morality of the ‘great Redeemer’ whilst securing the 
quiescence of the movement. With Albert central to 1907's effectiveness, his 
discrediting was a fatal blow to the movement's cohesiveness. By 25 June, order had 
been re-imposed in the Midi and the mutineers of the 17eme removed by further 
infantry regiments. The grande révolte and the violence which had emerged from the 
mass protests had ended in compromise and disappointment. On his release from 
prison, where he had been placed for over a month for his own safety, Albert narrowly 
avoided being lynched. Chastened by his involvement in politics, he died forsaken by 
the movement he had created. His remaining days were spent in obscurity, his legacy 
as a mythic figure at odds with his pariah’s fate. Echoing this sense of desperation, 
Warner describes the 1907 revolt as “a picturesque and pathetic episode in French 
history.”104 
Albert’s legacy, however, had been in successfully distilling the message of the 
Défense movement and mobilising an inter-classiste movement to historic effect. The 
Radical Albert Sarraut continued to campaign on the fact that Marcelin Albert had 
been an honest and simple man whose interview with Clemenceau had been 
revelatory, whilst the villain of the piece was the relentlessly ambitious Ferroul who 
had abandoned the ‘winegrower’s apostle’ as soon as was expedient.105 The conflict 
between Ferroul and Albert had been symbolic of the Socialist party’s desire yet 
inability to take ownership of the Revolt. If Albert represented the limits of the Revolt’s 
potential, then Ferroul was more indicative of the movement’s incompatibility with 
national politics. The Revolt had highlighted a uniquely Méridional situation in the 
                                                          
104 Warner, The Winegrowers of France and the Government, p.23. 
105 Loubère, Radicalism in Mediterranean France, p.214. 
58 
 
representation of winegrowers, born of a very specific process of development which 
confounded traditional class definitions. Furthermore, the role of Southern Socialists 
would have to adapt and diverge from the national model of the SFIO to highlight the 
region without falling into the trap of regionalists. The regionalist potential of the 
movement had been too strong for Jaurès to stand behind, and the haziness 
surrounding the class relationships of Albert's movement could have left the SFIO 
open to criticisms of pandering to the proprietors. 
 
Socialism & Regionalism 
The government’s firm reaction to the revolt of 1907 is seen by some as a sign of 
fear at its regionalist implication.106 For this reason, it is important to document the 
contemporary reaction to the revolt’s regionalist significance. The threat of contagion 
from the protests in the Midi was worrying for those in Paris if it challenged the unity 
of the Republic. The Radical L’Aurore cautioned that “si l’exemple du Midi devenait 
contagieux, nous n’aurions bientôt plus de représentants de la France, de représentants 
de la République, de représentants du peuple. Devant une telle situation, je me 
permettrais de dire: un peu de jacobinisme, s’il vous plait!”107 Clemenceau’s record of 
energetically putting down strikes108 belied the left wing heritage of the Radicals, yet in 
his commitment to Jacobinism he highlighted the flexibility of the Radicals at the centre 
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of the Third Republic.109 Furthermore, Le Radical warned of a grim future should this 
“cri de guerre insensé s’adressait à la nation” not be properly answered, foreseeing that 
“la statue de la Liberté soit voilée une fois de plus”.110 These outpourings exaggerated 
the destructive and disruptive potential of the disturbances in the Midi as a means to 
attack the Socialists, whose relationship with the Radicals following the withdrawal 
from the Bloc des Gauches had remained difficult. 
The Socialists were not ignorant of the movement’s regionalist potential, nor of 
the incompatibility of this with their ideological base. The sensationalised royalist or 
separatist strands which had emerged in the Revolt were an uncomfortable issue. 
Compounding these fears, Marcelin Albert had written in the Echo de Paris that the 
rioting Midi was “le germe d’un petit État dans le grand État de France!”111 Albert’s 
leadership made unconditional support difficult, and his incompatibility with the 
Socialist party ensured a distance remained between the central Comité d’Argeliers 
and the SFIO. Jaurès was forced to distance his party from such pronouncements, 
instead choosing to minimise grandiose rhetoric and focus on the economic plight of 
vignerons. He criticised “la folie mystique” of Albert’s movement, cognisant that as the 
head of a national party he could not endorse federalism based solely on the demands 
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of the South. France, he reminded the révoltés, “n’est pas toute dans les départements 
de l’Aude, de l’Hérault et des Pyrénées-Orientales.”112 
 
Protest poster glorifying Albert in Occitan yet draped in the flag of the Republic113 
In reality, as long as the 1907 Revolt remained essentially apolitical, the anti-
Jacobin appearance remained a projection. Albert’s scatter-gun pronouncements were 
intended to provoke a reaction from the establishment. Whilst federalism or secession 
could be inferred from his rhetoric, the Comité d’Argeliers itself had consistently 
championed “ni réaction, ni révolution”.114 To the extent that the Socialists supported 
the Revolt, it was as solidarity with an impoverished minority in a sector which 
required regulatory reform. This reading was echoed by Justin Augé, who agreed that 
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the exploited of the Midi “fatigués d’user de la voie légale, a cherché un moyen pour 
appeler sur lui d’une façon plus efficace l’attention de ceux qui l’avaient trop 
longtemps dédaigné.” They perceived no immediate threat to the nation as they had 
been unable to marshal the movement themselves, owing to their mishandling of 
‘inter-classisme’. With the labour strikes of the 1900s firmly in mind, the Socialist 
Mayor of Toulouse, Albert Bedouce, supported the rioters in the Assembly: “La vérité 
est que la mouvement n’est ni séparatiste, ni politique, mais que c’est un mouvement 
économique.” This summation of the riots is supportive yet also denies the revolt’s 
broader significance, perfectly encapsulating the SFIO response. Yet, when Bedouce 
clumsily used the phrase “départements fédérés” to describe the centres of the Revolt, 
transcripts record loud exclamations from all benches and a subsequent intervention 
from the President of the Chamber to remind Bedouce of the indivisibility of the 
Republic.115 Such a reaction was further indicative of the sensitivity felt towards the 
divisive potential of regionalism. 
The strongest link between the SFIO and the regionalist movement was Ernest 
Ferroul, whose attachment to the Midi was deep-rooted. Ferroul is purported, whilst 
still a University student, to have travelled to the tomb of the original hammer of the 
Cathars, Simon de Montfort, just to spit on his grave.116 Such antics were reflected in 
the references Ferroul made to the Albigensian campaign and to the Cathars as a 
means of mobilising support. He used the imagery as a means of pitching the region 
against the north:   
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Un souvenir me hante, souvenir de misère pareille à la vôtre! 
Lorsque les barons féodaux envahissaient le Midi et le saccageaient, 
un troubadour pleurait ainsi: Ah! Toulouse et Provence, et la terre 
d'Argence, Béziers et Carcassonne, qui vous a vu et qui vous 
voit! Depuis, les barons de l'industrie du Nord nous ont envahis et 
ruinés. Nous ne voulons pas les supporter davantage. En avant ! 
Debout pour les repousser, eux et leurs complices. Parlez plus fort, 
unissez vos voix, votre prière prendra le ton d'un commandement. 
 
Likewise, Marcelin Albert made direct reference to the crusades during one rally 
outside the resonant Cité médiévale in Carcassonne:  
Les albigeois étaient autrefois réunis sous ces murs, ils y tombèrent 
pour la défense de leur liberté. Nous ferons comme eux! En avant 
pour la défense de nos droits! Le Midi le veut, le Midi l'aura!117 
 
These references to the regional past were intended to mobilise resentment of the 
North and solidarity in the communal poverty of the region. By invoking such 
historical references, they drew themselves closer to articulating a common regional 
identity and sought to keep the Revolt grounded in an identity beyond class 
boundaries. This in turn drew upon the vocabulary of the prominent cultural 
guardians of the Midi, the scholarly Félibrige movement.  
 Despite the limited extent of links between the winegrowers and the Félibrige, 
there remains strong evidence for their connection. Ferroul is reported as having 
visited Frédéric Mistral, the famed champion of the Occitan language, at his home 
along with the capoulié (Chief officer) of the Félibrige, Pierre Dévoluy and a bevy of 
winegrowers. Despite Dévoluy supposedly begging Mistral on his knees, the old poet 
was to disappoint his deputy. Likewise, Marcelin Albert had telegrammed Mistral, 
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begging him (in Occitan) to join the ranks of protestors and endorse this movement in 
the spirit of the pays. 
Nous venons de la terre, et nous allons à la terre, et c’est de la terre 
que nous, nous voulons vivre. C’est pour cela que vous qui avez 
chanté, avec une si grande voix, la terre-mère du Midi, vous ferez 
plaisir à tout notre peuple si vous venez, aux côtés de tous ceux 
d’Argeliers, à Montpellier le 9 juin.118 
 
 
Mistral, however, declined to openly endorse the movement, choosing not to align 
himself with Albert and Ferroul’s assemblies of impoverished winegrowers.119 Instead 
he attended a fête in Avignon, citing prior commitments as a reason to opt out of one 
of the largest social movements since the Revolution. He did have kind words for 
Albert, however, whom he saw as the most effective leader of the movement: 
Ce qui est beau et étonnant dans ces manifestations, c’est qu’elles 
sont anonymes, spontanées, en dehors de tout autre prétexte que la 
misère du pays. Ce qui leur donne un caractère clairement, 
purement, hautement populaire, c’est que nous n’y voyons figurer 
ni personnage marquant de la politique, ni journaliste en renom, ni 
lettré, ni savant, ni artiste célèbre, ni personne en un mot dont le 
renom pourrait introduire une signification particulière ou 
différente; il n’y a qu’un nom, jusqu’a maintenant, qui surgit de la 




Philippe Martel suggests that Mistral’s squeamishness came from the competing 
visions of the Midi: the grand Occitanie of later nationalists which spanned 33 
départements and the more realistic base of the Languedoc viticole. In visiting Avignon, 
Mistral was opting for the grand Midi of nationalist imaginations and in choosing a 
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fête over a protest, he was choosing linguistic politics over the real cultural identity of 
the Midi rouge. In La Dépêche, Jaurès had railed against “la ferveur mystique des 
croisades” in the references to the region’s Cathar past.121. Mistral refused to engage 
with the protests through fear that the Félibrige would be adding fuel to the flames of 
Revolt, hoping not to undo the cultural work of his organisation with hasty political 
allegiances. The elderly poet’s rejection of political involvement was a retreat into the 
imagined construct of Occitanie and a step away from its reality. 
Yet Mistral was not the only prominent regionalist figure who could be 
approached to support the winegrowers. The head of the Fédération Régionaliste 
Française (FRF), Jean Charles-Brun, reflected on the events of 1907 as “un grand 
mouvement régionaliste, les viticulteurs se sont tournés vers l’Etat”.122 Yet, as Julian 
Wright has shown, Charles-Brun’s politics remained remarkably free of party 
association. With his socially-conservative Catholicism (in an anti-clerical political 
atmosphere) and Republican Federalism (in the face of Radical Jacobinism), Charles-
Brun’s moderate beliefs are difficult to ascribe to the traditional left-right revolutionary 
duality of French politics and his ‘organicist’ vision placed the development of 
pacifistic syndicalism at the centre of any meaningful regionalist project. Indeed, 
although Languedocian Socialism was not carried on the back of the growing 
syndicalisation of the wine trade, Charles-Brun acknowledged that it was “increasingly 
difficult to avoid the links between regionalism and moderate syndicalism or non-
Marxist socialism.”123 
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There was support for the Revolt as a regionalist symbol, with organisations 
declaring solidarity in Paris, Brittany and elsewhere. Jean Charles-Brun himself had 
started a group in Paris during the demonstrations in support of the Midi 
winegrowers. His Comité Parisien de Défense de la viticulture française expressed 
solidarity and distributed the posters of the Comité d'Argeliers around Paris.124 Indeed, 
Action Régionaliste, the newspaper of the FRF, declared that “la crise viticole a des 
causes nombreuses et complexes, mais là, comme ailleurs, c’est le régime centralisateur 
qui est le grand coupable.”125 The regional recognition and the tangible concessions on 
wine-growing which were gained from the riots had demonstrated the power of the 
periphery. In Brittany, Le Réveil Breton mused “Cette méthode vient de réussir dans le 
Midi, pourquoi ne réussirait-elle pas en Bretagne, si on en faisant un essai sérieux?”126 
Breton commentators described Clemenceau as a “nouveau Simon de Montfort, à la 
tête des Nordistes contre les modernes Albigeois!” This historical allusion showed 
precisely how the events of the South could be used by regionalist spokesmen in other 
areas. The Breton commentator Leon Le Berri described the revolt as representative of 
a “dégoût général pour la politique”, aligning the disgruntlement of the Midi 
vignerons with a wider dissatisfaction with centralised politics across the regions of 
France.127 Such sentiment was anathema to Republican centralists in the Assembly, and 
can indeed help to explain the severity with which Clemenceau’s government met the 
demonstrators.  
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Compounding the fears of the Radicals were supporters on the royalist and 
nationalist right who claimed that the Languedocian rising was the inevitable 
consequence of a centralised state. The royalist newspaper Gazette de France, gleefully 
reported that “les gueux du Midi deviennent les auxiliaires actifs de la Restauration 
royaliste!”128 Another royalist newspaper, Le Roussillon, had prematurely celebrated the 
torching of the Prefecture in Perpignan:  
Depuis Dimanche, la République est donc virtuellement abolie, 
déposée, dans cinq départements du joyeux Midi; le billard désaffecté 
d’Argeliers vengé par la force des choses et des événements, les 
couvents et les écoles volés, les églises profanées; le gouvernement 
absolu des Gueux fait l’intérim de la monarchie réparatrice et 
glorieuse!129  
 
Clearly, the Roussillon had got ahead of itself and Albert had no intention of restoring 
the monarchy, yet in their glee they made clear the hopes they held for the Revolt. Yet 
there were even more extreme commentators, and Édouard Drumont saw fit to link the 
movement to the Dreyfus Affair, calling on the protesters to continue combating the 
state: 
Languedociens et Provençaux, ouvrez les yeux: vous subissez la 
croisade de Dreyfus. Le Juif, le Maçon et la Fraude ne font qu’un. En 
vous élevant contre la troisième, vous avez déchaîné les deux 
premiers. Car, si vous supprimiez la Fraude, vous supprimeriez le 
Maçon et le Juif... et ce serait la fin de la République.130   
 
The ‘inter-classisme’ and apolitical program of the 1907 Revolt allowed extreme voices 
to discern in it a means for challenging the Republic. Through the Revolt, we are given 
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an insight into the political turbulence which faced the Third Republic, yet also the 
opportunism of the opponents of republicanism itself.131 This helps to explain the 
temporary and unlikely alliances formed in opposition to the government’s approach 
to the Revolt, when the royalist and nationalist right had voted alongside the SFIO. Yet 
it also helps to explain the reluctance of the SFIO to endorse the Revolt wholeheartedly 
in the Assembly. Ultimately, the Socialists could not unconditionally or universally 
support the Revolt because of its regionalist significance and its focus on ‘inter-
classisme’. Both these unifying aspects also encouraged the support of partners the 
SFIO did not desire. Although Ferroul and Albert did not court the endorsement of 
Royalists or anti-Semites, their association characterised the anti-Jacobin opposition 
still smarting from the government’s anti-clerical laws. Historical appeals to the 
region’s past helped to mobilise protestors, yet these nods to regionalism also carried 
within them a fundamental ambiguity which ensured the movement could not be 
dominated by any one political party.  
 
Socialism & Syndicalism 
Syndicalists in the Languedoc had long reserved a strongly independent 
tendency, with even their most dependable political supporters like Ferroul still 
maintaining the Guesdist belief that strikes were of secondary importance to political 
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control.132 Even after the unification of the SFIO, FTAM remained strongly opposed to 
associating the CGT with the newly formed Socialist party and helped to defeat the 
proposal at the 1906 Conference in Amiens. 133 1907, then, represented an odd moment 
for syndicalism due to its ‘inter-classisme’.134 FTAM’s focus on class struggle rather 
than class collaboration saw its leadership call for members not to participate in the 
Revolt. Most of FTAM’s members, however, ignored these orders and participated in 
the demonstrations regardless. The sheer scale of the revolt, coupled with Albert and 
Ferroul’s references to the Albigensian crusade, created a moment in the Languedoc 
where class division could feasibly be ignored. 
One of the most tangible legacies of the 1907 revolts was the formation of the 
Confédération Générale des Vignerons du Midi (CGVM), a pressure group designed to 
persecute fraud and push for winegrowers’ interests politically. Antonin Palazy, of the 
ill-fated 1905 movement, presided over the creation of the CGVM with his former foe 
Ferroul tasked with leading the organisation. The CGVM drew support from Jean 
Jaurès as an organisation designed to bring order to the otherwise chaotic marketplace. 
Indeed, the SFIO supported the CGVM in its electoral campaigns in the Languedoc 
whilst it remained an electoral asset at this time. Jaurès foreshadowed the rhetoric of 
post-war movements by praising the solidarity displayed in 1907 as demonstrative of a 
fundamental need to live in the region coming before any need to operate as a class. 
This focus on one’s right to live and work the land would form the basis of the later 
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appeal of the Occitan movement  and also mark one of the fundamental underpinnings 
of their allegiance to the winegrowers’ organisations. However, after the temporary 
alliance between classes (the union between land-owners and labourers during 1907), 
the formation of the CGVM marked a return to the class divisions of old. 
The weakness of the CGVM, despite its inclusive rhetoric, was that it contained 
little specifically targeted at the landless labour-force. In reality, large landowners had 
the loudest voice in the organisation and this discouraged syndical organisations from 
whole-hearted participation as it moved away from direct action and any emphasis on 
class struggle. Voting share was allocated on the number of hectares held and 
hectolitres produced – a bulwark against the organisation being taken over by the 
worker’s associations like FTAM.135 FTAM criticised the CGVM as being “yellow 
unionists” as it favoured large proprietors in its voting systems (sometimes weighting 
large landowners 11 times more than landless labourers).136 This struggle represented 
the symptoms of a crisis of representation, which would continue to plague the 
Languedoc well into the post-war period.  
FTAM’s representation of landless labourers was not exclusive, and small-
holding transient labourers were often members of both FTAM and the CGVM despite 
their supposed incompatibility. The CGVM could represent them effectively as 
landholders (however small) whilst the unions could represent them as workers (by 
coordinating strikes based on wage demands, for example). In 1908, however, this 
changed as FTAM moved to exclude members of the CGVM. This was a fundamental 
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misjudgement of the Languedoc’s socio-economic makeup, and the precipitous 
departure of small-holding labourers from FTAM’s ranks left it moribund. This 
miscalculation confined the labour unions to a minority role in the Languedoc. The 
incompatibility of FTAM and the CGVM led to a tussle between the two which saw 
membership fluctuate radically in the years after 1907; the overall story, however, was 
one of the declining relevance of labour syndicalism.  
Indeed, enthusiasm for the CGVM was short lived, and Ferroul’s role in 1907 
was all but forgotten when he was attacked by both the SFIO and members of the 
FTAM for failing to represent labourers and colluding with the interests of large 
capital. At the SFIO Conference in St-Etienne in 1909, the CGVM was criticised for 
forcing workers to ‘collaborate’ with proprietors and delegations from the Hérault and 
Seine both lobbied to encourage workers to shun the CGVM.137 Even Jaurès, whose 
support had made the formation of the CGVM possible, began to distance himself from 
the organisation.138 As criticism of the CGVM built up, SFIO Deputies began to 
disassociate themselves from the organisation in the 1914 elections, seeking to avoid 
being tainted by accusations of class betrayal.139 1907 had demonstrated the potential of 
solidarity amongst the natural allies of the winegrowers of the Midi,140 yet its fallout 
had also demonstrated the natural splits within the Midi which would fuel a crisis of 
representation throughout the twentieth century.  
Whilst labour syndicalism had declined in importance, cooperatives began to 
be formed more readily. Their greater compatibility with the ‘smallholder and 
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139 Frader, ‘Syndicalists, socialists and the peasant question in the Aude’, pp.462-464. 
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labourer’ model of the Languedoc viticole helped them assimilate into the CGVM. It was 
not overly-politicised or revolutionary syndicats which would proliferate in the 
Languedoc, rather it was organisations which offered tangible help to struggling 
winegrowers in a practical sense. This wave of collectivisation thus occurred amidst 
continuing economic challenges and in recognition of the potential for cooperatives to 
mitigate the worst impacts of downturns.141 The Fédération des Caves Coopératives 
(FDCC) was founded in 1924, and all the Departments of the Midi were invited to 
federalise their producers to defend the economic interest of winegrowers and 
cooperate in winemaking, storage and sales. The Gard created their own departmental 
equivalent in 1926 (FDCCG), the Aude in 1929 (FDCCA) and the Hérault in 1932 
(FDCCH).142 
These cooperatives offered more than merely the solidarity that had been found 
before the war.143 A resident wine-making expert could supervise vinification, whilst 
the provision of must-metres, acid-metres and hermetically sealed storage meant fewer 
defects in the wine and a more reliable product. The dates by which the departmental 
federations were formed tracked the cyclical downturns of the market, with 33% like 
for like price drops in the Midi during 1925 immediately preceding the formation of 
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the Gard’s departmental organisation. As well as providing shelter from market 
fluctuations, cooperatives also allowed a collectivisation of representation, providing a 
mouthpiece for small-growers in a similar situation within a small geographic area. 
Villages united under the banner of a cooperative suddenly had the ability to speak 
collectively outside traditional political channels. The Popular Front would 
subsequently support the establishment of wine cooperatives in the Languedoc as a 
means of effectively transmitting their ideological goals to the countryside.144 This 
support took the form of subsidies, low-interest loans and specialist teams of rural 
engineers who would help to construct cooperative wineries.145 The FDCC provided a 
more specialist, less ideologically rigid and more amenable form of syndicalism with 
which the Socialists could engage. The schisms that FTAM created ultimately 
diminished its importance and the subsequent increase in cooperatives ensured that 
these would become the dominant structure of syndical representation. 
 
'L'Union Sacrée': Ferroul, Barthe and the birth of 'Députés du vin' 
 The Legacy of 1907 rested not only in its potential as a foundation myth of the 
Défense movement, but also in its effects on the relationship between winegrowers and 
the state. The SFIO’s inability to dominate the Revolt locally had diminished their 
ability to support it nationally. Speaking at the SFIO conference in 1909 in St-Etienne, a 
delegate from the Hérault lamented the party’s inability to have an impact on the 
Revolt:  
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A ce moment les camarades socialistes n’étaient pas préparés [...], 
quand ils se sont aperçus qu’on les entraînait trop loin, il était trop 
tard, parce qu’il n’était plus possible de se faire entendre dans ces 
régions [...]. Il fallait voir comme on se précipitait contre eux et, dans 
les rues, sur les places des Narbonne ou de Montpellier, comme on 
écoutait peu leurs discours faits d’un point de vue socialiste.146 
 
In Ferroul’s fierce devotion to viticulture, Southern Socialists were presented with a 
new function which would bind them to the political landscape of the Midi. The 
'Député du vin' model thrived in the Third Republic (and would continue to do so in 
the Fourth147), where, as Julian Jackson observed, the “local responsibilities of a Third 
Republic politician could weigh as heavily as his national ones.”148 The role of 'Député 
du vin' was not a necessary qualification for election in the Midi. Nonetheless, it 
strengthened the electoral power of Deputies well into the 1980s at least. The role was 
"un des trophées politiques les plus convoités localement." It relied on the politician 
embodying the values and interests of the viticultural society they were representing 
whilst being bound into a normative system of viticultural action (such as endorsing 
protests). Likewise, in moments of crisis, the 'Député du vin' was expected "d'utiliser 
les registres que requiert le contexte de crise, moment essentiel d'expression de ce 
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rôle."149 Socialist Deputies who fulfilled this role referred back to the Socialist 
programme of 1906, stripped of the ouvriériste tone which had left it struggling for 
relevancy. Rather, Deputies retained a central core of issues which sprang from 1907: 
resistance to fraud, belief in the potential for a living wage from wine and the 
conviction that the Midi had an important role to play in wine's future.  
The intransigence of the Languedoc’s syndicalists had prevented the 1905 
movement from properly establishing itself. Likewise, in the wake of 1907, the 
incompatibility of Socialist party policies and the enduring convictions of 
Languedocian syndicalists had ensured that there was no abiding “union sacrée”. Yet, 
as discussed, the syndicalist movement radically weakened itself at the expense of an 
organisation to which the Socialist party was not firmly committed (the CGVM).The 
use of force against demonstrators in 1907 (and subsequently in 1908 and 1910) ended 
the electoral alliance between the Radicals and the Socialists in the Languedoc. This 
allowed them to challenge the government in regional campaigns, translating the 
motivation of the 1907 Revolt into a new electoral strategy. The SFIO continued to 
increase its popularity in the Midi, more than doubling the votes received in 1906 in 
the subsequent legislative elections of 1910 and 1914.150 
These subsequent elections set the tone for the Socialists' role in the Midi, even 
as it developed and moved beyond direct links to 1907. Jean Sagnes suggests that if 
there was ‘ferroulisme’ in the Aude, then after the Great War there was equally 
‘barthisme’ in the Hérault. Edouard Barthe was one of the most active Deputies in the 
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Midi, with frequent visits to the smallest villages of the region and a strong presence in 
the Commission des boissons.151 Throughout the 1930s Barthe spoke out for the region 
from his platform in the SFIO, railing against “la fortune scandaleuse des barons 
algériens.”152 The rapidly increasing output of Algerian wine was starting to make an 
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Graph of the rapid increase of Algerian wine production (in HL)153 
Barthe echoed the issues raised by Ferroul in his criticism of low quality Algerian 
imports and was the principal author of the majority of viticultural measures between 
1930 and 1935.154 The Loi Tardieu – named after the presiding Minister of Agriculture, 
but referred to as the Loi Barthe in the Midi due to his central role in its inception – 
systematically altered many accepted practices. Heavy yields were taxed to discourage 
over-production and programmes of uprooting and distillation provided the means to 
stabilize the market. The Law was not without controversy, however. It drew an 
increasingly stark divide between small and large growers and cracks appeared in the 
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CGVM over progressive taxation and the limits on irrigation. The CGVM splintered, an 
event which foreshadowed the later pluralist direction of the Defense du vin 
movement and increased competition between different representative groups.  
Barthe organised a meeting of 2,000 winegrowers in Pézenas on 27 March 1932 
to found the Ligue des Petits et Moyens Viticulteurs, an organisation bound to the 
SFIO. As we shall see, this organisation was to play an important role in the 
development of the later Défense movement. Its quickly swelling membership grew 
from 28,000 in 1932 to 55,000 in 1933. Barthe’s credibility within the SFIO took a 
damaging blow, however, as he was criticised for being too focussed on the Midi. In 
response, he withdrew from the party, joining the newly formed Parti Socialiste de 
France - Union Jean Jaurès (often referred to as the ‘Neo-Socialists’).155 Barthe’s support 
for the Ligue was not undermined by his involvement with the Neo-Socialists, whose 
focus on gradual social reorganisation along syndical lines had been outlined in Marcel 
Déat’s Perspectives socialistes. By attempting to unite small-holders into a more efficient 
power-structure rather than campaign for redistribution, Barthe’s doctrinal shift 
towards the right-wing of socialism was unchallenged.156 It was also compatible with 
the Languedoc’s sympathy for the ideological heritage of Radicalism (if not the party 
itself after 1907). 
Yet his focus on the union of classes rankled with the PCF, who launched a 
competing movement designed to outflank the rhetoric of his Ligue. Directly playing 
upon their competitors, the PCF established the Fédération Méridionale des Petits 
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Vignerons as a means of combatting Barthe’s youthful movement.157 The Communists 
had not previously been visible in Languedocian viticultural representation, though 
became increasingly so after the party began to stabilise after the long series of purges 
and ideological changes since their inception in 1920. In the era of the Popular Front, 
though concessions from the PCF had made the front possible, their continued 
attempts to outflank the Socialists in the Languedoc viticole created turbulence in the 
South.158 As they reconciled themselves with supporting small and medium proprietors 
as well as agricultural labourers, the Communists followed the same pattern of 
development as the Socialists had done in the immediate aftermath of 1907.159 This new 
openness allowed a fundamental starting point for their involvement in the 
representation of the Languedoc viticole.160  
This turbulence marked a new political dynamism in the Languedoc, which 
would see Socialists and Communists competing to channel the representation of 
winegrowers through a variety of jostling organisations in the post-war period. These 
organisations attempted to draw together syndical groups as a means of constructing a 
unified Défense movement, substituting worker’s organisations for cooperatives and 
capitalising on the visibility of Députés du vin in the model of Edouard Barthe. 1907 
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established new patterns of interaction between winegrowers and the state but also 
between winegrowers and the Socialist party. The Revolt changed the way in which 
the Socialist party related to winegrowers, eschewing the previously unhelpful 
ouvriériste tone which had marked the national SFIO’s attempts to dominate Albert and 
Ferroul’s movement. In their interaction with winegrowers and engagement with 
regionalism and syndicalism, Southern Socialists set the tone for future developments 
in the Défense movement. By under-estimating the ‘inter-classisme’ of the Revolt they 
had minimised their influence on it. Yet, by altering the ways in which they interacted 
with the constituent bases of that ‘inter-classisme’ they repositioned themselves as the 
natural ally of the Languedoc viticole. 
If 1907’s immediate legacy was complicated, this did not prevent the events of 
that year assuming an increasingly mythic status. Indeed, Guy Bechtel has asserted 
that the memory of the events gave birth to “une série de mythes, qui ont donné au 
mouvement une coloration presque religieuse.”161 As the ‘Myth of 1907’ shaped 
responses to decline, so too did it shape visions of the future. In the next chapter I will 
chart the post-war processes which created the independent CRAV, and the crises of 
representation which pitted representative bodies against each other. 
                                                          




Chapter 2:  
Les paysans et les paroxysmes: The development of 
the Défense du vin movement (1944-1960) 
  
The decades which followed France's Liberation witnessed rapid developments in both 
the Languedoc’s wine industry and its structures of representation. As the post-war 
recovery process took place, a wave of modernisation swept across French agriculture, 
driven by a technocratic focus on increasing the efficiency of France's farmers. In the 
Languedoc, the establishment of cooperative wineries and the pooling of resources 
were encouraged during this febrile period. The Monnet Plan, which governed 
France's recovery, called for a general principle of rationalisation. In the wine industry, 
this meant the consolidation of 3,500,000 HA of fragmented vineyards by the end of 
1950.162 This rationalisation, however, drew resistance from the traditional small-
holders of the Languedoc. In one of the most impoverished regions in the post-war 
period, Languedocians found the burden of this modernisation excessively onerous. As 
a result, alongside the reconstruction of the national economy came a reconstruction of 
the various Languedocian comités and representative organisations which had sprung 
from the legacy of 1907. 
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 Yet, the legacy of 1907 was not unchallenged, and as the Midi modernised, its 
representative structures witnessed profound turbulence with the resurfacing of 
Edouard Barthe’s Ligue des Petitis et Moyens Producteurs and other new representative 
groups. After the rupture of Vichy rule, the Languedoc seemed to return to a certain 
‘inter-classisme’ rooted in the need to rebuild the fragile economy. The increasing 
number of cooperatives seemed destined to draw the Languedoc’s traditional Radical 
and Socialist villages further towards the SFIO, a relationship which was only 
strengthened by the continuing influence of prominent Wine Deputies. Yet, as wine 
production began to reach pre-war levels, competing groups with allegiances to both 
Socialists and Communists tussled for prominence, attempting to outflank each other 
with recourse to increasingly strident rhetoric and direct action. Some of the debates 
which had been aired in 1907 resurfaced, as the Communist party attempted to court 
small-holders and divide the 'inter-classisme' of the Défense du vin movement. These 
continuities shaped the rhetoric which responded to the inevitable fluctuations in the 
wine market during this period. The first post-war wine crisis of 1953 altered the 
landscape of viticultural legislation, accentuating divides and creating a crisis of 
representation as the unified Défense movement splintered once more. Turbulence was 
both a cause and accelerant of mobilisation and radicalisation, feeding into a process 







 Although the Barthiste reforms of the late 1930s were some of the most 
enduringly popular and well remembered in the Midi, they clearly prefigured a period 
of extreme turbulence. France’s defeat at the hands of Germany brought about direct 
administration in the North and the creation of a sympathetic government in the South 
centred on the town of Vichy under Marshal Pétain. In the midst of global conflict, 
wine reforms were hardly the priority of the incumbent Vichy government. 
Resultantly, Vichy wine legislation had an extremely short-term focus which relied 
little on placating winegrowers and more on ensuring the free circulation of wine. An 
order of January 1941 fixed a ceiling price of 19Fr85 for wine, in order to ensure the 
normalisation of supply and prevent price hikes during moments of uncertain 
production. Winegrowers predictably protested that the move was unjust. Vichy 
authorities were unsympathetic, however, and set about further addressing supply 
issues by legalising the previously banned release of second press wines (known as 
“piquettes"). This focus on quantity set the tone for an administrative setup which was 
extremely regressive in policy terms. The 1931 Statut de la Viticulture was repealed, 
replaced instead with a system of authoritarian price-fixing and compulsory 
distillations which tipped the scales in favour of the consumer and firmly against 
producers. The imposition of rationing further angered growers and encouraged a 
thriving black market.163 The size of this unregulated market and the lack of real 
legislative engagement with winegrowers during the war had left the Midi somewhat 
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dislocated from any particular strategy and led to a pressing need for better 
governance.164 
 The Languedoc viticole had past experience of reconstruction after cataclysmic 
agricultural depressions. Whereas the recovery from Phylloxera had enshrined the 
'productivist' mindset at the heart of Languedocian viticulture, the recovery from the 
Second World War encouraged a remarkable upturn in the number of cooperative 
wineries. The responses to these formative crises provided some of the most 
recognisable characteristics of the Midi rouge and directly influenced the ways in which 
winegrowers interacted with the state.  The table below shows the figures for the 
whole of France, demonstrating the dramatic surge in the formation of wine 
cooperatives in the post-war decades. 
Year No. of Co-ops Members Capacity (HL) Area of vines 
(HL) 
% of Total 
wine 
1945 858 154,672 14,853176 229,464 25 
1951 997 207,386 19,868,402 336,572 27 
1959 1,128 252,565 27,955,800 395,102 35 
1969 1,202 289,970 44,813,012 495,819 42 
1980 1,158 263,646 55,042,567 501,722 49 
1983 1,163 251,200 57,088,877 494,860 44 
1985 1,158 273,711 56,945,414 486,547 47 
Table illustrating the rise of cooperative wineries in France165 
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This new wave of cooperatives built upon the small numbers which had been 
established before the Great War and the expansion of this number under the Popular 
Front. The pivotal role of cooperative wineries in the Languedoc was cemented during 
this period. Indeed, of the 880 winemaking cooperatives in France in November 1946, 
680 of them were in the Midi.166 As well as being responsible for some 22% of France’s 
total output, these cooperatives were held up as a paradigm for the spirit of solidarity 
they showed in overcoming post-war difficulties.  
 Cooperatives also provided a useful gateway to modernisation and the post-
war surge in their number was encouraged as a means to reform France's agricultural 
endeavours. The government offered subsidies to cover over 30% of the expenses 
incurred in expanding cooperative cellars and modernising winemaking processes. 
Likewise, cooperative buildings and equipment were immune from tax, and they were 
not required to pay the patente license fee for agricultural enterprises.167 Unlike later 
modernisation programmes which would accentuate the maximisation of value, the 
post-war modernisation drive was founded on the need to mechanise the agricultural 
sector and improve vinification techniques. Cooperative wineries played an important 
supplementary role to the Crédit Agricole168 in providing funds for mechanisation, 
allowing pooled purchase of new materials such as tractors and cuvéries.169 The 
availability of credit reinforced the newly preponderant cooperative structure and 
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allowed for a degree of mechanisation to occur from local impetus rather than outside 
pressure, further galvanising regional solidarity. Mechanisation meant, in turn, that 
work in the fields became less labour intensive, displacing agricultural labourers from 
traditional communities. Between 1948 and 1963 French agriculture as a whole 
witnessed its greatest increase in the use of tractors.170 This trend diminished the role of 
labour unions in the representation of the Languedoc's wine industry. Increasingly, the 
Défense movement spoke to small-holders and growers as the most 'proletarian' unit of 
wine producer. With small-holders constituting the main body of cooperative 
members, syndical representation was effectively conducted through cooperative 
structures. The modernity of the post-war period, however, would not remain a 
monolithic quality, and efforts to encourage cooperatives were not necessarily a long-
term tonic for the Midi's endemic problems. 
 The years following the Liberation had seen low quality wine for ‘consommation 
courante’ taxed heavily in a controlled market.171 This wine was the mainstay of Midi 
production, consisting of basic table wine unsuitable for ageing. In efforts to recover 
from the traumas and dislocation of war, many winegrowers had replanted their 
vineyards with stocks designed to produce high-yields and provide a remunerative 
volume of wine as a short-term palliative. The resultant fluctuation of wine prices 
owing to over-supply threatened the sustainability of post-war recovery.172 The prices 
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reached with the vintage of 1948-1949 were positive, though the ability of winegrowers 
to continue modernising would be curtailed, as their income remained precarious. The 
table below indicates the severe drop in prices which occurred over the following year, 














Index of the average price of wine in the Languedoc (1948 Harvest = 100%)173 
 
 The Bonnave plan174 of 1949 was the first active attempt in a campaign by the 
government to alter the complexion of the Midi wine industry.175 It was intended to 
bring greater stability to wine prices by staggering the release of that year’s harvest. 176 
Wine which had been 'blocked' from immediate release could then be held back if 
prices fell, or released if prices were to rise, stabilising the relationship between supply 
and demand. With Pierre Pfimlin at the head of the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
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modernising zeal of the Monnet Plan had a willing Minister. Pfimlin’s attempt to 
reform the wine market, however, was not well received in the Languedoc. The Mayor 
of Cessenon in the Hérault, Raoul Bayou, bemoaned the legacy of the Plan: “Au 
huitième mois de la campagne, leurs [vignerons] caves sont pleines, mais leurs bourses 
sont vides.”177 Blocage created problems for low-yield growers who had higher 
productions costs and generated new expenses for wine storage which were to be met 
by the grower. These facts only helped to encourage the trend towards cooperatives 
and the collectivisation of resources. Membership of cooperative caves allowed small-
holders to comply with government regulation and play an active part in stabilising 
the wine market.  
 The unity provided by such cooperative organisations offered a largely 
chequered significance, however. Some interviewees questioned the role of cooperative 
wineries in the Languedoc's development, claiming that they promoted stagnation in 
terms of quality wine production.178 Importantly, cooperatives were founded on the 
goal of reducing costs and protecting members, whereas their role would later demand 
greater engagement with wine merchants and more market-driven strategies. Only 
after the 1980s would cooperative wineries fully engage with this trend, for example by 
securing investment stakes in wine merchants and signing longer term partnerships 
with them.179  Nevertheless, post-war cooperatives served an important function in 
allowing small-holders, otherwise unable to afford the means of production, to operate 
in a financially viable manner. Such cooperatives, however, brought with them neither 
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assurances nor recommendations for producing quality wines. Modern vignerons tend 
to acknowledge the rationale behind the long standing cooperative tradition although 
they are cognizant of the fact that, in terms of over-production and poor quality, they 
represent part of the problem rather than part of the solution.180 
 As ever, the post-war modernisation drive produced its own share of ‘losers’, 
amongst those unwilling or unable to alter their modes of production who, in turn, 
vocally equated this with the “sacrificing of individual independence to progress.”181 
Such sacrifices fostered a fondness for concepts of “primordiality”182 (or visions of an 
idealised past) and recourse to the Languedoc's tradition of mobilisation. The 
winegrowers’ council of Argeliers, the village where the 1907 riots had been born, 
denounced the government's tentative attempts to reshape the wine industry as “un 
rude coup” to the rural economy. Instead of looking to Languedocian production, they 
called for an immediate halt to the import of foreign wines and the compulsory 
distillation of any found to have entered the country illegally. Many of these demands 
would become recurring themes of the Défense movement, as activists began to seek 
autonomy from the moderate professional bodies which dominated viticultural 
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 France had emerged from the Liberation shrouded in the unity of Resistance, 
though this had not negated old political struggles nor removed recourse to historical 
competition. Just as 1907 had seen tumultuous competition between the left and right 
(and the left with itself), so too did post-war crises provoke fracture and competition. 
The Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA) was founded in 
1946 as a national representative body which collected the views of syndicates and 
large professional bodies. As one of the largest agricultural organisations in France, the 
FNSEA included winegrowers within its broad congregation as well as farmers of 
other crops, thereby reducing its immediate relevancy to the Midi.  Furthermore, the 
FNSEA’s associations with conservative politics, according preference “au partis de 
droite”,183 distanced it from the prevailing political narrative of the Languedoc viticole. 
Accordingly, it did not franchise its Departmental subsidiaries in the Languedoc until 
into the 1980s as part of a process of modernisation which, as we shall see, ran counter 
to the ideology of viticultural unity being professed by the Défense movement.184 There 
were less ideological bodies which winegrowers could look to, however. The 
Fédération des Associations Viticole (FAV) was a national body which gathered 
together wine-growing bodies from every region in France. Its popularity in the Midi 
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still tended to be low, as a result of its need to represent, for example, Bordelais and 
Champagne growers, who held little in common with the needs of Midi vignerons.  
 These national bodies had a greater profile than the CGVM, the left-leaning 
professional organisation (although it professed it was apolitical) which had arisen out 
of the dire economic climate of 1907. It served as a general council for discussing issues 
of importance to the Midi wine industry and a forum for convening discussion across 
differing classes of professional organisation (i.e. from small independents to large 
estate owners and cooperative wineries). Greater regional representation within the 
CGVM model made it more relevant to the interests of southern growers, and its 
heritage offered it greater validation than any subsequent creation of government. Yet 
it continued to be associated with large land holders and concerned itself principally 
with professional matters, seldom intervening in political debates. ‘Syndicat des 
Vignerons’ groups were professional bodies organised on a more local level than the 
FAV. This local aspect deprived them of large membership, however, and they tended 
to work in concert with the increasingly overarching coordinating bodies such as the 
CGVM. 
 The Confédération Générale de l’Agriculture (CGA) was an organisation 
founded in 1943 as a clandestine group representing Communist peasants. After the 
Liberation, the organisation became a legitimate means of representation, acting as a 
peasant-led movement which was more ostensibly political than other professional 
bodies. The Comité des Jeunes Agriculteurs (CJA) was an offshoot of the CGA, created 
in 1947 to represent the views of younger members (and with Departmental level 
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subsidiaries - the CDJA).185  The CGA petered out in the 1950s, ceding to the Ligue des 
Petits et Moyens Viticulteurs (hereafter the Ligue) in its role as defender of small 
growers. The Ligue had originally been established by the Midi politician Edouard 
Barthe in the 1930s, only to fall into obscurity. In 1951 it was reactivated by militant 
vignerons from Béziers, and embarked on a long-term partnership with the PCF. 
Claiming to represent the disenfranchised masses of small growers, it echoed the 
influence of Ferroul in fragmenting the representation of winegrowers.  
 Despite the over-bearing influence of the national organisations, the post-war 
atmosphere of renewal and recovery encouraged the first steps of the regional ‘Défense 
du vin’ movement. The Comité Marcelin Albert (CMA) was created in 1946, emerging 
from protest at the inability of government to offer a cohesive plan for reconstructing 
the Midi wine industry. Named after the leader of the 1907 revolt, the Comité was 
designed to rise above the divisions of wine’s various representative bodies as Albert 
had done. It lobbied successfully for greater regulation in the wine market, attempting 
to force the government to review the patchwork decrees which covered wine 
production after the dislocation of Vichy rule. The government's first real attempt to 
reshape the wine industry with the Bonnave plan precipitated a new engagement from 
Languedocian vignerons as they reacted to externally led change. The representative 
groups which had helped act as a conduit to government, such as the CGVM and the 
CMA, were forced to adapt to ensure they retained their relevance. In large part, this 
meant engaging with newly formed cooperatives and appealing to their small-holding 
membership. Cooperatives provided repertoires of like-minded growers in similar 
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situations, and fed into the creation of numerous comités and new representative 
groups which enriched the Défense movement. At this stage in the development of the 
Midi wine industry, however, the Défense movement tended to be somewhat 
overshadowed by larger professional bodies designed to represent wine at a national 
level.  
 The CMA were victorious in forcing some change; a governmental decree of 4 
September 1947 saw the market for low quality, non-classified wines completely 
liberalised in an attempt to curb fraud in the controlled AOC market. Superior quality 
AOC production had incredibly jumped from a pre-war 2-4% of total Midi production 
to 16% in 1946, denoting foul play and raising the spectre of fraud once more. 
Liberalising markets was designed to counter the persistence of the war-time black 
market but unfortunately also led to greater instability of prices.186 Whilst allowing for 
a flood in the ‘consommation courante’ market, the government was attempting to 
protect value in the more exclusive and much smaller AOC market. Government 
reports warned of a “surge of violent opinion in the Midi” and winegrowers on the 
Liberation Committee of one small village spoke in hushed tones of demonstrations 
“as in 1907.”187 Having attempted to regain pre-war volumes during the investment 
period of the Monnet Plan, the government was now faced with an overheated market. 
Prices had fallen drastically amidst ballooning quantities, and after the unpopular 
reception of the Bonnave plan, a program of voluntary uprooting seemed one of the 
only options available to government. 
                                                          
186 ‘L’evolution du prix du vin  au cours de la campagne 1946-1947’, 21/11/1952 – ADH 2W2660. 
187
 Warner, The Winegrowers of France, p.164 
92 
 
 In February 1949, sales figures had demonstrated that Languedocian wine was 
being sold below cost and that existing stocks had been devalued by some 10 billion 
francs.188 In this stormy atmosphere, the Socialist Deputy for the Aude, Georges Guille, 
highlighted the short-sighted nature of government-imposed requirements for 
uprooting vine-stock. He described a situation in which winegrowers could be asked to 
tear up 2 hectares of AOC quality vine-stock in the short term only to be replanted 
several years later, having suffered financially in the meantime, with vines fit only to 
produce base table wine.189  Such measures were intended to ensure that post-war 
recovery did not overheat the Midi wine economy, causing an unsustainable growth in 
vine stock. This goal was laudable, but the methods imposed heavily on already needy 
growers. 
 Uprooting or arrachage was perennially unpopular and an open invitation was 
issued on 29 April 1949 by the CMA to participate in a demonstration the following 
day. True to its name, the Comité called for a reinstitution of the Statut Viticole, the 
measures eventually arrived at after the 1907 events but abandoned by Vichy.190 Their 
invitation attracted an estimated crowd of 10,000 in Béziers to hear rallying speeches 
by the Presidents of cooperatives and George Guille.191 Shortly after this protest, the 
visit of Maurice Thorez to Carcassonne saw local vignerons stage a vast tasting to 
welcome the political giant. Thorez attempted to tap into the traditional rhetoric of the 
Défense movement and, following the tasting, he declared to a supportive audience: 
                                                          
188 Ibid, p.169. 
189 ‘Intéressantes precisions de M. Georges Guille sur le délicat problème des plantations’, Le 
Républicain du Midi 12/05/1949 – ADA 31J22. 
190 ‘Appel du Comité Marcellin-Albert aux viticulteurs et aux Maires du Midi viticole’, Le 
Républicain du Midi 29/04/1949 – ADA 31J22. 
191 ’10,000 viticulteurs ont réclamé le retour au Statut Viticole’, Le Républicain du Midi 30/04/1949 
– ADA 31J22. 
93 
 
“N’est-il pas vrai qu’ils peuvent y venir avec leurs vins de Grèce, du Chili ou de 
Californie? Nous sommes imbattables!” Indicting foreign imports in front of the 
Languedoc’s ‘productivist’ viticultural establishment was a considered move designed 
to strengthen the regional presence of the PCF. Thorez’s visit capitalised on the tension 
created amongst smallholders by the government’s attempts to transform the region 
and the resultant rising unemployment amongst viticultural labourers owing to this 
modernisation.192 His recent vice-premiership and popularity within the Communist 
Party ensured that Thorez received a warm welcome in an increasingly impoverished 
region. With the PCF confined to the political hinterland after their resignation from 
government in 1947, they were free to snipe at government policies from a position of 
unencumbered opposition. Their attempts to establish themselves in the politics of the 
Languedoc viticole during the late 1940s prefaced a period of far greater involvement,193 
which would see them use agricultural representation as a conduit for political power. 
The active presence of the PCF in the Midi required a response from the traditional 
representatives amongst the Socialists, as they sought to ensure that they were not 
outflanked in an area of historical strength. The role of the SFIO was threatened, 
therefore, and necessitated the strenuous mobilisation of elected officials to intercede in 
parliamentary debates on wine crises.  
 The recovery of the Midi wine industry thus increasingly depended on the 
influence of Députés du vin, who ensured that wine remained a prominent focus of the 
government's agricultural policy. Increasingly, the model of Edouard Barthe became 
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more prominent, as they moderated the interaction of the Languedoc's small holders 
and the Assembly. George Guille was exemplary of the 'Wine Deputy' model as 
President of the Assembly’s Commission des Boissons. This long-standing, cross-party 
sub-committee drew in members from across France, yet its most prominent actions 
were under the leadership of Southern figures like Guille, whose proximity to the 
interests of wine-making allowed him a greater passion in their defence. The group's 
influence has been somewhat derided in the historiography, however, as “little more 
than a façade for the alcohol lobby.”194 That being said, their business was popular with 
its audience when it achieved success. Specifically, collected winegrowers lodged their 
approval that the penury of the people of the Corbières had been noted officially in the 
Journal of the Assembly. The resurgent role of ‘Wine Deputy’ was one which 
recognised this need to ride the popularity of the Défense movement and validate their 
own role by endorsing it. 
 The Mayor of Cessenon and Counsellor of the Hérault, Raoul Bayou began, 
during this period of reconstruction, to build the foundations of his own legitimacy as 
a Député du vin. Bayou was of the traditional radical-socialist Languedocian 
background, but involved with technocratic schemes designed to drive the 
modernisation of the region, notably in his support of the Compagnie du Bas-Rhône.195 
After the crisis of 1953, Bayou became increasingly active in coordinating the political 
modernisation of the Défense movement, as we shall see. SFIO Deputies became 
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important figureheads who could demonstrate the party’s engagement with wine and 
fend off the attempts by the PCF to establish themselves. This turbulence marked a 
new political dynamism in the Languedoc, which would see Socialists and 
Communists competing to channel the representation of winegrowers through a 
variety of jostling organisations in the post-war period. These organisations attempted 
to draw together syndical groups as a means of constructing a unified Défense 
movement, substituting worker’s organisations for cooperatives and capitalising on the 
visibility of Députés du vin in the model of Edouard Barthe. 
 
The crisis of 1953 
  The most severe crise de mévente196 during the Fourth Republic occurred in 1953. 
The severity of this market fluctuation was demonstrated by a fall of 20% in the real 
value of wine between the harvests of 1949-50 and 1953-54.197 With the help of 
cooperative production, France’s wine industry returned to pre-war production 
volumes by 1951. Yet, despite these advances, the consumption of wine failed to return 
to pre-war levels.198 The ensuing crisis delivered shocks to the existing structures of 
post-war representation and began a process of turbulent upheaval which would 
characterise the Languedoc's representative groups up to and throughout the 1960s.  
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 The abundant harvest of 1953 led to a drop in prices which the government 
sought to tackle initially by issuing a decree in December of that year that reclassified 
viticultural territories in an effort to reduce expected volume.199 The crisis set the 
government reeling, with inaccurate assessment having estimated the drop in the value 
of wine over the preceding four years as 50%200 and barricades being erected all over 
the Midi as vignerons took to the street.201 A period of furious protest, coinciding with 
a general strike, saw the government eventually arrive at a legislative review in the 
form of the new Code du vin. Little advance was made with this review however, as, 
despite superficial changes, 1953 saw a return to the measures introduced in the Statut 
Viticole in 1931, increasing the use of  sales blockage and compulsory distillation.202 
 The falling price index of wine in the years running up to the “grande crise de 
1953”203 had, however, seen preliminary measures introduced in an attempt to stave off 
further crisis. Efforts were made to reduce yields across the board, with the uprooting 
of vines intended to decrease the regional output and stabilise market value. These 
measures largely failed due to their voluntary nature, with distillation merely a 
palliative and the uprooting (or ‘grubbing up’) of vineyards, effectively eroding the 
future productive potential of vignerons and offering them only short-term financial 
remuneration. Likewise, for winegrowers firmly rooted in the social fabric of the 
region, accepting money from the government to uproot their vines carried a certain 
shame, as it seemed to be giving up on heritage and tradition. This uprooting, referred 
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to as arrachage, became associated with the physical uprooting of winegrowers from the 
region, eroding regional and occupational identity alongside the economic potential of 
the Languedoc. Winegrowers were recompensed for grubbing up productive 
vineyards and signed contracts which would prevent them replanting for a set period 
(often 5 to 10 years). In the mean time, they were encouraged to grow alternative crops 
or seek employment in a different sector. The process was tempting for winegrowers 
who were struggling, as it represented an immediate injection of funds, though it could 
remove smallholders from the wine industry entirely. Arrachage was employed as one 
of the primary measures of the governmental toolbox, as it offered an easy way to limit 
future productive capacity. Because of its implications, however, it remained perenially 
unpopular with winegrowers and every new round that was undertaken seemed to 
threaten the region's potential.204 
 The obvious alternative to arrachage was the distillation of excess unsold wine 
into industrial alcohol. The government funded this as a means of stabilising wine 
prices and reducing the overall quantity available for sale. It tended to be more 
popular with winegrowers as it didn't limit future potential and had much less emotive 
significance than the act of grubbing up vineyards. As such, a program of voluntary 
distillation was instituted by central government, at which wine was bought at the 
going rate to be distilled into industrial spirit. Between 1948 and 1952 distillation of 
surplus wines cost the state 9694 million Francs per year205, with minimal long term 
benefit, whilst creating a new form of overproduction in the distilled alcohol sector.206 
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Distillation was reimbursed at a “prix dissuasifs” in an attempt to further encourage 
growers to stick to prescribed yields. 207   
 During 1952, discussion of the parlous state of the wine market centred on new 
solutions to the crisis and an increasingly concerted call for a new body of legislature to 
constitute a Code du vin. The FAV had led the call for a shift towards 'a policy of 
quality', drawing support from the Ministry of Agriculture, as consensus settled on the 
existence of enduring problems.208  Agriculture Minister Roger Houdet was not deaf to 
the pleas of winemakers, and the Statut de la Viticulture was finally replaced in 1953. On 
30 September, the Code du Vin momentarily defused the summer of protests and 
discontent amongst winegrowers.209 It brought in a fixed percentage of blockages, 
which standardised what all growers could be expected to face while also raising taxes 
on yields and submitting all growers to a compulsory quota of distillation.210 Within 
these statutes there was scope for the government to alter the percentages to cope with 
annual fluctuations. The Code, therefore, brought about extensions in both distillation 
and blockages whilst extending the coverage to smaller growers. The Code also 
controlled both planting areas and accepted varieties, seeking to ameliorate quality by 
eliminating inferior grape varieties and diminishing the most marginal yield 
vineyards. The tardiness of the government’s legislative review had, however, 
contributed to widespread confusion amongst growers. A high degree of illegal 
plantings, both in ignorance and in spite of the new rules, had sprung up in the 
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interim.211 The legacy of the Code was an uncertain one in the Midi, fuelling as it did 
greater discontent and failing to grant the high prices for continued extraordinary 
distillations sought by the Défense groups. Thus, the Code du vin was less an 
unmitigated success than a stalemate, allowing the government to gamble on a short 
term solution and the possibility of long term benefits.212 
 Furthermore, in 1954 it had become clear that there would be further problems 
within the wine industry if there was not an increase in domestic consumption (or 
simply a return to pre-war levels) and further development of the export market. 
Without altering the structural frailties of the industry, the Code was merely an 
updating of existing practice to instill some rigour in the regulations surrounding 
production. The government’s tools for alleviating crises may have been strengthened 
but the underlying triggers for these cyclical crises remained unaltered. Roughly 18 per 
cent of the Hérault’s wine faced blockage from the market according to the new Code,213 
a tangible symptom of an unhealthy industry, especially considering that 27 days of 
frost had greatly reduced the harvest yield.214 Likewise, it was once again 
recommended that winegrowers plant better quality varieties as the stabilisation of the 
market remained contingent not only on regulatory control of quantity but also that of 
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quality.215 To this end, compulsory distillation was recommended for all prohibited 
varieties and blends prohibited by the Code. Likewise, attempts to encourage voluntary 
uprooting of vineyards by decree failed, with an outcome of only 4% of vines uprooted 
between 1954 and 1957.216 The Code du vin, as a first real measure to change the 
complexion of the Languedocian wine industry, was not a success. Indeed, without a 
firm long-term vision for development, the Code was little more than a palliative 
intended to react to a pressing crisis. 
 The 1953 crisis would have a transformative effect on the Languedocian wine 
industry, drawing cooperatives towards increased production despite government 
inducements to improve quality. Whilst the number of cooperatives and their share of 
wine produced nationally increased during the 1950s (see table above detailing the 
'Rise of Cooperative Wineries in France'), their capacity for volume increased at a 
significantly faster rate. Between 1951 and 1959 the number of cooperatives, their 
membership and the area of their vines all increased by between 10% to 20%. Yet their 
capacity for volume increased over 40%. Though cooperatives had been increasing 
since the Liberation as a vehicle for the government's efforts to enshrine quality at the 
heart of winegrowing, statistics demonstrate that the 'productivist' mentality was 
newly important to cooperatives. Although the Bonnave Plan had been an attempt by 
the government to alter the wine industry, recovery from war-time had fundamentally 
altered the structure of the Languedocian wine industry. Attempts to improve quality 
clashed with simultaneous inducements to collectivise and the crisis of 1953 made the 
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hardship of this contradiction plain. As the larger national syndical bodies failed to act 
as an acceptable interlocutor, the vignerons themselves began to organise ever more 
politically active groups to act as their representatives. The PCF sought to create a 
presence amongst these groups and the Deputies of the SFIO were thus increasingly 
bound to involve themselves in direct action in the Languedoc as a means of ensuring 
they remained relevant and visible. The direct nature of the later CRAV was incubated 
within this tendency towards politicisation. As the Midi responded once more to a 
crisis of representation, new committees emerged to voice old concerns made young. 
 
Turbulence in the structures of representation 
 The 1953 crisis had generated a new momentum in the Défense movement, 
energising new and vocal leaders to suggest tactics for resisting exigent demands for 
change from above. The CMA had not suddenly become redundant, nor indeed had 
the CGVM, yet lingering economic problems demanded constantly renewed forms of 
representation. 1950 had opened a new decade with another grand public assembly on 
11 January, during which the CGVM and the CGA called on winegrowers to unite 
behind their organisations in the pursuit of a living wage for winegrowers.217 They 
condemned those who suggested there were schisms in the syndical organisations, 
stating simply that “la lutte ne cessera… que lorsque nous aurons eu satisfaction.”218 
Yet, the prominence of the CGVM in existing syndical representation had begun to 
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provoke disillusionment, with the renewed prominence of ‘Wine Deputies’ having 
demonstrated the benefits of direct political intervention.  
 The CRSV is described as “nouvellement formé” on the 6th June 1953,219 having 
been established by Raoul Vidal a year earlier at the Maison du Peuple in Béziers 
amidst a “cacophonie” of support.220 In reality, this group had existed since January 
1945 as the successor to the Comité de Défense Viticole,221 and remained an “extremist” 
voice.222 Yet, just as the crisis of 1953 drew new responses from government, so too did 
it encourage change in the Languedoc. Vidal’s formalisation of the group saw it make 
headlines and immediately absorb the relatively minor organisation ‘Groupement 
National des vins de consommation courante’, whose head Jean Durand (the Senator 
for the Gironde) was promoted alongside Vidal.223 Although minor, Durand’s 
organisation had gained traction during the immediate post-war years when the 
‘consommation courante’ market was essentially flooded. Durand himself was born in 
1909, only two years later than the Deputy Georges Guille, yet both formed part of a 
generation who moved into political prominence in the post-war period. The 
viticultural crisis of the immediate post-war placed their political careers alongside the 
early development of the Défense movement. 
 This newly amalgamated organisation had a stronger voice, and Durand’s 
membership of the parliamentary Commission des Boissons gave it weight and 
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credibility. The CRSV specifically represented the Gard, Hérault and Aude, and 
through the association of the Comité Beauvoisin, of which Vidal was the head, they 
also claimed to speak for winegrowers in the Var and Bouches-du-Rhône.224 In the 
Hérault, the local arm of the CRSV was headed up by the increasingly influential Raoul 
Bayou, who presided over a department which was one of the most amenable to direct 
action throughout the twentieth century. Bayou was also the head of the Mayors' 
Association of the Hérault, and he mobilised this organisation in support of the CRSV. 
Between December 1953 and August 1954, he sanctioned waves of mayoral strikes and 
administrative shut-downs in protest at the government's handling of the downturn. 
He brought at least 40 communes with him directly, exercising his personal influence 
in support of the Défense du vin movement. By deploying the networks of local 
influence he had garnered during his term as Mayor of Cessenon and regional 
counsellor, he brought the elites of the Department closer to viticultural radicals. The 
CRSV can effectively be seen as the forerunner of the organisation which would come 
to be known as the CRAV in the 1970s.225 This early group already displayed certain 
distinct characteristics of the later CRAV: wide appeal to local vignerons of all classes, 
representation at the highest levels of local politics and the ability to successfully 
coordinate direct action across all of the viticultural departments. Likewise, the CRSV 
were an early demonstration of the increasingly independent streak within the Midi 
viticole.  
 As Joseph Laniel‘s newly formed conservative government of June 1953 
floundered in implementing the demands of winegrowers and prices dropped 
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severely, growers within the CRSV had sought to drive debate by stepping up their 
action and increasing their visibility. Having mounted a demonstration in Nimes on 29 
June,226 the CRSV were then involved in organising a large inter-departmental 
demonstration in Béziers for 2 July.227 Protest flyers recalled the tocsin of Marcelin 
Albert in 1907, and mentioned a modern tocsin being sounded by Raoul Vidal which 
called on 8,000 to attend the meeting.228 In the Indépendant, an editorial lent succour to 
the protestors by describing them as "fraternellement unis, non point en rebelles, en 
révolutionnaires, mais en travailleurs désireux de voir le fruit de leur travail préservée 
d'une misère qui pourrait être fatale."229 As the local press rallied behind the CRSV, 
they invoked the heritage of la grande révolte. As a natural inheritor of the ‘Comités de 
Salut Viticole’ formed during the 1907 riots, it is significant to see the CRSV espousing 
this regional mythology.  
 At the first meeting of the newly formalised CRSV, its members called for the 
immediate release and sale of withheld wine from the 1952 vintage and the distillation 
of all unsalable wine from the 1953 vintage. This would allow them to realise the value 
of withheld stocks whilst also clearing storage to allow an untainted market to emerge 
the following year. Those assembled criticised the FAV for failing to represent their 
profession adequately, insisting that only those that took an active stance had the right 
to demand concessions from the government.230 Even at this juncture, the distinction 
between locally led groups and national bodies lay in a rejection of the 'politics of 
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quality' and a willingness to endorse direct action. This focus on direct action as a 
legitimising quality helped establish the CRSV as an important political voice in the 
region. Likewise, the example of the CRSV set out a blueprint for increasing 
radicalisation and independence in the Midi which would see viticultural politics 
become a partisan arena, set apart from the large professional bodies which 
represented national issues. Durand derided the “scandale du dirigisme” amongst 
national organisations like the FAV as “le parasite qu’il faut détruire.” 231 
 There was no danger of such 'dirigisme' within the CRSV, however. Dispute 
and division were rife at its meetings, and groups like the Ligue des Petits et Moyens 
Producteurs represented a strong current of alternative opinion within the structures of 
the CRSV. This was demonstrated in the immediate aftermath of the Code, when the 
government hinted that it would allow further concessions to let the Code fully 
establish itself. The Ligue agitated in favour of more direct action and the rejection of 
governmental overtures. At a meeting in Pezenas, however, a majority of CRSV 
delegates opted for conciliation, over-ruling the dissenting Ligue. Resentment of this 
decision lingered, and the Ligue would use this ‘coup de Pézenas’ as a perennial 
refrain to censure those favouring talks instead of barricades.232 For the Ligue, 
appeasement at this moment represented a lost opportunity for the Midi.  
 As the CRSV was challenged, the Défense movement underwent a period of 
comparative democratisation. Ad-hov local committees were becoming increasingly 
popular, as the Défense movement gained traction amongst the viticultural base. 
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Winegrower's syndicats acted as local 'cells' of the CGV, participating in the CRSV as 
means of channelling their influence.233 The Ligue's role as a dissenting force at the 
heart of the Défense movement ensured that this development could not be stifled. The 
'coup de Pézenas' was a visible moment of crisis, the appearance of which would 
multiply as the Ligue sought opportunities to display its radical convictions and 
outflank the CRSV. The Ligue proposed a day of barricades in a communiqué on 8 
April 1954, encouraging vignerons to form Comités d’action at a village level and 
coordinate their own demonstrations.234 This was a clear attempt to move outside the 
structures of the CRSV, and highlighted growing plurality in the Défense movement. 
By devolving action to a local level outside the incumbent structures of representation, 
the Ligue had laid the groundwork for later regional mobilisation under the CRAV. As 
the Code du vin put further strain on smaller growers, this dynamic of radicalisation 
was bound only to develop. The Ligue pursued its rhetoric as a means of 
differentiating itself from the CRSV and so allowed the PCF to have a guiding hand in 
politics on the Midi. In an area dominated by the Socialist party, the PCF found 
vicarious success by garnering support through their involvement in the Défense 
movement. 
 As in 1905, when Guesdistes like Ferroul had supported a message of class 
division, the post-war PCF continued to reject the "mythe de l'unité paysanne".235 Yet, 
as Ferroul had done in 1907, the PCF continued to support broader organisations when 
they were successful. Thus, in their attitude to the CRSV, they were playing a double 
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game, attempting to balance their resistance to 'inter-classisme' with a realistic 
appreciation that the CRSV was more acceptable than organisations like the FNSEA 
which were dominated by the right. The CRSV, in attempting to resist domination by 
the Ligue and the PCF by proxy, was forced to become a functionally conservative 
organisation in the Languedoc's representative framework. This constituted something 
of a crisis of representation, as the Défense organisation fought amongst itself at the 
same time as attempting to stand against government. The competition for different 
sections of growers was rather one sided, the PCF had inherited the mistakes of the 
Guesdistes in the old SFIO, whereas the PS had rather more influence and experience 
in trying to construct unified movements in the Languedoc. 
 It is interesting that the announcements of some of these well-attended protests 
were made on the headed note paper of the Syndicat des Vignerons des Pyrénées-
Orientales and signed on behalf of the syndical President, Vidal.236 Direct action and 
mayoral support occurred in direct reference to 1907, as protests against regional 
difficulties were coordinated through local structures. Vidal’s dual role as Syndical 
President and CRSV leader became exemplary of a new class of viticultural 
spokesmen. Raoul Bayou also became one of the important members of the fledgling 
CRSV, organising the mobilisation of vignerons throughout the demonstrations of 1953 
and onwards.237 His multiple roles in local government (as Mayor of Cessenon, local 
Counsellor and newly elected President of the Association of Mayors of the Hérault) 
likewise helped legitimise the movement and increase the penetration of militant 
vignerons into the local political elites. This was strongly demonstrated in the strike 
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organised in May 1954, in which the Mayors of 262 (out of 343) communes in the 
Hérault walked out in support of vignerons and to protest at the breakdown of talks 
with government for relief packages. During cyclical crises of representation, local 
notables surfed the waves of innovation which encouraged the rejuvenation of the 
Défense groups. Despite some individual engagement with specific Défense groups, 
the independent status of ‘Wine Deputies’ allowed them to endorse the most positive 
aspects in an effort to bolster their own political stock.  
 For one of the most prominent viticultural leaders, Emmanuel Maffre-Baugé, 
the wave of demonstrations in 1953-1954 “fut le point de depart dans l’engagement de 
toute ma generation”238. Born in 1921, Maffre-Baugé was a powerful speaker with an 
infectious personality who “apparaît avant tout comme un tribun.”239 He believed that 
this moment represented the most significant crystallisation of viticultural radicalism 
in the post-war Midi. Specifically, he relates how “le vieux réflexe hérité de 1907 
intervenait”240, creating solidarity amongst vignerons and encouraging the intensity of 
the demonstrations by reference to their heritage. Maffre-Beaugé himself came from an 
illustrious and scholarly background; his grandfather had been a poet in the circle of 
Mistral, and his strict upbringing in Catholic schools run by Dominicans and then 
Jesuits gave him a cultured, serious and intelligent outlook.241 Despite a privileged 
background, his allegiance to the PCF and his romantic attachment to the vine 
fashioned a role for him in viticultural representation.  
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Emmanuel Maffre-Beaugé addressing a demonstration in Montpellier242 
Maffre-Beaugé, unlike his proto-Communist predecessor Ferroul, actively supported 
the cooperation of winegrowers across classes in service of the region as a whole, an 
opinion forged in this first crisis of the post-war era. The crossing of political and class 
boundaries at this moment was another clear indication that memories of 1907 were 
strong. Increasingly, the Midi was raising its head to assert a more independent 
political voice. The links between this developing political movement and radical 
direct action were complex, in that local committees tended to be more radical than the 
central CRSV, but this allowed the development of a genuine grassroots dynamism. 
The primacy of shared viticultural interests was what drove the invigorated Défense 
movement to develop further. Such development provoked reactions from government 
in the guise of increased engagement with the Midi. 
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 Nevertheless, as a result of this crisis of representation, local committees were 
becoming more independent, favouring more direct action than the established 
Défense movement were willing to endorse. On 9 May 1954, the CRSV attempted to 
rein in this tendency, asking the Comités d’action in all four departments to maintain 
lines of communication with the CGVM and the Association of Mayors.243 Despite 
having represented an extremist voice in the immediate post-war period, the CRSV 
was suddenly drawn into a validation of its own principles as it faced challenges, 
notably from the Ligue. In an illustration of what they were fighting against, reports 
emerged that same day of a Languedocian conference organised by the Union de la 
Jeunesse Républicaine de France (UJRF).244 This organisation was effectively a 
Communist youth movement, and thus shared the same strong links to the PCF as did 
the Ligue. The attendance of groups from Perpignan, Béziers and other viticultural 
areas saw the creation of young Comités d’action designed to rejuvenate the Défense 
movement and agitate for direct action. This was symptomatic of the increasing 
atomisation of the viticultural lobby, as a generational tide began to wash over the 
structures of the FAV and the CGVM. Again, even the formerly 'extremist' CRSV 
became a guardian of the limits, trying to keep viticultural representation legitimate. 
Nevertheless, the potential for mass action remained housed within local structures 
and increasingly many of these were drawn towards the Ligue as being more openly 
representative of smaller growers' interests. Indeed, on 2 April, Joseph Calas, the 
President of the Ligue, assured winegrowers that success would be theirs only if they 
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could “rester les maîtres de leurs luttes.”245 This control at a local level would – the 
Communists hoped – prevent a repeat of the ‘coup de Pezenas’ in 1953. That action 
coming from the UJRF had fed into strengthening the Ligue was indicative of success 
achieved by the PCF in manipulating the political landscape of the Midi.  
 The PCF actively supported direct action amongst the winegrowers, with 
Manuel Bernabeu, Secretary of the Hérault PCF, penning an article in which he vented 
his fury that “politiciens sordides ont avec eux les gros viticulteurs capitalistes”. He 
went on to criticise prominent deputies such as Paul Coste-Floret for claiming that the 
state did not have the resources to satisfy the winegrowers whilst pouring money into 
“le gouffre de la honteuse guerre d’Indochine”.246 Such vocabulary offers some clues as 
to the appeal of the notion of internal colonialism which came to be used in conjunction 
with both the wine industry and Occitan movement during the 1960s. This new 
dynamic built upon the rhetoric of 1907 reintroduced during the protests of the 
previous year and helped radicalise local committees into supporting direct action. 
Newly invigorated and more diffuse than ever, the Défense movement stepped up its 
pressure in the following months. More demonstrations took place on 14 March in 
Perpignan, 21 March in Carcassonne and 4 April in Béziers.247  Attempting to hold 
together the increasing fissiparous movement, the CRSV announced that it intended to 
remain alert to the possibility of direct action. In a direct overture to the support base 
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for the Ligue, it highlighted the charges levied against smaller growers to block the sale 
of some wines as both unfair and unacceptable.248  
 At a meeting at the Café Continental in Béziers on 7 January 1955 chaired by 
Joseph Calas, the Ligue issued demands for minimum pricing, a halt to imports and 
exemption of smallholders from government measures (blocage, distillation) designed 
to solve the wine crisis. Without such measures, they warned, winegrowers would “se 
tenir prêts à agir.”249 At a subsequent meeting on 28 January, Calas reiterated these 
demands.250 This was the beginning of a campaign of criticism which would see the 
Ligue increasingly stress the differences between their own adherents and those of the 
CRSV. The communist presence within the representative framework of the Languedoc 
was pushing further towards the collapse of 'inter-classisme' and increasing distinction 
between small and large landholders. This emphasis on the distinctions between 
growers fuelled a process of rejuvenation designed to radicalise the Défense movement 
and draw it closer to extremism. The Ligue’s solution to this crisis was to simplify the 
means of delivering their message: action had to be direct and loud enough to be 
heard.  
 Joseph Calas was the firebrand who led the Ligue des Petits et Moyens Viticulteurs 
towards this divisive tendency. His brother Raoul Calas had been the PCF deputy for 
the Hérault.251 Alongside his vice president Emilien Soulié, Jo Calas brought the belief 
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that “toute négociation doit s’appuyer sur un solide rapport des forces.”252 By 
challenging the CRSV to renegotiate their appeal, the Ligue brought the representation 
of winegrowers to a more local level by empowering local action committees as 
increasingly independent organisations. This was to prove one of the more potent 
organisational legacies of the Ligue. By so diversifying the political actors within the 
Midi, they furnished grass roots representative bodies with both a motive and a 
mandate to conduct direct action in support of their broader cause. Outside the 
umbrella of the CRSV, they shaped a cell structure more in line with that of a 
clandestine organisation. This proved to be the primary tool of the later Jeunes 
Vignerons movement and encouraged the gestation of the CRAV as an independent 
representative body during the 1960s. 
 On 17 February 1955, the press carried pleas for winegrowers to attend a 
departmental demonstration, as the Ligue stepped up its criticism of the CRSV, 
recalling once more the ‘coup de Pézénas’ in 1953. From this example, they drew the 
conclusion that “l’action paie toujours” and that only 'days of barricades' would evince 
any recognition from Paris.253 Days earlier, they had formed a Comité d’union et 
d’action, stealing a march on the embattled CRSV. By rallying the core support of the 
more numerous small-holders, they sought to encourage direct action as a more vital 
exercise than negotiation.254 Calas and Soulié of the Ligue attended the next CRSV 
meeting on 19 February to make their objections plain. The tone of the meeting was 
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tense, as opposition to the policy of conciliation was palpable. A succession of 
delegates from the villages spoke of their misery and readiness to act, with one stating 
that “Je ne suis pas un révolutionnaire, mais je suis prêt à le devenir, pas demain, tout 
de suite.”255 Although deliberately stoked by the Ligue’s communist ties, these 
sentiments seemed to have struck a chord amongst a population increasingly 
exasperated by the lack of radicalism displayed by the CRSV. Smaller growers were 
finding it impossible to sell for the minimum price, with the market flooded by the 
volume of large producers who could better absorb measures like compulsory 
distillation than family vineyards. 
 March witnessed more demonstrations in the Hérault, as dissatisfaction with 
fluctuating prices translated into direct action. A demonstration was organized in 
Béziers on 6 March 1955 at the ‘Maison du Peuple’,256 the very place the Ligue had been 
formed, and on 26 March a Ligue communiqué declared that “L’heure de l’action a 
sonné”.257 The CRSV attempted to retain a role for itself – organizing a strike amongst 
local government officials in April. However, it abandoned plans to blockade roads on 
14 April, instead sending a detachment to Paris to negotiate concessions.258 
Accordingly, on 23 April, the CRSV issued a communiqué to the Midi Libre, expressing 
their general satisfaction with the government statement made that day.259 Smaller 
growers were outraged by this appeasement, which they saw as running counter to the 
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notion of regional solidarity and serving only the interest of larger land-owners. The 
Paris negotiations were compared to the visit of Marcelin Albert to Paris in 1907, when 
he had been outfoxed by bureaucrats and politicians.  
 Emilien Soulié, vice-President of the Ligue, reported a subsequent wave of 
unrest within the body of the CRSV.  A representative of a local Comité d’action in the 
Gard had described the governmental concessions as “une piqûre de morphine”, 
whilst others pressed the need for action in the face of palliatives offered by the 
government.260 For the Ligue this was an opportunity to comprehensively outflank the 
CRSV and its political masters, the PCF, likewise came out against 'appeasement'.261 
These strong words rang somewhat hollow, however, suffixed as they were by a plea 
for votes in the upcoming election. Such an attempt to divide the syndical hierarchy of 
the region represented an opportunist tactic by the PCF, although it exploited pre-
existing fractures within the Défense organisations. A long article by Emile Soulié 
highlighting the struggles of the Midi in the face of Parisian laws ended with a 
dramatic conclusion: “Nous sommes la masse, nous sommes la force et dans l’action 
unie, nous arracherons le juste droit de vivre en travaillant.”262 He roundly criticised 
the CGVM, especially their role in securing the Code of 1953, in which – he claimed – 
tax liabilities were lifted from the large growers of France and Algeria and dumped on 
small vignerons. Citing the role of larger growers in derailing the meeting at Pézenas in 
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1953, Soulié underlined the importance of small-scale growers acting independently to 
make their voices heard. 
 The later crisis of 1956 can be attributed to the very harsh frost of that year263 
which coincided with a period of declining consumption (from 139 litres per head per 
annum in 1954 to 124 litres per head per annum in 1963264). 1954 actually represented 
the point from which consumption never recovered in France, facing regular 
diminishment thereafter.265 Between 1938 and 1955 sales of mineral water increased 
464%, illustrating the fact that the crises of the 1950s were, above all else, crises of 
diminishing wine consumption.266  Likewise, the crisis of 1956 can be seen to have been 
one of the contributory factors in the rapid decline of agricultural workers, dropping 
from 5 million to 1.5 million 1955-1988.267 The government’s methods in tackling the 
crisis focussed initially on traditional methods, such as blocking surplus wine from sale 
(8.5 million HL) and the distillation of surplus wine into industrial spirit (6 million 
HL), but going beyond earlier palliative measures by enforcing these as obligatory. 
Innovative methods were also introduced in an attempt to break the cyclical pattern of 
these market crashes, with 1.8 million Francs set aside in the 1955 budget to help 
encourage the exportation of Languedoc-Roussillon wines by granting massive 
subsidies to exporters. The recovery of the market was gradual but, as government 
initiatives took effect, prices returned to 1949 levels by the end of June 1957, having 
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dropped as low as 74% in February 1956.268 The ability of the government to solve 
market crises was demonstrable, therefore, although it encountered difficulty in trying 
to address the structural causes of the crises. This second crisis of the 1950s 
demonstrated the underlying weaknesses of the Languedoc's wine industry. 
 
Changing Republics  
 The advent of the Fifth Republic altered France's representative framework and 
enshrined a strong conservative executive at the heart of French politics. In the 
Languedoc, the continuing electoral prominence of the Socialist party set the region out 
of step with the national political majority. The electoral system of the Fifth Republic 
delivered blows to the Communists, who performed dreadfully in 1958 when they set 
themselves in opposition to the Socialist Party. For the SFIO, Francis Vals was elected 
in the Aude, Raoul Bayou in the Hérault and Paul Béchart in the Gard.269 
Unsurprisingly, the Gaullist Union pour une Nouvelle République (UNR) performed well 
on the General's ticket (with 3 deputies across the 3 departments), and the Christian 
Democratic Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) (rallying behind Paul Coste-
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Floret)270 equalled this tally. The Socialists, MRP and UNR all boasted an equal number 
of deputies across the Languedoc.271 The Socialist decision to engage in 'constructive 
opposition' to De Gaulle's centre-right majority isolated them from government 
successes and, as they remained unwilling to personally attack De Gaulle whilst the 
Algerian crisis endured, meant that they were unable to cast themselves as strong 
opponents to the government.272 The strength of the new Republic did create some 
strong opposition movements however, specifically relating to wine, where the 
heritage of the left was long-standing. The election of 1958 was an important moment 
for Raoul Bayou, whose career in the Assembly would be firmly bound to the 
Languedoc viticole, spanning some of its most turbulent moments and allowing him to 
actively engage with viticultural issues in the Assembly and at demonstrations in the 
Languedoc itself. 
 These governmental changes also spurred the creation of a new agricultural 
organisation. The Mouvement Ouvrier de Défense des Enterprises Familiales (MODEF) was 
formed in Toulouse in 1959 as a left wing rival to the politically conservative FNSEA. 
For the communists, MODEF represented "un relais politique dans le syndicalisme 
paysan."273 As their influence in the Assembly evaporated, the Communists had to find 
new methods for constructing valid means to oppose the government. In the midst of a 
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national programme of technocratic modernisation, which in the wine industry had 
seen the Bonnave Plan and then the Code attempt to alter economic structures, the 
Communists saw an opportunity to capitalise on discontent in the countryside. By 
inculcating themselves in the realm of professional representation, they were able to 
challenge De Gaulle's new Republic through the proxy of agricultural syndicalism. 
MODEF was a means to gather organisations opposed to the FNSEA into a more 
cohesive and effective structure under the aegis of Communist leadership. 274   
 The FNSEA had long been all but a footnote in the Midi’s syndical tradition, 
reckoned by some to be “sans aucune influence”.275 Whilst the FNSEA was readily 
criticised for representing only large scale agricultural interests, MODEF was intended 
to be a champion of smallholders. In this vein, it allied well with the demographics of 
Languedocian winegrowers, embodying the far left heritage which had called for 
smallholder representation since the aftermath of 1907. MODEF was the natural 
inheritor of the Ligue, both in terms of its attachment to the PCF and also in its 
personnel, with Emilien Soulié, former vice-President of the Ligue now installed as one 
of the founding heads of MODEF.276 In reality, the Ligue “s’intègre peu à peu dans le 
MODEF, dont elle prend le nom, dans lequel Emilien Soulié joue un rôle national.”277 It 
was another indication that the representation of Languedocian vignerons had come to 
be dominated by increasingly radical left-wing groups. Perceived crises of 
representation, following the underwhelming successes in gaining concessions from 
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the government, led to further splinter-groups attempting to rejuvenate the Défense 
movement. 
 As direct action became the preferred means of mobilisation, the Défense 
movement began to strike an increasingly intimidating figure in the media. The photo 
journal Paris-Match published a photo-essay on the phenomenon of the mobilised Midi, 
photographing the peaceful demonstration which took place on 19 April 1959.278 This 
piece was designed to show the depth of feeling which motivated protest, conveying to 
the centre an image of the periphery which set it apart. The beginning of the 1960s was 
perhaps the sea change moment in the Défense du vin movement. Indeed, this is 
reflected in the reports of the Renseignements Généraux (RG), which describe a “nouvelle 
vague de mécontentement chez les viticulteurs”.279 The new representative groups 
formed in the 1950s would mature into more discrete and articulated bodies in the 
1960s, garnering further support for their direct action. Likewise, the interpenetration 
of local elites with the representative bodies of the wine industry would continue, as 
the Défense movement capitalised on the dynamic political situation to place itself at 
the centre of debate. The atomisation of the sprawling Défense movement was to prove 
an important factor in motivating further episodes of protest, as the increasingly 
politicised Défense groups began to assert themselves in the turbulent climate of the 
1960s. 
 Differing responses to the endemic problems of the Midi wine industry allowed 
the gradual evolution of the movement as it distanced itself from the moderate 
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professional bodies which governed it after the war. Building upon successive waves 
of rejuvenation, the movement drew closer to the elites of the region, as SFIO Deputies 
sought to face off the challenge of the PCF. Reflexive legitimisation saw Mayors and 
Deputies seek to identify themselves with the developing regional powerhouse of the 
Défense movement, and protesters seek validation from traditional political 
figureheads. Yet, as the proportional electoral lists of the Fourth Republic were 
succeeded by the Fifth’s stable majority consensus, so the ability of ‘Wine Deputies’ to 
represent the south’s interests in parliament declined. Likewise, the continuing 
exclusion of the PCF from the political mainstream strengthened their recourse to 
alternative methods of opposition, particularly in their sponsoring of agricultural 
syndical groups like MODEF and the Ligue. A change in Republic heralded a defining 
moment for the political maturity of the Défense movement by removing the volatility 
that had allowed ‘Wine Deputies’ to act as a legitimising force for the Défense groups. 
This fact alone evinced a change in the dynamic of debate, as the Défense groups of the 
South now had to work harder to get their views across and the SFIO lost some of its 
purchase on the movement. 
 Ultimately, many of these qualities would be reconciled within the CRAV, 
which came to represent the dynamic force in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. 
By combining immediacy of action, a radical message, historical lineage and a sense of 
grievance, the CRAV inherited and developed the ideological mantle of the ‘Défense’ 
movement’s collective experience. By housing this inheritance within one organisation, 
the CRAV became the most articulate voice of the Midi vignerons and their most 
fervent champion. The CRAV was the latest manifestation of a long regional history of 
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mobilisation to defend the economic interests, and way of life, of Midi winegrowers. 
The “Défense du vin” movement had assumed various guises but always drew upon 





Chapter 3:  
Old Wine in Nouvelles Vagues: The unified 
Défense movement 
 
Even as production levels recovered, the consumption of wine was falling across 
France. The resultant crises des méventes channelled memories of 1907 through the very 
cooperative structures which the government had helped to create. Although they had 
been intended to serve as conduits of modernisation, these cooperatives soon became 
bastions of productivism. 280 Yet the frailties of 1907's wine movement were also shown 
to be constant characteristics of Languedocian representation. Specifically, the fractious 
relationship between Communists and Socialists invoked the uneasy tussling between 
Albert and Ferroul.  An opportunity had arisen for a group to capitalise on the ever 
more radical atmosphere which pervaded Languedocian viticulture. This group would 
unite the Défense movement behind the message of 1907 and emphasise the direct 
action and mobilisation which had come from the Défense movement's turbulent post-
war experience. 
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 The launch of a formalised CRAV took place in Narbonne on 27 June 1961, with 
André Castera presiding over the meeting.281 Born in 1924, Castera was an Audois 
smallholder pressured into a career of syndical representation by the strains of 
supporting an invalid father on the meagre income of his vines. Lionised in the region 
as both a “tribune” and the “Napoléon des vignes”,282 he was perhaps the defining 
figure of the CRAV, while being described by France-Dimanche as “Castéra le 
terrible”.283 
  
André Castera addressing a demonstration in Carcassonne flanked by CRS 284 
Castera, in his turn, wore the strains of life as a vigneron proudly: thin, with a gaunt 
face and an intimate knowledge of the region’s suffering – for Maffre-Beaugé he was 
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“le Christ des Corbiѐres”.285  Formed as an offshoot of the CGVM, of which Castera had 
been secretary in 1951,286 the newly constituted CRAV was intended to channel the 
unrest of the 1950s into a more focused and directed movement which could achieve 
tangible goals. The sudden crystallisation of protest in the summer of 1961 relied on 
the ability of the CRAV to circumvent the schisms which had hampered unity in the 
1950s.  
 
The Summer of '61 and the consolidation of the Défense movement 
The summer of 1961 was a compelling moment in the Languedoc's history, 
when the legacy of 1907 combined with the experience of post-war reconstruction. 
Thunder and lightning foreshadowed this turbulence as the south was battered by the 
same portentous summer storms that had assaulted that year’s harvest. Vignerons took 
to the barricades, paralysing the arterial roads of the region in protest at the sharp 
decline of prices.287 The protest was not a Lear-esque railing against the elements, 
however, but one focussed on the lack of human compassion shown by authorities to 
their plight. Tractors circled the streets of Carcassonne in convoy and 2,000 vignerons 
invaded Limoux, whilst traffic in Béziers and Lézignan-Corbières was held up in a 
demonstration of region-wide dissatisfaction with institutional responses to the 
crisis.288 That this protest represented something new was demonstrated by the 
increasing violence involved. The government sent the CRS into Béziers, launching 
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tear-gas into crowds of vignerons in an attempt to protect the rail stations from 
protestors who had already suspended road traffic. The protestors seemed to come off 
somewhat better in the ensuing scuffle: of the 26 wounded 9 were CRS, 14 local police 
and only 3 were protestors.289 The mood of the occasion was summed up by a 
winegrower's placard pictured in the Dépêche newspaper: “Pas discours – des actes – 
Les vignerons veulent vivre.”290  
The scale of the summer demonstrations in the Languedoc was such that 
regional newspapers relegated coverage of the imminent second act of the Evian 
agreement to later pages, supplanting leaders on France’s 'colonial problems' with 
pictures of vignerons en colère. The CAV d’Aude under Castera issued a statement 
condemning excessive imports, abusive ‘fiscalité’291 and demanding the formation of a 
body to enforce minimum prices.292 Although Algerian politics had been relegated to 
page 2 in the Midi, Algerian wine imports remained on the front page in a reflection of 
the more pressing concern. These demands were summarised in a call for a “retour à 
l’esprit social de l’ancien Code du vin.”293 The recourse to the spirit of the Statut viticole 
(the Code’s 'ancien' predecessor) evoked the spectre of 1907 and the demonstrators who 
ushered in that particular government concession. Likewise, the demonstrations 
continued during the Festival period in Béziers, allowing the free circulation of 
winegrowers during a relatively quiet part of the agricultural calendar and 
demonstrating the social upheaval often celebrated in the practice of local Southern 
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festivals. This setting linked the protest to an articulation of regional identity, making 
plain the sheer number of like-minded winegrowers and their inherent potential for 
mobilisation. This was part of a national change taking place in the agricultural sector 
as la France paysanne repositioned itself in the Fifth Republic. Yet it was also 
conditioned by the Languedoc’s specific heritage of viticultural mobilisation. The 
consistency of the message which winegrowers were articulating connected it with the 
demands of the Ligue and the CRSV and their forebears in the Comité d'Argeliers. In 
highlighting imports and fraud as the root cause of the Midi's problems, they were 
retooling the rhetoric of 1907 in a national debate and continuing an historic struggle in 
the peripheries of the Republic. 
The summer of 1961 also saw demonstrations take place in rural Brittany, as 
farmers burnt ballot boxes in a symbolic show of discontent.294 Their grievances were 
broadly linked to those of the Languedocian vignerons and represented a turbulent 
period at the beginning of the Fifth Republic in which periphery groups struggled with 
changing power structures. Government agricultural reforms in 1960 had introduced 
the promise of sociétés d'aménagement foncier et d'établissement rural (SAFER), 
organisations centred on each department which would have first refusal on 
agricultural land sales. The intention was that they would then offer plots to younger 
farmers and prevent the ever greater consolidation of land in the hands of wealthy 
agriculturalists. This was a policy greatly desired by unions representing young 
growers, but which ran into trouble as the initial orientation law which would facilitate 
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SAFERs passed through the Senate, being vetoed three times before the lower house 
intervened to pass it.295 Subsequent problems lay in bureaucratic dithering, as the bills 
to make the orientation law effective did not transpire.  The promise to include 
younger growers (and their subsequent disappointment) was the start of a mooted 
“révolution silencieuse” in which younger farmers began to take a more active role in 
reviving peasant protest as a means of communicating with government.296 Indeed, RG 
reports on the Languedocian demonstrations again described the formation of a 
"nouvelle vague chez les viticulteurs" in response to the dithering of central 
government.297 That it referred to developments outside the Languedoc was made clear 
by anti-Gaullist propaganda seemingly produced by the Ligue and distributed by 
young growers at demonstrations in July. This document featured six crosses of 
Lorraine, with an indictment beside each one: 
 
The text reads: 
Mensonges à Désonheur [sic. read Déshonneur]. 
Provocation. Désintégration Nationale. Du sang 
sur les mains. Gestapo, dictature. Opium du 
peuple Français. 
 
RG reproduction of anti-Gaullist propaganda298 
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Such strong indictments of national politics stressed the extent to which the 
demonstrations of 1961 were as much about De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic as they 
were about falling wine prices. The bungling of the SAFER initiative had, in the 
Languedoc, plugged into the turbulence which had radicalised the Défense movement 
throughout the 1950s, ensuring a youthful intake at the start of the 1960s.  
 Yet, amongst this "nouvelle vague", political engagement was not allied to 
mobilisation. Although both the Socialists and the Communists sought to court 
winegrowers, RG reports acknowledged that: 
Afin de ne pas risquer d'être pris de court par les communistes de la 
Ligue des Petits et Moyens viticulteurs, ces jeunes éléments ont voulu 
montrer de la sorte aux hésitants qu'ils étaient capables de ne pas 
s'embarrasser de considérations autres que professionnelles et que le 
monopole de l'action n'est en aucun cas le privilège de l'extrême 
gauche.299 
 
Thus, the newly mobilised growers who participated in the turbulent Summer 
demonstrations of 1961 had been radicalised both by the Languedoc's own syndical 
heritage and also the national debate on agricultural reform. Yet, the ability of national 
political parties to control this regional movement was weak and the new intake of 
younger growers into the radical movement helped heal the divisions of the 1950s. The 
protests of 1961 would help to crystallise a politically independent Défense movement 
in a spirit of contestatory mobilisation.   
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Political engagement with the protests 
As the streets of Béziers filled with winegrowers, other cities came out in 
support. Demonstrations continued on 28 June, as 3,000 vignerons occupied Narbonne 
with 15 barricades bringing the city to a standstill.300 This sudden wave of 
demonstrations highlighted once more the potential for mass mobilisation across the 
Languedoc and combined potently with the revival of 1907's rhetoric. Echoing the tone 
of Marcelin Albert's army of 'les gueux', winegrowers accused the government of being 
unsympathetic to the desperate plight of vignerons. The repeated employment of the 
CRS to break up demonstrations and dismantle barricades seemed to indicate to 
protestors that the maintenance of order ranked higher than the economic needs of the 
Midi. Indicative of this mood is another placard of a demonstrator, which bore the 
slogan: “De Gaulle contre les barrages; les vignerons contre l’esclavage.”301 An 
significant demonstration in Béziers on 7 July saw around 13,000 people take to the 
street as protestors and CRS clashed again.302  Tear gas was used and the Provençal 
daily La Marseillaise accused the CRS of going to war with vignerons.303  This 
vocabulary helped establish a conceptual distance between regional protestors and 
their challengers. Rhetoric was not directed openly against the Republic but rather 
against an unsympathetic government using troops to break protests and with De 
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Gaulle at its head.304 Once again the suggestion of regionalism impacted upon the 
relationship between winegrowers and the national political parties. 
The way in which parties attempted to capitalise on this regional difference was 
indicative of the changing relationship between the Défense movement and national 
politics. The 'Wine Deputies' Guille and Bayou addressed large audiences as they 
sought to highlight the SFIO's opposition to government, positioning themselves as 
strong critics of Debré and De Gaulle's achievements in developing the national 
economy. RG reports related Guille's address to winegrowers: 
L'orateur s'étonne en ce qui concerne l'agriculture que pour la première 
fois dans l'Histoire le malaise soit général et simultané dans toute la 
France. Il s'élève contre la fiscalité de plus en plus excessive, qui ne 
permettra pas à nos produits d'entrer en compétition dans des 
conditions satisfaisantes avec les vins italiens en particulier.305 
 
 
Once more, reference was made to the role that government could play in reducing the 
burden of foreign imports,306 with taxation forming a central grievance to winegrowers. 
For the SFIO, opposition to the government and criticism of the prevailing economic 
climate was more acceptably communicated in the language of the Republic. Since 
1907, the Socialists had been unable to engage with the regional import of the Défense 
movement's more radical demands. Guille's focus on the context of national downturn 
                                                          
304 The links between the Défense movement and Bretons will be explored in the Chapter 4, 
dealing extensively with the grand social alliance of occupational and regional identity which 
fuelled the burgeoning success of the Défense movement during this period. 
305 RG, 'Large audience socialiste chez les ruraux héraultais', 26/06/1961 - ADH 785W20. 
306 As an aside, there was no CRAV equivalent within Italy. Italian winegrowers, principally in 
the South, had a much more conservative tradition and their leaders were less likely to 
encourage mass mobilisation. Loubère notes their tendency to jacqueries rather than coordinated 
protest and speculates that this may have been the reason that a comparable 'winegrower's 




and attempts to diminish the singular character of the Languedoc seemed to echo the 
stance of Jaurès in 1907. 
 The Communist Party, however, was more ready to openly criticise systemic 
failings and distributed a wealth of leaflets to demonstrators in 1959 outlining their 
viticultural program. They sought once more to capitalise on existing political 
mobilisation. Just as in previous movements, the extreme left was attempting to divide 
the 'inter-classiste' platform in service of their own political interests.307 RG reports had 
observed that since the end of the 1950s, the PCF's efforts to scale up their presence in 
the Languedoc had been driving Socialists to defend their patch. 
Dans le département de l'Hérault le PCF cherche à étendre le champ 
d'activité des comités locaux aux partis politiques, initiative que les 
dirigeants fédéraux de la SFIO ont décidé de repousser.308 
 
 The SFIO was forced to intensify their attempts to undercut the Communists, 
producing pamphlets which highlighted their engagement with Stalinism and the 
realities of the Terror in the Soviet Union. Challenging Jacobin centralism paled beside 
the excesses of Soviet brutality which had become clear towards the end of the 1950s. 
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SFIO publication highlighting the PCF's association with Stalinism309 
As long as the PCF continued to try to involve itself in viticultural radicalism in this 
way, prominent figures associated with the SFIO had to ensure they remained relevant 
to the Défense movement. Sniping at the Communists was less effective than actually 
appealing to winegrowers, however. Local politicians were thus not slow to address 
these demonstrations, even in absentia, as Jean-Baptiste Benet - President of the 
Syndicat des Vignerons - telegrammed from Strasbourg to assure winegrowers of his 
“entière solidarité.”310 Alongside Deputies like Guille and Bayou, the support of local 
political elites strengthened the movement, binding it into the narrative of acceptable 
regional protest. 
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 There was a creeping unease with the toxic political tussling at the heart of the 
Défense movement, however. The sniping between PCF and SFIO which had 
characterised the 1950s had begun to overshadow yet another debate, shifting the focus 
away from the need for reform in the wine industry. This unease was shown most 
plainly in the ‘Comité local apolitique de défense de la viticulture’ which sprang up in 
Capestang in the Hérault as winegrowers sought to refocus the debate away from 
national political parties.311 This group was formed as a direct snub to the Ligue, which 
had been attempting for some time to install a local representative section. This was 
one of the first clear rejections of the Communist agenda, and one of the first moments 
in which we see the Midi vignerons attempting to regain some of the apolitical appeal 
which had characterised the success of the 1907 revolts. The CRAV, which lay close to 
the CGVM as a militant offshoot, was perfectly placed to capitalise and encourage this 
move away from national political parties. Castera's past presidency of the CGVM 
drew him back towards engaging with that body's long-standing, apoliticism. An 
emerging figure, Achille Gauch created a new group called the Jeunes Viticulteurs (JV) 
on the 20 July in Béziers, calling on them to forge their own direction and vowing “une 
étude approfondie des moyens d’action.”312 This movement revealed a refusal by 
prominent members (such as the ubiquitous Maffre-Beaugé and Gauch) to allow the 
Ligue to become the sole dynamic element in viticultural protest.313 
 Yet, no sooner had Gauch called for this study than the CGVM moved to adopt 
the JV into its ranks, seeking to appropriate a modicum of their dynamism to assist the 
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“rajeunissement des cadres de son syndicat”.314 This was no mere political shuffling, 
however, and represented a far more significant turn. In essence, the CGVM’s 
overtures showed the traditional structures of the Midi viticole (with the CGVM having 
been a direct product of 1907) regenerating themselves and finding their purpose once 
more. With Castera and the CRAV operating as an effective offshoot of the CGVM, the 
JV were drawn under their aegis, housing the most effective leaders of the Défense 
movement within the same structures. Castera and Gauch would remain important 
figures throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. Importantly, Gauch was an 
independent winegrower who was not part of a cooperative. Indeed, in 1978, he would 
become the President of the Confédération Nationale des Caves Particulières. Gauch's 
involvement ensured that the CRAV were representing not only cooperative wineries 
but also independent smallholders. They remained steadfast in their opposition to the 
dominance of large domaines and the prevalence of blending wineries which continued 
the demand for foreign imports. This convergence between different categories of 
growers helped buttress the representative legitimacy of the CRAV. Likewise, it drew 
towards it increasingly youthful members, driving the 'rajeunissement' so needed in 
the syndical structures of the Languedoc.  
 
Cases and les jeunes 
 On 26 August 1961, André Cases gathered a group of young winegrowers to 
consider new forms of action which might solve the problems of the wine industry. 
The 23 year old was much younger than established figures like Castera and possessed 
                                                          




a pugnacious quality which would endear him to the masse viticole. Cases was very 
much a man of the region, a rugby-playing smallholder born in 1936 and drawn to 
viticultural politics after working his own vines. Playing fly-half for a collection of 
regional rugby teams, he was well versed in leading the back line and coordinating 
attacks.315 He named this newly formed offshoot of the Jeunesse Agricole Catholique, the 
Cercle des jeunes agriculteurs. Posing for pictures in the Indépendant, Cases 
acknowledged the creation of both the JV and the CRAV earlier that year. Crucially, he 
clarified that he was not setting himself up in competition with these groups, but 
rather seeking to collaborate with them in finding new solutions to old problems. In 
respect for the CGVM and the nascent CRAV, he described his role as "siéger à côté des 
anciens, les uns représentant, selon Castera, la pensée, les autres, l'action."316 The direct 
action which had been central to the formation of the CRAV was assured a 
continuingly important role by these jeunes radicals. Whilst 1961 had seen the 
establishment of several different Défense groups, however, this was not an echo of the 
divisive politicisation of the 1950s. Whereas the CRSV, the Ligue and the CMA had 
jostled for position, creating a representative crisis, the CRAV operated as a central 
pole drawing towards it young and innovative groups like the JV and Cases' Cercle. 
Likewise, their distance from national political bodies anchored them in occupational 
identity and dispelled some of the old partisanship which had so disfigured previous 
movements. 
Emmanuel Maffre-Beaugé’s attempts to engage with the JV and the Cercle to 
heal traditional divides were not welcomed in some newspapers, where his desire to 
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re-energise local movements was seen as patronising. La Marseillaise criticised Maffre-
Beaugé for himself being a large producer, with between 5,000 and 6,000 HL at his plot 
in Belarga, and intimated that his rich man’s play at politics was unwelcome. Indeed, 
so critical were they that they advised him to “retournez à vos jeux de golf ou autres 
amusements.” Their criticism was in fact levelled at his entire movement, which they 
characterised as “les fils de gros viticulteurs aux mains blanches”, with little relevance 
to impoverished small producers.317 This attitude can perhaps be partially attached to 
the inherent sympathy La Marseillaise afforded to the activities of the Ligue and a 
recitation of Ferroul's fractious rhetoric. The Midi Libre, however, afforded him 
somewhat more right of expression, as they printed an article in which he called for 
greater solidarity amongst competing and politicised representative groups. The stance 
of the Midi-Libre was important in forging a regional 'inter-classiste' movement which 
combined small-holders and cooperative growers with larger independent vignerons. 
Maffre-Beaugé’s engagement with figures like Gauch, Cases and Castera at this crucial 
moment was inextricably tied to the unitary heritage of 1907. Whilst courting this 
apolitical movement, he invoked the vernacular of regionalism as he spoke of a Midi 
which “semble avoir été retranchée de la carte de France tant les pouvoirs publics 
l’ignorent.”318 
  The Summer of '61 was a formative moment in the evolution of the CRAV and 
its approach to mobilisation and direct action. In reality, the recognizable CRAV of the 
mid-60s onwards was a product of the course taken by the developing model of 
‘Défense’ articulacy and repeated attempts to consolidate the movement. Despite 
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beginning as an organisational expedient consolidating reservoirs of action within 
existing and diverse syndical groups, the CRAV emerged as an effective mantle for co-
ordinated inter-mural action not bound to political parties. Rather than being “issue de 
la Ligue”, the CRSV or the CMA, it represented a generational shift embodied in 
leaders like Castera and Gauch. Its durability seems to be the result of ‘la permanence 
du crise’ as the CRAV was transformed from a problem-solving expedient into an 
actual structure, retaining its initial functions whilst accruing more by virtue of its 
unique position. 
However, amidst this renewal there was destruction. On 29 July 1961, 
commando attacks were carried out on the railway connecting Bordeaux and 
Marseille.319 Such attacks became a symptom of the decentralisation of power 
structures within the Défense movement. If the Ligue had successfully decoupled 
direct action from organisations like the CGVM, then the JV and the CRAV had 
brought it back to regional organisations and begun to decouple it from the national 
political parties. Direct action became the recourse of the disgruntled vigneron, 
unbidden by larger bodies. This is not to diminish the role of organisational 
committees in inciting these demonstrations, but to observe that new reservoirs of 
action were pooling around village-halls and cafés as representation increasingly 
centred on individuals and communities rather than cooperatives and counsellors. This 
was a dangerous trend for the larger bodies, who felt their relevance being eroded by 
this atomisation of protest. Even amongst Communists, there was a realisation that 
after the campaign of sabotage which had begun there was a “nécessité d’une reprise 
de l’action de masse préférable à celle des commandos.” Popular support was with the 
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vignerons, as RG reports judged that reactions to governmental measures were 
“franchement défavorables et se traduisent par de la déception et de l’amertume.”  The 
JV in particular were keen to express ‘l’exaspération des masses paysannes”.320  
Maffre-Beaugé recalls how the frost of 1963 crystallised a change in his 
character, as he grouped together like-minded friends on a quasi-evangelical quest to 
agitate for change across the region. The harsh frost which caused such damage to the 
harvest in February 1963 was an historic occurrence in the Midi, as temperatures 
dropped to between -18˚C and -20˚C.321 Occurring so soon after the problems of the 
1950s, vignerons were reminded more than ever of the insecurity of their occupation. 
From village to village, Maffre-Beaugé railed against the iniquities of the wine market 
and sought to outline basic standards for the government to set in order to ameliorate 
the miserable plight of the winemakers. Even in these means of representation there 
was a shift towards the “rajeunissement des structures syndicales”. This desire was 
grounded both in the atmosphere of renewal that groups like the JV and Cases' Cercle 
were creating and a sense that syndical organisations like the FAV were not pushing 
hard enough for direct action to communicate grievances. The legitimate syndical 
organisations and the CRAV served mutually reinforcing roles which often intersected 
yet remained functionally distinct. This reservoir of action among young vignerons 
would lead to a rebirth of the CRAV as a political force. As a militant movement at 
once part of the traditional structures but simultaneously outside of them, the 
incorporation of youth groups allowed it to push for greater radicalism within central 
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structures. The CRAV could become the vanguard of viticultural syndicalism: “il ne 
suffisait pas de détruire le travail précédent, mais d’y participer en l’amendant.”322 
With Maffre-Beaugé and Gauch pre-eminent in both the JV and the CRAV, the 
two groups began to blend as distinctions blurred slightly. Maffre-Beaugé was the 
figure that Communists had been lacking since Ferroul, more able to operate in the 
political mainstream of the Languedoc than predecessors like Calas had been. 
Increasingly, Maffre-Beaugé’s name appeared on alternate letter-heads, denoting the 
increasing inter-changeability of both CRAV and JV at this point. Maffre-Beaugé had 
managed to break the pattern of Communist 'spoiling tactics' which had plagued their 
engagement with viticultural activism. Whilst the CRAV conducted and directed 
policy at a regional level and Castera led the CAV in the Aude, the JV defended its 
agenda at a Departmental level, securing the Hérault as a supportive base of 
operations. The CRAV’s agenda had become predominant as the JV laid the ground-
work of later direct action. As the JV leadership became that of the CRAV, 
Departmental successes in the Hérault were extended across the Midi. The CRAV was 
becoming a mass movement and a powerful social force in the Midi. 
 
'La permanence': Why now? 
 After the tumultuous summer of 1961, the CRAV was clearly on its way to 
becoming a prominent force in the Languedoc viticole. The unity which it forged in 
subsequent years ensured that this prominence would endure. When considering the 
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sudden permanence of the CRAV, however, it is insufficient merely to point to a poor 
wine market and the outcome of politicking in the representative organisations. This is 
especially true if we examine more closely the context in which the CRAV’s rise to 
prominence took place between 1961 and 1976. The increasing popularity of peasant 
memoirs and rural research from the mid 1960s until the 1980s suggests that this 
process was repeated across France. Sarah Farmer diagnoses a certain fascination with 
the countryside which began in crowded urban environments and encapsulated 
changing visions of the countryside. These changes, in perspective, arose partly from 
new 'settlers' in the countryside, as environmentalism and second-homeowners began 
to establish themselves as fixtures in France's rural hinterlands. Between the realities of 
France's increasingly modern consumer society and the precarious existence of a 
peasantry at odds with this modernity came a certain fetishisation of "charming" and 
"out-dated" ways of life.323 In addition, those, like the sociologist Henri Mendras, who 
studied the countryside began to diagnose the possible disappearance of the French 
peasantry as a vital force in the nation.324 Yet in the Languedoc, this process remained 
less prominent than elsewhere and tourism rather than absentee-ownership 
characterised the region's interactions with the metropolitan centre. Cases accused the 
government of consigning Midi vignerons to little more than an historical curio, 
disappearing except as a snapshot for touristic postcards.325 In defiance, this same 
period witnessed a revival in the Languedoc's celebration of its distinct character and 
distance from the North, as we shall see. 
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Nationally, the peasant violence of 1961 had forced the government into 
conceding to further reform. The orientation law which promised SAFERs was 
strengthened by the "Pisani Charter", named after Edgard Pisani, the Minister of 
Agriculture. This ensured that young growers would be given a better chance to 
acquire agricultural land which came onto the market. Yet this charter would not 
escape criticism. As G. Wright observes, it was denounced by both the right and the 
Communists as placing too much power in the hands of an unaccountable organ of the 
state.326 This in turn seemed to indicate a “neo-corporatist” turn in national policy, one 
which would favour the negotiation of centralised national unions over the boisterous 
regional organisations which had fuelled protest in the Languedoc and Brittany.327 In 
the Languedoc, however, the SAFERs presented an interesting pitfall, whereby young 
growers offered preferential sale could buy up marginal vineyards and uproot them 
for subsidy as part of the arrachage programmes. Interviewees suggested that this had 
been viewed by some young growers as a canny way to fund a move away from the 
countryside at the government's expense, though denounced by vignerons as 
demonstrating the destructive potential of arrachage. Again, the notion that the 
Languedoc's heritage was being torn up for the sake of short-term remuneration 
encouraged resistance to Pisani's plan.328 
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As such, the Languedoc's revival of rural protest was rooted in its own 
experience of rebellious difference. The establishment of a monument to Marcelin 
Albert, the undoubted figurehead of 1907, was an important moment in cementing the 
historical relevancy of the revolt in the regional consciousness. As Maffre-Beaugé, 
Gauch and Castera had healed the cracks in the Défense movement, Albert's inter-
classiste legacy became more important than ever. Emily McCaffrey points out that the 
most significant reprisal of Occitan politics in more than a century had taken place in 
the 1960s and 1970s, when economic pressure was at its most intense for the residents 
of the Midi.329 This pressure was a significant factor in binding 1907 into the collective 
consciousness of the region, and a telling influence on the reinterpretation of events to 
form a vital part of a mythical narrative. The funding for the project came from diverse 
local sources: private donations, syndical donations and money given by local 
administrations. The announcement of the monument was made in 1962, bookended 
by the viticultural protests of 1961 and 1963 and opened to donations at that point, 
seeking to capitalise on the fervour and dynamism which the protests had injected into 
local viticultural groups.330 The monument was announced following the 40th 
anniversary of Albert's death, which the CGVM and Comité Marcelin Albert, 
describing themselves as “les fils et les petits-fils de ‘Ceux d’Argeliers”,   were adamant 
would not pass “dans l’oubli et l’indifférence.”331 Indeed, the monument unveiled in 
honour of Albert, prefaced a reinvigoration of the Occitan movement and wrote 1907 
into the story of Occitanie.  The mayor of Argeliers, the town which hosted the famous 
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committee which had coordinated the events of 1907, claimed that the erection of the 
monument meant “justice est rendue” and that “le voile de l’oubli est tombé”.332  In this 
vein, regional press began to refer to the events of 1907 as an episode in which the 
region had “payaient dans le sang le prix de cette juste colère.”333  
 Yet, if the heritage of the Défense movement was the motor for strengthening 
the CRAV, then it still required fuel. The specific issue of imports had driven protest in 
1961 and would continue to dominate the Défense movement's agenda. Thus, the wave 
of minor sabotage which had started in 1961 and continued well into 1963, can be seen 
as the birth of the CRAV in its mature form. The smashing of Algerian wine bottles on 
18 March was a pivotal moment which characterized and influenced later discourse 
and methods of protest. One year after the signing of the Evian Accord, this act served 
as a timely reminder that France’s Algerian policies were still hurting the Midi. As the 
leaders of the Défense movement gathered for a large meeting to discuss the threat of 
imported wine, they posed for the cameras and smashed bottles of foreign wine in the 
road outside. The only place for this wine, they felt, was the gutter. The involvement of 
Maffre-Beaugé, Benet and others ensured that this act would be linked with the 
mainstream viticultural movement. As the leaders gathered, smoking, laughing and 
jeering as they poured the wine down the drains, a new model for action was formed. 
The regional nature of the movement likewise foreshadowed greater coordinated inter-
departmental action between the various Défense groups of the Midi viticole, by 
bringing together groups under the aegis of direct action.  
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Winegrowers smash bottles of Algerian wines334 
 RG reports from the period report a swell of ill-feeling growing amongst 
vignerons and warned that “ce mécontentement se cristallise sur l’importation des vins 
algériens.”335 Despite existing grievances surrounding Algerian wine, it is significant 
that growing disenchantment articulated by the leaders of the viticultural movement 
centred on a targeted rejection of the imports of a specific nation’s wine. Responding to 
a CRS officer’s query as to their motivations, one vigneron posed him a hypothetical 
situation: “Supposez qu'on vous quitte le costume et qu'on le mette à un Algérien et, en 
plus, qu'on lui donne votre paye. Est-ce que vous seriez content?”336 Winegrowers 
feared that the end of the Algerian war would neither end Algerian imports nor halt 
the growth of Algerian production. This new consensus agenda focussed the ire of the 
Midi, encouraging an increase in unified action over the following months. In 
particular, police warned superiors that this had unified opinion against the 
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government: "Les milieux dirigeants et les masses viticoles sont actuellement 
dangereusement sensibles aux importations algériens."337 Yet even as the Défense 
movement railed against Algerian imports, their replacement was starting to become 
obvious to those in power. On 14 January 1962, the Dutch born Commissioner for 
European Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt and the French Agriculture Minister Edgard 
Pisani had co-signed the documents which ended a marathon session of discussions 
and would begin the second step of integration leading to the European Common 
Market338 
A Deputy of the Hérault, Paul Coste-Floret, launched a scathing attack on 
Pisani, citing the decision to lower the minimum price of wine without seeking advice 
from the wine lobby as “un bel exemple de son incompréhension, de son injustice et de 
sa mauvaise volonté.”339 Although the CRAV was moving away from reliance on 
national political parties, the intervention of the MRP Deputy was welcomed. The fact 
that their support was coming from the centre and not from the Socialists, however, 
was a significant indicator that historic relationships were being tentatively 
renegotiated. As a result, the JV immediately reiterated Coste-Floret's criticism, 
declaring that any merchant who sold wine at this price would be subject to ‘la colère 
des vignerons mécontents.”340 Achille Gauch also published a communiqué lamenting 
the “panique” which had seized the Midi wine industry, placing the blame squarely at 
the inundation of the market by foreign wines. Denouncing “les vins de BEN BELLA”, 
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Gauch argued that the French government should respect the laws it set itself to 
protect French citizens and attempt to stabilise the market by halting imports.341 Later, 
Achille Gauch and Maffre-Beaugé would lead a meeting on 11 May 1965 in which they 
advocated that all syndical organisations boycott Pisani’s visit to the region, in protest 
at his policies as Agriculture Minister.342 In a piece of wordplay, the JV condemned 
Pisani’s reluctance to engage on equal terms with the winegrowers of the Midi by 
printing leaflets for distribution during his visit: “Quand Pisa Nie – Alger Rit.”343 
Pisani's involvement in strengthening the imports which challenged Languedocian 
winegrowers rendered him a perennial hate figure and a target for the new leaders of 
the Défense movement. 
Whilst figures such as Maffre-Beaugé, Gauch and Castera formed a radical 
leadership which was bound to the traditions of the region, the increasingly ‘jeune’ and 
radical character of the movement was symptomatic of a developing dynamism within 
the Défense movement. Yet, unlike in decades previous, this dynamism served to 
reinforce and reinvigorate the Défense movement instead of fuelling division within it. 
In a direct illustration of this trend, André Cases,344 who would become ever more 
central to the CRAV, took up his first prominent leadership task. The 25 year old 
Audois smallholder led the hi-jacking of a tanker containing 1,000 HL of Algerian wine 
on 21 November 1963, near Limoux.345 His involvement in commando actions at such 
an early age would set him up as a raucous tribune for CRAVistes and, eventually, a 
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worthy successor to Castera. This opposition to imports erupted as mass 
demonstrations shook the Midi on a larger scale than in preceding years. On 16 
December 1963, some 20,000 vignerons took to the streets, barricading roads with 
burning carts from Nimes across to Lézignan.346 The CRS were again sent to meet the 
crowd with tear-gas grenades in an attempt to shatter the lines. 23 vignerons were 
arrested in the turbulent day of protest as the CRS swept the region. Imports and fraud 
continued to be the buzzwords of the 1960s, inflaming the passions of winegrowers 
who felt under siege from various external pressures. In their long meditation on the 
Languedoc's wine industry, La Révolte du Midi, Cases and Castera argued that Midi 
winegrowers had never protested specifically against Algerian wines nor against Italian 
imports, but rather they opposed the disproportionate impact these imports had on the 
Midi.347 Whilst recognising that France had to play a role in the economic 
reconstruction of Algeria, they believed that a Parisian concession had ridden rough-
shod over the interests of their region.348  
In an echo of 1907, mass protests swept the Midi once more in 1967 as the 
“capitales de gros rouges” burned with the indignation of an estimated 60,000 
viticulteurs (30,000 in Montpellier, 25,000 in Carcassonne and 8,000 in Draguignan).349 
The Evian Accords signed to end the Algerian war in 1962 had been revealed to 
contain certain clauses which provided for the continued import of low quality 
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Algerian wines for blending.350 These revelations caused an explosion of anger.  
Newspapers reported streets barred, cars burnt and dumped in the canal and the use 
of tear-gas by CRS. 351  Shops and restaurants were ransacked in Carcassonne as 
violence swept through the streets during the spring of 1967. Interestingly, the CAV 
d’Aude released a statement denying all responsibility for the violent protests in 
Carcassonne, placing the blame for the events firmly on the reticence of the ‘so-called’ 
local authority.352 The decentralisation of the Défense movement had ensured that 
direct action was occurring without any means of controlling it. Indeed, Castera 
himself had spoken to an assembled mass of vignerons and appealed for calm, stating 
that the government “faudrait être sourd pour ne pas nous entendre.”353 
This calm was edged, however, with the words of defiance spoken. For every 
barge which sailed up the Canal du Midi laden with imported wine, or tanker full of 
foreign produce: “il nous faudra vider les péniches et mettre le feu aux camions!” In 
particular, Castera criticised the government policy of making credit increasingly 
available as a “cadeau empoisonné.”354 RG reports specifically noted that Castera’s 
popularity amongst the villages was drawing partisan support to the viticultural 
movement, and helping to energise dissenting voices.355 The autumn of 1967 effectively 
created the legendary persona of Castera which would come to dominate the CRAV 
and the wider world of the Midi viticole. Castera sat at the head of this movement, with 
                                                          
350 Y. Gilbert & J. Meistersheim, Orateurs en Languedoc1981-1986: La recomposition d'une imaginaire 
régionale (Paris: UDR-EASA, 1986), p.42. 
351 ‘Les incidents éclatent!’, L’Indépendant 17/03/1967 – ADA31J20. 
352 ‘Manifestent violemment à Carcassonne’, Midi Libre 17/03/1967 – ADA 31J20. 
353 ‘Vingt-cinq mille viticulteurs en colère’, Midi Libre 17/03/1967 – ADA 31J20. 
354 ‘1,500 viticulteurs des Corbières se sont rassemblés mardi soir à Saint-Laurent-de-la-
Cabrerisse’, Midi Libre 09/03/1967 – ADA31J20. 
355 RG, ‘Etat d’esprit de viticuleurs’ -10/02/1967 – ADH785W49. 
150 
 
the capability to call upon tens of thousands of protestors. This charisma drew fervent 
declarations of support at gatherings: 
A la manifestation de Carcassonne il y en avait cinq milles  derrière 
un pancarte: "Vaincre ou mourir avec Castéra".356 
 
André Cases described Castera acted as a "Professeur" for a whole generation of 
CRAVistes, with 1967 his most obvious classroom. His first lesson began with reference 
to the Languedoc's history. In Narbonne, he led a large delegation of winegrowers 
firstly to negotiate with the Prefect and then to lay flowers at the monument to the 
victims of 1907. The wreath read simply "ceux de 1967 à ceux de 1907."357 The message 
was clear and Castera's association with Marcelin Albert was more than obvious to his 
army of 'pupils'. He urged the youth of the region to stand alongside their parents in 
defending the existence of their vineyards: “Si le père s’était battu, le fils ne serait pas 
parti.”358Castera was proudly aware of his roots, when asked by an interviewer, "Vous 
étiez propriétaire?" his expression notably darkened as he stated categorically, "Non, 
ouvrier." Yet, despite identifying himself as a worker, Castera was certainly more 
identifiable with Albert than with Ferroul. The protests of 1967 promised to take the 
Languedoc (according to CRAVistes) "au bord de l'insurrection."359 It was the issue of 
imports which had driven the constitution and then formalisation of the CRAV. 
Opposition to this was best expressed in the familiar vocabulary of the Languedoc 
viticole and in the context of the Défense movement's heritage. Yet the timing of this 
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new upsurge of militancy remains problematic and the proximity of 1967 to the 
epochal year of 1968 is striking.  
 
The 'insurrection' of 1967 and the 'events' of 1968 
 The demands which drove the vignerons to demonstrate in such force were 
broad and levelled against the economic system as a whole. Specific grievances fitted 
into broader assertions that the south had been impoverished by “un système 
économique basé sur l’enrichissement des banques et des grands sociétés, au détriment 
des pauvres bougres qui cultivent la terre”360 and the CRS were cast as defenders of an 
increasingly hostile alien force. At 6.30pm, the Police Commissioner Alain Aze was 
given Prefectural authorisation to begin baton charges with CRS forces in Carcassonne, 
resulting in around 30 injuries and a liberal amount of property damage.361 Protesters 
hurled abuse at the CRS in Occitan as they drew a linguistic line between themselves 
and their fellow Frenchmen in helmets. Denouncing the CRS as “Assassins, Nazis” was 
another step in introducing a dividing line exacerbated by reports that protestors sang 
the Marseillaise before every charge at police lines. In this way, vignerons set 
themselves up as protectors of a classical republicanism, aligning themselves with the 
traditional reputation of the Midi as one of the guardians of French liberty.  It was in 
Carcassonne, inextricably linked with the past by the imposing Cité médiévale, that 
more traditional resentment was felt and parallels from collective experience were 
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more easily drawn. It became the fervent desire of protestors to ensure “Que de sang 
soit venu rougir les vignes aura peut-être servi à quelque chose.” 
The 16 March was to become even more violent, however, as injuries mounted 
to 73 (including 53 CRS officers) in Carcassonne.362 Messages of solidarity flooded in 
from agricultural groups around France, with the Fédération syndicale de Puy-de-Dôme 
condemning the use of police to counter otherwise peaceful demonstrations and 
supporting the right of vignerons to protest.363 The response of the Prefecture was to 
attack both the Comité d’Action and other syndical groups for their criticisms of 
policing, instead highlighting that the only police on the protest route were there to 
signpost and not to oppress.364 After the demonstration in Carcassonne telephone lines 
were cut in Narbonne by vignerons anxious to show that they too were in full support 
of the disturbances in their département.365 The direct action coordinated by the CRAV 
and other groups in the cities spilled out into the activities of local committees in rural 
villages. The felling of telephone lines, damaging of railway tracks and blocking of 
roads with trees became means through which those who did not make the march into 
the cities could also express their colѐre. 
This new vector of protest which had come with the formalisation of the CRAV 
owed its existence to a profoundly regional narrative which drew a red line from 1907 
to 1967. Yet, as acknowledged above, it is impossible to ignore the fact that these 
developments took place in the larger context of the années 68. After the furore of 1967, 
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the otherwise momentous year of 1968 was in fact almost a non-event in the Midi. 
Despite the radicalism of the regionalist movement alongside the Défense groups, the 
rhetoric of Parisian students found little foothold in the ‘Languedocian desert’. Unlike 
the peasants who joined with students in Nantes in 1968 or those of Larzac in 1970,366 
the Midi vignerons drew greater inspiration from the anti-imports demonstrations of 
the previous year. Whereas the May Events of 1968 were seen elsewhere in France to 
“ouvre une séquence d’insubordination ouvrière”,367 this same sequence had begun 
much earlier in the Midi, as the Défense movement edged closer to open rebellion. The 
challenges issued to centralism did, however, “enlarge the geographic scope beyond 
Paris”368 and provide some extra motivation and ammunition for Occitan groups 
seeking to distance themselves from centralist France. By strengthening these groups, 
albeit symbolically, the events of 1968 provided a tonic for the Défense movement. 
Andre Cases wrote an open letter to the students and activists of May '68: 
Nous venons de vivre les manifestations des étudiants, manifestations 
de plus en plus violentes jusqu'à la capitulation des autorités 
responsables. Pour leur action et leur détermination, ces mêmes 
étudiants, que l'on a qualifiés au début "d'extrémistes", sont 
aujourd'hui compris et ces mêmes autorités qui ont essayé de les 
dissuader à tout jamais de protester en employant contre eux le 
dialogue de la matraque et des grenades, admettent maintenant qu'il 
y a un problème. De même, nous vignerons, connaissons les 
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qualificatifs d'extrémistes. Nous aussi, il nous a fallu la manifestation 
du 16 mars 67 à Carcassonne et ses blessés pour obtenir la limitation 
des importations et la règlementation du coupage...369 
 
Whilst being sympathetic to the students, Cases firmly indicated that the Défense 
movement would choose its battles. The CRAV was no revolutionary organisation and 
not committed to altering political systems. Instead, as Cases affirmed, they remained 
bound to the pressing issues of Languedocian winegrowers: the threat of imports, the 
need for strict viticultural regulation and the obligation of the government to aid 
winegrowers in moments of crisis. At 30, Cases was perhaps just a little too old for 
student demos. Likewise, with Castera having left school at 13, he was perhaps too 
detached from the lives of students and unsympathetic to intellectual critiques of 
cultural alienation.370 The CRAV's engagement with the années 68 was to come later, as 
argued by Michelle Zancarini-Fournel,371 as it careened towards the mid 1970s in a 
blaze of confrontation. The regional dynamic which this represented built upon the 
importance of les événements but remained a profoundly Méridonal story. 
The most immediate relevance of 1968 to the Midi vignerons was to be found in 
the Legislative elections which it triggered, giving Castera a chance to test his support 
base. He asked vignerons to elect him as an independently minded, centre-right wine 
candidate and break the Midi’s long association with the Socialists. As with 1907, 
interaction with Parisian politics was to taint another ‘Great Redeemer’, as Castera 
succumbed to a fate similar to that of Marcelin Albert. Edgar Faure's stint as Minister 
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for Agriculture372 coincided with Castera's sudden ascendancy within the Défense 
movement. It also meant that the Minister, himself Héraultais, struck up something of 
a relationship with the viticultural firebrand.373 In a curious coincidence, Faure’s father 
had in fact been Castera’s father’s school teacher, and the two sons enjoyed frank and 
open dialogue.374 Faure's directness pleased Castera and the Minister's assurances 
offered him hope. Relating one meeting as an example of their relationship, Castera 
recalled:  
J'ai quelqu'un qui m'a beaucoup aidé, c'est Edgar Faure. Son grand-
père avait été instituteur à Montredon. [Impersonating Faure] 
"Castera! Comment va-t-on à Montredon?" [Answering] 
"Physiquement bien, comme vous le voyez, et financièrement mal!" 
[As Faure] "On va y porter remède." [Laughs] Il avait réuni 5 ou 6 
négociants de la capitale qui tenaient le marche en main et il avait dit: 
"Si vous ne mettez pas le vin à 6,000 francs l'hecto [aside] - c'est ce que 
j'avais demandé au lieu de 5,000 - [end aside] je vous mets les douanes 
et la répression des fraudes aux trousses et vous n'gagnerez rien. 
Début juillet, il faut que le vin s'achète dans le Midi à 6,000 francs 
l'hecto" Alors, tenez-vous bien,. J'ai fait gagner des milliards, et ils s'en 
souviennent de ça.375 
 
Some believed, however, that this old pedagogic link had turned out badly and that 
Faure had played on Castera’s traditional anti-Communism to convince him to stand in 
the elections of 1968.376 Undoubtedly the fury of the previous year’s riots created a 
worry that the extreme left could profit in elections. Castera’s attempt to change the 
representation of winegrowers at the ballot-box, however, was as much an indictment 
of the prevailing ‘crise du vin’ as it was a reaction against the Ligue and the PCF.  
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This election was the beginning of many of the CRAV's problems, damaging 
the momentum they had gained up to this point. Standing as a Gaullist Union pour la 
défense de la République (UDR) candidate against the Socialist Deputy Francis Vals, 
Castera divided the vote between traditional political loyalties and occupational 
identity. Although he garnered many votes from the villages, including Montredon 
itself, he failed to oust the incumbent.377 He may, however, have taken enough votes 
from the extreme left to ensure the Socialists remained in power. This was hardly a 
personal victory and his attempt to alter the political vocabulary of the South had 
failed at this juncture. Haunted by the ghosts of 1907 and a century of political 
precedent, the viticultural lobby remained too firmly bound by tradition to the 
Socialists to abandon the party wholesale. Cases describes friends in the CRAV losing 
sleep and appearing close to tears, torn between their loyalties to Castera and the 
SFIO.378 Setting himself against the Socialist party was Castera’s fundamental mistake: 
it challenged his voters not only to reject tradition but also to question his public 
persona. Much like Marcelin Albert, his foray into politics tainted him in the eyes of the 
syndical organisations, and he was disbarred from holding further official functions 
within the various representative bodies. He graciously acknowledged his defeat in an 
article written after Francis Vals had taken 60% of the vote. 
L'histoire est un éternel recommencement: Marcelin Albert qui sauva 
le Midi en 1907, faillait être perdu en sortant de prison et en rentrant 
chez lui. Il se retira et mourut pauvre. Trente ans après, ceux qui 
l'avaient condamné lui élevèrent une statute. En 1968, le monde 
vigneron (j'insiste sur ce point) le monde vigneron en grande partie 
me refuse sa confiance, et c'est son droit. Il serait ridicule de ma part 
de vouloir m'imposer ou, en ce moment, d'accepter les flatteries plus 
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ou moins sincère de ceux qui m'ont sali. Je me retire, heureux de 
pouvoir revivre en famille et de pouvoir retourner travailler mes 
vignes.379 
 
True to his word, Castera took a back seat, retiring from the leadership of the CRAV 
and opting instead for a quiet life. Although he remained abreast of the Défense 
movement, he no longer took such a prominent role in challenging the government. 
This experience drove the CRAV away from centralised leadership and the "Napoléon 
des vignes" represented by Castera.  
 Instead of designating a leader in the mould of Castéra, the CRAV moved 
towards a rather more practical model, recognising the importance of mobilisation its 
identity. The role of ‘Porte-parole’ subtly changed the CRAV’s mode of operation, 
meaning the new leader would claim ownership of attacks and make clear the 
demands of winegrowers.380 Amongst the younger men of the CRAV, decisions were 
now to be taken by committee. This was largely the case as the group moved on, 
although it is necessary to acknowledge that Cases was to adopt the real leadership 
role. Beside him, however, Jean Vialade and other younger leaders such as Georges 
'Jojo' Fabre would become much more important. Vialade, born in 1925 in Lagrasse 
was passionately committed to both Occitan culture and winegrowing.381 His 
involvement in the CRAV was conditioned by its relationship to the CGVM, which he 
saw as deriving legitimacy from 1907, a movement he associated with Ernest Ferroul.382 
Likewise, Fabre, born in 1928 and a former paratrooper had a similarly strong bond 
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with the Languedoc through his 12HA vineyard. Although this gravelly voiced 
winegrower from Jonquières was "un nom qui n'a pas le même résonance que celui de 
[...] André Cases" he would play a moderating role in the future of the Comités 
d'action. 383 The lesson these young men384 collectively took from Castera's 
misadventure was that the CRAV needed "ni Dieu, ni César, ni tribun."385 Ironically, 
although this was not a result of 'les événements' of 1968, the decentralisation of the 
CRAV did owe a debt of gratitude to the protesters in the capital. 
This in fact conditioned the CRAV to further radicalisation, encouraging 
increasingly direct action outside accepted political norms, a result also of the way in 
which traditional syndical groups in the viticultural South had been denied their 
traditional recourse to parliamentary influence since the installation of the Fifth 
Republic.386 Both the political institutions of the new Republic and greater strides 
towards European integration ensured that vignerons were increasingly marginalised 
in national policy, and that their representative groups possessed diminishing 
influence.387 Likewise, perhaps their greatest opportunity to effect change on a national 
scale had been with the partnership of Castera and Faure. Having failed to endorse 
Castera and without any other leaders bound so closely to the Minister, the Défense 
movement lost a valuable opportunity and an important leader. The abandonment of 
this leadership model fed into the trend of atomisation which had seen local action 
committees become increasingly important in forcing the agenda of the Défense 
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movement. The commando actions which emanated from the villages were more often 
than not the spur for larger demonstrations, helping to demonstrate outside the Midi 
that direct action could spring up unbidden across the region. 
The emergence of the CRAV as an independent group excluded from the 
political foreground by Castera’s electoral misadventures seems to have fed directly 
into the radicalism which it exhibited in the 1970s. Seemingly chastened by their 
attempt to engage with the political mainstream,388 the CRAV ushered in a period of 
near revolt. Likewise, the regional aspect of the conflict became more apparent as the 
Défense movement rallied behind the now powerfully influential CRAV. Embodying 
the sum of the Défense movement’s experiences, the CRAV displayed a unifying 
radicalism set apart from political parties and dedicated to advancing the interests of 
regional vignerons. Arguably this process of decentralising regional representation 
was both accelerated and inflected by the May Events, relying as it did upon the 
elections they had triggered.389 Yet 1967 was only the beginning of the Languedoc's 
'crisis event' which was to expand beyond the year of 1968. Rather, the established 
patterns of protest which were remobilised so flagrantly in 1967 were to lead to a long 
moment of crisis as the CRAV entered into near open revolt throughout the early 
1970s.  
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The ritualisation of protest  
In August 1975, the 33 year old Michel Romain would become ‘Porte-parole’ of 
the CRAV, in a concerted attempt to keep the leadership young and radicalised. The 
Audois smallholder was committed to pushing the boundaries of direct action to 
frighten négociants and force the hand of government. He led a group of commandoes 
against Jean Doumeng, a négociant who was close to the Communist party and had 
actually participated in the formation of MODEF. His political associations had 
previously rendered him untouchable, yet in striking out against Doumeng, Romain 
had affirmed the independence of the CRAV. Subsequent confrontations with Jacques 
Chirac saw the CRAV warned that if they continued to strike out so violently, they 
would face increasing scrutiny from the CRS. Maffre-Beaugé was unwilling to concede 
wrongdoing, however: 
Nous regrettons les excès commis, mais bien plus encore la cause qui 
les a provoqués! Si rien n'est fait, nous courons à l'aventure.390 
 
Tensions were undeniably rising in the Midi, as confrontations with the CRS escalated. 
Cases described how, eight months before the drama at Montredon, they came close to 
just such a conflict in the village of Thézans. A group of CRS are purported to have set 
about four young men with clubs, one of whom had his Achilles tendon torn by the 
blows. Later that night, hundreds of angry vignerons gathered in their cars, 
determined to make the CRS pay. Cases claims this was the first time that he saw 
vignerons carrying rifles in anger.391 Although that situation fizzled out, the resentment 
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did not. The CRAV were unequivocal about blaming the forces of order for the 
escalation of conflict between the two forces, claiming deliberate attempts to target 
their protests were intended to dampen their appetite for further manifestations. 
Sociologist Antoine Roger explains the violence of Languedocian winegrowers 
with reference to the theories of Ted Gurr. In his seminal Why Men Rebel?392 Gurr posits 
that political violence is explained by “relative frustration”, caused by the gap between 
what people think they can achieve and that which they feel they ought to.393 In this 
case, Languedocian winegrowers raised on an inflated image of their occupation’s 
importance to the culture and economy of the region were met with the reality of their 
contemporary position. Although their ritualised protest was focussed on the defence 
of their industry and their culture, their ability to do this was constrained by 
contrasting governmental visions of the region’s future. Yet the government's vision 
was about to be drastically redefined. 
The elevation of the charismatic Jacques Chirac to Minister for Agriculture in 
June of 1972 raised hopes amongst the Midi vignerons that political attitudes to their 
plight could change. In this climate of hope that the problems of the Midi were finally 
receiving their due attention, Chirac visited Montpellier in December, promising to 
“répondre aux questions angoissantes du viticulteur touchant à sa sécurité, ses 
débouchés, ses revenus, si l’on veut éviter à la viticulture de mourir guérie.”394 The 
realistic expectations of the winegrowers, in the vocabulary of Ted Gurr, were 
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enhanced. In February of 1973 Chirac laid out his plan for the national wine industry.395 
This blueprint for the modernisation of the wine industry centred heavily on the 
'réencépagement' of vineyards to produce better varietals, the improvement of the 
means of production and the grouping of winegrowers into units which could more 
flexibly respond to government guidelines (groupements). The plan also introduced the 
‘Vin de Pays’ category as a means of providing an intermediate quality  platform 
(between vin de table and AOC) to encourage gradual amelioration of production. 
These guidelines all demanded investment, however, with the path towards 
modernisation representing a gamble for struggling producers, especially in the Midi. 
Suddenly, there was a gap between the realities of Chirac’s plan and the expectations 
of winegrowers, eliciting a “relative frustration”. 
Moreover, Chirac stopped short, of laying out specific plans for either the 
qualitative or quantitative control of foreign imports. The CGVM entrenched their 
position in opposition to the liberalisation of the European market and the continued 
import of Italian wines.396 This disparity quickly condemned his plan to be viewed in 
the Languedoc as little different to those of his predecessors. Likewise, the minimum 
price established by Chirac's guidelines was insufficient to cover either the production 
or marketing of wine. If the level of price fixing was revised in July this was due not to 
a grand policy shift, but rather in old reactive fashion to the release of the poor 1971 
harvest. Instead, the expectation that the volume of wine available to market would be 
reduced was unfulfilled. Chirac’s policy had created a situation whereby a bumper 
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crop, coupled with increased imports, meant that 109millionHL came onto the market 
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Graph of Hérault Harvest (in HL)397 
The disappointment with this failure was all the more intense given the real sense of 
hope that had characterised the end of 1972. Chirac’s plan seemed to indicate that the 
Midi was on its own, and that expectations of the government’s ability to reform the 
market were unrealistic. The final blow to Chirac’s inglorious agricultural career in the 
eyes of winemakers came in December of 1974, when the exceptional distillation he 
had ordered to cope with that year’s surplus harvest was abandoned after it was 
declared incompatible with the rules of the European Community.398 The government’s 
attempts to reform the wine industry had manipulated the expectations of 
Languedocian winegrowers and created a degree of frustration. The increasingly 
violent nature of their protest was, thus, partly in reaction to the disappointment 
caused by government. Romain’s nomination as ‘porte-parole’ was a recognition of this 
frustration and the increasing importance of violent protest in the CRAV’s repertoire. 
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 The appearance of rifles at protests was a clear shift in the dynamic of 
viticultural mobilisation. Since 1907, wine demonstrations had followed predictable 
patterns, although they had become more violent and destructive since the 
formalisation of the CRAV in 1961. Traditional protests centred around the erection of 
barricades, which had been a powerful but acceptable tool of the Comités d’action 
since the 1950s, commonly referred to in the press as a “journée des barricades”. This 
permitted the paysan vigneron to paralyse roads and regional trade, creating the same 
impact as a workers strike in a different economic sector. As 'Jojo' Fabre had related in 
an interview the Indépendant, unlike other workers, "Le droit de grève n'existe pas chez 
nous.... Le seul droit que nous ayons pour nous faire entendre c'est celui que nous 
octroyons en passant à l'action."399 The collective nature of the ‘barrages’ was redolent 
of the Midi’s cooperative heritage and also allowed a degree of sociability during the 
protest. These "journées des barrages" became a sort of fête, allowing winegrowers to 
come together and display a collective identity in opposition to the state. They also 
allowed winegrowers to use tractors, carts and uprooted vines as part of the protest, 
strongly identifying them visually with their work. Such ritual protest formed the 
mainstay of the Défense movement’s arsenal, with the CRAV frequently endorsing and 
organising protests which presented a challenge to representations of central authority. 
This ritualised protest was a “riposte s’inscrit d’abord dans le sillage des formes 
initiées en 1907 et régulièrement réactivées.”400 The decline in these protests over time 
has seen increasing recourse to their other modes of operation and also a shift away 
from the traditional heritage of the Défense movement. This shift has, in part 
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challenged their relevancy, by questioning the extent to which they are acting in 
concert with the ‘rules of the game’ outlined over time in ‘la guerre du vin’.  
 Retrospectively, violence was understandably the least acceptable vector of 
CRAViste mobilisation, with interviewees asserting that in the Languedoc "la violence 
est le dernier refuge de l’incompétence."401 As the shootings at Montredon would show, 
the use of violence against the organs of the state was ever unacceptable in public 
opinion and would indeed be dismissed in the press as retrograde and immoral. 
Likewise, when acts of sabotage threatened lives, the reaction to the CRAV was 
unsympathetic. Violence, intentional or otherwise, was resolutely beyond the 
boundaries of acceptability. Understanding the boundaries of acceptability which 
governed popular reactions to the CRAV’s attacks relies heavily on the identity of the 
group. As an acceptable interlocutor, the CRAV’s endorsement of direct action could 
dictate whether or not it was received well by the more general public. To this end, 
their decentralised structure and diffuse nature made the identification of attacks 
difficult unless it claimed responsibility directly. There were differences between 
actions undertaken in the name of the CRAV and constituent CAVs and there were 
differences in opinion. This was not viewed as something particularly troublesome, 
however, as they tended to coalesce eventually. Vocal leaders capitalised on the often 
unprompted actions of individuals and large protests which were coordinated by 
representative groups (such as MODEF or the CGVM) were usually endorsed and 
publicised by the CRAV in newspapers. Historian Winnie Lem, for example, describes 
CRAV attacks aimed against foreign wine being sold in French supermarkets being 
                                                          
401 Interview with Michel Artigues - Château des Aveylans - Bellegard - Gard - 02/08/2010. 
166 
 
carried out by 6 men at most and revolving around the bar-room bravado of 
participants.402 Hushed conspiratorial discussions of small-scale violence evoked the 
very Resistance tradition to which the winemakers themselves aspired. With attacks 
based on a spur-of-the-moment mentality revolving around valorisation in local circles, 
winegrowers have been able to deliver far-reaching and powerful messages prefixed 
on a community of common interest centred on consensus institutions of the South and 
not bound by association to national parties but by regional interests. 
The CRAV was not directly politically affiliated although its members can be 
said to have been principally Socialist and Communist. Castera himself, however, had 
stood for the centre-right UDR, demonstrating that political plurality was broadly 
tolerated within the amorphous organisation. As was the case with Jean Huillet, who 
formed the Mouvement d’Intervention des Viticulteurs Occitans (MIVOC), there were also 
Occitanistes involved at varying points. MIVOC was critical of the wine world’s 
financiers and drawn to ‘gauchiste’ themes at a time when the cultural identity of the 
region was beginning to be strongly asserted in such circles. This group was indicative 
of shifting tides in the Midi, as the young were increasingly drawn away from 
winegrowing by economic pulls towards Paris and the cities. MIVOC, like the JV, was 
composed of young vignerons more in touch with the developing social trends of the 
region. The declining social relevance of their industry forced vignerons to form 
alliances with other relevant groups to ensure their continued validity. The mass 
movements of the 1950s were considerably removed from the political reality of the 
1970s, as increasingly radical political groups began to corner the debate, such as the 
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JV, MIVOC and the CRAV itself. Maffre-Beaugé, for one, refused to view this coalition 
building as a negative aspect of their modern situation. He saw it instead as a regional 
conglomeration, in which all the best aspects of the region’s identity were asserting 
their right to live and work their land. Referring to the developing Occitan movement 
as a “grande aventure sociale”, he sought to form a “fraternité de combat” which could 
champion the region’s interests against external pressures.403 Professions of sympathy 
for the winemaker’s cause flooded the letters pages of newspapers as organisations 
sought to line up alongside the vignerons. The fledgling Volem viure al païs (VVAP) 
Occitan political movement expressed its solidarity with their cause and claims to have 
marched alongside winegrowers on the "nuit chaude" in concert with MIVOC.404 This 
moment crystallised the convergence between the two grand social movements in the 
Midi which had been developing since the 1960s. The success of VVAP will be 
discussed later, although this moment represents the culmination of the ‘grand social 
alliance’ of Oc and vine. 
 A good example of the organisational ethic and potential for mobilisation 
which defined the CRAV was the Echo des Corbières: it is described as being the 'voice' 
of the CRAV despite largely being the work of one man, Henri Fabre-Colbert.405 The 
CRAV began to publish their own monthly newspaper in September 1970 in the village 
of Lézignan in the Aude.406 This newspaper provided a central voice to the group: 
printing communiqués from the CRAV alongside emotive editorial. The heavy use of 
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Occitan in the newspaper was likewise a theme which will be analysed in later 
chapters.407 Littered with cartoons, humorous stories and lascivious images of 
pneumatic women on the back page, this was a paper of genuine interest to the 
working men of the region. Its political diatribes and cries of outrage at the 
impoverishment of vignerons were happily juxtaposed with the triumphant news of 
recent rugby results. Nevertheless, calls for open resistance and direct action were its 
common recourse and its tone was one of outrage which served to heighten the 
immediacy of viticultural concerns. Cases wrote of the newspaper: 
 C'était le journal des C.A.V., mais c'était Fabre qui le faisait en 
entier, à son idée, sans avoir de comptes à rendre à personne - et 
ça aussi c'est l'esprit "comités d'action". Quelqu'un veut faire 
quelque chose? Qu'il aille au bout de son idée. Ce n'est pourtant 
pas le n'importe quoi: si le type est honnête, pas de problème, on 
respecte la liberté d'opinion, s'il fait une entourloupette, s'il essaie 
de se servir de nous, alors attention à lui... C'est vrai nous n'avons 
pas le sens de centralisme, mais je prends ça comme une qualité. 
Je sais bien, par exemple, que les manifestations viticoles ont de 
quoi faire s'arracher les cheveux à n'importe quel responsable 
ouvrier. La marche au pas, en rang, nous ne connaissons pas. Les 
"services d'ordre" pour orienter, canaliser, contenir la foule, nous 
ne connaissons pas. Parce que cette foule n'est pas pour nous une 
masse de manœuvre. Quand les viticulteurs viennent, ils font un 
peu ce qu'ils veulent, comme ils veulent: ils sont assez intelligents 
pour ça. S'il vient à l'idée de quelqu'un de faire une bêtise, il y 
aura toujours de ses voisins pour le dissuader. Nous sommes 
ainsi: parfois je me dis que nous sommes les derniers libertaires.408 
 
Cases’ description of the newspaper was an excellent window into the control 
structures of the CRAV and also the degree to which the permissiveness of its unelected 
but charismatic tribunes was key to mobilisation. Tartakovsky reports Castera as 
having claimed in 1967 that winegrowers “me suppliant tous de recommencer. [...] 
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Autrefois quand on entraînait une foule devant un monument aux morts pour une 
manifestation, c’était fichu pour trois ans. Maintenant il faut les calmer tous les 
jours”.409  As the armed wing of the CGVM, however, the CRAV was able to act where 
the legitimate organisations could not, striking forcefully to represent the wine 
industry's interests. Nevertheless, the CRAV were not simply the attack dogs of the 
syndical movement. The CGVM did try to control some demonstrations, demonstrated 
by advice provided to the leaders of the CRAV on specific protests. In 1967, one 
document discovered by Lawrence MacFalls indicates that the CGVM attempted to 
arrest the wider politicisation of the CRAV. Their instructions read: 
 En fait de drapeaux ou de chants, ne sont tolérés que le drapeau 
tricolore et la Marseillaise. C'est une manifestation Viticole et non 
politique. Des consignes seront données sur place au dernier moment. 
Respecter ces consignes, tout a été calculé et discuté avec les 
responsables des sept départements viticoles du MIDI, il faudra faire 
ce qui a été décidé, un point c'est tout [sic]".410 
 
The CGVM was acting to proscribe accusations of revolutionary leftism or reactionary 
Poujadism, which might allow authorities to dismiss their grievances as part of an 
externally led campaign. Such labels were both unhelpful and undesired. When 
accused of reviving Poujadism in 1983, CRAViste Jean Huillet reacted strongly, saying 
"je crois que tous les paysans du Languedoc ne sont pas encore devenus d'infâmes 
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fascistes, capitalistes réactionnaires..."411 Regardless of leadership opinions, however, 
the structure of the Comités themselves prevented the control of flags or songs being 
implemented with any real efficacy. Whilst action was often repetitive, it seems that 
there were attempts to ensure that it remained broadly in line with an accepted 
construction of the movement’s image – controlled at large by local viticultural elites. 
Yet, with the permissive attitude of leaders like Cases, this was allowed to waver, 
pushing the boundaries of the relationship with the syndical organisations and with 
popular opinion. 
 Indeed, the CRAV presented increasingly diffuse direct action as an inevitable 
symptom of a degrading climate of discussions between winegrowers and the 
government, where the comité “ne se sent plus maître des réactions de la base.”412 The 
leaders and tribunes at the head of the movement could mobilise and radicalise 
supporters, though they could do little to stay their hand. One protest on 17 March 
1975 saw public buildings (including the Bank of France and Trésorerie Générale) 
attacked in Carcassonne.413 On the same day, battles between winegrowers and the 
CRS spilled onto the streets and the major Route 113 was blockaded.414 In Perpignan, 
simultaneous demonstrations were marred by uncontrolled action that saw 
commandos destroy large containers of Spanish apples and imported vegetables.415 The 
next week, the cycle of intensification reached a head, as an estimated 50,000 protesters 
massed in Sѐte, blockading the town to prevent any imported wine leaving container 
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ships. As the day progressed, the protests descended into violent skirmishes with 
police416 despite earlier efforts to keep the CRS from the town with barricades of 
flaming tyres and trees felled across roads.417 After these battles took place over several 
weeks, commandos used explosives on a pylon by a railway line, paralysing all traffic 
heading south to Spain at the start of August. Narbonne station resembled a refugee 
camp the next day, with stranded passengers bivouacked outside and completely 
stranded by blocked roads and rails.418 After what was intended to be a cathartic ‘nuit 
chaude’, widespread anger at this escalating battle with police failed to dissipate. La 
Dépêche eloquently described how “Le ciel était lourd, le soleil écrasant et la colѐre des 
vignerons grondait comme un orage tourbillement.”419  
The increasing radicalism of CRAV methods during this period seems to be a 
useful leitmotiv in charting the progress of relations between the Défense organisations 
and the government, with the CRAV as interlocutor in a tense dialogue. More radical 
than the protest waves of 1963 or 1967, the 1970s were a period of almost total freedom 
of operation by the CRAV, as they bordered on open revolt in a sprawling series of 
intense protests and provocative skirmishes with the CRS.  
  The notion of “path dependence” is of specific relevance to the ritualised actions 
of the CRAV, whereby constant displays of action and solidarity became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, following the same methods. The same resources were consistently deployed 
to react to the same circumstances, demanding intervention from the government in 
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order to solve the problems of winegrowers. The threat of foreign imports, suspected 
fraud and external pressure unified the rambunctious Défense movement of the 1970s. 
Geneviève Gavignaud-Fontaine, a Southern viticultural historian, describes such 
coalitions of interest as “Formule magique de l’unité vigneronne au nom du ‘droit à la 
vie.’”420 The CRAV’s rhetoric speaks of a crise perpetuelle which has rendered them 
“victimes d’une crise endémique dont les causes n’ont guère changé depuis 1907”421 As 
Pierson describes: “une fois établis, les modèles de mobilisation politique, les règles du 
jeu institutionnelles et même les façons de voir le monde politique des citoyens vont 
souvent autogénérer des dynamiques auto-renforçantes.”422 The Midi Rouge has, in this 
sense, become its own agitator, with the structural and cyclical forces which have 
encouraged protest being met with the same vocabulary and action. Unlike other 
workers, CRAViste Jojo Fabre reasoned, "Le droit de grève n'existe pas chez nous.... Le 
seul droit que nous ayons pour nous faire entendre c'est celui que nous octroyons en 
passant à l'action."423 Mobilisation (be it in mass protest or direct action) became a 
means of circumventing winegrowers' inability to strike, a political ritual which 
enabled them to speak openly to political power in a vocabulary which linked directly 
to historical experience (i.e. the Myth of 1907).  
The ritualisation of viticultural protest ordered and made understandable the 
relationship between winegrowers and the state.424 In this case, it served as a constant 
reminder to vignerons that theirs was a long history of unequal development and that 
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in recent years meaningful representation had only been achieved through direct 
action. Such was the legacy of the tussles between different Défense groups in the 
1950s, as they outflanked each other to speak most directly for the milieu viticole. 
Interestingly, Durkheim's model of political ritual (outlined in Elementary forms425) 
allows for the rituals of the periphery to be equally as important as those of the centre, 
essentially motivating the centre to proscribe such rituals lest they dilute the unitary 
identity of the centralised state.426 Such periphery rituals will form the central focus of 
the next chapter, though it is important to highlight the extent to which ritualised 
protest served as symbolic restatement of collective identity both as a region and as a 
profession. In a direct example of this, several RG reports commented on the CRAV 
Occupation of the Cathedral St-Pierre in Montpellier at the end of February in 1971: 
"Bien que cette occupation relève du 'folklore' et prenne parfois des allures de 
kermesse".427 Such scenes were reminiscent of 1907, when similar demonstrations 
began in the wide central plazas of Montpellier against a background of rising 
discontent.428 The potential for these demonstrations to represent a sort of fête of 
resistance to authority was pronounced and the repetition of methods ensured that the 
parameters of action were understood. Likewise, Danielle Tartakowsky states that the 
‘primitive rebels’ of the viticultural South “répondent le plus souvent à des directives 
préétablies dont témoignent l’alignement du rythme des mouvements poujadistes sur 
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la stratégie définie par leur leader et, s’agissant des paysans et des commerçants, 
l’intégration dans des “journées”.”429 She is describing the early 1950s, when protest 
very much conformed to these models. 'Barrages' and mass protests were the public 
presence of winegrower's ritualistic ire, paralysing the towns and cities of the South in 
a physical embodiment of the blockages in the marketplace which impoverished 
winegrowers.  
Yet, only a decade later, viticultural protest had become more complex, with 
different streams of action represented. On the one hand, the ‘journées’ organised by 
the legitimate syndical movement (often the CGVM or MODEF separately or in 
conjunction) mobilised swathes of winegrowers in displays of solidarity, on the other, 
the clandestine ‘commando’ attacks of the CRAV which began in the 1960s were rather 
more decentralised and less classifiable in Tartakowsky’s traditional view of peasant 
mobilisation.  The flexible model of mobilisation was pinned to the Myth of 1907 and 
its message of viticultural unity and also (according to Maffre-Beaugé) “le rêve 
utopique d’une action pouvant tout changer”.430 Public opinion was, to an extent, held 
to ransom by ritualistic protest. André Castera had ominously warned in a 
communiqué that where opinion turned against them, the CRAV “poussons les 
viticulteurs à entrer dans la clandestinité.”431  
Beyond this grand dream of Durkheimian ritualistic significance also lay the 
simple performative aspect of protest, which saw men like Huillet earn their stripes in 
stand-offs against police - “en mettant la pâtée aux CRS avec [son] équipe” - on the 
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streets of Béziers.432 Violence against the forces of order was a characteristic of the 
CRAV as it developed, with the CRS seeing sustained confrontation throughout the 
late 1960s and the 1970s. Protests could take the form of a cat and mouse game with 
police, baiting the forces of order to sustain the demonstration. The benefit of such 
audacious confrontations lay in the respective coverage garnered in the local press. The 
importance of coverage in outlets like the Midi-Libre, Dépêche and Indépendant was 
imperative.433 These local newspapers were both more popular and more sympathetic 
to regional campaigns and the positive editorials which met CRAV manifestations were 
amplified by their prominence in the local media narrative.434 They could also be used 
as a means by which to conduct tussles with the police, such as when the CAV d'Aude 
warned police not to interfere in their operations or to provoke them when they were 
intercepting tankers of foreign wine.435 The tacit support of the newspapers was made 
explicit when they issued their own inducements to support the direct action of the 
CRAV in moments of pressure. In Narbonne, a truck driver refused the inspection at a 
roundabout controlled by winegrowers and had a paving stone put through his 
windshield for his trouble.436 In support of the CRAV, newspapers tactfully warned 
that "l'impatience des routiers est, en ce moment, mauvaise conseillère."437 Such 
accommodation of the CRAV's excesses was based on a belief in their ability to channel 
the mythology of 1907 and aggressively mobilise in defence of regional winegrowers.  
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Sympathetic coverage was prevalent, with few examples of openly 
condemnatory articles. Bernard Revel, a former journalist for the Indépendant, is a 
useful example when looking at the press relationship with the CRAV. In his book 
which contextualised the gunfight at Montredon in 1976, Montredon: Les vendanges du 
désespoir, Revel's admiration for the viticultural leaders is clear. His lionisation of 
Cases, in particular, seems based on a deep-seated respect for the man's passion, his 
regional pedigree and his readiness to resort to direct action.438 Cases likewise attracted 
the admiration of Pierre Bosc, another journalist motivated to publish a book on the 
Midi's wine struggle. Bosc described Cases as possessing "l'intensité d'un feu dévorant 
qui contraste avec une allure générale plutôt calme."439 These were the same qualities 
which the press more widely admired in the CRAV of the 1960s and early 1970s. 
The boundaries of acceptability which governed CRAV actions were supple 
and ill-defined. Yet they seemed broadly to rely on the strong identification of the 
perpetrator, as will be seen later when the public rejected the use of masks by CRAV 
activists. Likewise, it is possible to say that after 1961 and the formation of the CRAV, 
the acceptability of action no longer relied on strong association with a national 
political party. Much as in 1907, the inability of national politics to address itself 
discretely to Languedocian winegrowers ensured that regional particularism would 
continue to characterise the political engagement of the CRAV. Within this regional 
construct, the acceptance of divergent opinions was important, as can be seen in the 
accommodation of the Occitan movement and the political beliefs of Castera, for 
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example. These vectors did not need to be constrained or controlled because of the 
over-arching belief that the occupational identity of vigneron, the ideological 
inheritance of la Défense and all-pervasive regional context would see the viewpoints of 
CRAVistes coalesce when it mattered. This in turn was demonstrated by the relative 
free hand with which Fabre-Colbert edited the journal which bore the CRAV's name. 
Indeed, the inheritance of the Défense movement was key to the acceptability of the 
CRAV, binding them into a regional narrative which accentuated their representative 
legitimacy and bound them to historical figures like Albert, Ferroul and Edouard 
Barthe. Their continuing redeployment of the vocabulary of 1907 was testament to the 
extent to which this was a powerful validating force. Yet these boundaries of 
acceptability, defined by a process of experimentation which took place over seventy 
years, would be strained by the violence and unpredictability of the fusillade which 
took place near the winegrowing village of Montredon, near Narbonne.440 
 
Montredon: La Fusillade 
André Castera, long referred to as the “homme du Montredon”441, was forced to 
live up to the realities of this nickname in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of a CRS 
officer and vigneron at a gun-fight outside the eponymous village. On 4 March 1976 at 
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Montredon-des-Corbières, close to Narbonne, winegrower Emile Pouytès and CRS 
officer Commander Joel Le Goff were shot and killed, during the course of a 
demonstration which turned into a violent stand-off.442 Another 17 people were 
hospitalised with injuries from the disastrous fire-fight. The confluence of blood and 
wine evinced a significant reaction from the French political mainstream, which vilified 
the terroristic acts of regional extremists. Words such as “tragédie”, “tache de sang”, 
“d’émeute”, “d’insurrection” and “révolte” peppered the headlines of the national 
press.443 Amongst winegrowers, however, the fallen were martyrs of a struggle which 
was over a century old and part of a regional inheritance of resistance to ‘internal 
colonialism’. The Echo des Corbières, newspaper of the CRAV, lamented that blood had 
been spilt because the government felt a need “d’utiliser la police comme ultime 
argument.”444  
This eventuality was an unfortunate product of the increasing rancour which 
had been festering openly between vignerons and forces of order. The gathering on the 
bridge at Montredon which precipitated the gunfight had been arranged in order to 
plan the next course of action in support of incarcerated comrades. Two vignerons had 
been arrested on the 3 March for a raid carried out against M. Ramel, a négociant they 
felt was fraudulently importing and blending Italian wines.445 Regardless of 
accusations of fraud, Ramel was responsible for some 30% of the entire French import 
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of Italian wines.446 That police arrested these two men outraged members of the CRAV, 
who felt that the merchant was the criminal. Moreover, that these two men were then 
to be summarily ‘extradited’ out of the Département to face trial in Lyons was 
perceived as a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, protesters blocked roads, train lines 
and set fire to cargo vehicles between Toulouse and Narbonne, gathering at Montredon 
to show a unified presence.447 When this demonstration was challenged by CRS, 
winegrowers reacted furiously to what they saw as a further betrayal by the forces of 
order. Wielding hunting rifles, some winegrowers opened fire on the company of CRS 
who were training weapons on the group of protestors. Exactly who shot first seems to 
have been lost in the search for culprits afterwards. 
Pierre Lavelle, in chronicling a long history of Occitan culture cites 1976 as “le 
début du reflux de l'après-mai Occitan”448 The deaths at Montredon-les-Corbières, 
however, were a tragic reinforcement of exactly the regional issues which owed little to 
the experience of Parisians in 1968 and more to the troubled relationship between 
vignerons and the forces of public order throughout that decade. As Michelle 
Zancarini-Founel had observed, such post-Mai movements are not merely a result of 
'the Events', but rather occupy a shared space in which subsequent social movements 
fed off the “aspirations écloses en 1968”.449 Interestingly, as in Boris Gobille's reading of 
1968, the CRAV's new activism was not marked by changes to their 'horizontal' 
relationships. Their identity as winegrowers and their contestatory role was not a 
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rupture, but rather a continuity forged in the heritage of the Défense movement.  
Gobille quotes Michel De Certeau in referring to the 'wave effect' of 1968 as: 
une crise du fonctionnalisme: les étudiants cessèrent de fonctionner 
comme des étudiants, les travailleurs comme des travailleurs et les 
paysans comme des paysans. Le mouvement prit politiquement la 
forme de tentatives de déclassification et de bouleversement dans la 
détermination sociale des statuts.450 
 
In this reading, the CRAV were not contributing to a '68-style upheaval, but operating 
simply in a similar time frame. The long 'crisis moment' which spanned the années 68 
related to a national climate of upheaval, but was not a result of it. 
 In the same way that Andre Cases compared the winegrowers' protests of 1967 
to the student demonstrations of 1968, the violence of 1976 was significant in both a 
national and regional context. The symbolism of these ritualistic mobilisations, 
however, was firmly bound into the narrative of viticultural representation which had 
been developing since 1907. The context of 1968's regionalist inference and the echo of 
the challenges it had delivered to central authority may have conditioned police 
reactions or heightened the gall of protestors. Yet this violence and gunplay was 
inalterably bound into the processes of viticultural representation and only 
contextualised by a national trend of unrest.  It is interesting that whilst interviewees 
tended to view 'les années 68' as having opened up new avenues for representation 
(e.g. allowing winegrowers to "organiser syndicalement pour la défense de notre 
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profession"451; giving vignerons "additional motivation to fight for their rights like 
other employees in the French society"452) the reality is that the subsequent years saw a 
disaggregation of traditional structures of representation (the 'union sacrée') and 
severe challenges delivered to the most long-standing regional organisation (the 
CGVM), as the developmental agenda within the region changed. Some interviewees 
identified the legacy of 1968 as one which has become one of the main threats to 
today’s wine industry, hampering the expression of 'la défense viticole' and fostering 
"le manque de concertation entre les vignerons et leurs structures économico-
syndicales."453 Xavier Vigna's reappraisal of working class activism during the années 68 
highlights a period of normalisation towards the late 1970s, when the violence and 
political immediacy of 'l’insubordination ouvrière' was weakened by national 
economic downturn.454 Pascal Ory in turn paints a situation where during ‘L’entre-deux-
mai’ of 1968-1981 an era of disappointment and economic stagnation gave way to the 
hope generated by a Socialist victory.455 Although his cultural thesis is a broad 
statement, one can view this very era of disappointment as the high point of the CRAV, 
despite falling numbers towards the end of it. Whilst contestation remained an 
important issue, the CRAV's status remained prominent.  
 This contestation was not limited to the Languedoc, however, and its impact 
was amplified by the fact it was an echo of unrest elsewhere. In Aleria on the east coast 
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454 Vigna, L’insu ordination ouvrière dans les années 68, pp.313-314. 
455 P. Ory, L’Entre-deux-Mai (Paris: Seuil, 1983), p.243. 
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of Corsica, 50 members of Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse (ARC)456 occupied a 
wine cellar on 21 August 1975. They were protesting against speculation in the wine 
markets which was driving up land prices on the island. When confronted by police, 
they came out firing. Two CRS officers were killed in the confrontation and one of the 
separatists wounded.457 The strong association of wine, regionalism and the killing of 
policemen ensured that the events would be linked, especially by the forces of order, 
who stated that "Nous voulons que soit brisée l'escalade infernale qui va d'Aléria à 
Montredon."458 Michelle Zancarini-Fournel analyses the two movements as examples of 
'après-Mai' events which bookended the années 68. Although the two moments share 
some characteristics, however, they are distinguished by the fundamental differences 
between the CRAV and the ARC. Specifically, their relationships with regionalism and 
ethnic nationalism were radically different. The CRAV's involvement with the Occitan 
movement was the result of a convergence of causes during an extended period of 
regional crisis, as we shall see. For the ARC, however, separatism was their primary 
motivation. Likewise, the ARC was only five years old, its name change but two years 
earlier demonstrative of a shift in their methodology and demands. The ARC lacked 
the republican heritage which the CRAV possessed as the ultimate embodiment of the 
Défense movement's collective experience. 
 The permutations which created the nucleus of the CRAV were forged in the 
post-war period and the floundering reaction of the French government to the 
problems of the viticultural South. It is fair to say that the abortive introduction of the 
                                                          
456 The group, founded in 1970 as Action Régionaliste Corse by Edmond Simeoni, was renamed in 
1973 as Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse. 
457 Revel, Montredon, p.203. 
458 M. Zancarini-Fournel, ‘Montredon, 4 mars 1976: l’événement comme révélateur’, p.9. 
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Code du vin in 1953 was one of the principal determinants of the later movement. The 
resentment and disappointment which stemmed from the government’s reticence to 
engage with the South spawned a movement which would develop throughout the 
1950s into the articulate CRAV of the 1960s. Changing demographic trends within the 
Midi likewise led the Défense movement to create broad social alliances to ensure their 
continued relevancy, absorbing aspects of Occitan rhetoric to augment their 
developing regionalist ethic. Increasingly radical and increasingly aloof from 
mainstream political representation, the CRAV passed into direct action with a vigour 
which shocked authorities into action. Constant rebukes in the political arena and 
continued use of the CRS became the defining terms of debate during the development 
of the CRAV. It can come of little surprise, therefore, that their ultimate realisation was 
born in a bloody rejection of both politicians and the forces of order. Despite repeated 
attempts at engagement by both sides, it would seem that the ultimate tragedy at 
Montredon was symbolic of a profound alienation.  
 The CRAV, alienated from both mainstream politics and the professional 
bodies which were its predecessors, represented the Midi vignerons, sidelined by the 
under-development of their region and a lack of direct professional representation in 
Paris. The ensuing ‘psychodrame’ which claimed the lives of two men was a tragic 
catharsis from which both parties emerged chastened, yet it was also the ineluctable 
consequence of the CRAV’s formative experiences inherited from the post-war Défense 
movement. If one of 1968’s most potent slogans had been “Soyez réalistes, demandez 
l’impossible”459, then it is telling that the CRAV had maintained this attitude since its 
                                                          
459 A. Delale, G. Ragache, La France de 68 (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p.208. 
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inception, demanding often unrealistic concessions from an unsympathetic 
government convinced the problems were of their own creation. Yet European 
integration continued and imports would not let up, despite the demands of 
CRAVistes. The Prefect of the Aude would warn government that "ce problème des 
importations est et demeurera le problème majeur."460 When challenged by changing 
political and demographic trends with fingers singed with gunshot, the CRAV found 
itself struggling to remain at the forefront of the agenda, especially when confronted 
by ‘l’offensive moderniste’, as we shall see.  
 The next chapter will analyse the theses of Lavalle and Zancarini-Fournel in the 
context of Languedocian regionalism. Specifically, the interaction of Oc and Vine will 
be used to illustrate the regional narrative which developed throughout the twentieth 
century, covering the Occitan awakening of the 1960s, the 'Events' of 1968 and the wine 
battles of the 1970s. If the CRAV is to be situated in a '68 narrative', then it is through 
the conduit of the Occitan movement and its shared bonds with viticultural activism. 
Understanding the precise ways in which the groups interacted allows us to position 
the CRAV in relation to the cause of regionalism and Occitan nationalism alongside 
occupational identity. 
                                                          




Chapter 4:  
Crossing the Streams: Oc & Vine 
 
The potential for the Défense movement to interact with regionalism had been 
demonstrated in 1907, when both Albert and Ferroul had invoked the region’s Cathar 
heritage and Occitan identity. Yet, in the context of les années 68, this regionalism 
assumed a different importance, as it merged with challenges to centralism and the 
renewal of the Left’s engagement with such issues. The makeup of la nouvelle gauche 
was reflected in the Languedoc’s viticultural heritage, where regionalism had spoken 
directly to occupational identity, minority nationalism and a strong association with 
both Socialist and Communist parties. These characteristics seem to be associated with 
the CRAV as a conduit for this ’68 dynamic. Yet, when Michelle Zancarini-Fournel 
juxtaposed Montredon with the uprising in Aleria, in Corsica, she drew a more potent 
parallel that moved beyond awareness of ethnic or minority nationalism and towards 
the articulation of it by violent political means.461 Her distinction lay in the Languedoc's 
republican heritage, binding the development of the Défense movement from the 
debates of 1907 straight into the narrative of les années 68.  
                                                          
461 M. Zancarini-Fournel, ‘Montredon, 4 mars 1976: l’évenement comme révélateur’, pp.9-10. 
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This chapter will analyse the development of the Occitan movement in the 
1960s and 1970s, charting its evolution from the cultural preoccupations of an obscure 
group of intellectuals into a more politically self conscious reflection of a number of 
Southern sociologists before developing into a popular, working class regional 
movement. These moments of diversification, in which the Occitan movement courted 
mass appeal, saw it mesh with other regional pressure groups. This interaction with 
militant winegrowers was both an interesting demonstration of the values they shared 
and illustrative of the limits of the winegrowers' appeal. The changing significance of 
the Occitan Cross was a particularly revealing indicator of this relationship. 
A subtle shift distinguishes the viticultural demonstrations of the 1950s from 
those of the 1960s and after. Namely, we see the Occitan cross begin to appear in 
newspaper photographs of the gatherings.462 While it is not possible to account for 
every banner flown at any given demonstration, the memoirs of CRAV luminaries and 
newspaper reports reveal an increasing association with the Occitan movement 
developing in the mid 1960s, around the same time as the highly visible strike at the 
Decazeville pit. The first Occitan flag visible in winegrowers' protest photos appears at 
the Béziers Festival in 1961,463 and it had already served as a logo in the regional union 
of winegrowers' cooperatives in 1959.464  
                                                          
462 The Occitan Cross (Croix Occitane) is the distinctive twelve pointed yellow cross set against a 
red background which constituted the heraldry of the twelfth century Counts of Toulouse and 
represents an early emblem of Occitan nationhood. 
463
 Interestingly, the picture also displays support for the regionalist disturbances in Brittany 
occuring at the same time. 




Protest in Béziers, 1961465 
The newly politicized Occitaniste movement became grafted on to major 
moments of protest such as the Miner's Strike at Decazeville in 1962 and the later 
peasant camp at Larzac after 1970. By radicalizing their support and drawing 
comparisons with France's role in the Third World, it was able to increase their impact. 
This visible presence attracted support from the winegrower's movement, whose 
demonstrations (as charted in the previous chapter) fitted into an Occitan revival 
which was being advanced throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This new regionalism 
challenged Jacobin Republicanism by breaking with the old reactionary or royalist 
right with which it had been associated at the turn of the century. Likewise, after the 
Vichy government’s flirtation with regional themes, regionalism had acquired yet more 
undesirable supporters.466 The Occitan movement, however, had managed to maintain 
                                                          
465
 Protest photos - ADH - 785W47 
466 The interaction of Vichy and regionalism is well examined in the collected volume  C. 
Bougeard (ed.), Bretagne et identités régionales pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (Brest: Presses 
universitaires de Rennes, 2002). The volume unites a broad variety of studies which focus on 
the role of Vichy in articulating regional policy (M. Baruch, ‘L’État français et la création des 
régions’, pp.31-46, J. Harbulot, ‘La région de Nancy: en zone interdite’, pp.63-75) and the ways 
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its distance from the extreme right in the twentieth century unlike other movements.467 
Thus, in the febrile period of the 1960s, there was an existing heritage of modern, left-
wing, political Occitanisme on which to draw. The 1970s saw the cross adopted not 
only by the ‘Défense du vin’ movement but also the Larzac protesters, using it as a 
means of articulating dissatisfaction with the disparity of regional development.468 
Suddenly it embodied not only notions of regional cultural and economic difference 
but also of ethnic particularism - the CRAV could now claim the inheritance of a 
notional ‘civilization of the vine’ as well as the inheritance of 1907.  
 
Regionalism, Separatism and a Cross to bear 
At times, it can be difficult to reconcile the Occitan cross with the winegrowers 
of the Midi, as their aims appear often distanced from the demands of regionalist 
groups: the initial guardians of this symbol. Although the Défense movement 
professed an attachment to regional culture, it frequently requested greater protection 
of its economic interests by the central state. This was anathema to the decentralising 
and fundamentally federalist zeal of the Occitan movement. If we are to find a credible 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in which different regionalist movements capitalised on these opportunities (H. Chaubin, ‘La 
Corse des années 1930 à la Seconde Guerre mondiale : la passion de l’identité’, pp.135-150, J. 
Guillon, ‘Résistance et identité régionale en Provence’, pp.223-237). 
467 Perhaps most prominent is the role of Breton nationalist collaborators, see, K. Hamon, Les 
nationalistes bretons sous l'occupation (Kergleuz: An Here, 2001), G. Cadiou, L’Hermine et la croix 
gaminée (Paris: Mango, 2001), B. Frelaut, Les nationalistes bretons de 1939 à 1945, (Brasparts: 
Beltan, 1985). For a discussion of Breton regionalism and its impact on resistance, see J. 
Monnier, Résistance et conscience bretonne, 1940-1945,l'hermine contre la croix gammée (Fouesnant: 
Éditions Yoran Embanner, 2007). Also, for a dicussion of Breton identity and regional culture, 
see M. Ozouf, Composition française: retour sur une enfance bretonne (Paris: Gallimard, 2009). 
468 For a discussion of the fusion of industry and regionalism, see Porhel, Ouvriers bretons; M. 
Keating, New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change 
(Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998). 
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link between Oc and Vine the most natural intersection seems to be in the prevailing 
references to 1907. In this case the articulation of a strong tendency towards regional 
autonomy was ideologically validated by this long standing historical inheritance. 1907 
could be read as perhaps the popularly successful manifestation of regional 
independence: a moment when a particular and highly politicised viticultural 
constituency became acutely aware of its own mobilisation potential. The projected 
areas of both ‘Occitania’ and the Midi are contentious issues, and there are distinct 
difficulties in pinning down the physical geography. In viticultural terms, when 
vignerons speak of the ‘Midi viticole’ they imply principally the departments of Aude 
and Hérault with the Gard and Pyrenees-Orientâles supplementing this group. The 
Midi has been considered by some of its foremost champions to constitute as many as 
27 or even 33 different departments, however; in a rough sketch, this grand Midi can 
be depicted as spanning from Pau in the Southwest to Limoges at its northernmost, 
then across to Tournon and Valence in the east and down to Nice.469  
 
Map of the borders of Occitanie according to the COEA470 
                                                          
469 Comité Général Louis Deffès, List of events to commemorate Deffès across the Midi, 1936 - 
ADA10M22. 
470
 COEA, Le Petit Livre de l'Occitanie (Nimes, 4 Vertats, 1971)) 
190 
 
 Yet the Occitan movement of the 1960s was not simply a continuation of the 
cultural movement that had sought to preserve the language of the region throughout 
the twentieth century through the Félibrige and other apolitical groups.471 The Institut 
d'Education Occitan (IEO) was formed in 1945 as a successor to the Societat d'Estudis 
Occitans (SEO), an organisation that had been drawn to the right under the influence of 
the Vichy government.472 The SEO had been formed by an ambitious group of young 
writers with a strong connection to the Catalan movement in 1935, publishing two 
periodicals (Oc and Occitania) and at least one monograph reflecting on the political 
situation of the day.473 One of the leading lights in this movement, and editor of both 
periodicals, was Charles Camproux, a figure who fits poorly with the accepted 
narrative of French regionalism as an inherently right wing phenomenon. Camproux 
was “pacifiste, antifasciste, anticapitaliste” and symbolic of a politically aware 
“militantisme post-mistralien”474 which flared in the 1930s.475 In essence, he became the 
inheritor of Ferroul’s regionalist mantle, albeit without the same Guesdiste slant. 
 Camproux was, like the motto of his journal Occitania, “Ni blanc, ni rouge.”476 
He was at the centre of a new “jeunesse occitane”, along with Paul Ricard and Jorgi 
Reboul, who founded numerous organisations during this period which were directed 
                                                          
471 For further discussion of the history of the Félibrige movement and their cultural 
significance, see P. Martel, Les felibres et leur temps : renaissance d'oc et opinion, 1850-1914 (Pessac: 
Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 2010); S. Calamel, D. Javel, La langue d'oc pour etendard: les 
felibres (1854- 2002) (Toulouse: Privat, 2002). An internal history of the Félibrige was written by 
its capoué (leader), see  R. Jouveau, Histoire du Félibrige (Nîmes: Bené, 1977).  
472 COEA, Le Petit Livre de l'Occitanie (Nimes, 4 Vertats, 1971), pp.160. 
473 C. Camproux, Per lo Camp occitan (Narbonne: Lombard, 1935). 
474 R. Lafont, Clefs pour l’Occitanie (Paris: Seghers, 1971), pp.201-204. 
475 For a more in-depth study of French regionalism during this period (inlcuding discussion of 
the 1937 ‘Exposition Universelle’), see A. Thiesse, Écrire la France (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1990). 
476 ‘Le nom de Charles Camproux pour la maison des Etudiants’, Le Dit de l’Université Paul-
Valéry, no.70 (November, 2003) p.3 [http://www.univ-montp3.fr/filemanager/le_dit/dit70.pdf] 
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at raising the profile of Occitanism and separating it from the politically conservative, 
aesthetic engagement of its cultural guardians in the Félibrige. Camproux, in 
particular, was both a Proudhonian and a Federalist,477 building upon a Languedocian 
heritage that combined non-Marxist socialism with regionalism.  
 As a militant Occitaniste, Camproux was at the forefront of the emerging 
organisation that reinvigorated regionalism in the Universities of Montpellier and 
Toulouse, Ricard and Reboul formed the Parti Provençal in 1935, which, later that year, 
was to transform into the Partie Occitaniste. Reboul and Ricard were close to the 
extreme-left, whilst Camproux remained more difficult to pin down. In Per lo Camp 
Occitan, Camproux outlined the programme of the Parti Occitaniste. He denounced the 
toxic effect which centralism was having on the industrial development of the South, 
highlighting the potential for autonomy. As had been the case in 1907, however, such 
regionalism was unacceptable to national political parties and small movements like 
the Parti Occitaniste remained isolated. The ability of these young regionalists to appeal 
politically was limited, as noted by Phillippe Martin: “le viticulteur se sentira mieux 
défendu par un député radical ou socialiste susceptible de devenir un jour ministre que 
par des jeunes intellectuels sans pouvoir, fussent-ils ‘du pays’.”478 The failure of 
Occitanistes to connect meaningfully with the region’s dominant profession limited 
their political potential, although constituted an important developmental step in the 
modernisation of political Occitanisme. 
                                                          
477  It is worth noting that Phillipe Martin (Charles Camproux, pp.47-49) takes issue with the term 
‘Proudhonian’ in reference to Camproux, citing its later usage by Maurras as an indication of an 
ideological malleability which renders it useless as a descriptive term. Nonetheless, the term 
still seems apt and serves to communicate the broad political ideals of regionalist federalism 
stemming from non-Marxist socialism. 




Although the regionalist movement was overshadowed by figures like Maurras 
during the war,479 the political engagement of the “jeunesse Occitane” survived the 
challenge of fascism in a manner which Breton, Alsacien and Corse regionalists did 
not. Camproux himself was captured in 1939 and interned in Germany, before being 
released in 1941 and entering into active resistance. This resistant background 
preserved his work, allowing it to be revitalised in the 1960s by a new “jeunesse 
Occitan” who would rediscover the writing of the IEO and the Parti Occitaniste.480 After 
the war, he continued to teach philology at the Université Paul-Valéry in Montpellier 
and worked to promote Occitan culture through radio specials and regular discussion 
shows.481 He wrote in 1971: 
Un fait paraît l’assurer: les lettres d’oc ne sont plus désormais une 
sorte d’épiphénomène purement esthétique ou folklorique. Elles 
s’intègrent de plus en plus dans la conscience sociale, économique et 
politique des pays d’oc.482  
 
Yet, his continued adherence to neither reactionary right nor revolutionary left made 
him a significant figure in binding the heritage of regionalism in the Languedoc to 
modern political Occitanisme. Likewise, his unwillingness to conform to the traditional 
left-right division of French politics further reinforces Julian Wright’s emphasis on the 
political eclecticism of the regionalist cause.483 Indeed, in his tireless promotion of 
                                                          
479 R. Lafont, Sur la France (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p.231. 
480 Martin, ‘Charles Camproux’, pp.56. For a broader summary of the post-war Occitan 
movement, see X. Crettiez, I. Sommier (eds.), La France Rebelle (Paris: Michalon, 2006), pp.111-
116. 
481 ‘Le nom de Charles Camproux pour la maison des Etudiants’, Le Dit de l’Université Paul-
Valéry, no.70 (November, 2003) p.3. [http://www.univ-montp3.fr/filemanager/le_dit/dit70.pdf]. 
482 C. Camproux, Histoire de la Littérature Occitan (Paris: Payot, 1971), p.248. 
483 Wright, Regionalism in France. 
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Occitan culture and defence of moderate politics, Camproux conformed to the 
“distinctive and original” strand of regionalism that Wright uncovers.  
The rupture of the war years, therefore, did not sever the Languedoc’s 
connection to its Proudhonian and federalist regional heritage.484 The IEO, formed in 
the days after the Liberation, professed a nationalist and republican stance after the 
taint of Occupation had stained the regionalist movement and especially the Félibrige. 
They chose not to emphasise the disparity between Occitan and French cultures but 
instead to promote “les deux cultures en un service du rayonnement de la France.”485 
Specifically, the IEO highlighted that "rien ne sert sauver la langue d'oc si le pays doit 
crever."486 In attempting to reinvigorate Occitan identity as a facet of French culture, 
these post-war Occitanistes began producing copious studies of Occitan and Provençal 
linguistics and literature.487 Within the IEO, it was believed that this linguistic work 
could “se double d’une inspiration sociale, d’une poésie de combat.”488 The Parti de la 
Nation Occitan (PNO) was founded in 1959 in an attempt to push for greater regional 
autonomy.489 As the first Occitan political party, its primary function was to ensure that 
                                                          
484 The Félibrige elected Charles Maurras unaninmously as its leader on 1 June 1941. This saw it 
endorse the “National Revolution” of the Vichy regime and, come the Liberation, unable to 
claim any association with resistance. This helps explain the relative silence of the Occitan 
movement in the post-war years and also the subsequent desire to re-establish links with the 
Republican heritage of Occitanie. For a longer discussion of the Félibrige during Vichy, see J. 
Guillon, ‘Résistance et identité régionale en Provence’, in Bougeard (ed.), Bretagne et identités 
réginoales pendant le seconde guerre mondiale, pp.223-237. 
485 Lafont, Clefs pour l’Occitanie, p.211. 
486 COEA, Le Petit Livre de l'Occitanie, pp.160. 
487 For example: Phonétique et graphie du Provenc  al. Essai d’adaptation de la réforme linguistique 
occitane aux parlers de Provence (Toulouse: Institut d'Études Occitanes, 1951) part of a series 
entitled Du parler à la langue which focussed on codifying the linguistics of the Midi's regional 
languages. 
488 M. Le Bris, Les Fous du Larzac (Paris: Presses d’Aujourd’hui, 1975), p. 154. 
489 A. Judge, 'France: One state, one nation, one language?' in Stephen Barbour (ed.) Language 
and Nationalism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.64. 
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the concept of nationhood was revived in the region. Its founder François Fontan was a 
left-wing activist of wavering ideological attachment, best known for his book Ethnisme 
in 1961. Having meandered from monarchism in his youth towards anarchism and 
later facing prosecution by the Niçois courts for offering support to the FLN, Fontan 
found himself in the Provençal speaking valleys of Italy and rather isolated from 
currents of political relevance in the Midi.490 Rather, it was behind the IEO that the 
main force of Occitanisme's renaissance was to gather.  
Following the work of Serge Mallet491 and a reawakening of regionalist 
sentiment, Southern sociologists attached themselves to the IEO in a new way. 
Although better known for his commentaries on the evolution of La nouvelle classe 
ouvrière, Mallet’s engagement with the realities of agricultural identity in the “régions 
déshéritées” of France provoked a reinterpretation of regionalism and precipitated a 
fundamental shift in the strategy of the Occitan cause, with a move towards political 
engagement and an understanding of class struggle. Importantly, he highlighted the 
role of a modern peasantry as being equivalent to that of an agricultural proletariat: “le 
paysan de 1960 est autant un "proletaire" que l’ouvrier”.492 Specifically, Mallet used the 
term 'Occitanie' to refer to this emerging constituency of disadvantaged rural 
producers in the Languedoc, as distinct from the cultural conservatism of the Félibrige. 
Instead, Mallet's concept of a working class 'Occitanie' was to become the figurehead of 
                                                          
490 G. Grande, 'François FONTAN aux origines du Parti de la Nation Occitane (PNO)', Lo Gai 
Saber, N° 514 . Estiu de 2009 [http://lo.lugarn-pno.over-blog.org/article-fontan-origines-du-parti-
de-la-nation-occitane-pno-42191507.html Accessed 19/11/2010]. 
491 The Gardois sociologist and writer who had helped found the Parti Socialiste Unifié in 1956 
and wrote La Nouvelle Classe Ouvrière in 1963. 
492 S. Mallet, Les Paysans contre le Passé (Paris: Seuil, 1962), pp.196-224. 
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a political movement, inflected with the language of decolonisation and was adopted 
by an increasingly strident group of Occitan sociologists.493 
The dramatic miners' strike at Decazeville was an important moment in this 
process. Those convinced of the need to speak simultaneously of Socialism, class 
struggle and regional culture converged to form the Comité Occitan d'Études et 
d'Action (COEA) in 1962.494 This organisation was designed to channel the research of 
the IEO into more direct action to foster Occitan identity. The COEA criticised the slim 
membership figures of "le Parti de Fontan" and its preference for defining linguistic 
borders over mobilising a vibrant Occitaniste movement. They therefore deployed a 
litany of new slogans as banners and graffiti: "Occitanie socialiste"; "Descolonizem 
Occitania"; in the town of Cajarc, "La langue d'oc n'est pas une langue morte"; in 
Rodez, "La terre au peuple!"; on a poster of De Gaulle "Vai-t'en cagar"; and, at La 
Grande Motte, "Point zéro de la culture”.495 These slogans highlighted the links 
between Occitan culture, the survival of the language and leftist critiques of 
government. Other intellectuals emerged to champion the cause of regionalism in the 
1960s, drawing the tired constituency of the Felibrée into a new era of relevance. Robert 
Lafont, a long time member of the COEA was emblematic of this shift, moving from 
linguistic analysis to political theory, as southern intellectuals took on a new role as 
social activists. Lafont published La Révolution Régionaliste in 1967 in which he called 
for a new federalism as a solution to the increasingly alienating and “autarcique” 
                                                          
493 Lebovics, Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age, p.17. 
494 Lafont, Clefs pour l’Occitanie, p.219. 
495 COEA, Le Petit Livre de l'Occitanie, p.162. 
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character of the French Republic.496 In recognising the challenges of European 
integration and regional economic disparity, Lafont sought to construct a federalism 
that liberated through the representation of regional interests at a European level. 
 Even within the Languedoc, however, regional interests remained fractured at 
times. Fontan set up a new group in 1967 that sought to bridge the divide between the 
differing linguistic heritages of Occitan and Piedmontais identity, Mouvement 
Autonomiste Occitan.497 Fontan’s groupuscules in exile in Italy had little electoral impact 
back in France and were successful primarily in ensuring that the notion of Occitan 
nationhood remained in the political foreground of the region. Southern regionalists 
took strength from "les années 68" and the reservoirs of support filled by the actions of 
Fontan and those in the COEA would fuel an increasingly active Occitan movement. 
Although the impact of the années 68 will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter, it is worth noting that an increased national appetite developed for discussing 
the role of the regions in the centralised state. The same national processes that fed into 
the formalisation of the CRAV likewise fuelled the development of political 
Occitanisme. Lafont's reflection on the consolidation of the French nation throughout 
its history was released in this same year. His very first line warns that the book “peut 
choquer le lecteur français" and Lafont proceeds to tell the story of France’s triumph 
over the regions throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until the modern 
period, characterising internal and external colonialism as merely different facets of “le 
                                                          
496 R. Lafont, La révolution régionaliste (Paris:Gallimard, 1967), p.14. 
497 In a typically divisive manner, the bridge between Languedocien and Provençal nationalist 
groups would not be resolved until 1980 with the formation of L'union dèu poble d'Oc. 
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chauvinisme officiel français.”498 Burgeoning opposition to this chauvinism saw 
fracturing in the months after May 1968, as various groupuscules formed to translate 
the legacy of that Parisian spring into Occitan.  
Lutte Occitane was formed to push a specifically Socialist vision of Occitan 
independence in 1970 and drew together the many Comités d'Action Occitans that had 
formed in the wake of 1968 to form a socialist political federation and push for national 
liberation.499 Their eponymous publication is a particularly interesting source for 
accessing the extreme opinions that characterised Occitan militancy during the period, 
such as support for the IRA.500 This radicalisation drew parallels with France’s 
decolonisation of her overseas empire and the future role of regions like the Languedoc 
in a ‘post-imperial’ world. Robert Lafont published another book in 1971, specifically 
comparing this revival of regionalism to France’s decolonisation struggle and 
juxtaposing the challenges of “le tiers monde” with “l’hypocrisie nationaliste” of the 
French state.501 Despite Mallet's death in 1973, Occitanie had now taken off as a 
concept, and writers like Lafont had popularised the idea whilst radicalising 
supporters with an increasing focus on internal colonialism. One of the slogans of the 
period, "Volem viure al païs" became the name of a new political party in 1976. Their 
specific focus on pushing for economic policies that would allow people a sustainable 
life in their region was based on the problems affecting not only the wine industry but 
also the continuing struggle at Larzac, which will be addressed later in this chapter.502  
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 This new wave of regionalists challenged the centralising project of the state in 
ways that the purely cultural focus of the Felibrée had not done. Mallet's ideological 
inheritors sought to ensure that the representation of regional culture was politically 
engaged.503 Acknowledging the often-difficult relationship of regionalism with national 
politics, COEA militants targeted meetings of the dissenting Parti Socialiste Unifié 
(PSU), hoping to find support for the concept of regional autonomy.504 They succeeded 
in 1966, when Michel Rocard affirmed the principle at a meeting in Marseille.505 The 
PSU moved away from the nationalism professed by the Communists and the 
centralising beliefs of Debré, with the word 'Occitan' appearing on their posters for the 
first time in 1966.506 Indeed, these new regionalist organisations of the 1960s and 1970s 
allied to the left were not "new departures" but prefigured by a long association of 
French regionalism with the left and centre left.507 The influence of Camproux proved 
to Occitanistes like Lafont that “si certains occitanistes pensent à droite, lui dessine une 
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ouverture à gauche.”508 A new brand of Occitaniste sociologists and activists could 
trace their heritage via Charles Camproux back to the moderate politics of Jean 
Charles-Brun and the influence of the Proudhonian lobby within the FRF of the early 
twentieth century, 509 disavowing the "false but enduring impression that regionalism's 
discourse in turn-of-the-century France was necessarily ultra-conservative."510 For 
Julian Wright, this developmental path of regionalist political development cast Jean 
Charles-Brun and the FRF as "the obvious precursors of Mitterrand and Defferre" with 
Camproux and then the Occitanistes of the 1960s and 1970s as important conduits. 
Indeed, Lafont himself actively coveted this inheritance, claiming in 1968 to “nous 
réclamer à notre tour du proudhonisme et prendre un parti tardif dans la querelle de 
Proudhon et de Marx.”511 The aim of this chapter will be to analyse the developing role 
and evolving rhetoric of this new Occitan movement through the activities of the 
COEA and Lutte Occitane during moments of regional crisis.  
 
Decazeville: Patois and the Pit 
 Since the Second World War, southern regional solidarity has been largely 
bound to the image of south-western France as an economic hinterland abandoned 
after a concerted period of asset-stripping conducted by the centralised state. This 
regional disparity was a motor of political radicalisation. Indeed, this was precisely the 
vocabulary in which the miners of Decazeville expressed their grievances during the 
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1961-1962 strike, which saw men spend nearly a month occupying cold, damp 
underground mines isolated from their families and sleeping on piles of straw to 
protest a round of lay-offs.512 That the intensification of action involved 20 miners 
hunger-striking was intended to instruct the French public of the extent to which 
Parisian technocrats were wreaking havoc on the peripheries of the state, presenting 
broken, starving labourers as evidence of a barren and damaging industrial policy. 
Particularly relevant in this strike, however, was the extent to which it solidified 
Occitanisme as the new language of resistance to the centralised state, rehabilitating a 
concept, which it was commonly thought, had previously been the reserve of perceived 
intellectual dandies like the literary movement of the Félibrige. Mistral’s poesy had 
become the patois of the pit as the Occitan movement’s intellectual project was 
underwritten by the struggle of industrial workers. Many regionalist commentators 
highlight Decazeville as a turning point for the Occitan movement; for Michel Le Bris, 
“de culturel, le mouvement occitan devient, dès 1962, politique.”513 Using the language 
of the region, the miners conveyed that damage wrought on the culture of their 
community and their economy was in fact representative of damage done by the 
French state to the regions more broadly.514  
In 1962 this strike became a hallmark in the development of post-war 
radicalism in the region. Donald Reid describes the importance of the ‘long durée’ in 
understanding the development of this political radicalism amongst miners, focussing 
on the interaction of labour, capital and the state throughout. That the occupation of 
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the Decazeville pit evoked the vocabulary of Occitanie was a considered ploy to 
highlight long standing uneven development and the status of Aubin labourers as 
“second-class Frenchmen.”515 This had been a long-standing grievance rooted in the 
personalisation of labour demands in the post-war period, with greater demands for 
productivity inevitably meaning increased physical stress for individual workers and 
greater economic stress for their community.516 The phrase 'personalisation of labour' 
implies that the top-down demands for greater efficiency literally came to rest across 
the shoulders of miners, much as they did with winegrowers. This physical work 
provided little job security and was subject to the feast or famine demand in regional 
industry. Initiatives such as labour exchange programs in 1955 - in which southern pit-
workers were motivated by the Coal authorities (Le Charbonnage) to travel to Lorraine 
and utilise their labour in an area of labour scarcity - merely highlighted their status as 
a problem sector. Far from home and working alongside German speaking workers, 
southern miners drew comparison to Vichy’s Service du Travail Obligatoire and found 
solidarity in their own regional identity. Years later, during the strike of 1962, this same 
tendency set the miners against the technocrats of Paris, with their Occitan patois a 
stark contrast to the Parisian accents of their persecutors. So too was the icon of the 
Occitan cross a useful tool in communicating the distinct character of this industrial 
dispute, with the red flag synonymous with pit strikes and also communicative of 
regional difference. The intersection of direct action, labour relations and the cause of 
Occitanie, served as a strong precedent across the region, regardless of economic 
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groupings. The engineers at Decazeville had stood in solidarity with miners, proudly 
declaiming that “when the shed burns, we don’t have to know who wears a tie.”517 
Alliès likewise paints the Decazeville strike as an important moment in the 
development of the Occitan movement; it united regionalist intellectuals in the 
university towns of the Midi with the reality of direct political action. In particular, the 
theme of ‘colonialisme intérieur’ deployed by striking union officials lent a new string 
to the old bow of Occitanisme.518 Within this framework, articulate elites were able “à 
parler de l’aliénation de la région exactement comme l’on parle de l’aliénation 
prolétarienne.”519 Such a direct and simple conceptual link was a powerful tool in 
mobilising support for what had been a marginal movement. Strikes broke out across 
the Languedoc in support of the Decazeville miners in their “défense du basin et, au-
delà, de toute la région.”520 Gérard de Sède521, somewhat humorously, points out that 
concern was such that southerners went as far as to cancel all scheduled rugby matches 
in ferociously devoted cities like Toulouse and Perpignan as a mark of respect.522 These 
measures of support began to symbolise a meshing of movements as the political 
maturity of the Occitanistes allowed them to address problems of class and speak 
coherently to the region's economic interests. In voicing concern and support for the 
miners of Decazeville, the COEA also enabled themselves to begin to appeal to the 
winegrowers and their grievances in similar political terms. 
                                                          
517 Ibid., pp.197-210. 
518 P. Alliès, L’Occitanie et la lutte des classes (La Découverte, Montpellier, 1972), p.10. 
519 Reid, The Miners of Decazevile, p10. 
520 G. De Sède, 700 ans de révoltes occitanes (Plon, Paris, 1982), p.267. 
521 De Sède (1921-2004) was a Parisian writer and journalist with an interest in the surreal and 
the occult. His interest in Templars and the Cathar legacy of the Midi led him to write about the 
Occitan cause with fondness. Also, like Ferroul, he shared a strong belief in spiritualism which 
accentuated his fascination with the mysticism of the Cathar past. 
522 De Sède, 700 ans de révoltes occitanes, p.267. 
203 
 
Interaction with more tangible political causes and a greater recognition of the 
strength of the region's working class identity were the benchmarks for the success of 
the new Occitaniste movement. That these considerations could speak to winegrowers 
on an economic basis merely helped to encourage the meshing of these movements 
and the coalescing of protest movements against the central state. Indeed, in 1972, an 
interview with Jean Vialade of the CRAV stressed that, as in 1907, it was cross-class 
action which held the most promise for achieving results in the Midi: "d'être toujours 
unis pour nous défendre".523 The class-consciousness of the COEA allowed the Occitan 
movement to approach other regional pressure groups in the hope of providing a 
united front. The strike at Decazeville was not the Revolt of 1907, yet it shared certain 
key traits, in particular: “une profession sacrifiée par l’alliance du capitalisme et de 
l’Etat centralisé (par la loi de rentabilité de l’extraction minière).”  The increasing 
politicisation of the Occitan movement had seen it emerge as a valid electoral force 
within the region, and the progenitor of a multitude of political tracts delineating the 
potential for a federalised Occitan nation within a French state, demonstrated in the 
work of Lafont and Fontan.  Yet the political success of the Occitan movement in this 
sense was a cipher for broader discontent with the French state, prefixed on the 
economic hardship exacerbated by unequal development. The modernisation of the 
post-war period was also responsible for the partial atrophy of its traditional 
industries. The extent to which a modern industrial problem unleashed a storm of 
cultural significance made Decazeville exemplary of the nexus of issues that directed 
and shaped modern regional responses to external pressure. When these pressures 
endangered the livelihood of the Languedocian winegrowers, the events of 1907 
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provided a revolutionary handbook for the conduct of such a protest – with direct 
action at its heart. In the words of Robert Lafont, after the challenges of Decazeville: 
“les révoltes du passé, dont 1907, deviennent exemplaires.”524 
 
1968: Le Mai du Midi 
 In chronicling the development of regional identity and the meshing of social 
and industrial activism, May 1968 would curiously seem to be of lesser importance 
than events in the 1960s. The strike at Decazeville, the documented wine activism of 
the Défense movement and the reactivation of a coherent regionalist movement saw 
the Midi well set to echo the turbulence of les années 68. Whilst the riots of Paris were 
not mirrored in the Midi, the social pressures that triggered such a widespread 
movement across Europe were certainly brought to bear and the ramifications of 
challenges to central government were felt. If 1968 did not create the forces that 
encouraged expressions of Occitan identity and spurred viticultural radicalism, then 
the années 68 arguably magnified their influence. Yet, it is striking how little memorial 
legacy '68 has left in the region. Most interviewees showed little appreciation of 1968's 
direct impact on the Languedoc viticole, denigrating its importance as "un mouvement 
urbain et non rural."525  Some, however, were willing to concede at least that a general 
wave of discontent and structural change had washed over the region, causing a 
tangible shift in societal attitudes to family and sexuality.526 Yet, these generalised 
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responses may well be interpreted as subsequent revisions, incorporating the 
predominant narrative of May '68 on to personal reflections.  Where 68's legacy was 
acknowledged, interviewees in high-status positions within the wine world discerned 
a new organisational zeal amongst the Languedoc's syndical organisations. Henri 
Cabanel, Conseiller Général, délégué à la Viticulture, suggested that "Cela a permis à la 
filière de se conformer aux revendications de l'époque et de pouvoir nous organiser 
syndicalement par la défense de notre profession."527 In this sense, the open protests of 
Paris alongside the strikes of Sud-Aviation and various Renault factories, 
demonstrated the combative potential for industrial organisations, even outside their 
national federations. Likewise, Alfredo Manuel Coelho, an associate researcher at UMR 
MOISA SupAgro (an agricultural chemical supply company) in Montpellier conceded 
that 1968 provided additional motivation for wine producers to "fight for their rights 
like other employees in the French society."528  
 Within the cities of the Languedoc there was some solidarity with the students 
of Paris, yet far from the same epochal level of protest. Large-scale riots are not 
documented and nor do we see waves of sympathetic strikes reflected in the literature. 
Yet, in an area with such a high predominance of cooperatives, politics was "vraiment à 
gauche" and opposition to the government was often tacit if not articulated.529 As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Cases’ open letter to the students of the Languedoc 
in 1968 expressed solidarity with the label of “extrémistes”, yet indicated that 
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winegrowers would pick their battles.530 Nevertheless, schools closed in Montpellier as 
complementary disturbances brought the use of tear gas by police. One interviewee 
described how at the age of 10 she encountered tear gas grenades in her stairwell in the 
centre of town.531 Although there were "grèves pour les salaires"532, the ripples 
emanating from the Latin Quarter failed to destabilise the Languedoc 
comprehensively. Indeed, as mentioned previously, 1967 had been a much more 
significant year of protest for winegrowers in the Midi. The vectors that whipped up 
the pervasive revolutionary air of the 1968 years were similar but different in the 
Languedoc. The economic alienation and frustration with the centralised state 
expressed by Occitanistes and winegrowers may have mirrored the slogans of Parisian 
demonstrators, yet they related to a very different set of experiences in the Languedoc 
that had developed throughout the 1960s. Indeed, pre-eminent winegrower Emmanuel 
Maffre-Beaugé dismissed the Parisian experience and poured scorn on the cause of the 
students, deriding "ces intellectuels morbides affichant leurs phantasmes et prônant la 
licence. Nos valeurs sont différentes, le travail manuel en est le pivot."533 
 If winegrowers like Maffre-Beaugé were unsympathetic to the message of the 
protesting students, they found perhaps a more willing audience in the Occitan 
movement. There was, however, some interaction between winegrowers and 
Occitanistes that saw 1968’s presumed message bleed across the Midi. The formation of 
'Comités d'Action Occitans' after May 1968 denoted a radicalisation in the forms of 
                                                          
530 Revel, Montredon, p.61. 
531 Interview with Beatrice de Chabert - Syndicat AOC Coteaux de Languedoc - Montpellier 
Herault - 27-07-2010. 
532 Interview with Cathy Do - Domaine Campaucels - Montagnac - Herault - 27-07-2010. 
533 E. Maffre-Baugeé, Vendanges Amѐres (J.P. Ramsay, Paris, 1976),  p.66. 
207 
 
political intervention, which drew from the example of Paris. The linguistic heritage of 
these Comités is clear and articulated 1968's influence through the vocabulary of the 
COEA. In the late 1960s, these organisations flared up and disappeared in a moment of 
exuberant expression, stating their presence without any particular action. These 
Comités d'Action would eventually consolidate into the aforementioned socialist 
political federation of Lutte Occitane, demonstrating the growing representative 
strength of socialism amongst those who sought decisively to further regionalism and 
the Occitan cause. This amalgamation was demonstrative of the developing links 
between left-wing activists. the radical sociologists of the COEA and a minority of 
those who considered themselves peasants from viticultural organisations.  
  In studying this period, the mobilisation of the CRAV invites comparison with 
other left wing activist groups, especially with the involvement of the PCF through 
Maffre-Beaugé and MODEF. The Trotskyist Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) 
bears some comparison by virtue of its politics and its theories of direct action. 
Emerging from the ashes of the 1968 demonstrations in Paris and forming an important 
conduit of the années 68, their formation in 1973 represented a rejection of Giscard's 
vision of modernising liberalism. Their strong recruitment amongst students was 
indicative of a youthful exuberance for the politics of the extreme left in the wake of the 
1968 demonstrations. They reached their peak in 1976, boasting some 3,800 activists, 
although by 1979 schisms in the party saw them lose around 20% of their 
membership.534 During their most active period, however, they attempted to engage 
                                                          




with the issues of the Défense movement, attracted by the radicalism and 
organisational structure of the CRAV.  
 The LCR journal Rouge commented upon the radicalisation of the CNJA and the 
emergence of a Paysan-travailleur mentality which promised some attachment to their 
cause. The hope that such movements could be encouraged in the countryside was 
perhaps strongest in the Languedoc-Roussillon, long labeled the Midi rouge. Tentative 
and short lived groups were formed in both Montpellier and Nîmes to promote 
revolutionary communism, although both the Commission paysan and the Comité rouge 
paysan enjoyed slender membership figures. Leaders of agricultural unions were 
increasingly treated to long interviews in Rouge including Jean Huillet on 11 April 
1975. In highlighting and celebrating these emergent ouvriériste movements in the 
countryside, the hope of the LCR was that “un syndicat de classe de la paysannerie” 
would emerge as a natural ally of the urban working class. Likewise, members of the 
LCR were also attached to Occitan movements, providing a tangible link to the paysan 
identity they coveted. Two local publications of tiny circulation (Cahiers Occitanie Rouge 
and Petit Rouge du Périgord) promoted the LCR’s links to the Occitan cause. Cahiers’ 
finest moment came when they secured an interview with Maffre-Beaugé who outlined 
the difficulties of Languedocian vignerons and extolled the need for Communists to 
remain active in the region. Although these moments were of little impact in 
constructing a national structure for the LCR, they constituted an important and rare 
foray into the rural world for a Trotskyist group.535  
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 The involvement in the Occitan movement of wine producers saw political 
Occitanisme shaped by the proximity of radical peasantry, adding a flavour of anti-
capitalism to traditional politics. By setting issues of class alongside criticisms of 
capitalism, the Occitan movement displayed a form of leftism which has been 
described as 'Nationalisme de gauche', effectively drawing in pre-Marxist ideals of 
mutualism and cooperativism combined with a pronounced desire for independent 
sovereignty and cultural recognition. Indeed, the COEA portrayed its Occitan 
nationalism as more closely allied to theories of national minorities developed by 
Proudhon.536 Proudhon's strict preference for federalism in the face of centralised states 
was attuned to the beliefs of Occitan militants, specifically in relation to the region's 
right to auto-gestion: "Solicit men's view in the mass, and they will return stupid, fickle 
and violent answers; solicit their views as members of definite groups with real 
solidarity and a distinctive character, and their answers will be responsible and 
wise."537 In claiming that "Occitanie est essentiellement agricole"538, the COEA sought to 
distinguish the Midi as not only culturally distinct from the North but also 
economically. Proudhon's distinct groups could be dreamed up with the use of 
invented tradition and a focus on the region's turbulent past, allowing the Occitan 
movement to shape its own heritage by taking ownership of regional patrimoine. The 
lop-sided development of the past that had seen the Midi miss the profitable 
industrialisation of other regions had changed the very character of Occitanie's future.  
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 In the search for greater acknowledgement of their cultural autonomy, the 
COEA and the various strands of the Occitan movement changed both their tactics and 
the tone of their appeal from those of the intellectual Félibrige. Social and political 
relevancy could be manipulated by both focussing on the regional heritage of workers 
in threatened sectors and internationalising the conflict.  Indeed, the Occitan 
movement's broadly cast net fell far beyond France. Militants lamented the plight of 
Ireland, "état né des souffrances d'un peuple colonisé et de ses luttes"; Spain, where "le 
gouvernement espagnol refuse la liberté aux peuples basque, catalan et galicien et 
réprime l'usage de leur langue"; and Israel, "exemple de colonisation par l'argent de 
terres dont on expulse d'abord par achat, puis par les tracasseries administratives les 
habitants (ici les Palestiniens)."539 Subsequently, the 1970s witnessed the Paysans Larzac 
entertaining a delegation of Hopi tribesmen from America as well as Japanese farmers 
opposed to similar expropriation in service of Tokyo airport.540 Locating the oppressed 
and latching on to their cause helped to expand the relevancy of the Occitan 
movement.  
Trying to pin down exactly how effective or attractive the rhetoric of the 
Occitan movement was represents a difficult task in isolation. Indeed, other groups 
that meet Proudhon's federalist criteria were interested in interacting with Occitanistes. 
One of the Midi’s strongest associations for historians and analysts has traditionally 
been with the Breton region, by virtue of their regionalist movements. Both regions 
share a perception of being historically marginalized by a Parisian centre whilst also 
standing for a more traditional way of life in opposition to a modern, industrial and 
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capitalist mode de vie. Vincent Porhel describes a Breton 'mythology' mirroring that of 
the traditional resentment of the Cathar crusade in the Midi: "les mémoires des acteurs 
marquent la prégnance d'un certain mythe breton d'un retard, tant économique que 
culturel, reposant sur les manques de l'industrialisation."541 This lack of 
industrialisation could fuel resentment but it could also foster a fondness for the 
region's past, suggesting a closer relationship with traditional ways of life. This form of 
mythology became extremely important during the 1970s, with regionalists deploying 
patrimoine as a validating political force to help radicalise support for their cause. Yet 
the Breton movement has encountered similar difficulties to the Occitan movement in 
its struggle to create a mandate of sufficiently broad regional interests to present a 
cohesive whole.  
For Breton protestors, the issue of the Plogoff nuclear reactor served to 
characterise and sometimes dominate the regionalist movement at the expense of 
genuinely regionalist sentiment.542 In the Midi, the political Occitan movement's desire 
for a form of Proudhonian federalism based around centuries-old legitimisation 
offered little for winegrowers in need of subsidy and access to markets. The task of the 
COEA was to drag regionalism from the fringes of political relevancy and attempt to 
impress themselves in the political foreground by addressing the relationship between 
Occitanisme and the realities of the regional economy. This was shown in their reaction 
to Decazeville. Their role was to overcome these internal conflicts and provide a 
figurehead for the Occitan movement. As Vincent Porhel stated, the Breton movement 
following 1968 "soulignent l'ambivalence des répresentations sociales et culturelles: 
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entre recherche de l'isolement et ouverture sur l'espace des possibles, les acteurs 
régionaux peinent à trouver leur voies."543 If 1968 had failed to spark the sudden 
resurgence of regionalist sentiment that many had predicted, it nevertheless shook the 
foundations of a state and encouraged further activism amongst the myriad 
groupuscules formed in the heady days of May. The issues that had solicited similarly 
strong expressions of discontent with the centralised state and the health of the 
regional economy were strengthened by the demonstrations of 1968 but not caused by 
them. The radicalisation and alienation of the Défense movement throughout the 1960s 
met with a reinvigorated Occitan lobby characterised by the politically engaged 
sociologists of the COEA and saw these movements mesh in the first tentative 
moments of a regional protest movement. 
 
Patrimoine and possession: Lessons from Larzac 
 Although the developments of the 1960s had increased support for the Occitan 
movement, the conflict at Larzac helped entrench this support. When the French 
government (and specifically then Minister of Defence Michel Debré) sought to extend 
a military base which had been in place since 1899 from 30km2  to 170km2, infringing 
on agricultural land on the Larzac plateau, locals began a long-standing struggle to 
prevent the annexation of regional land.  Tractors and sheep-farmers inundated the 
proposed expansion area, setting up protest camps and allowing the free circulation of 
a new regional radicalism. The theme of 'Occitanie' entered demonstrations at an early 
point and helped bring disparate causes together: "le mot d'ordre 'vivre et travailler au 
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pays' permet à cet égard de coaliser les éleveurs du Larzac et les ouvriers."544 The 
gathered crowds at Larzac almost directly embodied the spirit of anti-establishment 
politics and 'New Left' ideology that had emerged from the '1968 years'. The multi-
cultural protest camp threw up odd combinations of freedom fighters; suddenly Kanak 
militants protesting the extension of army bases in New Caledonia545 appeared 
alongside Languedocian activists to express the solidarity of anti-Parisian minorities. 
By broadening their national and international appeal, the defenders of Larzac 
cultivated a potent authenticity that validated their non-violent actions and held them 
up as an oppressed group.  
 The specific introduction of the military brought along with them a new 
vocabulary of resistance. Suddenly, the presence of soldiers solidarised Occitan 
protesters and encouraged them to draw allusions to groups outside of the Midi. 
Indeed, there were demonstrable interactions between the Occitan movement and 
nationalist militants elsewhere in Europe. In particular, Occitan extremists sought to 
form connections with the IRA in an effort to show solidarity and draw a comparison 
between the Occitan nation under French control and Ireland under British rule. The 
'Long Kesh Ramblers' - an Irish republican band formed as a fundraising group for the 
families of interned political prisoners - were welcomed at a series of concerts in the 
South of France and happily posed for photos during "L'échange du drapeau occitan et 
du drapeau de l'I.R.A."546 (See below – the flags exchanged are the Croix Occitane and 
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the Starry Plough.547) The tour which they undertook was an interesting enumeration 
of the regions within France where regionalist sentiment simmered - Lyons, Angers, 
Grenoble, Annamasse, Avignon, Montpellier, Larzac and finally to the centre for a 
concert in Paris. Omitting the Breton region was a glaring mistake, although rectified 
by a tour dedicated to the 'celtic region' in 1974.548 The group's political engagement 
played well in the Midi, where following a concert, debate raged about violent struggle 
and the road to ‘national’ liberation. Protestors found common ground in their mutual 
hatred of occupying soldiers - also stationed at Larzac - who had massacred "nos frères, 
les travailleurs d'Irlande." Likewise, the two groups professed "la solidarité des 
peuples pauvres à la périphérie de l'Europe capitaliste".549 The 'colonialisme intérieure' 
described by both both the Occitan movement and the IRA allowed common ground to 
be found despite disparities in their actual situation. The professed non-violence of the 
Larzac movement allowed it to cultivate a support base that it would have been 
unattainable had it mirrored the violent action of some Breton protestors, for example. 
The death of a policeman in 1976 was a tragic outcome of a confused situation and not 
representative of a strategy of violence as practised in Ireland. 
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Occitanistes exchange the flag of Occitanie with the Irish Republican 'Starry Plough'550 
 Analysing the most extreme Occitan radicals, however, provides us with an 
interesting insight into the conceptual bonds they shared with other 'national 
liberation' struggles. The newspaper Lutte Occitane declared itself an "Organe 
d'information et de combat" and communicated an extreme line of Occitan political 
views to a largely sympathetic audience. As mentioned earlier, it was published by the 
socialist political party of the same name, formed in 1970.  The journal began to publish 
in 1972, in the midst of a turbulent period in the Midi as viticultural activism reached 
new heights and the decentralist legacy of 1968 was felt strongly in the Occitan cultural 
revival. Likewise, with the memory of Decazeville fresh and Larzac an open wound, 
the journal remained politically relevant. With a strident tone and a militant stance 
towards the Occitan political cause, 'Lutte Occitane' sought to denounce the sneering 
attitudes of Parisians and highlight the inequality occurring in the Midi as a result of 
lop-sided development. When referring to Northern opinion, Lutte Occitane railed 
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against the condescending attitude of a feature writer in Le Monde who dismissed the 
Occitan claim "C'est au mieux un aimable mythe, au PIRE une bonne plaisanterie". This 
Parisian 'attack' was seen by Occitanistes in the Midi to be a backhanded compliment 
for their strengthened movement - "On n'attaque pas ce qui n'existe pas, et, en tout cas, 
ce qui n'existe pas ne saurait répliquer." This image of tenaciously maintaining a 
presence despite the ill will of the state helped to motivate supporters with a siege 
mentality. The journal argued that the 'Langue d'Oc' was far from being dead, despite 
the best efforts of the French schooling system to kill it.551 This deliberate policy of 
exclusion from the school system was of particular irritation to the COEA, who quoted 
a UNESCO directive from 1967 which classified "exclusion de l'école d'une langue 
parlée par une collectivité" as "génocide culturel".552 
 This struggle arose as a profound regional rejection of Debré's seeming 
contempt for the Larzac farmers. Speaking to a TV audience on 28 October 1971 he 
dismissed "a few peasants there, not many, still living more or less as they had done in 
the Middle Ages, who pass their time [vaguement] raising a few sheep, and whom, 
therefore, it will be necessary to expropriate." As Herman Lebovics suggests, perhaps 
the most striking transgression in this attack was the breach of what E.P. Thompson 
called the "moral economy", provoking outrage and widespread support amongst the 
local population.553 The protesters at Larzac gathered as sheep-farmers and producers 
of Roquefort in the winter of 1970, before being joined by a motley crowd of supporters 
from Paris, Montpellier and elsewhere in the thaw of 1971. Despite some local 
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resistance to the assortment of newly arrived, long-haired radicals, the political left, 
industrial unions and the local clergy formed the Comité Millavois de Défense du 
Larzac. The breadth of the Larzac Défense group dwarfed the comparative insularity of 
the winegrowers and the CRAV, drawing support from organisations like the FNSEA, 
CDJA, PSU and Lutte Occitane.554 After meandering political adventures that attracted 
the support of Jean-Marie Le Pen, swathes of priests and even the European disciple of 
Mahatma Gandhi, the Larzac encampment endured as a jumbled alliance of ideologies 
and personalities fixed on a single cause.  
 The leadership of the Larzac 'commune' controlled this movement by the 
careful guardianship of authenticity, regulating the 'brand' of the protest and ensuring 
that if the camp grew beyond its original imagining, it did so as a beacon of solidarity 
for the sheep-farmers of Millau.555 This was of particular importance in that it 
channelled support not through a national organisation like the FNSEA or CDJA, but 
rather through the independent and specific 'Association pour la promotion de 
l'agriculture sur le Larzac'.556 Nevertheless, they retained the support of these national 
groups, who organised regional protests in support of the Larzac peasants.557 
Publishing their newspaper, Gardarem Lo Larzac, guaranteed national attention and 
even saw sympathetic protest break out in New York, whilst ensuring that the output 
of the commune could be controlled and directed by its leadership.558 In 1976, the 
Larzac camp gained perhaps its most famous proponent, José Bové, and he emerged as 
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a bombastic spokesman for the cause who would develop enduring and iconic status. 
Harnessing the tractor charges already utilised by protesters (and mirroring the 
viticultural protests of the late 1950s and early 1960s) along with his contacts in the 
academic world, Bové ensured that the protest remained relevant and imaginative.  
The recent violence which had marred other demonstrations in Europe, with 
“plasticages, les jets de cocktails molotov” demonstrated that care had to be taken to 
unite the organisations of the left and extreme left within the Larzac central committee 
to ensure the maintenance of a pacifist program. In particular, they hoped that the 
pacifism of the Larzac movement could offer a positive example to disaffected youth 
and draw them closer to regional identity: “ces jeunes militants rompent avec l’image 
de casseurs et l’identité occitane est bien séduisante pour ces individus à la recherche 
d’une ‘identité collective’." Controlling the appeal of their movement was important in 
the manner which it could attract support of regional youths. By focussing on creating 
a vibrant movement in opposition to the powers of the French state, Occitanistes could 
motivate political action in a manner that had been impossible for the Félibirige: 
Eux qui se sont toujours sentis diminués par rapport aux gens des 
villes, aux Parisiens... se retrouvent occitans, c’est-à-dire riches d’un 
pays, d’une culture, d’une langue et d’une histoire spécifique qui les 
touchent dans leur esprit et dans leur corps.559  
 
Unifying support in opposition to the powers-that-be allowed the Défense du vin 
movement, the Occitanistes of the COEA and Lutte Occitane and also the committee of 
Larzac to present themselves as attractive resistant forces which could curry the favour 
of regional youth. Controlling regional patrimoine and harnessing and cultivating 
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authenticity ensured that the Larzac Défense groups fed on a sense of moral 
transgression by the French state. In addition, the Larzac protestors drew in urban 
support internationalised their struggle and railed against an 'occupying' military. An 
association with the Third World was perhaps the defining characteristic of the Larzac 
resistors. Suddenly, the dormant Occitan nation was granted a similar cache to those 
resisting oppression all over the globe. 
 
Tangled lines between Oc & Vine 
The CRAV’s ties to the Occitan movement at the time of Larzac were diffuse 
and difficult to define, although their leaders used the vocabulary of regionalism to 
motivate support for what were increasingly seen as the analogous struggles of “la race 
vigneronne” and “la race d’oc”.560 This association was bound up into the climate of 
increasing intensity over the late 1960s and early 1970s that produced a remarkable 
convergence of causes in the Midi. Claude Marti, the famous Occitan singer, released a 
song in 1972 entitled 'La guerre du vin', for example, which celebrated the struggle 
facing winegrowers and the touristic exploitation of the Languedoc by “Metropolitan 
France”.561 This song was part of a wave of Occitan cultural produce which flooded the 
Languedoc-Roussillon during this period, as the area underwent something of a 
cultural renaissance inspired by the regional assertion of local militants. After 1972, the 
Occitan cultural movement made its mark on the Festival in Carcassonne, with plays 
and performances impressing an overtly Occitan character on a region already 
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asserting its independence from outside pressure. In identifying this new torrent of 
potentially subversive regional patrimony, Zancarini-Fournel detects a significant 
upturn in the fortunes of Occitan cultural production after 1968, with an explosion in 
the popularity of theatrical and lyrical works glorifying the toil of the winemaker in an 
unfavourable climate.562 Whilst acknowledging the different narrative trajectories of the 
Midi and Paris, it is necessary to stress that 1968 helped to develop a wider national 
audience for regional products. In the Occitan music of Marti, for example, one writer 
noted that the “‘jeune contestataire’ manifeste un évident désir de rentrer en contact 
avec la population réelle, avec cette ‘France sauvage’ que l’on n’enseigne pas dans les 
facultés”.563 
 Such a voguish trend helped produce a cultural association between 
winegrowing as a profession and Occitan nationalism that coalesced on the defence of 
communities vulnerable to contemporary social developments. When Occitan militants 
met with Jean Vialade in 1974, they agreed that “Nous menons le même combat.”564 In 
a sense, the two forces of Oc and Vine (as defined by their loudest proponents in the 
Midi) can be seen as having been characterised by a clash between 'Old left' and 'New 
left'. Whilst the 'Défense du vin' movement conducted industrial activism which 
touched on socio-cultural issues, the Occitan movement essentially pursued socio-
cultural activism which touched on industrial issues. The Midi vignerons were cast as 
the victims of modernisation as the government pursued what seemed to be 
hardheaded structural reforms designed to offer the brightest future to those in tune 
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with the institutional vision. As such, protest became characterised by the refusal of 
these actors to integrate fully with a system that they railed against, promoting a vein 
of collective action that occurred outside of political due process.565 Internal colonialism 
and narratives of Occitan resistance became the political currency of those wishing to 
pursue their grievances against the state, as movements increasingly converged to offer 
a regional response to what was in fact a national phenomenon. Michel Le Bris 
recounts a winegrowers' demonstration in 1971, which saw the mayor of Carcassonne 
address a raucous crowd and lament their status as “le désert languedocien ou encore 
la dernière colonie française.”566  
When vignerons occupied Montpellier Cathedral early in 1971, police 
diagnosed a new vivacity and different tone in their protest movement. RG reports 
noted that "cette occupation relève du 'folklore' et prenner parfois des allures de 
kermesse".567 The notion of an Occitan revival had become bound to the concept of 
regional resistance in the eyes of the forces of order. The significance of the highly 
visible and symbolic acts of the winegrowers was in creating new touchstones of 
regional identity. These demonstrations, bearing the Occitan cross at their head, served 
as a new form of cultural fête, in which the symbols of Occitanie and the region's 
occupational identify could be communicated. The cross became a potent and 
communicative symbol, a tradition which had been reclaimed or reinvented to serve 
modern needs.  Hobsbawm states that 'Invented tradition' is utilised to serve three 
main aims: establishing or symbolising social cohesion; legitimising authority and the 
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socialisation and inculcation of beliefs.568 This theory does not suggest one conscious 
font for tradition, but rather that communities can subtly, and at times unconsciously, 
shape their own traditions as reflective of their aspirations and preoccupations. In this 
sense, the alignment of Occitan and viticultural groups is understandable during a 
period of social and political radicalism as they were mutually validating. In the same 
manner as 'Wine Deputies' set themselves up as ideal representations of the region's 
interests, so too did radical groups find validation in appeals to regional identity. 
Likewise, the legitimacy of the winegrowers and the Occitan revival brought in 
other regional pressure groups. Reports on winegrowers' demonstrations lamented 
that "Comme à l'accoutumée, des éléments non viticulteurs se sont mêlés aux 
manifestants et se sont rapidement trouvés au premier rang lors des contacts avec le 
service d'ordre." In particular, the extreme left were seen by police to be playing an 
active role in disrupting winegrowers' demonstrations. The strict monitoring and 
knowledge of the CRAV's role suggests that the forces of order understood the 
difference between this organisation and some of the more raucous 'fellow travellers' 
seeking to communicate grievances against the state. RG reports lament that "les 
éléments gauchistes ne manqueront pas de profiler de la circonstance pour jouer les 
éléments provocateurs." This unwelcome involvement predicted at the Cathedral's 
occupation did indeed materialise and saw the arrest of 10 young men aged between 
18 and 24. Their backgrounds (3 from Algeria, 1 from La Réunion, 1 from Syria and the 
others from Poitiers, Gironde, Pézenas, Nîmes and Alès) and their ages suggested they 
were not winegrowers (as in fact the report confirms) and also that they were not 
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colluding in some organised violence. Rather they seem to have been simply joining in 
with a widespread communication of dissatisfaction. Reports did comment that "aucun 
d'eux connu du service pour une activité gauchiste antérieure, mais il n'est pas exclu 
qu'ils appartiennent à une organisation révolutionnaire."569 The fact that the youths 
were not from heartlands of Occitanie nor attached to winegrowers suggests merely a 
desire to be involved in a scuffle with police. Further reports suggested that "beaucoup 
de viticulteurs, âgés surtout, redoutent les excès qui risquent de voir le jour et 
désapprouvent les violence passées ou prévisibles."570 Indeed, this raises an interesting 
question relating to the CRAV but also to the more radical proponents of the Occitan 
movement. In interviews, many modern winegrowers expressed uneasiness with 
violence carried out by CRAV members whilst others were quicker to support what 
they saw as the "bras armée du syndicalisme".571 
Violent protests that pitted the forces of order against a clearly defined group 
claiming to speak for a region were of clear concern to government. When the identity 
of this group was obscured by clandestine action, however, support could waver and 
the forces of order were quick to suspect the involvement of some 'organisation 
révolutionnaire'. They were not too far from the truth, however. The fury of the CRAV 
fooled some into believing that the group were actively waging war against the French 
government in favour of separatist goals. Some reports have claimed that Colonel 
Gaddafi attempted to fund the CRAV as an instrument designed to topple the 
Republic. Libyan envoys are purported to have offered great sums of money to CRAV 
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activists between 1973 and 1974 in a series of meetings in which hushed chatter turned 
to whispers of sedition. Common cause was not found, however, with the ever-
garrulous Jean Vialade relating the outcome: 
Je leur ai expliqué que nous ne menions pas le même combat. Nous, 
on se battait contre la politique d'un gouvernement qui nous 
asphyxiait, mais pas pour renverser la République.572  
 
His rebuttal is far from patriotic, yet stresses that the conflict of the CRAV remained 
bound by economic concerns and was not driven by Occitan nationalism or the 
involvement of some revolutionary group. The alignment of the Occitan movement 
with the Défense movement was a worrying development for the forces of order, yet in 
both instances the Languedoc's republican inheritance prevented them tipping into 
revolutionary violence. 
Part of the difficulty, then, in constructing an acceptable and unified identity for 
both movements was the exclusion of 'fellow travellers' tempted by more radical 
violence. This demonstrates again the boundaries of acceptability within in which both 
the Occitan and Défense movements operated. There was little support for the use of 
violence in defence of political, social and economic causes. By collating the changing 
opinions of interviewees573 with those expressed in the local and national media,574 we 
can discern other issues that challenged acceptance of CRAV actions. Namely, these 
were the visibility of leadership and the identification of a cause. Behind Cases and 
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Castera, the CRAV of the 1960s and 1970s could act with near impunity as the 
charismatic orators turned heads at widely attended demonstrations. In later years 
when the group slunk to the shadows, the lack of an identifiable leadership saw public 
opinion waver. This theme will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, 
charting the history of the CRAV after Montredon and throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Yet this was, importantly, another strong bond to the legacy of 1907. Although the 
CRAV had attempted to divest itself of leaders after Castera's electoral defeat and 
instituted the 'porte-parole' model, Cases' prominence ensured that he was widely 
viewed as leader. In the tradition of Albert and Ferroul, Cases and Castera provided 
figureheads who could broadly control the movement, even if they tended to exercise 
this control loosely. Nonetheless, prominent leadership allowed the CRAV to resist the 
overtures of groups like the Libyans and maintain their republican rhetoric.  
 
Fighting for the Past 
Abandoning the modern phrase 'Agriculteurs' in favour of the rather out-dated 
label of 'paysans' was another of the principal unifying concepts which drew the sheep-
farmers of Larzac, the miners of Decazeville and the winegrowers of the Midi under 
the aegis of one movement. This label allowed all three movements to connect 
themselves to the past and fostered an understanding of patrimoine that emerged in 
opposition to the central project of the Parisian powers-that-be. Indeed, such imagery 
was key to the movement's seeming potency. By uniting as 'paysans' fighting for a 
regional 'patrimoine' under threat from a predatory coloniser, the conceptual battle for 
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legitimacy was won. These sweeping terms allowed the co-option of historical 
precedents that might reinforce their resistant claim. So too did the vocabulary of the 
Albigensian crusade and 1907 re-enter common circulation.  
In Claude Marti's 1973 album Un päis que vol viure, the popular poet and singer 
explicitly sang about Montsegur and the city of Carcassonne as a stronghold of Occitan 
values.575 The singer's rise in popularity can perhaps be attributed to an 'après-Mai' 
surge in fondness for rural products amongst city-dwellers576 and the legacy of la 
Nouvelle gauche. In particular, their focus on Marcusean social alienation had pushed 
"les groupes marginalisés de la société", and in particular the young, record-buying 
public, towards varied and often contradictory forms of anti-étatique, anti-authoritarian 
and neo-Marxist political expression.577 Such eclectic political engagement encouraged 
support for movements that purported to represent the peripheries and especially 
those that did so in the imaginative rhetoric of Larzac. There, the presence of people 
like Marti helped make the cause accessible and attractive. The young, bearded Marti, 
from the marginalised South and recalling past revolts against authority, offered an 
attractive prospect for young record-buyers in Paris as much as young Occitanistes in 
the south. His association with the Larzac campaign helped expand the visibility of the 
Occitan movement and, by extension, that of Languedocian winegrowers. In the same 
album, Marti invoked 1907 as a lieu de mémoire of the Occitan movement in the song 
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Lengadoc roge (Languedoc rouge), in which an oppressed regional working class found 
themselves in conflict with a repressive state.   
 
Marti's reference to the 'guerre aux Allemands' indicts the callousness of a government 
ready to send troops to the Great War whilst also raising the spectre of Occupation. 
Specifically, he is referring to the redeployment of the mutinous 17th regiment 
celebrated in the literature of 1907. The red flower symbolising the Occitan nation wilts 
over the grave of the lost Languedocian soldiers, sacrificed by a nation that had no 
need for them. In this song, the blanket of lies in which the flower is buried becomes a 
sad parody of the Occitan flag, subsumed by the pressure of the French state. Imbued 
with this imagery, the Occitan flag became supple enough to accommodate a variety of 
identities, narratives and causes under the banner of rural, regionalist resistance. 
Languedoc Rouge 
(French) 
C'était l'an 1907 
Les pauvres manifestaient 
Et ils n'ont pas voulu tirer 
Peuple et soldats étaient frères 
Ils n ont pas voulu tirer 
Les soldats languedociens 
Gouvernement tu te vengeras ' 
Avec une guerre aux Allemands  
C était l'an 1907 
Dans Béziers on manifestait 
Et ils n'ont pas voulu tirer. 
Toi qui ne voulais pas mourir 
Parmi des fleurs inconnues 
Ils t'ont enterré dans un drap 
De terre froide du Nord. 
Cette année 1917 r , 
T'écrivait ta mère : 
« Reviens vite, pour la vigne. 
« Je pleure si je la regarde.» 
Elle est pourrie la fleur rouge 
Elle est pourrie la fleur 
On l'a enterrée dans un drap 
Amer de mensonges 
Elle est pourrie la fleur rouge. 
Lengadoc roge  
(Occitan) 
Era l'an 1907 
Los paures manifestavan 
E volguèran pas tirar 
Poble e soldats èran fraires 
E volguèran pas tirar 
Los soldats lengadocians 
Governament te vengaràs 
Amb una guèrra aIs Alemands 
Era l’an 1907 
Per Besièrs manifestavan 
E volguèron pas tirar 
Tu que voliàs pas morir 
Entre flors desconegudas 
T'an enterrat dins un lençol 
De freda tèrra del Nord 
Aquel an 1917 
T’escrivia ta maire : 
« Torna lèu per la vinha . 
Plori quand la regardi » 
S ‘es pirida la flor roja 
S’es poirida la flor 
L’an enterrada dins un lençol 
Amargant de messorgas 
S’es poirida la flor 
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Relating 1907 to the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s saw the contemporary 
Occitaniste revival contextualised alongside a long history of protests in the wine 
industry. When the Marseillaise des vignerons was recirculated in 1972, the concept of 
traditional regional republicanism blended with Occitan identity and a spirit of the 
agricultural. The winegrower’s Marseillaise is indicative of the central conflicts that 
had survived the historicisation of 1907 – regionalism and uneven development. 
Marseillaise des viticulteurs (Auguste Rouquet) 
Pour affirmer nos droits de vivre,  
Fils du Midi, assemblons-nous ; 
Les fraudeurs à la mort nous livrent,  
Qu'ils redoutent notre courroux ! (bis)  
Entendez-vous dans nos campagnes,  
Retentir nos cris et nos pleurs ?  
Depuis trop longtemps les fraudeurs  
Affament nos fils, nos compagnes.  
 
Debout ! Viticulteurs ! 
C'est trop, trop de malheurs ! 
Luttons ! luttons ! 
Pour que la faim déserte nos maisons !  
 
Quoi! ces fraudeurs dans leurs richesses 
Riraient de nos pauvres foyers !  
Eux qui vivent de nos détresses 
Devant eux nous verraient ployer (bis)  
Quoi ! nous dépeuplerions nos terres  
Des vignes aux pampres juteux!  
Là où vécurent nos aïeux 
Nous ne trouverions que misère !  
 
Debout ! Viticulteurs ! 
C'est trop, trop de malheurs ! 
Luttons ! luttons ! 
Et, sans faiblir, ensemble nous vaincrons !  
 
De notre vin nous voulons vivre. 
Qu'on écoute enfin notre voix; 
Que des fraudeurs on nous délivre, 
Qu'on nous donne ce qu'on nous doit. (bis) 
Accourez ceux de Carcassonne, 
De Béziers et de Lézignan, 
D'Argeliers, Nîmes, Perpignan,  




Fils du Midi, Debout ! 
Nous irons jusqu'au bout! 
Luttons ! luttons ! 
Et, sans faiblir, ensemble nous vaincrons !  
 
The Marseillaise des viticulteurs reinvigorated the issues of 1907 to relate them to 
a specific moment in the resurgence of the Occitan identity that coincided with 
widespread viticultural unrest. Highlighting issues of fraud helped to demonstrate the 
long-standing nature of the Midi's grievances. Indeed, interviewees equated the lessons 
of 1907 with contemporary challenges to vignerons, with several stating that lessons 
could still be learned and one emphasising that they faced "les mêmes questions".578 
The line "De notre vin nous voulons vivre" is echoed in the frequent reuse of that 
phrase in support of the winegrowers' movement. Likewise, the notion that riches do 
exist in the North and that others are profiting from the misfortune of the Midi 
remained a primary motivation for the CRAV, who frequently spoke out against 
'fiscalité'. Bechtel astutely points out that the story of 1907, whilst “oublié à Paris, est 
resté comme une blessure profonde dans le Languedoc rural.”579 In this sense, 1907 has 
retained a certain mythology, which casts it as a revolt characterised by "fierté 
d'identitaire"580 alongside economic and political motivations.  
Contemporary manipulation of 1907 was aimed at exacerbating the tensions 
between Paris and the regions in an effort to advance the agenda of regionalist political 
parties. By appropriating the national anthem to support a regionalist agenda, the Midi 
vignerons clearly distinguished themselves from the Metropolitan centre of France. 
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Their Marseillaise speaks of blood and triumph over despotism but far removed from 
the traditional Revolutionary import. Such fondness for concepts of “primordiality”581 
and traditional values encouraged the proliferation of ‘ethno-history’ and regional 
myth making, in which aspects of regional heritage were extrapolated into myths of 
more contemporary relevance.582 
 One of the principal bonds that linked the ‘Myth of 1907’ to the Occitan revival 
was its tendency to encourage a search for villains from without the region. In this 
case, other regions and other countries have loomed like predators threatening the 
Midi's fragile stability. Thus, as Jean-Phillippe Martin eloquently states, "Négociants du 
Nord de la France, producteurs et surtout négociants étrangers, gouvernements 
français et d'Algérie ou d'Italie sont unis aux yeux des producteurs dans un étrange 
complot extérieur."583 It was this suspicion that drove the adoption of a siege mentality 
and encouraged recourse to historical moments of conflict. Under this siege, dissenting 
groups within the Midi were driven together in a fragile alliance, with a temporary 
convergence of cause during the 1970s. 'Lutte Occitane' highlighted the links between 
Oc and Vine as it spoke to CRAV adherent Jean Vialade, whose interview in 1972 
highlighted the economic plight of winegrowers and railed against the detrimental role 
of centralised government in choking regional development:  
Je dis que c'est le Midi qui soutient l'industrie du Nord. Nous sommes 
exploités par le Nord d'une façon détournée. Autrefois c'est 
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l'exploitation par les hommes, aujourd'hui c'est l'exploitation par 
l'économie c'est encore pire.584  
 
The roundabout way in which the exploitation of the Midi was achieved mirrored the 
roundabout way in which the two regional movements meshed. Vialade's citation of 
economic exploitation helped to demonstrate the unifying rhetoric of the movements. 
Likewise, his reference to 'autrefois' conjures up the images of historical repression 
associated with the Midi and Occitanisme. Yet further links between the movement 
were demonstrated when 'Lutte Occitane' reprinted material from 'Echo des Corbières', 
the organ of the CRAV. The two publications shared some common issues, especially 
relating to the conservation of the Languedocian countryside and the strong links 
between traditional industries and Occitan culture. Indeed, the sign-off on the article 
could well describe the editorial team behind both publications - "Un group d'occitans 
indignes".585 The causes that promoted interaction between winegrowers and the 
Occitan movement held strong associations with a traditional regional identity and the 
agricultural, binding both movements in their resistance to certain tropes of centralised 
modernisation. 
 As described in the last chapter, the formation of MIVOC in 1975 by a 
winegrower long involved with the CRAV forged a tangible example of the 
cooperation between winegrowers and the regionalist movement. Jean Huillet, in his 
trademark cowboy boots, blue jeans, earring, and handlebar moustache became 
involved with Occitanisme in the early 1970s through Lutte Occitane, the avowedly 
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socialist Occitan party, and carried their message into his participation in the CRAV.  
The ideology of MIVOC was fairly simply defined:  
 chaque viticulture méridional 'cultivent son pétassou de vigne' doit 
pouvoir percevoir un salaire directement lié à son travail (la culture 
d'une surface de référence devant donner droit à un salasire 
minimum garanti) et ce, quasi indépendamment des conditions du 
marché.586  
 
In 1975, MIVOC named the enemies of Languedocian viticulture as "le négoce... le 
pouvoir politique... et 'les grandes propriétaires fonciers'.587 These enemies were 
characterised as external, Parisian, centralising and of the political right. The CRAV had 
little cause to argue. 
 Moreover, Huillet published an article in the Paysan du Midi on 13 February 
1975 that specifically utilised the vocabulary of the Occitan movement in defence of 
winegrowers. In this article, he linked the wine industry to the regional economy, 
highlighting the extent to which their fortunes were interlinked:  
A travers le viticulture c'est l'économie de la région qui est atteinte, 
l'industrie, déjà, a fait les frais de l'opération. Pour que dans les 
villages on ne lise pas: 'Ici chômeurs naturels' à la place de 'Ici vin 
naturel', il nous faut rester mobilisés et organiser dans chaque canton 
les forces qui feront aboutir nos revendications. Volem viure al päis! 
 
Huillet associated regional identity strongly with regional viticulture as the 
predominant economic activity of a Languedocian working class. His attachment to the 
Occitan movement, the CRAV and also to Socialism linked class, region and 
                                                          
586 Y. Gilbert & J. Meistersheim, Orateurs en Languedoc 1981-1986: La recomposition d'une 
imaginaire régionale (Paris: UDR-EASA, 1986), p.45. 
587 J. Martin, Histoire de la nouvelle gauche paysanne (Paris: La Découverte, 2005), pp.137-142. 
233 
 
regionalism. For Huillet, 'l'économie' was viticulture, 'la région' was the Languedoc 
viticole and the 'päis' was Occitanie.588 Their interaction was seen as intuitive and their 
inter-dependency was reiterated as a political certainty deployed in opposition to the 
political and geographical "extérieur".589  That Huillet signed off this published article 
in the name of the CRAV, bound the organisation to the Occitan movement in the 
struggle against regional redundancy.  
 This direct association marked a tangible interaction of the 'civilisation of the 
vine' as both groups took an active stance in claiming the authenticity of their own 
regional patrimoine. This adapted patrimoine was the potent force that brought the 
broader regional movement closer to the winegrower’s widespread economic 
grievances in the post-war period: a heady mix of emotive ethno-politicking and 
enthusiastic class entreaties. The contemporary political relevance of regional economic 
imperatives papered over the gap between the conceptual ‘primordialism’ of Occitan 
nationalism and its modern significance as a regionalist movement. Likewise the 
cyclical structure of the Languedoc’s wine crises ensured reference to tradition and 
inherited memory, like the ‘foundation myth’ of 1907. In this manner it becomes 
possible to understand the conflation of the militant viticultural movement into the 
broader church of Occitanisme. This emotive narrative carried within it the very 
determinants of direct action by harbouring a sense of historical injustice and 
highlighting breaches in the 'moral economy'. The personalisation of labour in the 
vineyards served only to bring these injustices to the hearth. When the region – and the 
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dominant regional industry of wine – lost out in the stakes of modernisation it could be 
presented as an attack against the proud population of a region. 
 The subsequent period of intense radicalisation which culminated in the 
shooting at Montredon created a new vocabulary of Southern protest. Montredon arose 
as a result of the impunity with which the CRAV had conducted itself in the preceding 
year, now loosely allied with a group of Occitan nationalists railing against the internal 
colonialism of the north. These factors were considerable motivations towards 
violence, and explain how protest turned bloody so quickly. Importantly, the Défense 
movement remained republican in its focus and never fully integrated with any of the 
radical groups with which it flirted. Likewise, although the Occitan movement 
exchanged flags with other separatist groups, they never engaged in the same violence. 
Instead of a natural corollary of the 1968 hangover, the violence of 1976 can be seen as 
a natural development of a very different dialectic, distinguishing Southern protest 
from its contemporary milieu. The relevance of 1968 to the drama at Montredon is as a 
contextual example of the effects of radicalising opposition groups, and the catastrophe 
which the convergence of ‘antiétatique’ feeling can constitute when political dialogue 
fails. Indeed, although commemoration of 1976 may have failed at an official level, it is 
important to remember that whilst 1968 may still sell posters: “Le vignoble est toujours 
en crise et il n'oublie pas.”590 
 Three weeks after the Montredon fusillade, a winegrower called Albert Teisseyre 
was arrested and charged with “tentative d’homicide volontaire”,591 a charge which 
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was serious, but not such as to threaten his freedom. Four years after the events, 
Teisseyre was arrested again, with sketchy photographic evidence suggesting that it 
was he that fired the fatal shot. There was outrage that the prosecution had taken so 
long to arrive in court, with the PCF describing it as a “nouvelle provocation contre les 
viticulteurs et la viticulture.”592 Maffre-Beaugé promised the support “de toutes les 
organisations viticoles.”593 The court case spanned the 5th anniversary of the shootings 
as legal changes complicated proceedings.594 The difficulty lay in determining whether 
Teisseyre was involved in a political act or a criminal one, with the Peyreffite law of 
1981 allowing him to be tried for a criminal charge despite his predating conviction in 
1976. This in turn posed serious questions about the CRAV and their role The case 
encountered a series delays, with an original judgement date of November 1983 
postponed into 1984.595 Finally, on the 2nd February 1984 Teisseyre was pardoned under 
the Amnesty law brought in by Mitterrand’s government in 1981.596 Cases described 
the amnesty as a victory that was essential to maintain “la paix sociale”, congratulating 
the courts on reaching a sensible verdict.597 Inevitably challenged in the Appeals court 
by the prosecutors, the case rumbled on before Teysseire was fully acquitted in July 
1985, a verdict his lawyer described as “historique”.598 This protracted trial revealed the 
scars that Montredon had left. The amnesty allowed the Midi to come to terms with the 
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human cost of the events, with monuments erected in memory of the fallen.599 The 
failures of political representation that had driven the Défense movement into a cycle 
of radicalisation had created monsters and martyrs of ordinary winegrowers. When the 
dust settled, however, the gaunt Castera surmised that all that remained was “une 
honte partagée.”600 
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Chapter 5:  
Montredon to Mitterrand: Socialism, syndicalism 
and the South (1976-1984) 
 
The bullets that cut down Emile Pouytès and Commander Le Goff at Montredon were 
a blow to the fragile unity of the Défense movement, challenging the CRAV's 
legitimacy and its modes of operation. In the decade after 1976, the compact between 
winegrowers, local elites and the Socialist Party in the Midi slowly disintegrated as a 
new development strategy supplanted the Défense movement's rebellious appeal.601 
The government and local officials set out to push the Midi into improving harvest 
quality and reducing the volume of production by encouraging uprooting (arrachage) 
and incentivising the amelioration of wine. The nature of government reform meant 
that there was a necessary delay before the changes in legislation began to have a 
genuinely transformative effect upon the Languedoc. As such, frustration rankled as it 
appeared that the government was inactive. Delays in perceiving the impact of Chirac's 
plan led to a consensus that it had failed. 
 As such, the appointment, in 1975, of Yves Bentegeac to the post of Commissaire 
à la rénovation du vignoble méridional, was an attempt to build upon the Chirac plan of 
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1973.602 After Chirac's term as Minister of Agriculture, he was nominated as Prime 
Minister under Giscard. Chirac’s national plan to reinvigorate the stagnating French 
economy – which had until 1973 enjoyed a smooth period of growth – was the basis of 
the Seventh Plan, covering 1975-1980. Yet, in 1976, President Giscard replaced Chirac 
as Prime Minister with Raymond Barre, whose drive to modernise the French economy 
eschewed interventionist methods or the use of budget deficits as a stimulus. Taking 
the German economy as his model, Barre set out to encourage efficiency measures and 
help France’s industry modernise.603 The Bentegeac report adapted this modernisation 
drive to the Languedoc viticole and was completed in 1976, although withheld until the 
Midi Libre published it in 1977. Even as Bentegeac set to work on the Languedoc's wine 
industry, he was criticised for his failure to engage openly in dialogue with the 
regional press.604  
 Bentegeac's plan did not represent a break with what had been outlined in 
Chirac's vision, but rather the wider deployment of subtler methods to push the Midi 
towards modernisation at a more rapid pace. The cornerstone of Bentegeac's findings 
was the acknowledgement that although speculation was having an impact on the 
Midi's wine industry, the root problem was that too much bad wine was being 
produced. The creation of groupements de producteurs in the Chirac Plan placed the onus 
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for meeting government targets on individual producers, ensuring they were available 
to receive subsidies and funding.605  Across the Midi, uptake had been slow, and the 
establishment of groupements would only take off considerably after 1978.606 Bentegeac 
sought to encourage adhesion as a means of stressing the politics of quality, 
accentuating the national focus on increased efficiency and modernisation. Each 
groupement was required to detail the greatest determinants of harvest yield (planting 
techniques, grape varieties and the size of vine holding). The attraction for growers 
was increased subsidy and - at Bentegeac's request - a simplification of the registration 
requirements. Yet Bentegeac was not a popular figure and suspicion lingered about his 
reforms. The Midi Libre confronted the bemused Minister with an ugly nickname he 
had earned from winegrowers: "Belphégor", one of the seven princes of Hell, who 
coaxed sinners to ruin with inventive schemes and outlandish promises.607 He duly 
protested: 
Alors "Belphégor", je veux bien, c'est drôle et cela prouve que les 
Languedociens ne manquent pas d'humour, mais j'ai été poussé bien 
malgré moi à jouer ce rôle. 
 
 Yet there was devilry afoot. The reform presaged seismic shifts in the landscape 
of viticultural representation. By putting winegrowers in charge of improving their 
own quality - linking subsidy and sales - the government embarked on a policy of 
"responsibilisation" of producers. Placing different cooperatives in these groupements 
moved the locus of decision-making away from the village and towards an extra-local 
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administrative unit. Likewise, the groupements changed traditional marketing 
relationships, encouraging winegrowers to bypass the intermediaries of the négoces and 
sell direct to wholesalers and distributors (with around 43% of wine sold directly like 
this by 1987).608 By disengaging the grands négoces (the merchants consistently vilified 
for their 'fiscalité' since the Revolt of 1907) from their traditional role as primary 
movers in the wine market, the government removed much that had generated 
opposition from the Défense movement. The villainous role of the négoce was in some 
sense forced upon the very men who had organised protests against them in the past. 
Likewise, by channeling government support through these new structures, they 
linked the politics of quality directly to the availability of subsidies. "Belphégor's" 
scheme was slowly but certainly coaxing the Midi's traditional Défense movement to 
ruin. 
 Another sweetener designed to drive adhesion to the modernisation agenda 
was the introduction of an Office du vin, which had long been a policy reserved for the 
Socialists. The Office National Interprofessionnel des Vins de Table (ONIVIT) was 
formed in 1976 with the express purpose of improving the quality of wine flowing 
from the Midi, guiding the market in the long term towards a more sustainable and 
production.609 The formation of ONIVIT from the ashes of the old Institut des Vins de 
Consommation Courante (IVCC), added the new politics of quality to the old duties of 
the IVCC.610 Indeed, the cornerstone of this amelioration was "contrats de qualité" 
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which were signed by adherents and endorsed "sous l'egide des Pouvoirs Publics."611 
The innovation did bring with it some tangible improvements in the nature of the wine 
market. The Office ensured that the largest wine merchants signed up to agreements to 
decrease the amount of wine they imported, especially from Italy, whilst also 
negotiating prices at the start of the season.612 As a national body, the benefit of 
restricting imports was clear, whilst early and binding negotiations reduced the 
amount of wine withheld from the market speculatively and helped remove some of 
the volatility from wine prices. ONIVIT's creation, however, failed to silence 
traditionalist pressure groups in the Midi viticole.613 
 Feeling that the government was doing little more than attempting to appease 
the developing furore in the South, syndical groups were open in their criticism of 
ONIVIT's ability to effect change. With the focus on improving quality and not 
defending price, the patience of some winegrowers was short-lived. Even the Minister 
of Agriculture Christian Bonnet admitted in the Assembly that "Il ne répond sans 
doute pas à toutes les ambitions de ceux qui en prônaient la création depuis 
longtemps."614 The Office du vin sat representatives from the wine world face to face 
with state functionaries in an attempt to shake up the staid representative structures of 
the Midi which had failed to offer new solutions outside state interventionism. On the 
winegrowers' side, Jean-Baptiste Benet (the long-standing President of the CGVM) and 
Emmanuel Maffre-Beaugé were reluctant participants in the compromise of the Office 
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du vin. Indeed, as early as May 1976, Benet was already criticising the "'inanité de 
l'office" and its inability to properly control imports and both men eventually 
withdrew in protest.615 
 This shift towards 'responsibilisation' was a slow and uneven process. In part, 
changing attitudes amongst the winegrowers of the Midi can be seen through the 
arrival of the FNSEA as a political force in the region, representing something of the 
success of Giscard's modernising liberalism in changing modes of production across 
France. Yet, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the ‘neo-corporatist’ role of the FNSEA 
produced conflicts with regional unions, especially whilst the FNSEA’s vision of 
agricultural modernisation remained different to its regional counterparts. The 
FNSEA’s attraction lay in its long-standing presence on the national syndical scene and 
its access to government. The national farmers union's stance on imports, fraud and 
speculation was much the same as the most ardent interventionists amongst the CRAV, 
yet the difference lay in the notion that such external pressures could be overcome by 
changing structures and modernising production methods. Whilst the CRAV had come 
to define the ideology of ‘la Défense’, the FNSEA came to embody ‘l’offensive 
moderniste’ in the Languedoc. These were not mutually exclusive, though belief in the 
future required both heavy investment and the sacrifice of some traditions on the 
behalf of already struggling winegrowers, a short-term sacrifice that many CRAV 
activists felt was altogether too onerous.  
 MODEF had remained the dominant 'national' syndical organisation in the 
South ever since its split from the more politically conservative FNSEA in 1959.616 The 
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CGVM remained the principal mouthpiece of the Languedoc's syndical heritage, whilst 
MODEF represented a satellite of the CGVM (with overlapping members and shared 
priorities).  The modernisation of the national economy necessitated liberalisation, yet 
in the vineyards of the South the CRAV continued to campaign against imports and 
call for government intervention in the regulation of wine prices. The groupements were 
weapons designed to undermine these causes by gradually shifting production away 
from the low quality wine coming out of high-yield vineyards (often from the plains of 
the Languedoc) and towards better quality, lower yield production (typically 
stemming from the coasts and hills).617 The more temperate climates of the coast and 
hills traditionally allowed for lower yields and more concentrated must (unfermented 
grape juice), usually permitting finer winemaking whilst the searing heat of the 
Languedocian plains contributed to a 'thin' must brought on by high-yields from 
grapes grown for quality and not quantity.618 Such plains wine had constituted much of 
the 'vin de la bibine' that had marred the Midi's reputation. Encouraging better quality 
production and challenging growers to gamble on modernisation was an ambitious 
policy aimed at developing the region and removing it from a long cycle of established 
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production. Increasingly, the CRAV came to speak for the losers in this modernisation 
struggle, not so much 'dinosaurs' as traditional producers who suddenly found 
themselves out of tune with the institutional vision for their region. 
 
Changes in adjusted value of Languedocian agriculture over time (in Euros per hectare, 2003)619 
 The table above highlights three distinct periods (marked with vertical lines) 
which show strong statistical characteristics. The plotted points indicate the adjusted 
value of Languedocian agriculture since 1950, with a dotted line representing a best-fit 
trend that follows the varying values. The first period, from 1950-1975, corresponds to 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, in which the growth of volume instituted a 
'productivist' mindset which developed a complementary system of representation. 
Whilst this period saw the CMA, the Ligue and the CRSV jostle to speak for the mass 
producers of the Languedoc viticole, the most enduring product of this period was the 
CRAV. The second period, from 1975 to 1995, corresponds largely to this and the next 
chapter, highlighting a sustained period during which both the surface area of vines 
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and the average price for wine decreased.620 It is certainly no coincidence that, after 
Chirac's attempt to modernise the Languedoc viticole in 1973 and then Bentegeac's 
supplementary upheavals, the surface area of vines decreased. The encouragement of 
better quality, lower-yield production squeezed out the many small growers who had 
replanted or increased production during the first period.621 Between 1976 and 2006, 
some 2 out of 3 small agricultural businesses have disappeared, whilst land used for 
agriculture decreased only 3%.622 These were fluctuating figures (especially during the 
period after 1995 when an upturn in regional fortunes led to replanting) yet 
demonstrate the trend towards larger consolidated plots producing less voluminous 
but more expensive wines. 
 The table below illustrates some of the changes that were the backdrop to 
disillusionment with government reform. High levels of ownership amongst the soon-
to-be retired meant that many vineyards were sold on, often to be consolidated within 
larger plots held by wealthy growers and leading to a decline in the number of 
smallholders. Likewise, a shrinking coverage of vines meant that winegrowing was no 
longer as central to the regional economy as during the early post-war years. These 
smallholding growers connected with the region's past were the natural constituency 
of the CRAV. Whilst the Midi’s birth rate rose during this period, the role of 
agriculture in the region diminished. Between 1962 and 1990 the number of those 
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employed in agriculture in the Languedoc-Roussillon fell from 31% to 9%.623 A compact 
of viticultural unity had defined the evolution of the CRAV and constituted perhaps its 
greatest strength. The gradual loss of this consensus undermined the CRAV's 
relevance. Its irrevocable alteration was not simply the result of regional economic and 
social changes, but also stemmed from national political developments that 
exacerbated these causes.624 As these trends robbed it of this mandate, destructive acts 
against the state disguised the CRAV’s frailty. In reality, the CRAV's core support was 
shrinking and this placed more pressure on those they continued to speak for. Their 
supporters were not disappearing, simply becoming less central than it had been, a 
problematic concept in a region where identity had become so embroiled with 
occupation.  
 1970 1979 1988 2000 2005 
Number of plots 105,900 83,700 68,800 43,800 35,800 
Area under agricultural use (HA) 1,119,100 1,065,300 1,012,200 965,300 958,600 
Plots under 20HA (%) 87.8 84.5 81.8 73.7 68.7 
Proprietor over 55 years old (%) 52.0 49.0 50.8 41.5 41.3 
Key facts about the agricultural sector in the Languedoc-Roussillon625 
 The Midi was not allergic to change and neither were its winegrowers 
unwilling to improve quality. The gamble constituted by investing in improving 
quality, however, may well have seemed a risky one alongside still rising foreign 
imports from countries that certified quality wine without the same stringent 
legislation as France. Neither were the CRAV innately against improving the quality of 
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Languedocian wine, rather they were protesting against both rapid modernisation and 
the blunt economic tools (such as arrachage) which threatened to shake up the regional 
economy.626 Nevertheless, the work of regulating and encouraging quality wines in 
France was an ongoing project, which ran alongside efforts to curb imports. Yet their 
impact was often slow in being felt, leading to public criticism and a sense that the 
government was insensitive to their problems. To some extent, this has led to a 
perception that winegrowers' grievances have historically been "linked with short term 
difficulties."627 There was, here, a problem of perspective which governed the 
sympathy of politicians to the cause of winegrowers who were often unwilling, or 
unable, to wait patiently for the long-term impacts of reform to be felt. 
 Even in the Languedoc, some growers who had been supportive CRAVistes 
were amongst the first to step away from the philosophy of productivism. In these 
'ameliorative' plans of the government, some growers saw a new opportunity for 
progress and regionally accented development. In 1976, Charles Ramirès, an Audois 
winegrower, was the creator of the first Fédération Départementale des Caves Particulières. 
This group sought to unite the independent growers of higher quality wines, although 
importantly the focus still lay on small and medium landholders.628 By 29 June 1978, 
the Confédération Nationale des Caves Particulières (CNCP) comprised 8 Departmental 
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franchises, with the former JV leader Achille Gauch as its first President.629 Gauch's 
involvement in the CRAV had brought independent winegrowers together with 
cooperative members in a semblance of the 'inter-classisme' of 1907.  In this new 
climate of modernisation, the disparancy between these two categories of growers 
would once again become an issue in the Languedoc. The modernisation agenda that 
Bentegeac's Plan pursued in earnest was responsible for the re-emergence of divisions 
amongst the milieu viticole. The shocks of Montredon may have shaken the unity of the 
Défense movement. However, it was the impact of government efforts to rationalise 
the Languedoc viticole that isolated and divided the CRAV. 
 The creation of groupements had been a means of moving towards 
modernisation and ensuring that government subsidies were maximised for struggling 
growers. 'Responsibilisation' was the bitter medicine disguised by attractive subsidy. 
Bentegeac's plan favoured large producers and different areas within the region (the 
broadly quality-producing coast and hills over the quantity producing plains - a divide 
somewhat represented by Gauch's CNCP). In later years, the model for Bentegeac's 
style of modernisation came to be termed the 'Bordeaux model' (low yields and high-
value production based on strict geographic delimitations). Yet, as it was forced upon 
the Languedoc viticole, it chafed against centuries of tradition that bound occupation 
with identity and lifestyle. The CRAV's role as the armed wing of the Défense 
movement charged it with resisting these 'external' challenges - essentially becoming 
the voice of the 'losers' in this modernisation drive. Their focus on representing the 
producers of the plains whilst simultaneously calling for unity offered nothing to those 
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successful and adaptive growers whose attempts to invest in modernisation worked 
well over time. Essentially the voice of the plains drowned out the coast and hills as 
they had greater need of concessions and more reason to succumb to the short-term 
expedient of arrachage. It would take some 20 years for a competing model to take the 
place of Bentegeac's 'Bordeaux' inspired plan.630  
 
The CRAV after Montredon: Imports and Action 
 Regional defence was sacrificed at the altar of regional development and 
transformed the traditional character of the Languedoc and its viticultural heritage. 
Just as regional patrimoine had lost its radical edge and become institutionalised, so 
too did the mainstream of viticultural representation move away from the defiant mass 
movement of the 1970s. Yet the CRAV remained active. The threat of European 
integration delayed the impact of modernisation on the base of CRAV operations, 
bolstering their faltering relevancy to the contemporary Langudeocien wine industry. 
Indeed, against this bleak background, opposition to European integration encouraged 
something of a rejuvenation, albeit temporarily.  
 A programme of voluntary arrachage in 1976 granted compensation to 
winegrowers who uprooted their vine stock and agreed not to replant within 6 years. 
The European Community continued this policy for three consecutive seasons, with 
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encouragement of technological investment to ameliorate high-yield wineries, mirroring the 
experience of Australia and the USA. 
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some 14,000 HA across the Languedoc-Roussillon being torn up.631 Opposition to 
arrachage was as entrenched as ever, with the Défense movement continuing to view it 
as the uprooting of regional culture and economy. Further revelations in the press in 
1977 that 150,000 HL of subsidised Italian wine were pouring into France every week 
shocked winegrowers. RG reports identified a new activism from the CRAV, as they 
channelled frustration with European imports into further demonstrations. The 
juxtaposition of arrachage with imports made for an ugly comparison. In an ominous 
and symbolic reply to these revelations, the CRAV organised a commemorative 
procession to the bridge at Montredon on 4 March.632 Yet the symbolic commemoration 
of violence was not the limit of the winegrowers’ repertoire, even after Montredon. On 
9 December 1977, an anonymous call to police had warned that "la nuit allait être 
chaude", and the six explosions that followed were estimated to have caused 
thousands of Francs worth of damage. Explosives were detonated across the Aude in a 
coordinated series of attacks that left few clues as to the perpetrators.633 Newspapers, 
however, were in little doubt: "On sait trop, depuis Montredon, qu'il ne faut grand 
chose parfois pour mettre le feu aux poudres".634 The CRAV, however, denied having 
coordinated the bombing of the Crédit Agricole, saying that the perpetrators had not 
consulted the '"milieux viticoles" and had almost certainly "trompés de cible".635 
Nevertheless, the suspected involvement of winegrowers raised questions about the 
CRAV's role in these recent moments of violence. The Dépêche asked "Après des mois 
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634 'Six explosions déchirent la nuit audoise: le feu au poudres ou un coup de semonce?', La 
Dépêche 10/12/1977 - ADA 98J12. 
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de calme, est-ce le retour du bruit et de la violence sur la scène viticole?"636 The spectre 
of Montredon hung over these violent acts and the suspicion of anonymous violence 
raised concerns even amongst traditional supporters in the press. 
 The CRAV would find a new voice in its opposition to Europe, no longer 
opposing only Paris but also Brussels. André Cases stated that in this new climate 
"notre combat pour la survie recommencera. Nous n'accepterons pas une concurrence 
illégale."637 He made this statement during an interview for a German television 
segment focussing on opposition to EEC expansion. His complaints focussed on the 
regulation of Italian produce and warned that the addition of Spain would see the 
market flooded. This exposure was significant and demonstrated that the CRAV could 
still flex its muscles even after the excesses of the fusillade. The CRAV warned that 
organised mass protests were unlikely to continue and Commando reprisals might 
take their place as imports continued unabated.638 With this seeming license, some of 
the wilder elements came out in force protesting against Italian wines: on 26 June, six 
tollbooths were destroyed with explosives by suspected vignerons near Carcassonne.639 
Later still that night, traffic signs around Montpellier were doused with white paint, 
and suspicion for the anonymous acts fell firmly on the CRAV.640 As with the 
bombings that had taken place in 1977, the CRAV had not specifically organised these 
attacks, but refused to openly condemn them Their mood remained sour with Italian 
wine continuing to pour into the country, 492,313HL in the first half of 1979 alone. 
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Langudeocien officials warned Paris that whilst vignerons remained calm for the 
moment, protests and violence would continue whist imports remained so 
considerable.641  
 In December 1979, vignerons, fishermen and dockworkers gathered together in 
opposition to the enlargement of the EEC and the abiding threat of increased imports. 
In the same manner as Cases' appearance on German television had suggested, the 
CRAV were engaging with politics outside of the regional and viticultural context. A 
group of around one hundred boarded and then occupied a merchant ship in the port 
of Sѐte in order to stop it unloading imported Italian wine. Amongst those that 
boarded the ship were Maffre-Beaugé and his fellow member of the European 
Parliament Maurice Martin, accompanied by the Mayor of Sѐte and the President of the 
FDCC. 642  This symbolic occupation was followed by a large protest at Narbonne that 
saw 4,000 winegrowers heed the call of the CAV de l'Aude. Cases, rallying 
winegrowers in front of CRS, warned that unhappiness was "aussi profond qu-en 
1976." The spectre of imports was of sufficient threat to rouse winegrowers from 
complacency.643 The battleground had shifted from Paris to Brussels and "le Languedoc 
est à nouveau en première ligne sur le front de la guerre du vin."644 
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André Cases confronting the CRS at Narbonne645 
 European integration motivated winegrowers to act as a political pressure 
group, breaking with traditionally reactive protests that dealt with bad harvests and 
market fluctuations. Achille Gauch and other notables warned that the Midi “ne serait 
en aucun cas sacrifiée sur l’autel de la communauté.”646 Indeed, Gavignaud-Fontaine 
casts this issue as the principle reason for the resurrection of a mass movement only 
years after the stuffing had seemingly been knocked out of the Défense movement: 
"Les liens se resserrent entre vignerons, journalistes, syndicats de salariés, 
universitaires". Significantly, the reappearance of this phenomenon gave a platform to 
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'L'Offensive moderniste': Political responses 
 The late 1970s marked a period of profound change in France, from the 
surprising defeat of the Left in the legislative elections of 1978 up until the Socialist 
victory of 1981. The anticipated success of the PS in the legislative elections of 1978 had 
motivated the Défense movement to believe in the possibility of a strong Office du vin 
which might solve their problems after the previous disappointment of ONIVIT. The 
dream of an Office charged solely with moderating the price fluctuations of wine had 
long been a dream of Languedocian winegrowers.647 An Office du vin had been part of 
the Socialist programme since the 1950s, constituting one of their most tangible 
inducements to winegrowers. Championed in the SFIO by Jules Milhau of the Hérault 
in 1945 and then Robert Gourdon of the Gard in 1954, the idea was one of the strongest 
bonds to the Socialist support base in the cooperatives of the Midi viticole.648 Indeed, the 
roots of the idea’s inception lay in the loi Barthe of the 1930s, which, despite 
contemporary criticism, was subsequently viewed as a regulatory golden age. Once 
again the “esprit social” of 1930s legislation had cast a rosy glow over the ideas of that 
period. Its survival in the Socialist programme indicated both a connection to the past 
and a desire to pander to the Défence movement as a key supporter in the Languedoc. 
  The traditional predominance of the Socialists in the Languedoc had drawn the 
Défense movement close to Socialist politicians, yet the CRAV remained a body that 
acted outside of due process and was not exclusively attached to any party of the Left 
or Right. After the electoral disappointment of 1978, Europe provided a new platform 
for representation. 1979 saw the first elections of Deputies to the European Parliament, 
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facilitating the rise of Emmanuel Maffre-Beaugé and a new form of 'Wine deputy' 
forged in the tumultuous years of the 1970s, with ample experience of conducting 
direct protest and speaking to the masses viticoles of the Midi.  
 In the Languedoc hostility to the Common Agricultural Policy was as prevalent 
as ever amongst the traditionally critical vignerons du Midi. With agricultural revenues 
falling across France from 1978 and bottoming out in 1980, the Midi had reason to 
grumble. As a result, the PCF stole a march on its rivals by opening its list to 
Emmanuel Maffre-Beaugé, a long-time tribune of the viticultural masses and pre-
eminent CRAV activist. Maffre-Beaugé was returned amidst an excellent electoral 
outing for the PCF that saw it improve on the result of 1978, which had been marred by 
factionalism on the Left, taking 14% of the agricultural vote in comparison to 9% in 
1978.649 The former leader of the FNSEA, Michel Debatisse, ran on Giscard's UDF ticket. 
In a straight choice between CRAV and FNSEA, Maffre-Beaugé had both the political 
skill and the notoriety to win out in the South. Yet this victory for 'la Défense' over 
'l'offensive moderniste' was not definitive. 
 In the Spring of 1980, the Giscardian government announced the updating of its 
agricultural policies which had been developed in concertation with the FNSEA. As a 
close, almost corporatist, client of the government, the centre-right FNSEA served as a 
means for moderating and interpreting the demands of the agricultural sector as well 
as a cheerleader for mobilising support for policies in which it had been involved. The 
Bentegeac Plan had been a forerunner of this top-led initiative to modernise the 
agricultural sector, turning agriculture into (in the words of Giscard) “the oil of 
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France” and “correcting the handicaps” of France’s less successful regions.650 Giscard 
and Barre sought to offset the rising commercial imbalances brought about by the costs 
of oil imports during this period by increasing the volume and value of agricultural 
exports. Although wine was not the most valuable export by volume, it represented a 
desirable product that could have further value added by a focus on improving 
quality. The vin de table being produced in the Midi was less relevant to this aim than 
the less voluminous but more valuable AOC wines being promoted by government 
policy and subsidy.  
 Another symptom of this policy was the implantation of the FNSEA in the 
Midi. In 1980 the first Fédération Départementale (FDSEA) was established in the 
Hérault.651 Indeed, despite standing against Debatisse, by 1980 Maffre-Beaugé himself 
had reconciled himself with the FNSEA, seeing it an opportunity to unite agricultural 
syndicalism and counteract the division and disillusionment in the Languedoc which 
had followed the gun-fight at Montredon. Jean-Phillipe Martin described the process 
by which the FNSEA gained itself an audience in the South: 
Sous la houlette d'E. Maffre-Baugé, homme de gauche et régionaliste, 
la FDSEA qui se développe dans l'Hérault de 1976 à 1979 regroupe 
aussi bien contestataires de gauche que "modernisateurs" qui en 
prennent rapidement le contrôle.652 
 
A locally managed FDSEA could connect with the debates of the FNSEA as a whole 
without having to slavishly follow its pronouncements, much as with the role of the 
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Ligue within the structures of the CRSV, as described in Chapter 2. That it was the 
Communist Maffre-Beaugé who led this was again significant, binding it to the same 
methods and ideology as the Ligue had displayed in the mid 1950s. As well as having 
stood against Debatisse, he remained an active figure in the CRAV as well as a 
European Deputy; building onto these roles a qualified engagement with the forces of 
modernisation was not a surrender but something more tactical. Importantly, the 
Hérault had taken a different stance form the Aude, who so far staunchly refused to 
engage with the FNSEA. Sociologist Andy Smith quotes an unidentified union leader 
in 1998, who reflected that the 1980s were: 
[A] period of mental acrobatics. In the morning we experimented new 
methods on our farms, in the afternoon we demonstrated against any 
change outside the prefecture, and in the evening we debated the pros 
and cons of both actions.653 
 
 The Languedoc's tempered engagement with the FNSEA saw it remain the 
furthest behind the national narrative, where the growth of the FNSEA had been 
considerable. The Giscardian focus on productivity and modernisation yielded some 
success on a national agricultural scale, yet was criticised by the opposition Socialists 
for ignoring the obvious losers in their drive towards modernisation, a theme that was 
raised during the 1981 electoral campaign. The PS highlighted that the lowest two 
thirds of the agricultural sector received only one fourth of the total income, with large 
enterprises dominating sectoral growth and fuelling regional inequality in economic 
development. Mitterrand’s ‘110 Propositions’ aimed to reduce Barre’s dependency on 
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the international markets to subsidise domestic budgetary austerity. Mitterrand 
referred back to the ‘Common Programme’ between the PS and the PCF of 1972 in 
advocating a “recapture of the home market” which would arrest import 
penetration.654 Yet Mitterrand argued that this could be achieved   within the 
framework of Europe. Proposition 41 stated: 
41 - Le gouvernement proposera aux partenaires de la CEE, afin de 
revenir à l’esprit du Traité de Rome, une réforme de la Politique 
agricole commune. [...] Des mesures particulières seront prises pour 
l’élevage, la viticulture, les fruits et légumes, jusqu’ici défavorisés. Les 
marchés seront organisés par des Offices par produits ou groupes de 
produits, chargés de mettre en œuvre des prix garantis, tenant compte 
des coûts de production, dans la limite de quantum par travailleur. 
[...]  
 
As such, France's relationship to Europe would form the starting point for any 
attempts to reform winegrowing, tempering the hopes of CRAVistes who hoped for an 
import ban. Yet, the focus on guaranteed pricing related to the costs of production was 
a profoundly positive proposal. Proposition 11 specifically called for the "application 
stricte du traité de Rome" – a regulatory stance which would have further appealed to 
vignerons keen for regulation to temper the perceived fraud being perpetrated by 
Italian growers.655 Focussing on domestic production, however, went contrary to 
Giscard’s development agenda and the PS specifically committed itself to promoting 
small-scale agriculture and family farming. In combating fears of a decline in incomes, 
growing inequalities and rural migration as a result of Giscard and Barre’s 
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modernisation, the PS attached itself to a policy of “no longer losing a single farmer.”656 
The opposition PS thus supported modernisation but, crucially, claimed that it could 
smooth the impact of this process. 
 The Socialist party Convention in February 1981 outlined the specific policies 
that would constitute the opposition’s response to governmental agricultural policy. 
Socialist reform was targeted at reversing inequalities of income and ensuring the 
survival of smallholders whilst encouraging the modernisation of the sector. This feat 
was to be achieved by changing the structural basis of the agricultural sector as 
included in propositions 10 and 11 of Mitterrand’s ‘110 propositions’: “la création 
d’offices fonciers ruraux; la création d’offices par produits pour en garantir le prix”.657  
 The traditional land management agencies - sociétés d’aménagement foncier et 
d’établissement rural (SAFERs)658 - were operated at a regional level and run by leaders 
appointed by recognised professional organisations (such as the FNSEA in most of 
France or the CGVM in the Languedoc). These were to be replaced with offices fonciers 
operating at a departmental level and drawing their leadership from elections held at 
the same level.659 The PS cast this as rural autogestion, pressuring the bodies at a more 
local level, whilst critics feared the politicisation of the office.660 The other central 
reform proposed was the introduction of offices par produits designed to replace the 
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interprofessions661 which had traditionally governed interests. These offices would 
guarantee a fixed price for a fixed portion (quantum) of agricultural produce, whilst 
allowing for the rest to be sold freely (hors quantum). Although these offices seemed to 
flout EEC regulations, the PS promised to fight for them at European level, pleasing 
winegrowers whose impression of such external pressures was overwhelmingly 
negative. 
 A CRAV statement read by Jean Huillet intimated that European legislators 
must make allowances for French wine including minimum pricing and controlled 
foreign imports from other member states. These policies, it seems, came straight from 
the platform announced by the PS in February. Failing this, Huillet counselled 
demonstrations and action to express the difficulties they faced - quoting statistics that 
claimed a 144% increase in the costs of production between 1973 and 1981.662 A meeting 
of the CRAV in Béziers on 13 March saw Huillet announce that measures would be 
taken "sur toutes les formes" against Italian wine to demonstrate the continuing 
menace that it presented to Midi winegrowers.663  
 Falling wine prices, enfeebled earnings and the continuing stream of wine 
imports from overseas brought some 5,000 winegrowers from across the region 
together in Sète,664 as winegrowers set up roadblocks and controlled the circulation of 
traffic to the ports.665 The CAV d'Aude, however, announced that in such pressing 
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circumstances "ils préféraient des actions 'commando'" to protests and mass 
mobilisation.666 They highlighted the truck stops they had made on 1 April, when they 
destroyed some 800HL of Italian and Algerian wine as signifying the fact that although 
the winegrowers of the Midi controlled Sète, "le commerce persiste dans son offensive 
anti-Midi."667 Nevertheless, the blockade grew as winegrowers set up roadblocks and 
checkpoints.668  Action continued on the roads as another tanker of Italian wine was 
hijacked during the night of 1 May 1981 by a group of CRAV commandoes. After 
seizing control of the vehicle, they drove it to the Prefecture in Carcassonne and piped 
the contents (270HL of Italian wine) directly into the Prefectural gardens.669 These 
repeated demonstrations and increasingly radical actions only demonstrated the extent 
to which the CRAV felt fundamentally challenged; struggling against prevailing 
imports, market fluctuations, declining consumption and the state policy to decrease 
the volume of production.  
 Interceptions and the destruction of imported wine were strong and 
provocative measures that raised the profile of problems in the area. They also, 
however, mired the image of Midi vignerons in a combative and traditionalist rut. 
Whilst Huillet's statement may have found an audience in Paris, it was unlikely to do 
so quite as easily in Brussels. The Midi faced the problem of peripherisation anew, one 
which only encouraged further recourse to the vocabulary of regional identity which 
had characterised the Défense movement of the 1970s. Whilst the government and the 
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FNSEA were speaking about the politics of quality and modernisation, the CRAV 
spoke only of concessions, intervention and disparity. Regional defence was a hard sell 
when it clashed with regional development.  
 If the political relationships had shifted, so too had the syndical networks of the 
Languedoc. Since the arrival of the FNSEA, the CRAV, linked to the CGVM and 
MODEF, could no longer claim a monopoly on syndical representation in the region. 
The government's attempts to promote quality as a central tenet of the Midi's 
production had threatened the traditional Défense movement. Likewise, Maffre-
Beaugé's involvement with the Héraultais FDSEA had shown the potential for a 
rapprochement between Défense and modernisation. Disaggregated by the creeping 
appeal of Bentegeac's retooled groupements and bought off with short-term 
reimbursements for distillation and arrachage, the winegrowers of the Languedoc faced 
increasing inducements to abandon their traditional livelihoods. Distillation was a 
tonic for poor sales, a problem largely allied to declining consumption within France 
(from 136 litres per head annually in 1956 to 87 litres in 1982).670  
 The presidential election of 1981, however, offered hope that this dip in the 
fortunes of the wine industry might be arrested, and that the traditional faith of the 
Midi in the Socialist party would presage a new era. After all, the ideology of the 
Défense movement had been founded on the 'union sacrée' of Albert and the Socialist 
model of Ferroul and Barthe. The 70 year history which the Socialist party shared with 
the Défense movement seemingly assured that they would recognise growers' interests 
and perpetuate state interventionism to control imports and discourage fraud.  
                                                          
670 'Production et consumption des vins', Paysan du Midi, 01/11/1984 - ADG JR438 33/34. 
263 
 
The Presidential Election of 1981 
 By 1981, the Left had reconstituted itself behind Mitterrand on the national 
political scene, with the PCF encouraging its supporters to endorse him in the second 
round671 of the Presidential election.672 The Socialist party had traditionally held a 
prominent position in the Midi viticole; their support came from the cooperative 
structures and the prominent role of local Socialist elected officials in mediating 
dialogue between winegrowers and the state.673 Mitterrand garnered Méridional 
support with his promise that he would create an Office du Vin to "définir et défendre 
la politique de la qualité, garantir un revenu minimum aux viticulteurs." This seemed 
to combine his stated predilection for ‘autogestion’ alongside responsible planning 
with his desire to stimulate domestic production. Importantly, he focussed on 
modernising agriculture whilst guaranteeing present circumstances would be 
ameliorated for producers.  
 Combining short and long-term visions of viticultural prosperity presented the 
vignerons of the South with a tantalising promise of change. The inability of Chirac 
and Giscard to present a united front in the last days of the incumbent Presidency with 
agricultural credit had convinced many that the time was right for change. Indeed, 
support for Mitterrand in the Languedoc had been high (63.7% in the second round) 
and the announcement of his victory on 10 May was met with enthusiasm: "La victoire 
de la gauche, nul n'en doutait en terre d'Oc, serait celle du Midi viticole."674The Aude, 
for its part in the parliamentary election of June 1981, was "the most Mitterandiste 
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département of France".675 In the broader Languedoc, a meagre return of 5 seats for 
Socialist Deputies in 1978 had been doubled, meaning the PS held 10 out of 17 seats. In 
Provence, this was even more pronounced, moving from a low of 4 seats in 1974 to 16 
out of 28 in 1981.676 The PS had rebuilt itself in these traditional heartlands, translating 
lingering sympathy into electoral success. 
 When Mitterrand announced his first cabinet, he named Edith Cresson as 
Minister for Agriculture. The 47 year old was not only the first female French minister, 
but also a brashly Parisian figure whose extravagant outfits earned her an uneasy 
relationship with the press and the agricultural sector (many of whom nicknamed her 
“la parfumée”).677 She held the position for 22 months, taking up a pugnacious attitude 
towards with the FNSEA, whose cosy relationship with power during the last 
government she criticised in one of her first speeches.678 She immediately ended the 
FNSEA’s monopoly as “le syndicalisme officiel” by recognising 3 other agricultural 
unions: MODEF, Fédération Française de l’Agriculture (FFA) and Confédération 
Nationale Syndicale des Travailleurs Paysans (CNSTP). The FFA was an ultra-
conservative union representing only around 5% of the farming community and 
virtually unknown in the Midi, the CNSTP was an amalgamation of six Socialist unions 
formed in the aftermath of the Socialist victory and MODEF, the Communist 
dominated smallholders union, claimed support from some 15 to 20% of farmers.679 
Membership of MODEF was common amongst the smallholders who constituted the 
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base of the CRAV. As such, in the Midi, the recognition of MODEF was significant and 
promised greater involvement for the region’s interests on the national stage. 
Elsewhere, the FNSEA criticised Cresson’s recognition of both the splinter group 
MODEF and the newly formed CNSTP, branding them as an attempt to divide union 
representation. By shaking up the national syndical scene, the PS sought to carve out a 
Socialist presence in the agricultural sector that was nationally coordinated. The 
specific nature of Languedocian representation made it intrinsically suspicious of 
Parisian influence and not necessarily useful to the government for transmitting their 
policies in the manner the FNSEA had done for Giscard. 
 The change promised by Mitterrand's victory was not immediate, however, and 
the summer of 1981 was to prove one of the most raucous in years. During the night of 
7 - 8 July, four explosions rocked storehouses in Sète and thousands of hectolitres of 
wine were destroyed. This represented a warning to the incoming administration that 
the CRAV - "casseurs par nécessité"680 – remained a formidable force. Mitterrand 
reiterated his commitment to the agricultural sector, reaffirming the Giscardian belief 
that agriculture could constitute a central pillar of French exports in a speech made in 
Nevers in front of international ambassadors.681 Sensing that the temperature in the 
Midi was rising, the minister of state for Agriculture, André Cellard, set about trying to 
tackle the sheer volume of imports distorting the market. The Moroccan-born Andre 
Cellard was the Socialist Deputy for Gers and minister of state for Agriculture between 
May 1981 and March 1983 during the first two Mauroy governments. As Cresson 
wrestled with the national unions, Cellard sought to respond to the problems 
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sweeping the South. Attacks on tankers on 19 July between Nîmes and Montpellier 
pre-empted the reaction from government as Cellard created a cellule de crise to look 
into the Midi wine industry's endemic problems. In the minds of the Midi's staunchest 
guerriers du vin, Cellard's cellule would fulfil the promise of the Socialists to democratise 
local involvement and strengthen state interventionism in market stabilisation and 
price controls. The reality, however, was one of disappointment for the CRAV and the 
traditional Défense movement. 
 Cellard declined to invite the CGVM to form part of the consultative group, 
circumventing the oldest and most symbolic of the Midi's traditional professional 
bodies. The existence of a Socialist government out of step with their traditional 
vocabulary challenged the long-standing role of the Socialist party’s local elected 
officials in the representation of the milieu viticole. Because of the snub of the CGVM 
Jean-Baptiste Benet, the long-standing President of the CGVM, resigned. It has been 
suggested that this may have been a move by Cellard designed to weaken the 
Méridional character of Southern wine representation and push it towards a more 
avowedly neutral footing.682 This representation had, in turn, been the product of the 
long-standing agitation that had seen Southern wine aggressively represented both 
within the National Assembly and in local politics - the 'union sacrée' that had held 
since the days of Albert and Ferroul. A near century of militant syndicalism led by the 
CGVM had led to wide representation of the wine industry in Southern politics, with 
winemaking cooperatives and representative bodies providing personnel for 
incorporation into the apparatus of local government. Indeed, cooperatives 
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represented not only greater security, sheltering adherents from market forces683 but 
also “constituent la base d‘un lobby régional capable de négocier une politique 
favorable à la stabilisation du marché national de vin de table.”684  
 In opposition to this snub, cooperatives met their syndical representatives 
alongside local mayors to express their solidarity at an enormous meeting of 
viticultural representatives on 28 July that was cast as an "États Généraux de la 
viticulture militante".685 The heads of cooperatives, local notables (such as the Mayor of 
Puicheric, in the Aude) and representatives from the CGVM attended a regular 
meeting of the Syndicat Régional des Vignerons de Carcassonne-Limoux to discuss the 
conflict threatening to shatter the compact of viticultural unity. The CGVM called for a 
renewed spirit of solidarity and combat: "Nous devons conserver à tout prix l'unité du 
syndicalisme C.G.V. et de son complément naturel le C.A.V. qui doit rester le fer de 
lance de l'action viticole." The meeting concluded: "Notre politique est simple: sauver 
notre vignoble, nos exploitations, nos vignerons et leurs salariés, dans l'union totale 
des forces méridionales."686 Stressing viticultural unity even as the PS wavered enabled 
the CGVM and the CRAV to use the rhetoric of tradition to disguise their increasing 
vulnerability. The snub of the CGVM suggested an end to the cosy relationship 
between the Socialist party, local elites and the wider Défense movement represented 
by the CGVM and CRAV.  Within the Languedoc itself the government's attempts to 
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change representation was not indicative of a lurch to the right (that would come later 
between 1982 and 1983) but rather a desire to change approaches to modernisation in 
the region. The abandonment of this traditional ally of the Socialists was unusual, 
although seemingly designed to separate the ideology and inheritance of 1907 from the 
notion of monoculturalism and a reliance on intervention.687 If the area was to develop 
and overcome the crise, the new Socialist government surmised that it would only do 
so in a progressive manner by changing the landscape of the viticultural movement. 
 This was also true of the government’s pre-election promises regarding an 
Office du vin. The Socialist victory had raised hopes that the construction of a strong 
Office might become a reality; however, that too would lead to disappointment for 
winegrowers. The government did indeed create a new institution, called the Office 
national interprofessionnel des vins (ONIVINS) to address the structural weaknesses 
that had prevented the pre-existing ONIVIT from exercising any real control of the 
markets. Instead of merely controlling vins de tables, the remit of ONIVINS included all 
wines, removing the administrative distinction between these categories in the eyes of 
the French government. Like its predecessors (IVCC & ONIVIT), however, it did not 
set out to guarantee a minimum price for vignerons or overtly control imports, but 
rather to guide production and increase awareness of the market amongst growers.688 
Thus, ONIVINS was not the organisation winegrowers had imagined when they had 
invested in the Socialist vision: it was neither reflective of the “esprit sociale” of the 
1930s, nor of the Common Programme of 1972. 
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 The rebranding of the largely ineffectual ONIVIT as ONIVINS was scant solace 
to those Languedocian winegrowers for whom progress was still far off. Indeed, Cases 
claimed that ONIVINS "se révèle aussi peu efficace que l'ancien," calling for new 
solutions other than distillation or bans on chaptalisation which might impose stricter 
regulation whilst allowing winegrowers a living wage.689 As the Socialist victory began 
to give way to disappointment and disillusionment, Languedocian winegrowers were 
forced to question their allegiances. The masse viticole which had always shown support 
for the Défense movement (although this had diminished since the 1970s), was faced 
with the reality that they were running out of allies. This in turn made the 
comparatively vibrant FNSEA seem increasingly attractive as a representative 
organisation. What the CGVM could not achieve by virtue of its exclusion from the top 
table of government, the FNSEA would seem to dictate from its position at the 
government’s right hand. 
 Describing the early 1980s, historian Yves Gilbert highlighted some of the 
roadblocks to modernisation that the government sought to overcome by casting aside 
the CGVM:  
Comment concilier par exemple le maintien d’un réseau de très 
petites exploitations (dont la survie n’est rendue possible que par la 
coopération – support technique et concentrateur des aides et 
subventions) et la mise en application des progrès techniques? 
Comment faire collaborer un négoce de plus en plus concentré, 
engagé dans un processus de modernisation et soumis aux règles du 
marché (national et international) et des producteurs très encadrés 
par des mesures de protection qui tendent à figer leurs 
comportements face aux évolutions du commerce?690  
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Gilbert outlines the central contradictions of the Midi wine industry at a potent turning 
point. As the economic and social predominance of the industry declined both 
regionally and nationally, the repetition of ritualised protest stymied the potential for 
positive change in the region. Yet, it also allowed for these traditional support groups 
to hark back to an imaginary era of viticultural unity while voicing the concerns of the 
less well off areas of the Languedoc viticole. If 'unity' stressed the plains over the coast or 
the hills then it was because this was the support base of vulnerable winegrowers 
whose interests both the CGVM and the CRAV represented. Projecting unity and 
tradition stressed the heavy costs of planned modernisation work and attempted to 
remind Parisian legislators that the Midi should not be sacrificed in the name of the 
markets. 
 
L'Europe comme révélateur 
 In many ways European integration presented a strong challenge to the 
traditional mores of the Languedoc viticole, yet it also served simply to cast familiar 
themes in a new form. The promises of the PS that it would fight Brussels on several 
key issues relating to agriculture were heartening to the population of the Languedoc 
viticole, yet they proved illusory. Suddenly Paris and Brussels were a twin-headed 
beast for the Défense movement to oppose and, in their eyes, fraud was as likely to 
come from Italy as it ever had been from Algeria. Yet Europe also changed the 
dynamics of protest. Paris could no longer bow to the demands of active and vocal 
pressure groups when bound by supra-national treaties. Likewise, calls for the 
government to ban imports were more unrealistic than they had ever been. 
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Nevertheless, the CRAV continued to tilt at windmills. European integration acted as a 
revelatory process, wherein the government's antipathy for Languedocian resistance 
shone through the hopeful rhetoric of Mitterrand's early years. The principle of 
European integration defined the Socialists' relationship with Southern syndicalism 
almost from the start, although the PS would not openly retreat to the centre until 
several years later. As Europe cast a pall over the Languedoc, the CRAV sought to test 
the government's resolve immediately. Building on the momentum gathered in 
demonstrations a month earlier, Jean Huillet and a group of Commandos took control 
of a boat called L'Ampelos anchored at Sète on the 10th August 1981.691 Having seized 
control of the vessel, they destroyed the shipment of Italian wine which it contained 
using the engine-oil from the boat.692 At the train station in Sète, CRAVistes intercepted 
25 wine tankers carrying Algerian wine and emptied them onto the platforms, with a 
loss of some 15, 000HL of wine.693 The government response to the Sètois attacks was 
swift as they sought to introduce measures “de nature à apaiser les esprits”.694 Prime 
Minister Pierre Mauroy tabled discussions with officials in Brussels to control and 
disclose imports, ensure the robustness of their documentation and tax their blending 
in France much more heavily. 
 Although these promises contravened the policies of the European Union (and 
specifically the CAP), the government pressed on and refused to release 500,000HL of 
wine from customs in Sète. Legality won out, however, and the French government 
reluctantly capitulated to European pressure, releasing the wines 2 months later. 
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Sensing a betrayal, the CRAV remobilised, and commandos again seized tankers on 24 
October. Some 2,000 protestors gathered in Béziers on 29 January 1982 to protest 
against the perceived tyranny of Brussels and foreign imports. On the 11 March, 
further demonstrations took place in Mireval and Béziers and CRAV commandos at 
Sète intercepted yet more imported wine. Several weeks later, a regional march took 
place through the streets of Montpellier consisting of 15,000 demonstrators with 
Maffre-Beaugé at their head.695 The slogan of this march was "la force tranquille de la 
viticulture", deliberately echoing Mitterrand's campaigning motto of 1981.696 The march 
was the largest since Montredon,697 and it was significant that the government's 
commitment to the liberalisation of the European market had mobilised winegrowers.  
 Even as European trade issues dominated the Languedoc, the rest of France 
was criticising the performance of the bumbling Cresson as Minister for Agriculture. 
Mitterrand's promise not to lose another farmer looked increasingly strained as 
reforms stalled and European regulations hampered national policy. The FNSEA led 
large-scale farmers’ protests across France that characterised the winter of 1981-1982 as 
“un hiver chaud”. An enormous farmers’ demonstration in Paris of some 60,000-
100,000 made worldwide news and Cresson came under sustained criticism and faced 
volleys of insults on her tours of farms across France.698 Plans for the ambitious reform 
of the SAFERs ultimately failed. The bills for the implementation of the offices fonciers 
bounced around the mechanisms of government throughout Cresson’s ministry and 
were eventually dubbed “les grands absents" as their lengthy delay implied a 
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reluctance to tackle reform.699 Sure enough, they were eventually abandoned when 
they proved problematic to implement and were deemed “peu réalistes dans le 
contexte agricole de l’époque”.700 Instead, her successors in the Ministry for 
Agriculture, Michel Rocard and Henri Nallet, progressively yet slowly reformed 
existing structures in subsequent ministries. 701 
 Both these central projects witnessed a degree of retreat, with the government 
stepping back from yet more commitments made before the election. An adoption of 
realism over doctrine brought about by popular resistance to planned reforms and an 
extremely poor economic outlook marked the end of Mitterrand’s état de grâce. 
Likewise, MODEF and the CNSTP complained that the government had not done 
enough to dilute the influence of the FNSEA and, after the “hiver chaud” had actually 
backtracked on some measures to avoid alienating the union.702 They declared the level 
of subsidies granted to the FNSEA to be incommensurate and criticised the continued 
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proximity of the union to government (e.g. addresses from the President and Minister 
of Agriculture at their national conferences). Elections held to the Chamber of 
Agriculture in January 1983 demonstrated that the PS had failed to circumscribe the 
influence of the FNSEA as its national vote share rose from 65% to 70%, with the leftist 
unions (MODEF, CNSTP and the newly formed splinter the Fédération Nationale des 
Syndicats Paysans) receiving only 23% combined.703 Even in the Languedoc, where the 
performance of the FNSEA lagged behind the rest of the country, they were beginning 
to gain a foothold. In the Hérault they claimed 36% of the vote in the Chambre 
d’Agriculture elections of 1983, as they set themselves in opposition to government 
policy. Jean-Phillipe Martin describes the construction of their appeal:  
L'arrivée de la gauche au pouvoir offre à la FNSEA 
l'opportunité de déployer son offensive. Alors que ses alliés 
locaux diffusent les thèmes de la qualité, de l'organisation des 
producteurs et critiquent l'activisme des CAV , François 
Guillaume adopte (avant 1986) un ton véhément et protestataire 
contre le gouvernement de gauche et l'élargissement de la CEE à 
de nouveaux États méditerranéens. 704 
 
Continuing economic problems had brought about a package of austerity measures in 
June 1982. These comprised wage and price controls, expenditure cuts and the raising 
of interest rates (which tightened the availability of credit). This round of austerity 
would presage the devaluation of March 1983, eschewing the temptation to turn 
inwards in a search for recovery and instead relying on European structures as a 
springboard to growth. Mitterrand’s Industry Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, 
proposed an alternative to the cuts that amounted to autarky and included withdrawal 
                                                          
703 Keeler, ‘Agricultural Reform in Mitterrand’s France’, pp.83-85. 
704J. Martin, ‘Le syndicalisme viticole en Languedoc sous la Ve République’, Économie rurale, 
no.237 (1997), p. 47. 
275 
 
from the EEC and European Monetary System. The policy's prospects were uncertain 
but its potential cost was severe and the government rejected it in favour of a European 
commitment.705 A report prepared by the Socialist Euro-parliamentarian Georges Sutra 
outlined the basis for the region as a developmental structure for Europe, an early 
version of a ‘Europe of the regions.’706 In November 1982, Maffre-Beaugé challenged 
the Sutra Report, declaring it excessively preferential to the interests of proponents of 
European integration.707 This criticism was emblematic of a growing disenchantment, 
as the Socialist party's residual goodwill in the Midi gradually eroded. Sutra, as the 
highest-ranking Languedocian Socialist in European government, was not immune 
from Maffre-Beaugé's stinging rebukes. As the government scaled back reflationary 
policies under international pressure, Michel Rocard replaced Edith Cresson as 
Agriculture Minister, on 22 March 1983.  
 During this period, Spain's proposed entry to the EEC was plaguing the 
thoughts of winegrowers already feeling inundated by low quality Italian imports, 
which threatened domestic table wine sales. Spain, it was feared, would only 
exacerbate this trend. Spanish entry into the EEC had never credible whilst Franco 
remained Dictator, though economic cooperation from 1970 eased the formalisation of 
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this relationship later in the decade as the country moved towards democratisation. As 
such, Spanish entry into the EEC was presented as a test of the democratic credentials 
that the election of Spanish Socialists in 1982 had seemed to confirm. The specific issue 
of the Common Agricultural Policy was widely viewed as a negative aspect of 
membership by the Spanish press, although economic and social modernisation 
presented potential boons.708 Rocard declared himself in favour of Spain's accession to 
the EEC and reinforced to protesting winegrowers that the government could not flout 
the restrictions of the Common Agricultural Policy, as demonstrated by Cresson’s 
abortive introduction of the offices par produits.709 Rocard’s presence as Minister ensured 
that modernisation would be a primary issue in the agricultural sector. His rivalry with 
Mitterrand in the run up to 1981 had seen him first marginalised and then brought in 
to government710 Rocard's endorsement of the proposed entry of Spain into the 
Common Market set an already volatile situation aflame.  
 On the roads, winegrowers burnt tollbooths and national representatives from 
the FNSEA and the Fédération nationale des vins de table acknowledged “qu’ils ont 
perdu tout contrôle de la situation.”711 What made matters even worse was the 
secondment of the Deputy Mayor of Narbonne, Pierre Guidoni, to Madrid in order to 
negotiate the terms of Spanish entry. His involvement as a Languedocian Socialist 
shocked some in the region, leading to cries that he was "l'assassin du Midi" and that "il 
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nous a vendu".712 Rocard's commitment to the liberalisation of the European market 
would show the Défense movement that they did not have a natural ally in 
government. The rift between the Socialists and the Midi was becoming ever clearer. 
With this realisation would come an intensification of the CRAV's methods, a 
radicalisation born of increasing desperation. 
 
Radicalisation of methods 
 The intervention of Brussels had heightened viticultural extremism and the 
Midi Libre described the CRAV as "plus nombreux, plus mobilisés, plus offensifs".713 On 
4 February 1983, vignerons met in Béziers to protest714 against a round of measures 
mandated by Brussels, which diversely imposed a distillation of excess Vin de Table 
and required AOC wine to be declassified (i.e. stripped of its AOC status) and sold at a 
lower price (as basic table wine). 715 This was entirely in tune with the top-down 
promotion of quality produce, through incompatible with the interests of producers 
who lost out in the bargain. This was clearly unpopular in the Midi and the fact that 
the decision came from Brussels only served to deepen the sense of injustice that 
external pressures were threatening the area’s livelihood. As a result, the CRAV seized 
and emptied and a tanker near Carcassonne, staining the white of the Southern snow 
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with 145HL of red wine.716 Vignerons then attacked several stores in Béziers - the 
Mammouth supermarket and a Géant Casino - and broke vast numbers of bottles of 
foreign and principally Italian wine with bats and clubs.717 Later, around 200 vignerons 
stopped the 'Talgo' train, which travelled between Barcelona and Geneva.718 They 
sprayed it with slogans protesting against the EEC: "C'est n'est pas par hasard si nous 
avons bloqué un train international. C'est un avertissement contre toute entrée de 
l'Espagne dans le Marché Commun". Interestingly, this symbol was also sprayed with 
the Occitan cross (pictured below), combining a rejection of European expansion with 
an articulation of regional identity.719  
 
Winegrowers spray-painting the Croix Occitane on the halted Talgo train720 
 That summer, Cases would restate in the press that "Le CAV intervient quand 
la situation est bloquée."721 With the regionalist outcry represented by the Talgo 
operation and continuing problems in the national economy the situation was indeed 
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blocked and the lines of communication between winegrowers and the state strained to 
breaking point. An anonymous nighttime tip from the Comité alerted authorities that a 
bomb had been placed on the railway between Narbonne and Carcassonne.722 
Explosions near Lézignan destroyed signalling equipment, as burning tyres blocked 
the railway. In response to this action, the head of the SNCF wrote an open letter to 
winegrowers in the Indépendant. He questioned the thinking behind their tactics, 
highlighting the 18 million francs worth of damage inflicted upon railway equipment 
over the last 8 years. Tellingly, he commented on the extent to which the Défense 
movement was alienating support amongst the wider public with its increasingly 
radical actions:  
Pour être défendable, une cause doit s'appuyer sur une opinion 
publique favorable; les viticulteurs peuvent-ils croire que tous ceux 
qui sont touchés par les actions destructrices se feront les défenseurs 
de la causes viticole?723  
 
The CRAV's increasingly provocative and desperate actions threatened to alienate the 
tacit support they had previously relied on. Economic and demographic shifts threw 
the compact of viticultural unity that had governed the Midi into disarray amidst the 
political upheaval represented by the Socialist party's attempts to distance itself from 
the CGVM and wider Défense movement.   
 Expensive damages arising from CRAV actions occurred against the backdrop 
of a devaluation of the Franc in March 1983. Following frantic planning at the Ministry 
of Finance in the wake of then Budget Minister Laurent Fabius’ overly optimistic 1982 
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budget, France was forced to petition its European Monetary System partner West 
Germany for permission to devalue her currency.724 The economic outlook was poor 
both regionally and nationally. Austerity measures focussed on remedying the balance 
of payments deficit, immediate deflationary policies and continuing to drive economic 
modernisation. Wage controls and spending cuts were felt across public and private 
sector as subsidy and intervention were casualties of the government’s bid to get the 
balance of payments back into the black.725 Against a background of continuing ‘rigeur’ 
in the public sector, redundancies in the private sector and national insecurity, the 
demands for price controls and import tariffs emanating from the viticultural South 
must have appeared naive at best and selfish at worst. 
 If the CRAV could no longer mobilise tens of thousands of vignerons to support 
their message, then it could still use its vocal leaders as combative tribunes and direct 
smaller mobilisations to communicate specific grievances. After a statement from 
Brussels signalled that the EEC “ne pas vouloir subventionner indéfiniment la 
viticulture française”726, the atmosphere in the Midi worsened. André Cases issued a 
series of stinging rejections of European plans to include Spain in the EEC, criticising 
Spain's lack of sales tax, low employment costs and links to South America described 
as akin to a "Commonwealth".727 Protesting vignerons embarked on a graffiti raid in 
Narbonne on 27 June, spray-painting "Non à l'Espagne", "CEE = ruine du Midi 
                                                          
724 Friend, The Long Presidency, p.186. 
725 Holmes, ‘Broken Dreams’, p.47. Also, see previously cited works on the economic 
retrenchment of the Socialists and S. Berstein, P. Milza, J. Bianco, François Mitterrand, les années 
du changement (1981-1984) (Paris: Perrin, 2001), especially ‘L’impératif économique’, pp.329-521. 
726 Gavignaud-Fontaine, Le Languedoc viticole, p.397. 
727 'Le C.A.V. audois: non à l'Espagne', Indépendant, 17/06/1983 - ADA 98J15. 
281 
 
viticole"728 along the railway and on local buildings, an action which was noted in the 
national press. Numerous communiqués followed these exhortations to protest, 
drawing hard-line supporters to the streets. Three simultaneous protests were 
organised in Lézignan-Corbières, Narbonne and Alzonne to oppose the entry of Spain 
into the Common Market.729 These actions escalated with the dynamiting of a 600-
metre high-tension electricity pylon in Talairan in the Hautes Corbières, 730 a 
particularly destructive act, in which the CAV d'Aude denied involvement, although 
some newspapers strongly suspected their involvement. André Cases denied 
responsibility, stating that "Il ne s'agit absolument pas d'un acte décidé par le C.A.V. 
Aucun mot d'ordre n'a été donné en ce sens."731  
 After an inflammatory call to action only a few days earlier, however, his 
retraction rang hollow. This demonstrated willingness for extreme action at the base of 
the viticultural community as well as a degree of local autonomy in the organisation of 
protests. The suspicion of direct CAV involvement motivated Cases to insert a 
communiqué in newspapers the next day, condemning those "actes criminels, mettant 
en jeu la vie des personnes".732 The autonomy of attacks was alarming for the 
authorities, but what worried the Défense movement was the threat of spilt blood. The 
memory of 1976 remained vivid, and with wavering syndical and political support, the 
CRAV could not afford any repetition of Montredon nor to forfeit the support of the 
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press. Without such support, the ability of the CRAV to communicate with the milieu 
viticole was vastly diminished.  
 
The CRAV's Alternatives 
 Part of the problem with the CRAV's role was that it remained a reactive group. 
Maffre-Beaugé's engagement with the FNSEA had created rifts within the CRAV, as 
some activists, such as Jean Huillet, sought jealously to guard their independence from 
national unions. Amongst this constituency, the vocabulary of 1907 endured because 
credible alternatives to government policy were absent. As such, calling for the 
repression of fraud or the banning of imports were the only real solutions the CRAV 
could offer. Its prominent leaders did not produce manifestoes for change but rather 
led protests against it. 
 CRAVistes rarely involved themselves with these debates at length, preferring 
the appeal of pugnacious rhetoric delivered to a supportive audience. It is significant 
that Jean Huillet was one of the few CRAVistes who made some effort to correct this. 
Huillet's broader political involvement perhaps conditioned him better than most to 
fulfil this role, yet even he stopped short of articulating coherent CRAV alternatives. 
During a conference on "autogestion" in October 1983, Huillet made a speech that 
touched upon many of the issues surrounding the activities of the CRAV and sought to 
answer critics.733 As one of the principal planks of the political platform erected by the 
PS under Mitterrand, the success of ‘autogestion’ was something of a barometer for the 
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government’s success. The conference, organised by the Gaullist Centre d’études et de 
recherches Egalité et Liberté (CEREL),734 allowed a reflection on the record of the PS in 
driving growth through Keynesian economic stimuli alongside a participatory 
approach.735 Yet it was precisely this participatory approach which was resented by 
CRAVistes. The attempt to institutionalise representation elicited a strongly 
independent reaction from Huillet, who recalled the Languedoc's heritage by way of 
comparison. 
 Reflecting on the history of autogestion in the Languedoc viticole, Huillet spoke 
about the ways in which cooperatives had changed from their roots in 1901 - "déviation 
d'une expérience autogestionnaire".  He worried that the increasing appeal of national 
unions was depriving regional institutions of their ability to represent regional 
problems. The continuing influence of "neo-corporatist" policy was, according to some 
CRAVistes, disenfranchising smaller growers in favour of the FNSEA, which was still 
popularly associated with large growers (as it had been since its inception). Huillet's 
belief in the heritage of the CGVM was absolute, yet he criticised it for having "tué tout 
le côté positif de la lutte de 1907". For him, the way in which the CGVM had failed to 
stand up to the FNSEA represented a surrender. Whilst the CRAV had always been an 
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offshoot of the CGVM, he now advocated that it should take a primary role in leading 
resistance to government led modernisation and defending growers' interests: 
 Gardons-nous de faire la course pour devenir un syndicat de masse. 
On serait bouffé et on perdrait les réalités du terrain. Notre rôle est de 
développer des dynamiques avec une analyse précise.736 
 
Huillet remained convinced that the CRAV could build on its historical role to avoid 
domination by the national unions. Despite claiming that the CRAV had a role to play 
in developing analyses, they offered little of constructive value. Instead, this was 
substituted with broad criticisms of the government and appeals to regional identity. 
Importantly, this harked back to the rhetoric of 1907 and, in particular, deputy Justin 
Augé's appeal to the Assembly, “Vous êtes le médecin qui devez guérir la malade.”737  
As before, the government's responses to such appeals were unsympathetic. If the Midi 
could offer no solutions, then it would be subject to reform. 
 Yet, in discussion, Huillet rejected new solutions that were put to him which 
hinted at changing crops or scaling down the importance of winegrowing to the 
region. By way of example, he railed against the nascent trend towards producing "bio" 
or organic wines, labelling it the domain of bourgeois growers who could afford to 
meddle and stating "la biologie ça me fait caguer". Such truculence led to questions 
about Poujadisme, and what the CRAV truly represented. When accused of reviving 
Poujadisme, Huillet reacted strongly, saying "je crois que tous les paysans du 
Languedoc ne sont pas encore devenus d'infâmes fascistes, capitalistes 
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réactionnaires..." Instead, he chose to refocus the conversation onto more familiar 
territory, addressing issues of peasant and Occitan identity. In defence of this focus he 
asserted that "chaque fois qu'on a entubé un paysan du tiers monde, on a entubé un 
paysan de chez nous!"738 Broad social criticisms of capitalism and global markets were 
fine, though without any clear strategy for improving Languedocian viticulture, they 
were something of an indulgence. 
 Without a clear economic vision, neither Huillet nor the CRAV were likely to 
solve the problems of the Languedoc. Indeed, the lack of any positive or transformative 
vision confined the CRAV to reactive mobilisation. Maffre-Beaugé's decision to engage 
with the central bodies championing modernisation suggested that he could play a role 
in directing development, rather than rejecting it wholesale. Yet Huillet's annoyance at 
the presence of the FNSEA in the Hérault would put him more in line with the Audois 
CRAVistes who had, as of yet, rejected their influence. These ruptures would cause 
tension, highlighting splits between the two main departments of the Languedoc viticole 
and deploying violence in an attempt to secure consensus. Mobilising the base was 
difficult, but it was even harder to control them. 
 
"Un échec indentique à celui de ses prédecesseurs" 
 On the one hand, Europe provided an obvious figurehead against which to 
mobilise protests, on the other the often-complex nature of European negotiations led 
to further cracks in the already damaged concept of viticultural unity. Nonetheless, the 
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traditional vocabulary of the CRAV (railing against imports, fraud and speculation in 
the name of viticultural unity) served to ensure that they remained a vocal if more 
isolated pressure group. The government’s preference for continuing European 
integration and inability to deliver on specific election promises further distanced 
Languedocian PS Deputies from their traditional role as the ‘Députés du vin’. Instead 
they were forced to play the role of transmission belt for government policy. This led to 
the Socialists distancing themselves from the radicals of the region, pushing the vocal 
and disenchanted minority within the CRAV to harden their stance against the 
government.739 
 In December 1983, 3,000 winegrowers from nine Departments set off by train to 
take their protest to the doors of the EEC. 740 Whilst Huillet in Strasbourg 
communicated the Midi viticole's refusal to see unregulated expansion, the FNSEA back 
south was unsurprisingly reputed to be "plutôt réticents à l'égard de l'expédition 
alsacienne." By withholding its support for the mission, the FNSEA made clear that it 
did not support the CRAV's demands, placing a wedge between themselves and the 
CGVM as opposing representative organisations. The radical actions of the CRAV had 
shock value, but the FNSEA's closeness to government seemed to offer a more effective 
route to improving regional fortunes. This was especially true in the Hérault, where 
the Communist Maffre-Beaugé had shown that forming an FDSEA did not represent 
unqualified engagement with the centre-right FNSEA. The CAV de l'Aude attempted 
                                                          
739 For a sociological discussion of the PS attempt to renegotiate its appeal in the Aude, see A. 
Roger, ‘Faire parler les viticulteurs: La construction d’un ‘électorat’ dans le départment de 
l’Aude’, in V. Anquetin, A. Freyermouth, La figure de l’Ha itant (Rennes: Presses universitares 
de Rennes, 2008), pp.95-114. 
740 'CAV: objectif Strasbourg', L’Indépendant, 09/12/1983 – ADA98J19. 
287 
 
to paper over these cracks, stating that "la profession est une et indivisible".741 Yet, the 
CAV de l'Aude was also about to engage in an attempt to relaunch the CRAV, 
demonstrating its independence and its strength. 
  One way of reinvigorating unity was decisive and significant action. On the 
night of 10 to 11 January 1984, explosions tore through the Tax Office in Narbonne. 
Whilst circumstantial evidence implicated the CRAV, Andre Cases preferred to focus 
on the economic violence done to the region and their profession. "Il faut que les 
pouvoirs publics se gardent d'une faute qui serait de jeter une étincelle sur de 
l'essence... L'effet est toujours explosif."742 Nonetheless, he declared that the CRAV had 
not ordered the attack and that "il y a des éléments incontrôlés qui acceptent mal les 
provocations de toutes sortes."743 These were the members who would be responsible 
for any relaunch, and the attempt to remobilise relied on setting loose the CRAV's most 
extreme elements. Action continued, as winegrowers from the CAV de l'Aude 
intercepted trucks and tankers on 12 January and 17 January.744 More sensational was 
the fact that when the suspected CAV commandos had broken into the rail station at 
Carcassonne to intercept the tankers, they had stumbled across a police car, which they 
swiftly upended and rolled down the hill.745 Attacking police vehicles raised the 
spectre of 1976.  
 Vanguard action from the CAV de l'Aude seemed to be working. By the end of 
the month, Jean Huillet was promising "une action spectaculaire et originale" from the 
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CAV de l'Hérault to grab the attention of Prime Minister Mauroy and Agriculture 
Minister Rocard and shake the region from its torpor.746Andre Cases was once again 
dragged into the role of tribune, stating that “la violence des CAV est le seul moyen 
d’être écouté” and that “les pouvoirs publics n’ont qu’une réponse, la répression, ils 
sont censés prendre position pour les importateurs.” By highlighting the primacy of 
the CRAV, Cases sent a message to those wavering in their support. Michel Rocard 
condemned the commandos: “toute cause perd de sa crédibilité dès lors que des 
individus, qui disent la défendre, se livrent à de telles exactions.” Andre Cases 
immediately replied, condemning the Socialist government: “Je dis au gouvernement 
que sa politique, en matière viti-vinicole, est encore un échec identique à celui de ses 
prédécesseurs, avec, en plus, un immense espoir déçu.”747 
  As controls on the road continued and the CRAV targeted trucks, the wilder 
elements who had reconstituted the CAV de l'Hérault and Aude were determined to 
display their resolute stance. They hijacked 8,000HL of Italian wine destined for 
merchants and emptied it into a nearby stream.748 Jojo Fabre then led subsequent 
marches in Narbonne where, speaking for the CRAV, he promised that until regulation 
was properly applied "nous continuerons ce genre d'action". As mobile police 
squadrons closed down the demonstration, Fabre led his troupe to a new location - the 
bridge at Montredon. Travelling to this point - "un lieu chargé de symbole" - was a 
response to supposed provocation by police.749 Tension between the CRS and CRAV 
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escalated: whilst winegrowers condemned 'provocation', the state backed the CRS by 
condemning violence on the part of protestors. This volatile situation temporarily 
disguised the problems of the Défense movement as André Cases addressed an 
audience of 8,000 winegrowers in Narbonne in bullish fashion: 
Je dis à tous ces jeunes que nous avons régulièrement intégrés au 
C.A.V. qu'ils doivent prendre la relève [...] En attendant, je continue 
jusqu'à la relève, mais cette relève, je 'l'attends... Ceci dit, plus que 
jamais, le C.A.V. est une institution indispensable.750 
 
Again, Cases was attempting to rally the traditional support base of the CRAV whilst 
also seeking to address young winegrowers possibly more inclined to fatalism or 
disinclined to old-style syndicalism. These were the FNSEA's target audience in the 
Languedoc and the constituency which the CRAV needed to engage with. His 
insistence on the role of the CRAV was contingent not simply on his desire for it to 
retain prominence, but on his belief in direct action as a necessary means of 
communicating the immediate grievances of the Languedoc. Such rhetoric was 
designed to stress the lot of the most vulnerable producers, deliberately ignoring 
growers who were more successful and pushing the CRAV ever more towards 
becoming the mouthpiece of the plains. With an ageing core marginalised by the focus 
of modernisation programs, the CRAV needed continually to strike out to ensure they 
did not seem passé. Stressing viticultural unity and the challenges of imports, fraud 
and speculation allowed them to use age-old vocabulary to stress modern problems, 
highlighting their longevity in the face of the growing regional influence of the FNSEA. 
An FDSEA was established in the Aude in February 1984 by the national leader 
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Guillaume. In the eyes of the CRAV, such organisations would never adequately 
mobilise in support of the Midi’s recurring cycle of immediate problems and there 
remained a telling need for locally organised and often extra-legal action groups.  
 Likewise, Jean Huillet's subsequent address lamented the arrest of winegrowers 
at the start of the month and promised a reaction: "chaque fois qu'un viticulteur en 
service commandé sera inculpé, un autre se lèvera et prendra sa place pour continuer 
la combat."751 Their arrest and subsequent sentencing was, needless to say, unpopular 
and a swathe of attacks followed, creating almost 3.5 million Francs worth of damage 
in response to the fines handed down. The ransacking of the Trésorerie-Général in 
Carcassonne, the torching of a Tax office in Lézignan, the destruction of railway points 
and attacks on the Mayor’s office in Capendu were the immediate response of furious 
vignerons.752 Huillet called on winegrowers from all over the region to gather at the 
Palais de Congrès in Béziers on 19 March to protest against Rocard’s impending 
negotiations with the British and others in Brussels.753 8,000 marched in Béziers on 19 
March under the watchful eye of 5 companies of CRS and 4 squadrons of mobile 
police.754 As the protest gathered - among them Claude Alranc from the Mouvement 
Culturel Occitan and Georges Fontès the Mayor of Béziers - Jean Huillet addressed a 
largely peaceful crowd. Outlining his objections to the renegotiation of the CAP he said 
that "nous sommes, sur le plan humaniste, totalement d'accord sur l'élargissement, c'est 
une tâche noble. Mais nous ne pouvons accepter d'être poignardé dans le dos."755 The 
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protests would continue against these discussions, with the CRAV shifting next to the 
Gard, where 8,000 - 10,000756 gathered in Nîmes on 9 April to lament the fact that 
despite 4 Presidents "la crise du monde viticole [qui] dure et perdure".757 
 
Protests in Narbonne758 
 Gavignaud-Fontaine comments on the disparity between this 10,000 and the 
100,000 in 1976, or the 600,000 in 1907; she ruminates on the means by which “bon 
nombre d’élus et de professionnels de la viticulture se sont désolidarisés des actions 
violentes.”759 More stringent policing coupled with a broader acceptance of market 
liberalisation and modernisation was beginning to marginalise the CRAV. The 
creeping advance of the FNSEA was likewise undermining the authority of the CGVM 
to act as the principal interlocutor for vignerons and the CRAV, its ‘bras armée’, faced 
similar challenges. On 14 April, the protests moved from Nîmes to Perpignan,760 but 
what became apparent was that the fallout of 1976 was still jeopardising the future of 
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viticultural defence well into the 1980s. By 1984, with declining attendances at protests 
and increasingly violent means of communicating the grievances of the milieu viticole, 
the CRAV represented, in reality, a shrinking segment of the population despite 
attempts to relaunch its appeal. 
 The disaggregation of the Midi's 'union sacrée' fundamentally altered the 
landscape of the Midi viticole, yet in the persistence of the CRAV's recourse to direct 
action, we can identify a continuity. Path dependency helps to rationalise and account 
for the responses of Midi vignerons to evolving phenomena in a consistent vocabulary 
founded in the riots of 1907. The processes that had shaped the CRAV ensured that 
they remained an expression of consistent and reliable resistance to the central project 
of modernisation. The struggle between 'l'offensive moderniste' and the traditional 
bastions of 'la Défense' highlighted that this central message, with its recurring 
vocabulary and actions, persisted even when the tension was inter-mural. Despite 
attempts from above to foster a desire to improve quality amongst winegrowers, 
certain responses have consistently stressed the regional, rooted character of an 
industry that represents an exceptional aspect of culture and identity and as such 
claims immunity from any need for alteration. Such claims help to ensure that 
ritualised protest was a recurring means of communicating with the state. Yet when 
dialogue seemed unprofitable, as it would when the ‘union sacrée’ collapsed, ritualised 
protest could yield to more radical forms of action permitted by the patterns of 
mobilisation practiced by the CRAV. Within this model, the debate with ‘l’offensive 




  The next chapter will explore the means by which the Défense movement's old 
mandate weakened, with the CRAV still striving to make itself heard in a world 
lurching towards globalisation. The tragedy of Montredon and the victory of 
Mitterrand challenged the aspirations of the Défense movement, forcing it to adapt. 
Yet, as the 1980s continued to prove formative for the wine industry, the vocabulary 
and ideology of 1907 would continue to frame regional responses despite dwindling 




Chapter 6:  
"Enterrement ou résurrection": Modernisation and 
marginalisation (1984-1992) 
 
Just outside Carcassonne at 10pm on 20 April 1984, around 100 viticultural 
commandos gathered in a Leclerc supermarket car park.761 Concerned by the 
appearance of such a crowd, the store's night watchman challenged the men. With 
balaclavas and weapons in hand, their response was a gruff warning that the guard 
should disappear and lock up his guard dogs. No sooner had he done this than the 
hooded men duly advanced on the empty store.762 They smashed windows with iron 
bars before others launched a volley of Molotov cocktails through the shattered 
frames.763 Quickly, fire took hold of the building and billowed out to destroy 3,500 
square metres of retail space, with damage estimated at 30 million Francs.764 The next 
morning, as the blackened shell of the building still smouldered, politicians and police 
mobilised to condemn the culprits and dampen the potential for further action. 
Raymond Chésa, the Mayor of Carcassonne since 1983 stated: 
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Après les événements qu'a connus cette ville, je dis que le climat 
d'insécurité qui règne est le prélude à une guerre civile, Non 
seulement la réprobation de nos concitoyens est générale, mais on 
sent que s'enclenche un processus d'exacerbation dont on ne sait où il 
peut conduire. Il ne faudrait pas arriver dans l'Aude à la même 
situation qu'en Corse ou au Pays Basque. Hier, les édifices publics 
étaient visés. Aujourd'hui, ce sont les particuliers. Jusqu'où ira cette 
escalade de violence?765 
 
His response was no doubt heightened by its immediacy to events, even if the mention 
of civil war seems alarmist. Clearly, he believed the winegrowers had breached their 
usual boundaries of protest and moved closer to outright rebellion. Of particular 
interest is the mention of Corsica in the context of Michelle Zancarini-Fournel's 'après-
Mai' analysis of the Montredon shootings. Her reference to Corsica bound the narrative 
of regionalism into the CRAV's political expression. As mentioned, these movements 
may have complemented each other at specific moments, yet they remained distinct. 
As Zancarini-Fournel points out, however, the cases of Aleria and Montredon were 
different, a difference she attributes to the Aude's republican heritage. Regarding 
Montredon, she notes: 
La présence constante dans les manifestations, et même lors d’actions 
violentes et minoritaires, de maires des villages des Corbières a 
maintenu le lien avec les représentants politiques du département766 
 
The burning of the Leclerc store symbolised a breaking point, however, when the 
methods of the CRAV broke with traditionally accepted modes of protest. Chésa's 
denunciation of the winegrowers demonstrated that in such a case they were unable to 
rely on the support of local notables. The Dépêche highlighted that the act had been 
                                                          
765 Revel, Montredon, p.320. 
766 Zancarini-Fournel, ‘Montredon, 4 mars 1976: l’évenement comme révélateur’, p.9. 
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criminal and "condamné avec force par l'opinion publique mais aussi par une large 
frange agricole et viticole audoise." 
 Likewise, in the capital, the Agriculture Minister, Michel Rocard, appeared on 
television to condemn what he called “actions scandaleuses moralement, et imbéciles 
économiquement. [...] Des gangsters viennent ainsi d'affaiblir la cause de la viticulture 
française."767 As in previous attacks which had crossed frontiers of acceptability, this act 
caused both massive property damage and a threat to the safety of bystanders. Attacks 
on tax offices and telephone lines were intended to strike out against emblems of the 
state in a dramatic manner. Yet, as had been the case with dynamiting pylons and 
railways, these actions drew criticism from the usually supportive press and also from 
unions representing workers employed by these institutions. The Leclerc affair was the 
most openly destructive act so far undertaken and subsequent mobilisations would 
take place under "l'ombre de l'incendie du centre Leclerc de Carcassonne."768 Unlike 
other attacks which took place during the dead of night or in open countryside, this 
was an urban shopping centre attacked at 10pm, with 90 staff facing redundancy as a 
result of the attack.769 Despite Andre Cases assuring the winegrowers detained by 
police of his support, the event generated wide condemnation. Even Jean Huillet 
admitted that he was troubled, though remained committed to the solidarity of the 
Défense movement, "Je continue à être sur le terrain, mais je suis très ennuyé pour 
réagir. [...] Je reste toujours aux côtés de mes amis audois."770  
                                                          
767 'Carcassonne: Les 'casseurs' de Leclerc arrêtés aujourd'hui?', La Dépêche, 25/04/1984 - ADA 
98J21. 
768 'Les vignerons aujourd'hui dans la rue', Midi-Libre, 24/04/1984 - ADA 98J21. 
769 'Le centre Leclerc de Carcassonne sera reconstruit', Midi Libre, 25/04/1984 - ADA 98J21. 
770 'La 'manif' des inquiétudes', Midi-Libre, 25/04/1984 - ADA 98J21. 
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 Yves Gilbert identifies multiple streams of reaction to the arson attack which 
indicated a shift in the public's willingness to sanction the activities of the CRAV:  
La rupture se consomme entre, d’une part, un nombre de plus en plus 
important de viticulteurs modérés, une opinion public locale qui se 
scandalise devant les exactions des derniers temps, des élus qui ne 
cautionnent plus la violence et, d’autre part, un noyau de plus en plus 
réduit et de plus en plus marginalisé de militants des Comités 
d’Action Viticoles. ‘Viticulteurs: isolés et divisés.’771  
 
Gilbert depicts an industry changed by the process of economic reform which was 
undermining the political importance of the Défense movement and casting it as a 
backwards looking reaction against progress. In reality, continuing programmes of 
arrachage had undermined the predominance of winegrowers in the region, whilst the 
inability of the Socialist government to tackle the FNSEA's dominance on a national 
level had pushed a large number of Languedocians towards supporting it in the face of 
regional malaise. Likewise, the policy of the FNSEA had become ever closer to that of 
the government, owing to its close relationship with power. Amidst continued 
demonstrations and acts of violence it seems that support for the CRAV had started to 
wear thin amongst the public. Although it retained a core of ever more embattled petit 
vignerons amongst the milieu viticole, their faltering relevance on a wider scale could not 
be disguised by increasingly strident action.  
 If the marginalisation of the CRAV had been progressively underway since the 
Socialist victory, the month of April 1984 witnessed a rapid acceleration of the process.  
This one act of destructive folly came to symbolise the CRAV's position in the Midi in 
much the same way as Montredon had highlighted their extremism 8 years earlier. By 
                                                          
771 Gilbert Le Languedoc et ses images, p.45. 
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striking out violently against targets which offered little threat to Languedocian 
winegrowers, the CRAV forfeited public sympathy. Hijacking tankers of Italian wine or 
spray painting the local prefecture had clear links to the cause of 'la Défense'. When the 
CRAV targeted private companies actively engaged in promoting their product, 
however, many were outraged if not simply confused. As politicians failed to spring to 
the defence of the viticultural commandoes and the scale of damages frightened off 
their traditional supporters, the Leclerc fires seemed destined to mark a turning point 
for the CRAV and the Languedoc more widely.  
 The reaction from Edouard Leclerc – the proprietor of the supermarket chain – 
was equally damaging. He pointed out that in all their 450 stores around France, 25% of 
wine sold came from the Aude, whilst only 0.1% of wine came from outside France. In 
destroying the Carcassonnais store, the CRAV had cut off one of the principal 
distributors of Audois wine, a fact which would only be exacerbated as the chain 
boycotted Audois wine for a month following the attack.772 The choice of target and the 
scale of damages impacted on the CRAV's credibility as an acceptable interlocutor. 
Likewise, it was Chésa and Jacques Talmier who led the way in setting up conciliatory 
meetings with Edouard Leclerc, bringing along with them François Guillaume. He 
declared that he was "certain d'obtenir que M. Leclerc lève interdit."773 Furthermore, 
Guillaume declared that if sales recommenced, Leclerc should only allow the wine of 
"producteurs et coopérateurs qui se réclament de la F.N.S.E.A." to ensure that 
                                                          
772  'Carcassonne: Les 'casseurs' de Leclerc arrêtés aujourd'hui?', La Dépêche, 25/04/1984 - ADA 
98J21. 
773 Talmier was the head of the local Chamber of Commerce and President of the Carcassonnais 
rugby union team. He showed himself a firm ally of modernisers both in business and sport. 
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"Groupuscules de casseurs" were punished for their actions.774 Suddenly, some of the 
figureheads of the modernisation movement were publicly shown to be cleaning up the 
mess of the Défense movement's wildest elements.  
 This arson attack was indicative of the increasing antagonism between the 
objectives of regional development and regional defence. As described in the previous 
chapter, the foundations of the Languedoc viticole had been undercut by demographic 
shifts in the regional economy and political developments which altered the 
framework for interaction between winegrowers and elites. This process would 
continue as the Défense movement became increasingly divided over approaches to 
development. As traditionalists and defenders of the most vulnerable smallholders, the 
CRAV originally emerged as the stalwarts of ‘la Défense’. The creeping influence of 
'l'offensive moderniste', however, would win converts amongst some winegrowers, 
especially as it had managed to acquire the endorsement of the PS. This changing 
political climate called into question established modes of protest and undermined the 
popular tolerance of violent CRAV attacks. Indeed, during the latter half of the 1980s, 
the frontiers of acceptability would be breached with ever greater regularity. Changing 
public attitudes to the CRAV illustrated both an evolution in the group's methods and 
a decline in the importance of the traditional Défense movement to regional politics. 
The modernisation of Languedocian viticulture partially mirrored the development of 
regional patrimoine as a form of cultural capital which could be directed towards 
improving relations between the French state and regional peripheries.  
 
                                                          
774 'François Guillaume: 'Groupuscules de casseurs''. Midi-Libre, 25/04/1984 - ADA 98J21. 
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The Midi transformed? Falling consumption and changing production patterns 
 This Leclerc attack came against a background of steadily worsening news for 
the smallholders and mass producers of the Languedoc who were the mainstay of the 
Défense movement and the foot soldiers of the CRAV. Declining consumption and 
shrinking vine coverage both in France and across Europe was acutely felt in the 
Languedoc. The influence of Brussels had ensured that member states were pushed 
ever more towards increasing the quality and decreasing the quantity of wine 
produced. The table below denotes the shifting patterns of wine consumption within 
Europe and the marked transformation of those levels. Clearly, consumption in 
traditionally wine-producing countries has fallen considerably across the 40 year 
period surveyed. In France, Italy and Portugal consumption has almost halved. The 
other evident trend is the growth of consumption in markets which produce little or no 
wine, such as the UK and the Netherlands. This pattern of increased trade amongst 
European countries kept the overall level of consumption across Europe from 
collapsing during this period. Despite 50% declines in some countries, the overall 
consumption level fell only 9.4%. Nonetheless, this marks a considerable downturn in 




                                                          
775 A. Smith. J. Maillard; O. Costa, Vin et politique (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des 
Sciences Po, 2007), p.95. 
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 1961 1970 1980 1990 2001 
France 126.1 109.1 91 72.7 63.9 
Italy 108.2 113.7 92.9 62.5 50 
Portugal 99.3 99 68.7 63.3 50 
Switzerland 36.7 41.9 47.4 49.4 43.1 
Spain 52.5 61.5 64.7 37.4 36.2 
Greece 41 40 44.9 32.8 34 
Denmark 3.3 5.9 14 21.3 31.2 
Austria 20.8 34.6 35.8 35 31 
Germany 12.2 16 25.5 26.1 23.9 
Netherlands 2.3 5.2 12.9 14.5 18.9 
Belgium 8.6 14.2 20.6 24.9 18.7 
UK 1.8 2.9 7.1 11.5 17.5 
Consumption trends in Europe (litres of wine per inhabitant per year)776 
 Amidst a climate of gradually falling consumption within Europe between 1984 
and 2003, the other important factor was the changing ratio between geographically 
limited wine (such as AOC in France, for example) and vin de table. In 1984, roughly 
35,000,000HL of geographically limited wines were consumed, in comparison to 
roughly 95,000,000HL of non-geographically limited wine. By 2003, this ratio saw a 
steady convergence at around 55,000,000HL each. The Midi’s continued reliance on vin 
de table over AOC wine heightened the implications of this trend. The stalwart 
cooperatives producing wine which had always been intended for consommation 
courante struggled in the face of higher value production governed by the appellation 
system. The logic behind the qualitative revolution enshrined at the heart of French 
winegrowing since the Plan Chirac of 1973 and reiterated by Mitterrand during the 
election of 1981 had been borne out. This trend also helps to display the Midi's 
complicated relationship with European expansion. Although organisations like the 
                                                          
776 These figures come from the work of Jean Clavel, a former syndicalist involved with the 
restructuring of Languedocien viticulture. He continues to play an active role in documenting 
the changes and challenges facing the Languedoc, with an optimistic belief in the region's 
potential. I will rely on his work for many of these figures. CF. J. Clavel, Mondialisation des vins 
(Bordeaux: Féret, 2008), especially pp.43-64. 
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CRAV vilified Italian imports as the primary menace to their industry, falling 
consumption in Italy was augmented by falling production. After the worst of the 
Italian wine scandals in the 1980s, Italy's production stood at 61.7 million HL, yet in 
only 5 years it fell to 41.4 million HL. Likewise, though 88% of its production was vin 
de table in 1986, this had shrunk to 44% in 2005. The viticultural legislation of the 
European Community remained principally a threat to those producing vin de table, 
with regions such as the Midi more affected than relatively affluent producers in 
regions such as Bordeaux. Whilst the politics of over-production and minimum price 
guarantees dogged the activities of low value producers, the grands marques of 
longstanding AOCs were somewhat immune from supra-national reform and, instead, 
lobbied at a national level for regulation and brand protection.777 During this period the 
motivation of those pursuing 'l'offensive moderniste' was to reduce the coverage and 
yield of vines whilst also trying to increase their requisite value, a strategy often 
referred to as the Bordeaux model.  
 Continued focus on arrachage by European policy-makers ensured that the 
Midi's vine acreage was ever shrinking in service of reduced yields and better grape 
varieties.778 It remained, as mentioned earlier, an unpopular option for winegrowers 
who felt that regional identity was being torn up alongside productive vines. By 1989, 
uprooting was ‘menacing’ roughly 100,000HA of vines in the Languedoc-Roussillon, 
threatening to undermine the centrality of the Midi’s wine industry to its regional 
                                                          
777 Smith, Maillard, Costa, Vin et politique, pp.87-97. 
778 For a fuller discussion of arrachage and its uptake patterns throughout the Languedoc see the 




economy.779 ‘Arrachage’ had a telling impact on France between 1968 and 1988, but 
most specifically in the Languedoc. The French national vineyard dropped from 1.2 
million HA in 1968 to 960,000HA in 1988 (a decline of a fifth) and in the Languedoc the 
drop was from 450,000HA to 300,000HA (a decline of a third).780 Between 1976 and 
1984, arrachage occurred mainly in the marginal vineyards of the Languedoc, though 
between 1984 and 1990, productive vineyards at the heart of the Languedoc viticole 
began to disappear. Economic pressures and the temptation to take the immediate 
reimbursement for uprooting impacted upon small vineyards most of all. As a result, 
the trend from the 1970s was of a disappearance of the smallest vine plots, as vineyards 
were either sold, amalgamated or torn up. The 'rationalisation' of the Midi's patchwork 
vine coverage reduced the number of smallholders depending on the CRAV, CGVM or 
MODEF to represent them. Whilst, in 1970 the average vineyard size in the Aude was 
10.1HA, in 1979 it was 13.2HA and by 1988 it was 16.4HA.781 Between 1976 and 2006, 
some 2/3 of small agricultural businesses had disappeared in the Languedoc, whilst the 
acrage devoted to agriculture had decreased only by 3%.782 Likewise, this process 
served to weaken the area's traditional co-operatives, instead strengthening the more 
flexible winemakers who could produce higher value wine more in tune with the 
institutional vision for development. The number of cooperatives had decreased, as 
many fused together in the face of economic difficulties: of the 550 cooperatives in 
1980, only 380 remained by 1998. As a result, between 1984 and 2004 wine as a 
percentage of total regional agricultural produce dropped 10% (from 55% to 45%). 
                                                          
779 'Des ceps qui pourraient s'enflammer', La Dépêche,  19/01/1989 – ADA98J20. 
780 O. Torres, The Wine Wars (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), p.58. 
781 Gavignaud-Fontaine, Le Languedoc viticole, pp.419-424. 
782 Touzard, Klajman, Développement régional Agriculture et IAA en Languedoc-Roussillon, pp.12-15. 
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Indeed, by 1989, almost 1/3 of the region’s vines had been uprooted in response to 
European directives and Parisian development strategies.  
 
Changes in the Surface of vines (HA)783 
 Further European directives in 1988 modified the rules on arrachage to allow for 
the replanting of better quality varietals (such as Cabernet and Merlot) in place of high-
yield and low-quality varietals (such as Aramon and Alicante). The extension of this 
decree saw immediate impact, with 21,000 HA replanted over the course of the 1988-
1989 season. Between 1976 and 1989 “près de la moitié du vignoble languedocien est 
arraché définitivement ou renouvelé en cépages qualitatifs en l’espace de vingt ans.”784  
The structural changes implied by this amelioration were considerable and the 
traditional grape varieties of the Languedoc occupied ever less area. The table below 





                                                          
783 Gavignaud-Fontaine, Le Languedoc viticole, p.420. 
784 Rouzier, Le Languedoc-Roussillon 1950-2001, p.79-82. 
Years Aude Gard Hérault Languedoc 
1970 118,104 90,897 162,172 371,173 
1979 115,758 86,734 147,933 350, 425 
1988 102,759 77,647 127,813 308,279 
1994 88,836 64,961 111,426 265,223 
Reduction 29,268 25,936 50,746 105,950 




 1968 harvest 1999 harvest 
Alicante Bouschet 11,164 7,415 
Aramon noir 107,273 9,797 
High yield varietals 118, 437 17,212 
Cinsault 7,943 20,980 
Carignan 175,666 82,783 
Regional varietals 183,609 103,763 
Mourvèdre ? (100HA planted) 3,600 
Syrah 82 27,853 
Grenache noir 23,841 41,375 
Quality regional varietals 23,923 69,228 
Cabernet - 13,591 
Merlot - 23,380 
Sauvignon - 4,349 
Cépages extérieurs - 41,320 
Total 431,239 291,400 
Changes in varieties by HA (1968-1990) 
Aramon, a stalwart of the Midi ‘de la bibine’, had virtually disappeared by 1990, falling 
from an area of 130,000HA in 1958 to less than 10,000HA and representing only 3% of 
the regional harvest. Carignan, although often a high-yield variety, forms the basis of 
many of the Midi’s AOCs, such as Fitou and Corbières. As such, its use has been refined 
and has shrunk some 45% between 1958 and 1990. Cinsault, which was not generally 
seen as a positive grape for quality reds, became increasingly used in the production of 
marketable Rosé wine. Alicante Bouschet retained its role as a high-yield seldom 
planted vine with little attraction for serious growers. The most important varietals 
have been Grenache, Cinsault, Syrah and Mourvèdre, the most important grapes in 
many of the Languedoc’s premier appellations. Although Syrah and Mourvèdre were 
almost non-existent in 1958, they constituted 27,800HA and 3,600HA by 1999. These 
trends of amelioration represented a substantial shift in the character of the 
Languedoc's wine industry. The old image of the Midi as a bulk producer of poor wine 
was being challenged by the reality of better varietals and better quality production. 
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The CRAV's role as spokesman of the smallholding producer was becoming untenable 
in the face of these shifts.  
 The politics of quality did play a part in improving the fortunes of some 
growers, however. AOC Coteaux de Languedoc was introduced in December 1985, 
drawing together 168 communes and 15,600 HA of vineyards along the Mediterranean 
coast from Narbonne in the west to Nîmes in the east.785 The AOC Coteaux de Languedoc 
came from a proposal originally floated in the Hérault from 1977 by a former CDJA 
member Jean-Claude Bousquet.786 It is significant that these proposals for renewal and 
modernisation originated in the Hérault, where a greater willingness to engage with 
changes to traditional production methods was evident. Federalising these diverse 
areas under one appellation allowed the collective regulation and marketing of wine. 
As such, limits on the yield per hectare and on the varieties of grape permitted in 
blends were established and enforced. Jean Clavel highlights that demands on yield 
(one of the strongest indicators of a commitment to quality) were actually stricter in 
AOC Coteaux de Languedoc than it was in AOC Bordeaux, as shown in the table below.787  
                                                          
785 The sub-regions included in AOC Coteaux de Languedoc are Saint Chinian, Faugères, Clairette 
du Languedoc, Clape, Quatourze, Picpoul de Pinet, Grés de Montpellier, Terrasses du 
Larzac, Pic Saint Loup, Terrasses de Béziers, Pézenas, Cabrières, and Sommières.    
786 Bousquet remains President of the Syndicat des Coteaux de Languedoc. The Directrice of that 
organisation, Mme. Béatrice de Chabert was interviewed in relation to this thesis. 












Permitted yield HL per HA
(1998)
Actual yield HL per HA (1997)
AOC Coteaux de Languedoc
AOC Bordeaux
 
Comparison of AOC yield restrictions 
 Subsequently, the Vin de Pays d’Oc appellation was created in 1987 under the 
leadership of Jacques Gravegeal, a former luminary of the FNSEA. This measure was 
popular in that it circumscribed the often expensive process of obtaining an individual 
AOC for a small area outside existing boundaries. Instead it provided for some 
freedom of blend and method – in the loosely regulated Vin de Pays category 
established in the Chirac Plan – whilst accentuating the regional brand of Occitan 
heritage. This measure combined pride in regional identity with a tangible means of 
ameliorating production, raising the possibility of rehabilitating the Midi viticole’s 
reputation within the wine world. An initial 200,000HL of wine was produced under 
this appellation, although this increased to over 3.5 million HL within 15 years, a 
useful indication of its popularity.788 The politics of quality had seen marked success 
against the declining centrality of the wine trade to the regional economy.  
 In 1990, the estimated population of those involved in winegrowing in the 
Languedoc was 39,000 where it had been 75,000 in 1975. The continuing success of the 
                                                          
788 Torres, The Wine Wars, p.57. 
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Coteaux du Languedoc appellation marked "le vent tourner à temps." Jean Clavel - the 
President of the appellation's support organisation - acknowledged both its success 
and its growing influence: "Au début, nous étions des marginaux, mais tout le monde 
se rend compte aujourd'hui que nous étions dans le vrai."789 Indeed, this image of 
improving quality and greater stability was an impressive and progressive step, 
constructed as it was on costly investment in quality and the tempting if painful 
arrachage programs promulgated by the Dublin Accords. The Dublin Accords of 
December 1984 singled out the Midi as one of the key targets for change if European 
agriculture was to avoid constant over-production and continued poor sales.790 This 
image of progress stood in stark contrast to the contestatory image being trumpeted 
defiantly by the CRAV. These trends in the Midi’s development help explain the 
FNSEA's growing attractiveness. Its increasing role in the Languedoc was not simply 
due to political manoeuvring but because the vision which they presented meshed 
with government policy. 
 
The Role of Europe 
 The changing economic climate of the 1980s in the Languedoc was largely a 
product of two differing aspects of European integration: the desire to usher in a 
programme of structural agricultural reform and to widen the European Economic 
Community. Two key moments on the European stage altered the CRAV's field of 
                                                          
789 'La piquette n'est plus ce qu'elle était', Le Monde, 03/06/1990 - ADA 98J15. 
790 For further discussion of the Dublin Accords, see Martin, 'Le syndicalisme vitivole en 
Languedoc', p.46; Y. Chiffoleau, 'La "Révolution qualité" en milieu coopératif viticole 
languedocien', Pôle Sud, no.9 (1998), pp. 111-124. 
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operation during this period and solidified their resistance to both aspects. Firstly, the 
Dublin Accords and secondly, the accession of Spain and Portugal into the European 
Union in 1985, which ensured that the provisions of the Dublin Accords would become 
reality. The Socialist Party's willingness to engage with European expansion on both 
these occasions signified another step away from its previously close relationship with 
Languedocian winegrowers.791 In pursuing further European commitment, the PS 
prioritised an improvement in the quality of France's wine production as the only 
development path worth considering. In 1985 Minister for Agriculture Nallet summed 
up his approach to European negotiations in a metaphor which would strike a chord in 
the Midi: 
 Au rugby on ne botte pas en touche lorsqu'on a la possibilité de 
marquer un essai en coin, sous prétexte qu'après la remise en jeu de la 
touche, on pourrait le marquer entre les poteaux. J'ai pris mes 
responsabilités...792 
 
The government's attitude to viticulture in Europe was remarkably consistent with the 
tenets of the Chirac Plan in 1973 and the subsequent Bentegeac Plan. The FNSEA and 
their subsidiaries were also consistently in line with these policies of creating 
groupements de producteurs, replanting vineyards with better quality grapes 
(restructuration), reducing yields and the improvement of commercial structures. Their 
                                                          
791 For further discussion of Mitterrand’s engagement with Europe, see Bergounioux, Grunberg, 
L’am ition et le remords; P. Moreau-Defarges, 'La France et l'Europe, l'inévitable débat', Politique 
étrangère, vol.67, no.4 (2002), pp. 951-966. Also of note is the work of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, 
the former government Minister who resigned his post after a conflict with Mitterrand over 
policies to keep France in the European Monetary System. Chevènement describes how 
Mitterrand substituted the social policies abandoned after the conservative turn in 1983-1984 
with an increasing focus on European integration. He casts this as a "pari pascalien" which 
offered respite from France's economic problems by changing the terms of debate. See, J. 
Chevènement, La France est-elle finie  ?, (Paris: Fayard, 2011). 
792 Midi Libre, 28/02/1985 
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ability to survive the challenge of Cresson had seen them become the dominant 
agricultural union in France, which in turn served to increase their support in a 
mutually reinforcing process. As government policies converged with the 
strengthening of the dominant union, the government's ability to satisfy a greater 
proportion of the agricultural sector increasingly depended on 'cogestion' with the 
FNSEA, especially over smaller interests such as the Midi vignerons. Thus, when 
approaching agricultural negotiations, ministers like Nallet could take the "try in the 
corner" and sacrifice the interests of winegrowers at the expense of the FNSEA and the 
wider agricultural sector (drawing in milk, cheese, grain production etc).  
 The EU held its Dublin Summit between 4 and 11 December 1984, referred to in 
the Languedoc as “les accords de Dublin”. It made the limiting of all types of 
agricultural overproduction a priority.793 Specifically, the production of European wine 
was to be reduced in advance of the entry of Spanish and Portuguese wines into the 
Common Market, with “la production méridionale” the prime target for making good 
this commitment.794 Each member country was assigned a production quota, beyond 
which wine would be distilled at near production cost. Likewise, an adjustment of the 
reimbursements for arrachage induced many more vignerons to uproot their stocks 
with the promise not to replant. Over the next three seasons 20,000HA would 
disappear from the Languedoc-Roussillon, in addition to the 34,000HA already 
                                                          
793 For a detailed discussion of the Dublin Accords, see Smith, ‘Beyond ‘Connections in 
Brussels’’; Y. Le Pape, A. Smith, ‘Décentralisations et agriculture: analyse comparée de deux 
régions français’, Politiques et management politiques,vol.16, no.4 (December 1998); M. Berriet, A. 
Faure, W. Genieys, A. Smith, Le Languedoc-Roussillon et les politiques communautaires agricoles et 
rurales, (FAIR/DGVI research report, December 1998). A. Smith, ‘Le Midi et le vin’, Pôle Sud, 
no.9 (November, 1998), pp.125-135. 
794 Y. Gilbert Le Languedoc et ses images (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989), p.40. 
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uprooted between 1976 and 1985.795  Gavignaud-Fontaine remarks that the outcome of 
the votes in Dublin must have sounded like “les notes d’une marche funèbre” to the 
winegrowers of the Midi, with widespread uprooting alongside regular compulsory 
distillation now a reality.796 The Socialist government which had in 1981 promised to 
present new hope to the winegrowers of the Midi had progressively reverted to the 
policy of its predecessor.  
 The CRAV's reaction to the Dublin Accords was predictably negative, although 
also somewhat revelatory of the health of the organisation. A massive regional 
demonstration against the outcome of the Summit was planned on 14 January 1985,797 
but cancelled after a forecast for heavy snow. In its place, MODEF, the Fédération des 
Caves Coopératives de l'Aude (FDCCA) and the Occitan group Païs Nostre held 
round-table talks to discuss their opposition to Spanish entry. Such talks, however, 
were a disappointment when compared to the potential impact of loud and visible 
mass protest. Newspapers began to speculate whether the snow had not been a pretext 
used to disguise the muzzling of the CRAV by leaders of the regional PS wishing to 
avoid direct protests against the Socialist Conseil Régional, also in favour of 
modernisation.798 The CRAV issued another call to protest 'against Dublin' on 30 
January at Montpellier. As Jean Huillet arrived at the Hôtel de Région, Maffre-Beaugé 
led 8,000 protestors outside in a collective denunciation of Michel Rocard and the 
failure of Socialist deputies to prevent the Dublin agreements. After scuffles broke out, 
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the CRS intervened and isolated incidents continued through the night, with tollbooths 
vandalised on the autoroute to Béziers. Despite disappointing attendances and 
cancelled protests, the actions of a core of viticultural radicals made clear that the 
CRAV, the CGVM and MODEF all stood strongly against European expansion in 
direct contrast to the government. 
 Michel Rocard refused to compromise, declaring: 
nous n'avons aucun droit, historique ou politique, de rejeter 
l'adhésion de l'Espagne. [...] L'Europe n'a pas le droit qu'on insulte ou 
qu'on lui ferme la porte au nez.799 
 
True to his word, the ineluctable process became a reality. The accession of Spain and 
Portugal to the European Union on 28 March 1985 exacerbated traditional concerns of 
foreign imports and the potential fraud for vignerons.800 After years of discussion 
which had seen lobbying against expansion from the CRAV, MODEF and individual 
PS Deputies, the reality of a larger Europe was unavoidable. The seeming 'betrayal' 
which had seen Pierre Guidoni (a former favourite in the Languedoc) help to negotiate 
Spanish entry was indicative of the disappointment felt by vignerons.801 The actual 
opening of the borders was scheduled for 1 January 1986 in a phased roll-out which 
was designed to mitigate the shock that any immediate action might cause. 
Nonetheless, the technocrat Phillipe Lamour802 declared the decision “une erreur 
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historique”, whilst Maffre-Beaugé condemned “une trahison des intérêts de notre 
région”.803  
 
The National Scene  
 The modernising agenda of Mitterrand's government remained consistent, even 
as it moved into cohabitation. Indeed, as the Right was given a route back into 
government, the policies championed by the FNSEA were ever more likely to inform 
France's relationship with Europe regarding agriculture. Mitterrand's reintroduction of 
proportional representation for the legislative elections of 1986 provoked accusations 
that he was gambling with the nation's political future by strengthening the FN to spite 
Chirac's centre-right coalition of  RPR and UDF. Results saw the Socialist government 
move into a period of co-habitation, with Mitterrand remaining and appointing Chirac 
as Prime Minister. François Guillaume, the combative head of the FNSEA in the Midi 
and now an active member of the RPR, was named Minister for Agriculture.804 This 
promotion, it seemed, came as a reward for the FNSEA's consistent opposition to the 
Socialist government’s attempt to direct agricultural representation.805 Jacques Blanc, of 
the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMR), was elected President of the Conseil 
Régional of the Languedoc in the first direct election to the council.806 Coming from the 
centre-right, he set out to combat the dominance of the left in the Languedoc. Born in 
Toulouse, Blanc had been a member of the second Barre government and Secretary of 
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State for Agriculture under Pierre Méhaignerie807 and was returned as a deputy in 
1978. As a centre-right politician in the traditionally Socialist Midi, Blanc's association 
with Barre's modernising cabinet was an indication that 'l'offensive moderniste' would 
find a welcome audience amongst regional élus. 
  The shifting landscape of the Midi had changed the nature of traditional 
representation. As the wine industry fell under the sway of the FNSEA and the push to 
modernise, improve quality and uproot old vines, the CRAV's core support among 
regional political elites was undermined and it moved towards political marginality. 
McFalls collates the first round of the Presidential election of 1981 with the European 
Parliamentary elections of 1984 and the 1986 National Assembly elections to construct a 
picture of continued Languedocian support for the Socialist party despite their 
changing rhetoric regarding viticultural defence. Whilst there was a wobble in 1984, as 
the Socialist party moved away from the "ideology of political unity", the resurgence in 
their vote in the Midi in 1986 at least partly indicated a wider acceptance of the 
"nouvelle politique de qualité".808 
Abandonnés par leur parti, les viticulteurs se trouvèrent devant un 
choix. Ou ils pouvaient se rallier autour du vieux mouvement de 
défense professionnelle - le Parti Communiste, avec Maffre-Baugé à 
son sein, et tenant le vieux discours unitaire, était toujours là comme 
alternative possible - ou ils pouvaient rester fidèles au Parti Socialiste 
et s’adapter à la nouvelle idéologie socialiste libérale et pro-
européenne. 809 
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McFalls highlighted the novelty of the Socialist party's ideology, yet the developments 
were also attributable to the shifting realities of the wine market. Despite the 
developing professional distance between viticultural syndicalism and the Socialist 
party, many individual voters maintained their personal loyalty to the party. In part, 
such a result is indicative of changes in identity. Attachment to the Socialist party 
proved to be more resilient than identification with their role in the "union sacrée" and 
the long history of the Midi viticole. At the same time, however, a turn away from 
localised and regional organisations like the CGVM which had sprung from 1907 
meant that the traditional bond between the PS and the area was diminished. Instead, 
many winegrowers who were traditional supporters of the PS found themselves 
involved politically with the FNSEA, a union which could not hide its associations 
with the political right. The PS was forced, therefore, to walk something of a tightrope 
in order to balance the traditional centre-left expectations of the South as well as the 
modernising tendencies of the centre-right union to which many Languedocians now 
belonged. 
 It is significant that although the PS was increasingly predisposed to follow the 
policies of the FNSEA as regarded modernisation of the wine industry in the Midi, 
they did not seek to do so unquestioningly, as Yves Gilbert outlines: 
Mais, ce qui peut paraître une volonté de la part du gouvernement de 
briser la forme violente du mouvement viticole (et peut-être même le 
mouvement viticole traditionnel - cf. l'éviction de la CGVM, dès 81, 
des instances de concertation), ne l'empêche pas d'adopter une 
attitude tout à fait conciliante au regard de la résolution des 
problèmes économiques qui se posent pour la viticulture régionale.810 
 
                                                          
810 Gilbert, Meistersheim, Orateurs en Languedoc 1981-1986, p.81. 
316 
 
Whilst attempts to address the economic issues of the Midi were underway, their 
success was constantly limited by the resistance of 'la Défense' to radical change. There 
remained sticking points which the CRAV refused to concede, for example its 
stigmatisation of fraud. The CRAV continually equated European integration with 
fraud, highlighting Italy and Spain as the most likely source of fraudulent wines. 
Speaking in 1981, Jean Huillet had openly descried the threat presented by Italian 
imports: 
L'Italie exporte sa crise chez nous... Il faut lutter contre les 
importateurs apatrides et la fraude organisée à l'échelon international. 
Le souvenir de Montredon reste effectivement dans la mémoire de 
chaque viticulteur.811 
 
The references to Montredon indicted the merchants who committed fraud by 
blending foreign imports as Ramel had been accused of in 1976. As the enlargement of 
the European Economic Community in the 1980s promoted new liberalisation of the 
wine market, there was a resurgence in the rhetorical value of 'fraud' to the Midi 
vignerons. The relaxing of trade tariffs and barriers was starkly juxtaposed with the 
tight regulation which warded off most fraud in the region and which vignerons had 
repeatedly demanded. The ‘scandale du vin’, in which Italian wines fraudulently cut 
with ethanol poisoned 21 people, was a clarion call to the Défense movement. 
Newspapers amplified the outrage by reprinting anti-fraud posters from the Tocsin of 
1907, echoing continuity with the struggle near 80 years earlier.812 As signs read ‘MORT 
AUX FRAUDEURS’ the parallels with earlier condemnations were clear. The CRAV 
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likewise saw this as a moment to reinforce their role as the inheritors of 1907 and 
Huillet accused the EEC of being complicit in the murder of those 21 people due to 
laxity in the regulation of Italian produce.813  
 Memory of the Italian wine scandal of 1986 remained pertinent as long as 
Italian imports remained high. In 1988, Italian police detained 8 winemakers and 
questioned 3 other people associated with the company Saco-Vins for tampering with 
wines. Suspicion that some wines from this company may have entered Sète aroused 
angry condemnations of the cheap Italian imports which were supposedly forcing "les 
viticulteurs méridionaux à arracher pour faire la place à la 'bibine'."814 The interaction 
of fraudulent Italian wineries and Sètois merchants caused many to call for a complete 
ban on Italian imports as a viable, if essentially illegal, solution to continued 
problems.815 Maffre-Beaugé denounced Italian wine as dangerous to one's health and to 
the economy of France. He pointed to "la tendance à frauder de l'Italie" and spoke of 
his years of resisting this influence, pointing out that "chaque année qui passe nous 
laisse la preuve de ces trafics."816 
 Heightened import figures during the autumn of 1988 provoked action in the 
early months of 1989. Responding to the pressure, the Minister of Agriculture Henri 
Nallet convened a consultative meeting of the wine industry, drawing together 
producers, merchants and importers.817 At this meeting on 13 January, suspicions of 
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fraud amongst unscrupulous merchants and importers were once again aired.818 The 
Minister of Agriculture was keen, however, to stress that although anger was 
mounting, there was no desire for protests to escalate and "revenir à la guerre du vin... 
Sur certains points vous [producers] dansez sur un volcan." Escalation was inevitable, 
however, as figures emerged which alleged Italian imports had increased by 70% 
between 1987 and 1988. Trucks continued to be hijacked and wine continued to be 
pumped out onto the road in a strategy which had become a reliable staple for 
disenchanted winegrowers.819 These actions were a declaration of faith in alternatives 
to EEC led growth. The fact that there remained both a voice championing this cause 
and an audience showed that the Défense movement's rhetoric had not yet been 
entirely marginalised. 
 In addition, the Communist led MODEF remained a staunch supporter of 'la 
Défense'. In 1989 it came out in force to demonstrate against uprooting, displaying 
their belief in alternatives to modernisation and the defence of small family farmers. In 
a striking show of defiance, activists collected uprooted vines and trucked them en 
masse to be dumped outside the sous-préfecture in Narbonne. This image of 
destruction was intended to be "symbole d'une Espace européen auquel le MODEF' 
s'oppose 'farouchement'". Such events, demonstrated that some life remained in the 
official structures of the Défense movement and that the CRAV did not possess a 
monopoly on activism. Marching at the head of the demonstration, Emilien Soulié 
linked the protest with long-standing opposition to the perceived enemies of Midi 
winegrowing: "ces souches que nous avons amenées, c'est la résultat d'une politique 
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agricole menée par Bruxelles avec la caution de Paris, prônant la jachère, la friche 
comme solution. Alors que notre vocation c'est de produire, la vocation de Bruxelles et 
de Paris, c'est de détruire."820 Whilst such action reflected a degree of shared discontent, 
it plastered over developing cracks in the unity of the different departmental CAVs 
and the larger Défense movement. 
 
Protest against arrachage in Narbonne821 
 Mitterrand's approach to the Midi vignerons had been admirably consistent, 
however, with his focus on the politics of quality separating the defence of 
winegrowing from the emotional ties which bound it to regional identity. The 
President expressed the belief that "la qualité devrait, un jour ou l'autre, permettre à 
nos viticulteurs de surmonter leurs difficultés."822 By consistently pushing for greater 
professionalization and modernisation of the wine industry in the Midi, the 
government had effectively compartmentalised the Défense movement, stripping it of 
its regionalist aura and forcing it to resort to increasingly damaging attacks to make 
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itself heard. Whenever these attacks were condemned in the public sphere it damaged 
the credibility of the Défense movement (and specifically the CRAV) and their claim to 
speak for a majority in the region. By replacing regional defence with regional 
development as the primary policy goal, the government portrayed the Défense 
movement as no longer fighting for the past but against the future.  
 
New Leaders, new moderation?  Co-option and fragmentation 
 Despite overtures, the Midi had as yet steered clear of domination by the 
FNSEA, which had enjoyed a privileged position as an interlocutor of government 
throughout the centralist Fifth Republic. The CGVM remained up until 1981 the central 
anchor of professional representation in the region, with organisations like MODEF 
existing as complementary satellites in the crowded syndical scene. The FNSEA as a 
modernising, politically conservative organisation remained tainted in the Languedoc 
as a "tool of the 'betteraviers du Nord'".823 Yet, as mentioned, the FNSEA began to scale 
up its presence in the Midi from 1983 and embark upon a ‘charm offensive’, firstly in 
the Hérault where it claimed a third of the vote in the Chambre d’Agriculture elections 
of that year. Its resilience in the face of Socialist attempts to “decorporatise” its role had 
shown it to be durable, effective and powerful, creating an attractive prospect for 
Languedocian growers disenchanted with the perpetual ritualised contestation of the 
Défense movement. Guillaume himself had begun to appear at growers’ 
demonstrations despite his lack of any viticultural background. Throughout this 
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period, the FNSEA loudly reiterated its opposition to Spanish entry into the EEC and 
gained some traction amongst sympathetic winegrowers for this concession.  
 Georges Hérail, the President of the CGVM, resigned his post in 1984, 
essentially relenting in the face of increasing difficulties facing the traditional bastions 
of la Défense. He highlighted the uncertain atmosphere which hung over the 
Languedoc viticole as one of the primary motivations for his retirement, when he 
declared that he was determined: 
à renoncer personnellement à cette entreprise et surtout à participer à 
une polémique stérile qui ne ferait qu'aggraver les dissensions.824 
 
Increasing fragmentation had seen the establishment of an FDSEA in the Hérault in 
1980 and the CGVM snubbed by the Socialist Party in 1981, as described in the last 
chapter. After years working with the opposition in a relationship which had been born 
in 1907, the inability of the CGVM to speak effectively to the Socialist government was 
disastrous. As the realities of the Chirac and Bentegeac plans continued to see the 
Languedoc subject to arrachage and restructuration, the traditional core of small-holders 
and growers allied to the cooperative movement and the CGVM was being eroded. At 
this point the CGVM lost its role as the emblematic figurehead of la Défense. Henri 
Fabre-Colbert, the editor of Echo des Corbières, wrote of the Défense movement's plight 
upon finally seeing the Socialists in power and the problems of the Midi remain in 
place: 
Ils ont encouragés, soutenus, glorifiés par l'opposition durant ces 
vingt ans au point de s'identifier avec cette opposition. Tellement que 
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l'alternance du pouvoir les a pris de court, et que les liens de 
complicité avec la gauche (disons le mot) ont été tellement forts que, 
confrontés aujourd'hui aux mêmes problèmes d'abandon par Paris et 
ses énarques, ils se trouvent déchirés et moralement paralysés. Le 
voilà le drame... Le conflit fratricide pour certains!825 
 
The awkward position of the CGVM, tied as it was to the PS and yet still cast aside, 
ensured that internal contradictions would stifle its ability to act decisively. As the 
departmental organisations floundered, their membership moved ever closer to the 
newly inaugurated FDSEA826 in the Aude and the more established one in the Hérault. 
The disintegration of the CGVM as a meaningful and unitary body swung the 
momentum massively towards "syndicalisme à vocation générale" as opposed to the 
specifically regional focus of the CGVM. In March 1985 the FNSEA stepped up its 
campaign significantly by staging its national Annual Congress in Narbonne, a 
symbolic move which made clear the transfer of power in the very city which had 
given birth to the CGVM during the epochal riots of 1907. The FNSEA's attempt to 
drag viticultural representation out of the sole grip of the Left mirrored the attempts of 
Cresson to drag agricultural representation out of the hands of the Right. As the 
opposition moved into power, however, in 1986 the reality of the Midi's problems 
forced the painful realisation that the 'union sacrée' between the Défense movement 
and the Socialist Party was broken. Guillaume, at the Narbonne Congress, announced 
"La confusion entre le débat politique et professionnel n'avait pas permis aux 
viticulteurs de se défendre véritablement."827 Essentially, he was echoing the comments 
of Hérail on his retirement, reinforcing the strength which the FNSEA could boast as a 
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result of its position at the right hand of government, whilst encouraging winegrowers 
to abandon partisan political attachment in their own best interest.  
 In the midst of this turmoil, Antoine Verdale, the influential President of the 
Fédération Audoise des Caves Coopératives (FDCCA), spectacularly announced his 
intention to join the FNSEA, carrying his supporters in the syndical organisations of 
the Aude with him. He is reported to have announced to the organisations under his 
presidency: "Qui m’aime me suive!"828 His influence in the legitimate syndical 
organisations was impressive (although he was not openly involved in the direct action 
of the CRAV) and his personality was evocative of regional identity.829  Verdale 
mobilised "un dense réseau de relations économiques, sociales et organisationnelles 
qui, en fin de compte, a servi de courroie de transmission pour l’imposition d’un 
nouveau discours viticole."830 Conspiracy theorists in the milieu viticole suspected that 
in order to "demobilise the Languedoc", Verdale may have been bought off by the 
government, with the lucrative presidency of an agricultural export organisation 
(SOPEXA) as the price of his cooperation. Nevertheless, the decline of the CGVM and 
the binding of the FDCCA to the FDSEA meant that the Aude was now firmly sworn to 
the modernisation project, along with the Hérault.  
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 This table highlights the marked fall in numbers present at viticultural 
demonstrations in the 1980s. The post-war years of recovery had been marked by 
competition to represent the Midi vignerons, provoking large demonstrations when 
the future of the wine industry seemed to be at stake. When the 1960s brought the 
CRAV to predominance in the Défense movement demonstrations were effectively 
coordinated and direct action increased. During the wild years of the late 1960s and 
1970s, protests occurred in a climate of almost open sedition. The enormous numbers 
of protestors during that period marked the apex of the CRAV's influence. Yet, the 
economic pressures of those years and the tragedy of Montredon led to changes in the 
Midi's representative structures. As the state sought to address the Midi's underlying 
problems with the Chirac and then Bentegeac plans, the modernisation of the industry 
became an inescapable fact. The region's demography shifted and growers became less 
united behind the old bastions of 'la Défense' and the 'union sacrée'. The promise of 
1981, which mobilised the South in expectation at a Socialist victory, failed to prove as 
325 
 
propitious as had been imagined. Attendance at demonstrations tailed off as the reality 
of the Défense movement's fragmentation became more obvious amidst the cooption 
and retirement of prominent leaders.  
 Throughout the later 1980s the CRAV would lose many of the leaders who had 
driven it through the tumultuous 1970s and attempted to maintain the movement's 
profile after the Socialist victory. In July 1984 newspapers reported that André Cases 
was stepping back from his role "à la tête du C.A.V." and speculated that the less 
experienced Jean Ramond might take over in his place.831 A day later, the Midi Libre 
confirmed that Ramond, a young smallholder from Sallèles in the Aude, would be 
taking over.832 Cases left his successor a difficult legacy, which Yves Gilbert describes 
as "une sorte de testament militant au travers duquel on sent poindre en sentiment du 
demi-échec."833 Likewise, Ramond was less visible in the media, a fact which was seen 
to make the CRAV's presence more sporadic and less sympathetic to the public.834  As 
Ramond commenced his leadership of the CRAV, so too did Laurent Fabius that of the 
French government. Amidst a crisis caused by school reforms which precipitated 
Pierre Mauroy's departure, Mitterrand appointed Fabius as Prime Minister on 17 July 
1984. With the country facing a political and economic crisis, the choice of Fabius 
marked the end of the expansionary economic policies of Mitterrand's first years in 
power. Although Cases had been more moderate than Huillet, he still represented a 
militant tendency of the 1970s that had seen the CRAV embroiled in the Montredon 
                                                          
831 'C.A.V. Aude: des décisions inadmissibles', Indépendant, 04/07/1984 - ADA 98J15. 
832 'Succédant à André Cases', Midi Libre, 05/07/1984 - ADA 98J15. 
833 Gilbert, Meistersheim, Orateurs en Languedoc 1981-1986, p.77. 
834 A. Roger, 'Syndicalistes et poseurs de bombes', Cultures & Conflits, vol. 1, no. 81-82 (2011), 
p. 59.  
326 
 
shootings. Ramond, like Fabius to some extent, signified a clear repudiation of radical 
activism. The appointment of Fabius to Prime Minister was something which "il n'a été 
possible qu'à la faveur d'une modification structurelle du PS disqualifiant les valeurs 
militante, populaire et idéologique qui a pu faire apparaître L. Fabius comme "l'homme 
de la situation".835 So too was the appointment of Ramond indicative of a changing 
atmosphere in the Languedoc, in which commando actions had become increasingly 
violent and increasingly unacceptable in the eyes of the public. 
 
Jean Ramond addressing winegrowers836 
 Unlike the promotion of Romain in 1975, this reversion to singular leadership in 
the Aude limited the radicalism of the Comités d'action. Ramond's moderation was 
demonstrated by his campaigning for concessions which saw some satisfaction during 
his leadership. Subsequent reactions to these hard-won concessions illustrated the 
differing leadership styles of both Ramond and Huillet. Discussions in Brussels on 24 
July settled some immediate grievances of the CRAV regarding insecurity during an 
enforced period of national economic rigeur. After Socialist Deputies, including the 
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Minister of Agriculture Michel Rocard, petitioned the European Community for 
emergency intervention, they returned home with the welcome news that performance 
bonds would indemnify 18% of a winegrower's income.  A PS statement read: 
Cela vient donc confirmer, une fois de plus si c'est nécessaire, que les 
élus socialistes réussissent dans leur entreprise et savent défendre 
l'intérêt de nos concitoyens. Nous ne doutons pas que nos viticulteurs 
sauront, comme par le passé, leur garder toute leur confiance.837 
 
The Languedocian PS was attempting to paint national gains as responses to regional 
pressure, helping to bridge the rupture between the Défense movement and the 
Socialist party over approaches to European development. The 18% indemnity 
guarantee was relatively positive amidst a climate of national economic woe. Ramond 
stated that although they had got satisfaction "Ce n'est pas une victoire: ça nous était 
dû." Nevertheless, the threat of action was momentarily withdrawn, despite Huillet 
pointing out that "Nous restons mobilisés."838 Ramond remained cautious compared to 
Huillet's radicalism and his willingness to accept the concessions represented a more 
realistic approach to negotiation with government. Previously, he had been quoted as 
stating that "'84 est pour nous un bien mauvais cru"839, yet in managing to gain the 
guarantee of an 18% indemnity, he had got the immediate measures demanded by the 
CRAV to address pressing problems across the Languedoc. Ramond accepted the 
concession as 'a good deal', showing moderation in his willingness to engage rationally 
with government debate. 
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 Jean Huillet, however, characterised the combative air of the old Défense 
movement, rejecting the moderate and conciliatory tone of Ramond. He declared that 
"ce compromis est un coup de poignard pour la viticulture méridionale."840 Ramond's 
voice was noticeably quiet, having achieved the primary goal the CRAV sought - the 
18% indemnity. Despite fragmentation in the ranks of the CRAV and an ever 
strengthening opponent in the FNSEA, the radicals who identified with Huillet waited 
for a chance to protest. Gavignaud-Fontaine describes the cooperatives as the home of 
this partisan remnant, where they "rongent leurs freins dans l'ombre."841  
 The 18% bond was, essentially, a prime de restructuration, little more than a 
palliative designed to help winegrowers take some of the risk out of modernisation 
and encourage the planting of better quality grape varieties. In this way, it was 
consistent with the modernisation agenda while serving to mitigate short-term 
concerns. This represented a rare moment of success, in which threats of CRAV action 
seems to have pushed through positive change at a supra-national level. In essence, 
however, it represented a changed leadership style. Huillet's insistence that the 
concessions were not sufficient characterised the attitude which had always governed 
the CRAV. Ramond's acceptance of 'a good deal' was reflective of a more rational 
moderation which angered some of the core keen to maintain an air of 'contestation' in 
service of future demands. The success of the indemnity was not a vindication of 
violence (there was none) nor did it buck the trend of modernisation (as a prime de 
restructuration), rather it represented a sympathetic attempt by the government to push 
modernisation whilst mindful of its immediate impact, as Mitterrand had promised in 
                                                          
840 'L'après vendange du C.A.V.', Le Paysan du Midi, 11/10/1984 - ADG JR438-33. 
841 Gavignaud-Fontaine, Le Languedoc viticole, p.456. 
329 
 
1981. Instead of Cresson's grandstanding, Rocard's conciliatory attempt to reconcile the 
will of the Midi vignerons with Brussels had yielded tangible results; in Nallet's 
terminology, he'd scored between the posts. 
 The differing styles of Ramond and Huillet revealed divides opening up in the 
Défense movement. As modernisation gathered pace in the Languedoc and the FNSEA 
moved closer to government, the temptation to support modernisation increased. The 
CRAV's claim to be champions of the Languedoc viticole was challenged by the reality 
that, in the face of economic changes, continuing European integration and the collapse 
of the 'union sacrée', more and more winegrowers were being co-opted by the FNSEA. 
Huillet, attempting to continue the fight against the insurgent FNSEA, condemned 
their "politique du coucou" in trumpeting their opposition to European enlargement: 
Je suis un tenant du pluralisme syndicale mais contre le clientélisme, 
contre l'utilisation d'une force syndicale qui ne soit pas au service des 
vignerons, contre son exploitation politicienne. L'important c'est de 
bosser sur le terrain. Quand le FNSEA fait de l'élargissement son 
cheval de bataille, je trouve cela abusif et curieux.842 
 
Yet Huillet's opposition was important in the face of the FNSEA's growing popularity 
in the Midi and their 'clientélisme' with the Socialist Party. 
 After Cases' retirement from the front lines of the CRAV, Huillet signalled in 
March 1985 that he was set to resign as head of the CAV de l'Hérault.843 The relatively 
poor attendance at the 30 January protest seems to have convinced him that something 
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in the region had changed.844 This created a succession problem after Huillet's parting 
shots at the 'careerists' in the ranks of the syndical organisations:  
Je suis un militant, un combattant qui considère que le pouvoir doit 
être attaché à une cause et non pas à des intérêts personnels. Ceux qui 
font le procès de Jean Huillet voulant le pouvoir pour le pouvoir en 
sont pour leur compte; mais je resterai un bon soldat.845 
 
Huillet was addressing a multitude of targets, from those like Verdale who had been 
co-opted to the moderates such as Ramond. As the founder of the Occitan 
winegrower's movement (MIVOC), he incorporated loyalty to the values of 
occupational and regional identity in the face of external pressures (the FNSEA and the 
EEC). Yet, his statement also highlighted the fissiparous tendencies in the Défense 
movement (already latent throughout the 1950s as representative groups like the 
Ligue, CMA, CRSV etc. jostled to outflank each other) which had for two decades been 
papered over by the ideology of viticultural unity expressed in the language of 1907.  
 Although the CRAV had developed from (and represented the ultimate 
distillation of) the Défense du vin movement, they now found themselves threatened 
as some producers broke rank. The Indépendant printed a CRAV communiqué which 
showed an awareness of this threat: 
Le Comité d'action viticole de l'Aude est un phénomène que des 
sociologues ne manqueront pas, un jour d'analyser, d'étudier. Sa 
présence dans l'action syndicale a été fondamentale dans la survie de 
la viticulture méridionale. Certains aujourd'hui posent la question de 
la représentativité du C.A.V. Une connaissance, même simpliste, du 
monde et des problèmes viticoles leur aurait évité une telle position. 
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 Face aux attaques dont il est l'objet de la part certains, le C.A.V. qui 
n'a comme seul but que la défense du revenu du viticulteur, se pose la 
question de la vocation syndicale de ces mêmes personnes puisque 
pour certaines d'entre elles, le syndicalisme constitue une fort belle 
promotion socio-financière. Exemple: quel est le montant des 
indemnités (exonérées s'impôts), que perçoit un conseiller 
économique et social? 
 Dans ces conditions l'on comprend mieux que le C.A.V. gêne ces 
mêmes personnes: est-ce l'altruisme qui caractérise? Est-ce son action? 
 Face à l'évolution des problèmes économiques, le C.A.V. estime que 
les hommes doivent tout faire pour que l'économique prime sur le 
politique. 
 S'il en est autrement, le C.A.V. doit impérativement cesser toute 
action sans toutefois oublier certaines affaires qui sont encore de son 
ressort.846  
 
By responding to challenges issued to their legitimacy, the Comités d’action sought to 
stress the primacy of ‘la Défense’ over plans for regional development. In reality, this 
was the CRAV hitting out against the FNSEA , maintaining the message that Huillet 
had put out on his retirement and attempting to ensure they remained the primary 
voice of 'la Défense'.847 In turn, the recently retired Cases gave an interview to the Midi 
Libre, in which he acknowledged that "le Comité d'action avait une main-mise moins 
évidente qu'autrefois en matière de défense professionnelle" and warned of 
"dispersion" being the greatest threat to winegrowers.848 
 Huillet's retirement and the signing of the Dublin Accords had demotivated 
many in the region, reflecting a creeping 'growers' disunity'. When the Conseil 
Municipal of Ferrals-des-Corbières (in the Aude near Lézignan) came out in support of 
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the Dublin Accords and refused to sign a CRAV petition, this disunity was starkly 
revealed.849 
Le conseil municipal, après lecture de la pétition du CAV régional, et 
après avoir pris connaissance du contenu des accords de Dublin, 
refuse à la majorité des membres présents de signer la pétition 
présentée. [...] 
 Le conseil municipal réaffirme sa solidarité et son soutien aux 
viticulteurs de Ferrals-de-Corbières, producteurs de bons vins à petits 
rendement; mais ne comprend qu'ils puissent donner leur accord à 
une pétition qui va à l'encontre de leur intérêt, en défendant les 
producteurs à gros rendements dont les excédents sont responsables 
de l'encombrement du marché et de la mévente du vin.850 
 
Although Ferrals was a small town, speaking against the CRAV was a significant event 
and suggested that invoking the heritage of 1907 was beginning to wear thin as a 
means of attacking the FNSEA. Winegrowers were being co-opted towards the new 
politics of quality and away from old productivist tendencies. The CRAV's role had 
been one of "resistance" against malign external forces, as economic historians Touzard 
and Laporte observed: 
Les institutions et réseaux viticoles languedociens sont le fruit 
d'affrontements successifs à "l'État", en particulier de la révolte de 
1907. Ceux-ci ont en effet suscité une connexion politique au niveau 
de l'aire de spécialisation viticole et ont conduit à des représentations 
communes qui légitiment l'action collective (l'unité du midi viticole 
face à l'État ou aux fraudeurs, etc.).851 
 
Not all CRAV leaders were ready to give in. Maffre-Beaugé, a leader who had shown 
himself ready to support modernisation, called the leaders of the Comités d'action to a 
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meeting in Pézenas to reassert the relevance of CRAV alongside the FNSEA. He 
announced Ramond was to "constituer des cellules dans villages et cantons" in order to 
"mobiliser peu à peu la base." There was confusion amongst winegrowers as their 
leaders appeared divided and their role was uncertain. When the Indépendant 
highlighted the "4 tètes" of the Comités d'action, they speculated that it was "révélatrice 
d'un certain malaise."852 The reaction of the usually supportive press was indicative of 
uncertainty in the Languedoc's political climate.  
 Meeting on 21 August 1985, the CAV de l'Hérault reinstated him at their head 
in recognition that "la situation viticole est grave et que la pari de Michel Rocard a été 
perdu."853 Huillet, as head of the CRAV, was becoming an emblematic figure, 
dependable for his combative style amidst the cooption and softening of older leaders. 
Huillet's revival as a viticultural leader was prefixed on a belief that economic action 
was proving incapable of mobilising the Midi in advance of the Presidential election. 
That he was quickly offered a job by the UMR led Conseil Régional in the Comité 
Économique des Vins de Table du Languedoc-Roussillon has been viewed not as 
meritocratic, but rather as "an apparent attempt to buy his silence" in the face of his 
tirades against the government.854  
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Jean Huillet addressing winegrowers855 
Huillet's new role within local government was indicative of the extent to which the 
waters had been muddied. No longer could the CRAV reasonably expect to bring tens 
of thousands of winegrowers onto the streets. As part of this very same process, the old 
heads of the CRAV began to be co-opted by the state to act as conduits for change. 
André Cases was elected President of the Audois Chamber of Agriculture at the age of 
53.856 His ability to mediate between the extremists acting in defence of regional 
viticulture and the State was seen as a force for stability as the region faced up to new 
CRAV action. Although Cases was receptive to the cause of the modernisers, he was 
also one of the most prominent leaders of the Défense movement. Likewise, Jean 
Huillet's career in the legitimate representation of the wine industry continued, as he 
assumed the leadership of the newly formed 'Béziers oenopôle', designed to promote 
the wines and AOCs of the Hérault.857 This co-option of former combatants of the 
Comités d'action did not put an end to ever-more radical actions by the CRAV, but 
these increasingly spoke for an extreme minority. Huillet's career would continue to 
                                                          
855 'Après la démission de Jean Huillet', La Dépêche, 02/03/1985 - ADA 98J15. 
856 Gavignaud-Fontaine, Le Languedoc viticole, p.458. 
857 'La piquette n'est plus ce qu'elle était', Le Monde, 03/06/1990 - ADA 98J15. 
335 
 
progress in January 1991, when he became President of the Féderation des Caves 
Coopératives de l’Hérault.858 
 The CGVM's decline was accompanied by other changes in the regional 
structures of representation for winegrowers. The longstanding ‘Wine Deputy’, Raoul 
Bayou, declined to stand for re-election in 1986, after the Socialist Party listed him as 
third choice on their electoral list.859 This was emblematic of the changing importance 
of the wine industry to the region’s economic future and of the winegrowers in the 
sociology of the PS. Olivier Dedieu's reflection on Bayou's career ends on the 
recognition that his resignation was symbolic of a shift in the character of the Midi, 
away from the model of the 'Député du vin' and towards a new future of 
professionalisation: "Si les élus méridionaux cherchent toujours à capitaliser des 
soutiens au sein des milieux viticoles, le modèle du député du vin est aujourd'hui 
historiquement daté."860Andre Cases hoped that the CRAV could still be "un 
interlocuteur valable."861 Andre Castera, "le terrible" of old, released his own alarmist 
communiqué: "Savoir si toute une région va se laisser rayer de la carte de France, sans 
brocher ou si la masse des vignerons et autres appuieront à fond les jeunes qui sont 
prêts à prendre la tête de la défense viticole du Languedoc."862 
 Throughout its existence, the CRAV, as the most activist expression of a wider 
Défense movement, had been able to rely on at least the tacit support of syndical 
organisations and Socialist politicians. This was no longer the case, and becoming 
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increasingly isolated in the region, it was forced into even more extreme gestures in 
order that its voice be heard. The CRAV declared that the political allegiance of 
whoever was in power in the region was largely irrelevant and garnered no sympathy 
as long as problems persisted; winegrowers "sont mobilisés pour défendre leur travail 
et la région, sans en faire un combat politique et sectaire." Although many still 
supported the party on a personal basis, the "union sacrée" which bound the party to 
viticultural syndicalism had been broken. The CRAV statement made clear the 
fractious relationship between the forces of order and those seeking to aggressively 
defend their industry and their region, acknowledging that "les grenades 
lacrymogènes, qu'elles soient de droite ou de gauche, ont la même odeur."863 
  
'Terrorisme viticole': The acceptance and performance of violence 
 By the end of May 1992, local Police Colonel Weber stated that “il y a 
manifestement un terrorisme viticole”864  in the region. This came after a coordinated 
series of 4 bombings which saw government buildings targeted in both the Aude and 
Hérault during the Fête de l'Ascenscion on 28 May.865 In Olonzac, the Crédit Agricole 
was attacked, with windows smashed and the office itself damaged. Amidst the rubble 
was a young boy injured by shards of glass,866 according to one newspaper, although 
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others described him as unharmed.867 The wide use of explosives and the potential-
injury of a child ensured that the CRAV's actions had crossed a dangerous threshold. 
In his forceful press conference, Colonel Weber seemed to be drawing a line under 
"l'impunité apparente qui semblait protéger jusqu'à présent les activités du comité 
d'action viticole dans l'Aude."868 The veil of legitimacy provided by viticultural unity 
had been lifted and beneath it lay a hardcore of small winegrowers whose claims to 
represent the region were very dubious. 
 April of 1988 provided a useful barometer for how far the CRAV could go 
down the road of "action dure" without jeopardising their base of support. 
Winegrowers had congregated at Carcassonne to set up burning barricades and 
commit symbolic acts of vandalism. The injury to an innocent toll-booth operator 
brought many general workers' organisations out to condemn the winegrowers: "Le 
vin oui, le sang non!"869 Force Ouvrière wrote a strongly worded open letter of protest 
to the syndical organisations of the Midi viticole: "La casse, c'est nous tous, citoyens, 
qui la payons." The union also objected to the manner in which the CRAV was carrying 
out its attacks, highlighting that clandestinity was not a legitimate or laudable means 
for protest: "Vous venez ce premier avril de signer encore une fois par cet acte de 
violence, cagoules, cocktail molotov et bouteiller de gaz à l'appui, une façon certaine de 
vous mettre à dos le monde du travail."870  
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 The CRAV's violent protests increasingly drew comment about their 
sustainability. The Midi Libre asked if this phenomenon marked the "enterrement ou 
résurrection" of viticultural activism. Built into the Midi Li re’s criticism was the 
possibility that the peaceful, politically oriented sectors of the Défense movement 
could be reborn to become representative of a newly modernised wine industry in the 
Languedoc. Indeed, this seemed to become something of an editorial theme, with the 
newspaper beginning to support conciliation over the extremes of the CRAV. 
Commenting on a large scale demonstration on 30 November which seemed to 
prefigure a return to viticultural unity, the Midi Libre hailed: 
Un vrai miracle. Démobilisée, déboussolée par la confusion syndicale, 
égarée par la folle équipée du Leclerc et les absurdes arrestations de 
l'autoroute imputables à un préfet inconstant, qui aurait juré que la 
base pourrait encore se voir aussi nombreuse dans la rue? Et qui 
aurait juré de voir assis sans brocher à la même tribune, la totalité des 
formations viticoles, sans aucune exclusive? 
 
But Henri Fabre-Colbert, the avowedly Occitan writer behind Echo des Corbières, came 
out in support, defiantly claiming that the Défense movement was still vibrant:  
Les CAV ne peuvent ni être tués, ni se suicider. D'abord ils n'ont pas 
d'existence formelle. Ils ne sont qu'un état d'esprit combatif, fraternel, 
commandé par des hommes d'exception. 
 
The intermittent character of the CRAV, was seen in this view as a measure of 
resilience during a period in which its support seemed to be diminishing. Expressing 
his loyalty to the Défense movement's goals, Fabre-Colbert spoke out against the 
creeping influence of the FNSEA:  
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Les CAV portent l'avenir viticole à bout de bras. Ils ont été et sont 
l'ultime recours. Il suffit que le front viticole sache se différencier des 
organismes politico-syndicalo-administratifs, dont certains comme la 
FNSEA plongent les viticulteurs dans une ambiguïté déroutante.871  
 
Such uncertainty was in itself fuel for both processes of radicalisation and 
disaggregation. Addressing the issue of damages in 1985 and the continuing pressure 
on the wine industry, Cases firmly indicted the government's role in the economy as 
the main culprit: "Lorsqu'une réglementation n'est pas bonne, elle n'amène qu'anarchie 
et violence."872 One interviewee concisely summed up the role of the CRAV: "Ils ont le 
rôle de gardien des limites."873 It is interesting that for any consideration of 'the rules of 
the game' regarding ritualised protest, one must remember that as the CRAV remained 
convinced of their legitimacy, that they too were involved in policing the limits of 
acceptability. Their actions were intended to strike out against inequalities or 
hardships that constituted unacceptable behaviour on behalf of the state. In a worrying 
incident which presaged a return to exactly the days which many winegrowers would 
have liked to have forgotten, a policeman drew his weapon on rowdy protestors in 
Carcassonne on 21 January.874 The protesters were incensed by the discovery of a 
document which seemed to indicate that Italian grape must (unfermented grape juice) 
was being widely and openly imported to enrich French wine.875 If chaptalisaton was a 
contentious subject for French winegrowers, and especially those in the Midi, then the 
use of foreign wines to carry out this practice was positively inflammatory. 
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Chaptalisation, in particular, motivated recourse to 1907’s legacy, with the grande 
revolte having been largely motivated by objections to the very same process. 
 The appearance of a gun at a protest was indeed a worrying reminder of 
Montredon. That it was the forces of order who brandished the weapon only served to 
increase the tension between winegrowers and the state. The legacy of those shot in the 
1907 demonstrations was powerful enough to have relevance nearly 80 years after the 
events, and the police were condemned for being swift to resort to violence. Local 
newspapers were firmly on the side of the winegrowers, viewing the police reaction as 
likely to incite escalation. Whilst worrying that the flashpoint "aurait pu avoir des 
graves conséquences" the Dépêche criticised the police for hiding behind technicalities 
to avoid explaining this lapse to the public.876 A CRAV spokesman attempted to 
capitalise on the support by declaring that "Nous ne sommes pas des bandits", 
highlighting the over-reaction of authorities and attempting to reclaim a little 
legitimacy.877 That the police had crossed the frontiers of acceptability was evident 
from the negative public reaction and the backlash from the press. This served once 
more to emphasise the unwritten ‘rules of the game’ governing the interaction of 
protesting winegrowers and the police. 
 In an attempt to mediate, despite his retirement, Cases spoke to the Prefect on 
behalf of winegrowers. From a personal standpoint he said "Ça fait trop de bavures. Il 
y a un problème de relations entre le maintien de l'ordre et notre profession. Les 
bavures ne sont pas de notre côté. Nous, nous revendiquons pour notre survie." 
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During his meeting with the Prefect, Cases called for calm whilst he reiterated his 
support for the interception of wine tankers and the emptying of their contents as a 
viable means of combating "importations abusives.... chaque fois que cela sera 
nécessaire".878 Much as the “journées barrages” had become an acceptable aspect of 
ritualised protest in the 1950s, so too had the interception of tankers become a 
recognised part of the winegrowers’ repertoire in the 1980s.  
 The boundaries of public acceptability were not entirely elastic, however. 
Although hijacking tankers may have proven a tolerable form of protest, the ill-health 
of the CRAV's standing in the Languedoc ensured that explosives were not. At the tail-
end of 1991 the CRAV bombed a tax-office in the Aude, spray-painting its walls with 
the letters 'CAV' in large, red text - a clear indication of the author of the attacks. The 
attack drew howls of protest from the unions which governed treasury workers, who 
condemned "ces méthodes qui n'ont rien à voir avec la démocratie."879 Those three 
letters made a reappearance as vignerons cut telephone cables during the following 
night in Coursan.880 Neither attack was devastating, nor particularly were they obvious 
targets. Indeed, the Midi-Libre speculated that this may be a new mode of operation for 
the CAV and the CRAV at large: "A-t-il opté pour des opérations moins spectaculaires 
mais plus rapprochées?"881 The condemnation meted out highlighted that such new 
methods were breaching the boundaries of acceptability. The CRAV had demonstrably 
acted outside of the ‘rules of the game’. These new modes of operation were ever more 
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desperate responses to the increasingly undeniable primacy of viticultural 
modernisation as a basic postulate of regional development. 
 After the bombing of the tax office, the spectre of radical violence was again 
roundly condemned in the press. A demonstration in Béziers on 6 February was 
motivated by perceived fraud, yet quickly escalated after a confrontation between the 
Deputy Mayor Alain Barrau and CAV member Michel Bataille over government 
responses to this fraud.882 As 50 or so winegrowers noisily demonstrated outside, some 
jostled with the driver of a police car which triggered a response from police who had 
arrived to call a halt to the protest. The police commissaire ordered forces to "Arrêtez les 
masqués" and several CRAV members were seized.883  The appearance of masks at 
growers’ demonstrations was a worrying development which echoed the criticism that 
the CRAV’s methods had increasingly little to do “avec la démocratie."884 One 
interviewee wholly condemned the CRAV's use of masks as delegitimising their cause: 
Je le condamne fermement. Il est plus facile et pas du tout courageux 
(comme ils le croient) de casser en mettant une cagoule, que de se 
battre démocratiquement, même si parfois cela est découragent 
devant notre manque de solidarité.885 
 
Such comments highlighted that although violence in itself was not always enough to 
draw open condemnation from the public, the appearance of accoutrements such as 
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masks and hoods were suggestive of a more clandestine and less sympathetic group. 
The CRAV, however "sur le pied guerre, ne sont pas prêt de se démobiliser."886 
 When dialogue took place within the boundaries of acceptable protest the 
establishment was responsive and the Défense movement could regain public 
sympathy. When these hazy boundaries were breached, the region's political climate 
was inimical and arson attacks only served to distance the CRAV from the political 
mainstream. With a very decentralised leadership structure, however, the CRAV 
struggled to keep its members within the boundaries of legitimacy and when the base 
mobilised, the leadership was under pressure to endorse these actions to maintain the 
fragile illusion of viticultural unity. 
 Colonel Weber’s label of terrorism is, then, an interesting one. If the CRAV are 
or were terrorists, then they sit strangely alongside other violent groups mobilised 
during the 1960s. As with Action Directe (AD), the radicalisation of the CRAV’s 
methods was a response to adverse external pressure; for AD the adherence of the 
French left to the Fifth Republic threatened an abandonment of revolutionary ideals, 
for the CRAV the adhesion of regional representatives of the PS to central government 
threatened the abandonment of the ideology of ‘la Défense’. In both cases the groups 
“turned to terrorism out of weakness and fear of marginalisation.”887 Interestingly, one 
interviewee was keen to stress the difference between the CRAV and the AD when this 
interviewer clumsily asked: "Approuvez-vous leur [CRAV] utilisation de l’action 
directe?" Remonstrating that AD were simply "terroristes", he expressed cautious 
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sympathy for "l'action dur" of the CRAV when it was deployed judiciously.888 Such a 
distinction demonstrates that the CRAV's legacy has not been overly tainted by 
Weber's denunciation, yet still retains some semblance of respectability in popular 
memory as long as it respected 'the rules of the game'.  
 Aside from AD, there are interesting parallels between the CRAV and other 
contemporary groups denounced as terroristic. The majority drawn to political 
violence through gauchiste ideology (the Gauche Prolétarienne and the LCR, for example) 
drew back from the “tentation terroriste” towards the end of the 1970s.889 Both Maoist 
and Trotskyist groups demonstrated first of all the "deligitimization" of the PCF after 
1968,890 then the "deradicalization" of the far-left at the end of the 1970s, as former 
activists moved towards electoral politics and alternative means of representation.891 
The impact of gauchisme on the national parties, as demonstrated by the PS-PCF 
Common Programme of 1972, provided acceptable outlets for activism, marginalising 
the gauchiste organisations themselves. So too did the establishment of more legitimate 
representational bodies in the Languedoc drain the reservoirs of support for the CRAV: 
when the FNSEA coupled Défense and development, the ossified tenets of la Défense 
seemed outdated. Yet the radicalism and violent mobilisation of the CRAV seemed to 
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891 S. Charlton, 'Deradicalization and the French Communist Party', The Review of Politics, vol. 41, 
no. 1 (Jan., 1979), pp. 38-60. 
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outlive that of the ultra-left in France, even as their appeal shrivelled. As such, the 
CRAV's peers became terroristic groups from across Europe.892  
By the late 1980s, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), or Baader-Meinhof gang, in 
West Germany had fallen away from prominence as the extremity of their action 
provoked a far harsher crack-down from authorities. Before they officially dissolved in 
1998, they had been responsible for 34 murders, yet the peak of their activity came 
during the 'German Autumn' of 1977 not long after the CRAV's most outrageous 
moment at Montredon.893 The German Left had met this challenge from the fringes, 
and Isabelle Sommier describes the disaggregation of the extreme left as the 1970s 
came to an end, plagued by “les vagues de défection des militants qui, soit rejoignent 
les partis traditionnels et les “nouveaux mouvements sociaux”, soit cessent tout 
activisme politique.”894 Particularly in West Germany, any sympathy which radicals 
had enjoyed became quickly exhausted, driving potential supporters towards different 
channels of representation. As Karen Hanshew observed of lapsed supporters of the 
Rote Armee Fraktion: "Their vision of social critique as outside institutionalized politics 
thus shifted to one of communication, nonviolence, and, eventually, cooperation with 
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mainstream political society."895 Similarly, the CRAV's increasingly marginalised role 
drove support away, strengthening the idea of development at the expense of the old 
Défense movement. 
 Interestingly, “terroristic” methods remained most resilient where grievances 
were grounded in territorial claims, as was demonstrated by Basque nationalists. The 
“terrorism” of the CRAV was not bound to the regionalist cause, though it had been 
associated with it in the past. This was in direct contrast to groups like Iparretarrak, 
whose violence, foreign links and political agenda distinguished them absolutely.896 
Their formation was not directly related to the années 68 but a result of the 
intensification of their fight against Franco and ideological fractures within ETA.897 
Likewise in Corsica, political violence remained a serious threat to stability, as the 
Fronte de la Libération nationale Corse (FLNC) pursued its vendetta against the state.898 
Breton nationalists also remained active, with the Armée Révolutionaire Breton 
rejuvenating the violent nationalist movement in 1985 and continuing to strike out 
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against icons of the centralised state.899. The CRAV may have taken more from the 
model of Breton or Corsican nationalists than they had from ultra-left terrorists like the 
RAF or AD, yet they remained distinct from all these groups. Although the grievances 
of the CRAV were grounded in the land, they were not expressed as a desire for 
separatism. Although it engaged with Socialism and championed occupational identity 
it never engaged with doctrinaire Marxism or supported profound political change. Its 
flirtation with militant Occitanisme in the 1970s had highlighted the importance of the 
Languedoc to viticultural identity, yet also shown that separatism was not potent 
enough to direct violence itself. Its political pluralism likewise eschewed any 
ideological fervour, excepting that of its own rebellious heritage.  
 
Cartoon illustrating the CRAV's links to the land900 
 Returning to the model of “relative frustration” developed by Gurr, the 
resilience of the CRAV was based in individual grievances and disappointments 
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vocalised in the tradition of the Défense movement. The notion of a century long 
“guerre du vin” provided frustrated individuals both the means and the mode of 
action, without demanding overt commitment to political causes. The disintegration of 
winegrowing as a mass activity had diluted support and tolerance of increasingly 
violent actions committed without any clear agenda. The old ideals of the Défense 
movement had shown themselves incapable of addressing the problems of the Midi 
and had failed to meet the challenge of modernisation as the region moved forward. 
 In a comment upon the problems in the Aude, the Indépendant the fundamental 
shifts which the Languedoc had undergone: 
La viticulture fait partie intégrante du patrimoine culturel et 
économique de l'Aude. Aujourd'hui, elle se trouve à la croisée des 
chemins. L'avenir se teintera des couleurs que voudront bien lui 
donner les politiques en réponse aux questions urgentes des 
viticulteurs.901 
 
These urgent questions were the very same facing the CRAV concerning the 
relationship between development and ‘la Défense’. Attempting to decouple the wine 
industry from the cultural heritage of the Aude, or the Languedoc more generally, was 
an onerous task for the government. Attempting to do this whilst depriving 
winegrowers of a living wage was, understandably, even harder to justify. As the 
government's approach to European economic integration and its viticultural 
implications remained consistent, the burden of change fell most squarely upon the 
Midi. Nevertheless, the national organisations shared a common platform with the 
government when it came to modernising wine production in line with European 
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standards. The difficult questions which faced the core of support which the CRAV still 
held was whether to fight against the trends of economic development in service of a 
static regional identity frozen on the vine or rather to undertake the painful process of 
modernisation and gamble on the region’s future success. For the most committed 
CRAVistes, this gamble remained too great and the demands of modernisation too 










Despite the challenges delivered to the Défense movement in the wake of the shooting 
at Montredon, the appeal of the CRAV proved supple enough to withstand the shocks 
of changing political and economic climates. In the era of the EEC, the old enemies of 
Parisian bureaucrats and French merchants were replaced with those of European 
technocrats and Italian imports. At the same time, a concurrent change in the basis of 
viticultural politics meant that the attitude of growers to their traditional 
representative structures was massively modified. As the Socialist party broke up the 
'union sacrée', so too did they break up the formula which had motivated protest 
throughout most of the twentieth century. Even as professional loyalty wavered, the 
electoral strength of the PS was testament to an enduring appeal which eclipsed that of 
the 'Défense' movement. This was in part a reaction to the demographic changes in the 
region. As winegrowing became less central to the regional economy, the political 
interests of its elites became less immediately important. 
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 Demographic shifts and political disaggregation exacerbated the strains of 
market pressures as "l’immense et puissant mouvement viticole du Midi soit réduit à 
un groupuscule d’hommes cagoulés"902 The appearance of masks and the downgrading 
in local sympathy for the CRAV was a result of their increasingly dangerous 
relationship with the authorities. The sociologist Antoine Roger highlights that 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s “les actions violentes sont tacitement tolérées.”903 Yet, 
after the economic and syndical developments of the 1980s, this tacit acceptance 
withered. By way of example, the traditionally supportive Dépeche du Midi qualified its 
coverage of CRAV attacks in 2001, seeking to distance itself from any perceived 
endorsement: 
Le reportage de nos envoyés spéciaux Joël Ruiz et Roger Garcia, qui 
ont suivi le commando de viticulteurs audois, ne constitue pas une 
approbation. L'acte commis hier matin à Nantes est un acte hors-la-
loi, il porte préjudice à une entreprise, et, par conséquent, la justice 
sera saisie. 
Toutefois, l'actualité est notre métier. En rendre compte, lorsque nous 
en sommes les témoins, constitue une obligation. Il s'agit donc 
d'expliquer à nos lecteurs les raisons qui ont poussé un groupe 
d'hommes à agir de la sorte. 
Ce reportage de « La Dépêche du dimanche » est à verser au dossier 
plus général du malaise de l'agriculture qui, de la « vache folle » à 
l'épizootie de fièvre aphteuse, en passant par les démêlés de José Bové 
avec la justice, pose à notre société une question simple: quel avenir 
pour ceux qui travaillent la terre.904 
 
The qualifications which the Dépêche placed on its coverage indicated how attitudes to 
the CRAV had changed. Whilst sympathy for the plight of struggling winegrowers 
remained, the methods practiced by the CRAV were far beyond the frontiers of 
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acceptability. Suddenly, the interconnectedness of agriculture was more readily 
addressed by national bodies focussed on reform and development rather than violent 
defence. This did not rule out direct action, as indicated by the mention of José Bové, 
but rather placed an emphasis on constructive solutions to the “malaise de 
l’agriculture”. 
 Yet the failure of past solutions had shaped the CRAV. The rise in cooperatives 
during the post-war period is testament to the extent to which they were central to 
reconstruction - they allowed winegrowers to collectively capitalise on mechanisation 
and viticultural innovation. Yet, the crises des méventes which struck in the mid-1950s 
showed the post-war development model to have been flawed. These crises were 
driven above all by declining wine consumption in France, a phenomenon which was 
entirely unrelated to issues of production. Thus in response to continuing wine slumps 
in the 1950s and 1960s, cooperatives harked back to the productivist mindset of the 
post-Phylloxera days, clothed in the same symbolic vocabulary of 1907. So too did they 
reconstitute the organs of regional defence in an effort to unite winegrowers as a 
pressure group.  Once again, they vilified traditional enemies to bring themselves 
closer together - imports, fraud and speculation. These remained important 
contributors to the Languedoc's declining fortunes, yet were all ancillary to the reality 
of declining consumption.  One interviewee concisely summarised the protest 
movements of the Languedoc viticole: 
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En 1907, c’était la fraude, les vins artificiels, en 1962 l’importation des 
vins Algériens en 1975 les vins Italiens. Le négoce s’est toujours servi 
des importations pour faire baisser les prix des vins languedociens.905 
 
This continuity of message was the CRAV’s greatest strength, as it bound them to the 
region’s contestatory heritage. Thus, they became spokesmen for a historical identity. 
The drama of 1907 projected divisions which remain to this day, with lasting suspicion 
of foreign imports and resistance to central authority neatly bundled up within a 
narrative of regional assertiveness.  
 In the midst of Giscard's premiership, the Languedoc was subject to the 
tinkering of technocrats committed to reducing the quantity and improving the quality 
of wine produced in the Midi. These were not new solutions and, indeed, built upon 
the legacy of the 1953 Code du vin. In the midst of European integration, this push 
towards a value-driven modernisation of the wine industry was accelerated. Structural 
transformation remained disguised by the issue of imports related to European 
integration, however, in line with the CRAV's continuity of message. Opposition to 
Italian imports, which were indeed substantial, saw a lack of engagement with the 
development debate. This left the CRAV outmoded, as the changing demographic 
realities of the Languedoc began to be echoed in the attitudes of its winegrowers to 
change.  
 Suddenly, the wine industry was split between attitudes to development and 
defence. The "unanisme viticole" which had governed the Défense movement since the 
end of the 1950s was ruptured. Inducements to modernise highlighted the Languedoc's 
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potential as an area of quality production, drawing valuable support from the 
representative power groups of the Languedoc, who saw in the plan a new vision for 
development. This vision promised redundancy for a large share of small growers 
whose role had evolved almost unchallenged since at least the 18th century. With an 
intervening period which accentuated their ancestors' determination to celebrate and 
defend this role, their quiescence was understandably absent. The changing 
relationship of defence and development has straddled this narrative of the CRAV. 
Whilst the Défense movement played an important role in resisting overt challenges to 
regional industry in the 1960s and 1970s, their role subsequently lessened in its 
importance. By 1984, the CRAV were no longer mobilising the masse viticole in support 
of an entire region, but rather loudly representing a small constituency of truculent 
winegrowers. Although their methods had been born out of adherence to the 
mythology of 1907 and the experience of protest, the 1990s saw them become 
increasingly violent and unacceptable. As their support base dwindled, so too did the 
CRAV. 
 The modern media narrative which arose after the 2007 video depicted the 
CRAV as a 'Lear-esque' group railing against the void. In reality they were taking 
direct action as a pressure group defending 'la vie paysanne'. This has been an 
identifiable characteristic of the group for as long as they have existed. Regional and 
occupational identities have been easy bed-fellows as long as they both remained 
focussed on the construction of a peasant identity with historical resonance. The 
sudden dislocation of the CRAV's mandate, however, stemmed both from the creation 
of groupements as an administrative structure and the exclusion of the CGVM from the 
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political mainstream by the PS from 1981. The Socialist victory was momentous in a 
manner which had not been envisaged by supporters in the Languedoc, long reliant on 
the bonds between their party and winegrowers. The failure of the PS to shatter the 
agricultural stronghold of the FNSEA made it expedient to endorse their plan, limiting 
the ability of the left to shape agricultural policy. As the influence of the CGVM waned, 
the voice of the CRAV had to become increasingly loud to ensure it was heard. Its 
subsequent means of communicating were both violent and frequently dangerous, 
leading to condemnation from traditional supporters. As the CRAV alienated support 
in the media and the professional organisations increasingly tilted towards the politics 
of quality, the Défense movement all but succumbed to 'l'offensive moderniste'. 
Increasing marginalisation, increasing violence and a swathe of cyclical protests 
highlighted the fact that the CRAV would not disappear, although neither would it 
reclaim its role as the undisputed spokesmen of the Midi viticole.  
 This role was rooted in the region, and in a narrative which had seen the 
CRAV’s development inflected with the political vocabulary of the Languedoc. As 
such, they fed off a climate of contestation within France, operating as a regional 
representation of contemporary challenges to central authority. Julian Jackson's 
historiographical survey, The Mystery of 68, highlights the temptation to ascribe all 
subsequent events to the 'consequences' of the May Events.906 This temptation is strong 
with a group like the CRAV, especially considering their dates of operation. If the 
violence and protests of the CRAV are to be related to the années 68 then it is in 
recognition of the fact that their heights lay beyond the totemic year of 1968. Perhaps of 
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closest relevance to the CRAV is Zancarini-Fournel and Artières' estimate of the années 
having lasted from 1961 to 1982. In the case of the CRAV, however, their années 68 
would be bounded by their formalisation in June 1961 and the torching of the Leclerc 
in Carcassonne in May 1984. Yet this could equally be bookended by 1907 and 2007. It 
could also be argued that this process has yet to come to a close. The CRAV's continued 
existence and their resilience in the face of profound challenges has shown them to be 
rooted in regional processes of radicalisation and reliant on cores of local support. 
Whilst the boundaries of acceptability which have governed responses to their actions 
have moved, they retain enough support to continue their struggle. Mass support and 
mass mobilisations have been replaced by cautious, reluctant support and the violent 
acts of commandoes. Their message, vocabulary and styles of action, however, have 
remained remarkably consistent. 
Attacks were not confined to remote history, and have continued until today. A 
tax office was destroyed by explosives in 1998, there were dynamite attacks on power 
stations and train lines in 2002, supermarkets were smashed up and the regional 
agricultural ministry dynamited in 2005, whilst explosives targeted wine merchants, 
banks and treasury buildings in 2006. In one of their most recent attacks, in March of 
2009, they caused half a million Euros worth of damage at a large wine-merchant in 
Nimes.907 Increasingly, the CRAV has faded from the political mainstream, reappearing 
only as a name spray painted on a wall with some glib threat such as CRAV BOUM. 
The amenability which characterised their earlier attempts at reconciliation with public 
powers, and their attempts to engage with political process, have been largely 
                                                          




forgotten. This leads us back to 2007, the anniversary of the great 1907 revolt and a 
resurgence of the CRAV. This was commemorated by the release of the video 
mentioned earlier, in which five masked men threatened violence against the French 
establishment. That newspapers around the world awoke to their presence, as if they 
were newly formed, highlighted the extent to which their story had been forgotten. The 
difficulty is that in forgetting their story, some of the understanding of the wine 
industry has been lost to statistical analysis and economic projections. 
 This interpretation is corroborated by the violence which followed the video 
threats made by the CRAV in 2007, with riots in the summer of 2008 spreading across 
the Languedoc as vignerons sought to "exprimer la colère" in violent demonstrations. 
The Interior Ministry denounced “une tentative d’homicide” as masked men attacked 
convoys of policemen and attempted to set fire to occupied police vehicles.908 That 
vignerons met demands to tear up their vines with this fury encouraged inevitable 
allegories of 1907 from regional commentators: “Alors le vent de la révolte se lève. Le 
spectre de 1907 plane.” Much has changed since 1907, with a diversified economy, 
altered political structure and a diminished ability to stage mass demonstrations. Yet 
tradition and mythology still have a significant role to play in motivating regional 
responses to external pressure. As eminent Midi historian Remy Pech pointed out, the 
riots of 2008 were “l’expression de la violence du désespoir”,909 a situation which 
encouraged a retrenchment to the established rhetoric of 1907. It is interesting, 
therefore, to note the extent to which the mythology invoked by the CRAV in 2007 has 
been adapted from its original generation, and also to realise that its rejuvenation is 
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based in the realities of economic need and not pious observation of heritage. Whilst it 
may appear that the mythology has been a candle burning at the altar of 1907, in reality 
it has been used somewhat more cynically. The story that inspired violence and 
bloodshed has become a minority pursuit, resurrected only in times of direst economic 
need. 
Perhaps the most pertinent line of that video was one of the last: 
Faisons en sorte que nos enfants puissent connaître la viticulture.910  
 
In reality, the CRAV embodies a very particular southern narrative which charted the 
latter half of the twentieth century. They have become emblematic of an industry 
which has lost its central place in the social fabric of the region and representative of an 
increasingly marginalised minority of winegrowers raised on articulate representations 
of their role. In this sense, the CRAV developed initially as just another groupuscule 
alongside the myriad divisions of the Défense movement. Yet in its prime it became 
associated with revolutionary ideals, as it formed social alliances which included the 
increasingly strident Occitan lobby. Yet its largest debt to the Occitanistes was the cry 
of "Volem viure al païs!" After electoral failure and the stain of spilt blood had excluded 
it from the political mainstream, the CRAV's became a story of radicalisation and 
alienation. As the group developed its voice, so too did it develop methods 
increasingly based in clandestine operation and violent modes of protest. Defining the 
role of the group is grounded in an understanding of this narrative, and ultimately an 
understanding of the fact that their erratic and chimerical existence has rendered them 
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in the popular imagination as terrorists, revolutionaries and just another groupuscule. 
These labels were fleeting, but their identity as winegrowers, Languedocians and their 
desire to live and work their land for a living wage has been their defining 






From antiétatique to altermondialisme: 
Development & Défense in a globalised world 
  
This narrative of the CRAV's history ends in 1992 with the condemnation of CRAV 
activists as 'terrorists' by Colonel Weber. The purpose of this Epilogue is to connect the 
CRAV and the Défense movement into the larger alter-mondialisme movement in France 
and demonstrate the bonds between the core of the CRAV in 1992 and the broader 
“nouvelle gauche paysanne”. The CRAV did not fade away in 1992 nor did the 
problems of the Midi viticole neatly resolve themselves.911 Indeed, the overarching 
narrative of the Languedoc has been one of structural transformation, a process which 
did not finish in that year. As mentioned in detail in previous chapters, improving 
vineyard quality and a shrinking vine coverage ensured that the wine industry had a 
more sustainable future, albeit with a more diminished role. The dwindling relevance 
of the CRAV alongside the amelioration of the region's output has seen economic 
growth and better production methods lead to an increased market share. Yet, cyclical 
downturns have not been eliminated and the occupation of winegrower is still not a 
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period. See, Roger, 'Syndicalistes et poseurs de bombes'.  
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secure one. Indeed, these pressures upon the Languedoc viticole have encouraged a 
reaffirmation of identity, strengthening the idea of the paysan alongside modern, 
profitable producers. Jean-Phillipe Martin, a prolific commentator on the peasant 
movements of France, observed that: 
Le terme de ‘paysan’ n’est pas neutre. La définition des exploitants 
agricoles et de leur activité professionnelle est un enjeu de luttes entre 
les diverses catégories d’exploitants, entre les syndicats agricoles 
voire entre les chercheurs spécialisés sur le monde rural. Au début 
des années 1960, de nombreux chercheurs avaient mis en évidence la 
fin des paysans, la disparition de la vieille civilisation rurale qui avait 
façonné la France.912 
 
Martin’s analysis focuses on the ‘industrialisation’ of the agricultural sector, wherein 
producers were encouraged to standardise and ‘rationalise’ agricultural production in 
line with market demands. The battle he describes over the term paysan remained vivid 
after the modernisation drive of the 1980s. The endurance of the term paysan owed 
much to the organisations which had continued to fight for representation throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, when European integration and the influence of the Common 
Agricultural Policy had fundamentally challenged the role of agriculture within 
modern French society. Likewise, its usage became more flexible as it became more 




                                                          




Alter-mondialisme & Paysan activism 
 Confédération Paysanne (CP) was an organisation which had links to the CRAV 
but dovetailed into a broader narrative of ‘paysan’ resistance to 'damaging' modernity.  
Its foundation myth lay in the Larzac struggle of the 1970s and the knot of gauchiste 
threads which bound the eclectic activists. CP was officially formed in 1987, reconciling 
the CNSTP which had emerged from the Paysans-Travailleurs movement founded in 
1972 by Bernard Lambert, and the Socialist FNSP.913 As mentioned in Chapter 5, these 
were the Agricultural unions which Edith Cresson had attempted to support as a 
bulwark against the conservative FNSEA following the Socialist victory in 1981. Their 
inability to act in concert, however, had cost them influence. Subsequently, neither 
Michel Rocard nor Henri Nallet had seen fit to confront the FNSEA after the popular 
discontent of 1982 and the difficult economic situation thereafter. Guillaume’s (the 
former head of the FNSEA) appointment as Minister for Agriculture served only to 
highlight the renewed proximity of the union to government during the period of 
‘cohabitation’. In this sense, Guillaume’s appointment acted as a catalyst for the 
Socialist unions, forcing them to issue a call for unity: 
L’appel affirme que la crise persiste, que le modèle de développement 
est dans l’impasse et qu’il faut mettre fin à la diminution de nombres 
d’agriculteurs, d’où la nécessité de débattre et construire un 
mouvement qui rassemble ceux qui veulent s’opposer à ses 
logiques.914 
 
                                                          
913 Also cf. J. Martin, ‘La Confédération paysanne et José Bové, des actions médiatiques au 
service d'un projet ?’, Ruralia no.6 (2000), p.2. (pp.1-25) 
914J. Martin, Histoire de la nouvelle gauche paysanne (Paris: Découverte, 2005), p.198. 
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The CP thus became a new means by which to challenge the dominance of the FNSEA 
in the syndical scene at the end of the 1980s.915 Although stronger in the Hérault than in 
the Aude, CP continued to stress the specificity of Languedocian winegrowing as its 
main tactic to criticise the FNSEA.916 This took it back to the old appeal of organisations 
like the CGVM, stressing the peculiar problems of the Midi as a reason to avoid 
national organisations. The CP would become more important towards the end of the 
1990s as it drew the fragments of different Défense movements together, eventually 
incorporating members such as Huillet with ideological sympathisers from different 
industries such as José Bové. By changing the structure of the agriculture debate in 
France, CP moved away from direct competition with the FNSEA.  
  The CP grew to become more than simply a pressure group for French 
peasants. Its involvement with Via Campesina (the international conglomeration of 
peasant groups) has seen it represent a ‘new-left’ alter-mondialisme in myriad forms, 
from opposition to nuclear proliferation to resisting American corporations. Indeed, 
Bové was also a member of Greenpeace and was present on the ill-fated Rainbow 
Warrior as it sailed the Indian Ocean in protest at weapons testing. Involvement in such 
varied causes highlighted the broad ideological engagement of CP and its difference 
from the Défense movement in the Languedoc. Whilst the CRAV was decidedly 
regional and industry specific, CP’s interests sprawled over continents and across 
issues.917 The CRAV would continue to be active in the Languedoc, though the CP 
                                                          
915 F. Seifert, ‘Consensual NIMBYs, Contentious NIABYs: Explaining Contrasting Forms of 
Farmers GMO Opposition in Austria and France’, Sociologia Ruralis vol.49 (2009), p.26. (pp.20-
40) 
916 Martin, ‘Le syndicalimse viticole en Languedoc sous la Ve République’, p.48.  
917 P. Ariès, José Bové: Le candidat condamné (Lyons: Golias, 2007), pp.20-24. 
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presented a new national body to interact with, one which had as its motto: “For small 
farming and the defence of its workers.”918 It was drawing former CRAVistes like 
Huillet towards a new form of activism, which recognised the specificity of 
Langudocien winegrowing but connected it to new trends of gauchiste contestation. 
 In 1999, Millau was the scene of the CP’s most mediatised moment, when a 
group of activists led by Jose Bové engaged in a symbolically cathartic act of 
destruction. Midway through the construction of a McDonalds restaurant, a crowd of 
activists began its deconstruction. Removing bits of roofing, doors and varied other 
pieces, the CP activists loaded a truck and dumped the debris at the door of the sub-
prefecture. In an immediate sense, the destruction was in protest at American plans to 
restrict the import of products like Roquefort, which Bové described as “mesures de 
rétorsion américaines.”919 In dismantling the restaurant with tractors, Bové was hoping 
to juxtapose the globalised homogeneity of the McDo with the artisanal quality of 
locally produced Roquefort.920 Yet the media reaction, led by the local prefect, was 
extremely negative and reports spoke of the restaurant being “ransacked”. Following 
the arrest of 4 farmers involved (and Bové once he returned from holiday), the 
prisoners refused bail and a trial date was set. Part of this negative reaction seems to fit 
in with the media relationship established by the CRAV and the increasing intolerance 
for acts of destruction in the 1990s. Colonel Weber’s label of ‘terrorism’ once again 
seemed to hang over agricultural protest. In the face-off against McDonalds, however, 
there lay a more sympathetic vein of public opinion than there was when the CRAV 
                                                          
918 J. Bové & F. Defour, The world is not for sale (London: Verso, 2001), Appendix. 
919 J. Bové, Candidat rebelle (Paris: Hachette, 2007), p.91. 
920 G. Williams, Struggles for an Alternative Globalization (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), pp.124-126. 
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had targeted negoçiants.921 Petitions and public support mobilised in favour of Bové 
and, by the time of his trial, a public clamour met the now famous photo of him with 
handcuffed wrists raised defiantly to the camera.922 
 
 
Jose Bové being arrested for dismantling a McDonalds923 
 
The town of Millau lies literally in the shadow of the Larzac steppe and so this 
act was directly bound to the spirit of contestation established during the Larzac 
occupation of 1971. So too did it connect with the nexus of interests which had bound 
Oc and vine in the 1970s, as discussed in Chapter 4. The destruction of the Millau 
McDonalds indelibly marked the CP with the spirit of the Larzac demonstrations (and 
the New Left ethos it embodied) and demonstrated that Bové was an effective and 
popular leader. Naomi Klein, writing in the foreword to Bové’s best-selling The world is 
not for sale states: 
                                                          
921 Although the protest’s focus was intended to be the plight of Roquefort farmers, it also drew 
in the issue of McDonalds using hormone-treated meat (a fact subsequently highlighted by the 
CP). The proximity of the British ‘Mad Cow disease’ culling in 1996 remained trenchant enough 
to raise suspicion of tainted meat which helped to capture the public imagination 
922 Bové, Defour, The world is not for sale, pp.3-18. 
923 Cropped Cover of Bové ,Defour, The world is not for sale. 
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Theirs is not a nationalist battle, nor is it only about food. Bové’s and 
Dufour’s message has resonance everywhere battles are fought for the 
right to local democracy and cultural diversity in a world governed 
increasingly by the principles that govern McDonald’s: the same fare 
everywhere you go. It is about the right to distinct, uncommodified 
spaces – cultural activities, rituals, pieces of our ecology, ideas, life 
itself – that are not for sale.924 
 
Klein’s analysis of Bové’s significance is perhaps grandiloquent, but helps connect to 
the narrative of the Défense movement as it developed out of the 1960s. The desires 
which Klein attributes to Bové’s cause are essentially the same which motivated the 
Défense movement and the CRAV: the desire to promote traditional industry as a vital 
activity which promised a future for Languedocians; the desire to protect Occitan 
language and culture as an expression of difference to the Parisian centre; the desire to 
fight against the dominance of tourism in the Languedoc. 
In this sense, a figure like Jean Huillet presented a natural ally for Bové. 
Huillet’s involvement with the CRAV and desire to strike back against peripherisation 
through involvement with the Occitan movement and founding of MIVOC singled him 
out as an activist whose campaigns were more significant than their immediate 
surroundings. Huillet himself acknowledged that during the most extreme moments of 
the CRAV: “J'étais en contact avec les révolutionnaires irlandais de l'IRA ou basques de 
l'ETA, mais je détestais le nationalisme. Je ne savais plus où j'étais.”925 His politics were 
naturally aligned to Bové’s, although his commitment to the region was much stronger. 
Whilst Bové’s endorsement of regional protest as part of Larzac’s repertoire had 
demonstrated his interest in the theme it was never central to his politics. The 
                                                          
924 Naomi Klein foreword to Bové, Defour, The world is not for sale. 
925 ‘Sa vendange sera terrible’, Midi-Libre 18/03/2006. 
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cooperation of such figures highlighted the supple nature of paysan identity. Much as 
with the early regionalists like Charles-Brun and Camproux, these new alter-
mondialistes were not readily identifiable by traditional political labels. Their loose 
adhesion to the left was not based on doctrinaire socialism or revolutionary ideals. 
Rather, Bové and Huillet both championed protectionism, heritage and the right of 
people to live and work the land. Such pliable ideals meant that the Languedocian 
Défense movement could engage with altermondialisme without being subsumed by it. 
Much as Occitanisme had been an important characteristic of the modern Défense 
movement since the 1960s, so too was resistance to global capital and market 
standardisation a prominent characteristic of the Défense movement after the 1970s. 
 
Guibert and Mondavi  
Although the narrative of this thesis has described a shrinking vine area in the 
Midi as a result of the reforms begun in the mid-1970s, the decline had, however, 
halted after 1995.926 An upturn in regional fortunes led to replanting and an 
acknowledgement that the area had become a "nouvel eldorado viticole".927  Such 
success predictably drew admiring glances from investors keen to source value within 
the global wine market. So it was that the incredibly successful American firm 
Mondavi investigated options for opening a flagship European vineyard in the South 
of France. The swift mayoral acceptance of the plans to construct the Mondavi winery 
in the Arbroussas massif, in the Gard, roused local anger. The scheme’s opponents 
                                                          
926 As shown in the table in Chapter 5, however, this seeming upturn lasted only a short period 
and failed to arrest a long-term downwards trend in the value of Languedocien agriculture. 
927 Touzard, Klajman, Développement régional Agriculture et IAA en Languedoc-Roussillon, p.12. 
368 
 
derided the quick decision as evidence of collusion with an over-bearing ‘dollar 
menace’.  
 The winegrower Aimé Guibert has done more than most to ensure that the 
issues surrounding the South’s traditional production methods have remained in the 
public eye. Specifically this has been in his resistance to the establishment of a French 
arm of the Mondavi brand. Much like the protagonist of the film Local Hero928, Guibert 
stands for an indefinable and outdated romance, bound to the land which he works at 
Mas de Daumas Gassac in the Hérault. Guibert became a hero of the alter-mondialiste 
movement by resisting the influence of winemakers like Mondavi and also fashionable 
consultants and critics, such as Michel Rolland or Robert Parker. This focus on the 
economic significance of American capital alongside the cultural implications of 
standardising food binds Guibert to the same movement represented by Bové. 
Likewise, with his defence of winegrowing in the Languedoc, he inevitably conjured 
up the spirit of the Défense movement. The film Mondovino captured the character of 
Guibert and the struggle in which he was engaged, spreading its focus to understand 
the global impact of increasingly industrialised wine production.929 Yet Mondovino is 
not without its critics, even in the Languedoc, where its message might perhaps be 
expected to be warmly received. Jean Clavel has criticised the film for its tendency to 
“simplifie et caricature souvent...” As an anti-modern rural Frenchman, Guibert has 
frequently been dismissed by detractors as little more than a stereotype, railing against 
the irresistible spread of American influence.  
                                                          
928Local Hero (1983), dir. Bill Forsyth. 
929 Mondovino (2005), dir. Jonathon Nossiter. 
369 
 
One curious aspect of the story is the relative unimportance of the land parcel 
which Mondavi sought to rent. At merely 50 HA, the vineyard was unlikely to flood 
the region’s cellars and the renown which would have come from the wine would 
undoubtedly have raised the region's profile. Jean Clavel considers the affair a missed 
opportunity: “Le Languedoc a encore raté une chance historique d’acquérir une 
audience internationale, une image et notoriété positives sur le plan viticole.”930  This 
was the perfect example of path dependency in the Languedoc, wherein responses to 
external pressure had led to a rejection of foreign influence and denunciation of 
wealth. Embodying the core concepts of the 1907 riots, Guibert led a campaign 
rounded in a rejection of industrially produced foreign wine and fraud (which would 
see the Mondavi corporation sell the produce of the winery at cost-price to a subsidiary 
in order to evade value-linked taxation within the Hérault).931 When, in Mondovino, 
Guibert declares that “Le vin est mort” he is specifically referring to a definition of 
wine which he believes has been forged through millenia of experience: “une rélation 
presque réligieuse de l’homme ... avec les élements naturelles.”932 In essence, many of 
Guibert’s criticisms of ‘industrial wine’ are somewhat hazy and ill-defined, though 
they represent a laudable artisanal spirit which has seen the Languedoc become a 
leading bio-dynamic producer, as vignerons strive to create a point of difference in 
genuinely hand-crafted wines. 
                                                          
930 J. Clavel, Mondialisation des vins, pp.91-92. 
931 Oliver Torres has written extensively about ‘The Mondavi Affair’ and the reasons that it 
produced such strong feeling from supporters and detractors. See O. Torres, La guerre des vins : 
l'affaire Mondavi - Mondialisation et terroirs (Paris: Dunod, 2005) and O.Torres, ‘The failure of the 
Californian Mondavi’s implantation in France: entrepreneurship and corporatisme’, International 
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, vol.1, no.1/2 (2004). 
932 Mondovino (2005), dir. Jonathon Nossiter. 
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Yet, such a defence of the small-scale in the face of overwhelming competition 
has formed the vital activity of the South since at least 1907. Guibert’s criticisms and 
prejudices about small-scale production channel the themes of this earlier, well 
established dialectic which has continued to condition reactions to contemporary 
phenomena. The constituency, of which Guibert is only the most contemporary 
champion, do not represent the “vrais paysans” dismissed by Michel Rolland but a 
powerful conduit for a centuries-old tradition of resistance. Guibert's story was 
strongly evocative of the contestation bound into the narrative of the CRAV. This 
illustrated the supple nature of Languedocian identity as it related to paysan resistance, 
with both Bové and Guibert plugging into a narrative of rural resistance which was 
directly bound to 1907 and the 2007 video address made by the CRAV.  
There is, however, a clear conceptual distinction between, on the one hand, 
Bové and Guibert and, on the other, the continued actions of the CRAV. Both Bové and 
Guibert have been involved in searching for developmental alternatives and have 
supported the value of regional agriculture rather than simply reacting as part of an 
historic tendency towards la Défense. In part, although Guibert and Bové's actions 
represented a defensive stance against external pressure, they also embodied a certain 
progressive attitude which valued the potential of regional producers. Their stands 
against development were rooted in a vocabulary of international resistance to 
economic and cultural hegemony, not the regional issues of the CRAV. 
 The targets of these protests have also been important. For Bové, McDonalds 
offered a rather unsympathetic foe which helped augment his popular reception. So too 
did Guibert choose a fight which named an unsympathetic multi-national as his foe. 
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This tapped into the old debates which the CRAV had used in the 1970s alongside the 
Occitan movement. Yet, in the twenty-first century, changing attitudes to the 
amelioration of wine have undercut regional opposition to viticultural modernisation. 
As the CRAV became increasingly marginalised in the 1990s, groups like Achille 
Gauch's Vignerons Indépendents began to dominate a new balance of defence and 
development. Thus, it is possible to understand how interviewees expressed confusion 
or even indifference to the targets of the modern CRAV. This, in reality, is the means by 
which we can bridge the Languedoc's contestatory heritage and the realities of 
progressive growers today.  
In particular, the FNSEA has emerged from its tussles with the Défense 
movements reasonably unscathed. One interviewee who identified themselves as a 
member of the FDSEA also identified himself strongly as Occitan. In addition, his 
reflections on 1907 emphasised that it had been a "lutte contre la fraude sur le vin et une 
affirmation de l’identité régionale."933 His words certainly seemed to chime with the 
message which the CRAV had been promoting throughout the 1970s. Clearly, however, 
they had moved away from an audience which was once supportive. Within this 
context, the winegrowers who distanced themselves from the actions of the CRAV after 
the 1980s934 affirmed that the shared heritage of Défense did not have to be dominated 
by the action of the CRAV. The CRAV, however, continued to pursue defensive 
measures against the iniquities of regional development and the precarious existence of 
small winegrowers but offered little as a progressive alternative. This assured them of 
                                                          
933 Interview with Philippe Vaillé - Domaine Saint Paul de Fannelaure - Castelnau de guers - 
Herault - 27-07-2010. 
934 The interviewee cited denounced their actions after the 1970s and 1980s as outdated. 
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an audience, but increasingly diminished the size of that audience to a core of 
radicalised winegrowers. 
 
The CRAV Endures 
The destruction of a McDonalds in Millau and the resistance to a franchise 
winery in Arbroussas were not immediately linked to either the grande révolte of 1907 
or the shootings at Montredon in 1976. Yet the revival of these themes helped to 
legitimise the struggle of the CRAV against modernisation imposed by the EEC. In this 
instance, modernisation could be conflated with globalisation, with ‘improved’ quality 
representing a shift towards a standardised product. During this period of resurgence 
in the cultural capital of rural resistance, old scars were very much in evidence. In 2002, 
Huillet led a protest of between 700 to 1,000 winegrowers to Montredon to lay wreaths 
at the monument to the fallen and commemorate Emile Pouytès and his service to 
Southern wine. This came after an emergency distillation of 4 million HL of table wine 
promised economic woe for the winemakers of the region. Huillet, writing to the newly 
installed Agriculture Minister Francois Patriat, suggested that he take the opportunity 
to help the Midi in the name of peace: "Je vous demande d'agir vite pour retrouver la 
paix sociale."935 
Between ‘la paix sociale’ and the contentment of Languedocian vignerons, 
however, there was a considerable gulf. In reality, differing attitudes to development 
fuelled constant breaches of ‘la paix sociale’, promoting conflict with the forces of order 
                                                          
935 'Viticulteurs: veillée d'armes avant Montredon', Midi Libre 02/03/2002 
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and viticultural competitors. There was a prominent struggle between the Languedoc 
and Bordeaux in 2005 and 2006, when a war of words erupted over development 
patterns and unequal development. Jean Huillet stood at the forefront of the debate, 
accusing Bordeaux growers of 'twiddling their moustaches' as Languedocians 
struggled. Much of the debate centred around surpluses coming from Bordeaux, a sore 
point considering the long march of 'l'offensive moderniste' designed to curb the 
Languedoc's overproduction.936 The disparity encouraged recourse to vocabulary 
which evoked 1976. Huillet proclaimed: 
Vignerons, la patrie vigneronne est en danger! Je vous demande de 
vous organiser en armée de révolte qui va faire que nous sortirons de 
notre sort debout!937 
 
The familiar rhetoric was a precursor to familiar violence and 3 CRAViste winegrowers 
were arrested for setting fires by a Leclerc in Nîmes, dredging up memories of the 
"affaire Leclerc" which had so embarrassed the Défense movement in 1984.938 Such 
violence was naturally allied to a sense of vulnerability which was only intensified by 
inequality amongst regions of France. The under-current of the winegrower's ire was 
that the Languedoc was being specifically ignored or written off as unworthy of saving 
- a fact seemingly justified by recourse to rhetoric which stressed a century long 'guerre 
du vin'. Indeed, in June 2005 when a new CRAV leader Phillipe Vergnes addressed an 
                                                          
936 'Après le ministre, la parole aux vignerons', La Dépeche 24/02/2005. 
937 '10.000 dans les rues de Nîmes', La Dépeche 26/05/2005. 
938 'Arrestation de trois viticulteurs', La Dépeche 29/05/2005.  
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8,000 strong crowd in Nimes, he spoke of “an economic genocide” being perpetrated 
against the winegrowers of the Languedoc.939  
 Abundant harvests in 2005 saw Bordeaux struggle and, as the saying goes in 
the South-west, "quand Bordeaux va mal, tout va mal."940 After further commando 
actions from the CRAV, Huillet issued another statement: 
Nous sommes, je crois, en route pour une situation de révolte. Car les 
viticulteurs ont le sentiment de ne plus avoir d'avenir. Et les autorités 
ne font rien.941 
 
Prices were reported to have fallen 30% in a year, as winegrowers in Bordeaux faced 
up to the reality of market 'blockages' and the Languedoc continued to struggle.942 
Rhetoric became increasingly inflamed as the contrast between strategies for easing the 
market highlighted the Bordelais unwillingness to compromise or engage in arrachage. 
Libération came down firmly on the side of the Languedocian growers, presenting the 
disparity as a class issue: 
Les vignerons du Languedoc en ont marre! Marre d'une crise qui les 
étrangle chaque jour un peu plus, marre des ministres de l'Agriculture 
qui les méprisent, marre de l'image de mauvaise piquette que l'on 
colle à leurs vins alors qu'ils remportent des médailles aux quatre 
coins du monde. Et marre, aussi, des viticulteurs de Bordeaux, qu'ils 
accusent de ne pas participer à l'effort collectif mené contre la 
surproduction et la crise du vin français. «Nous, on n'arrête pas 
d'arracher, on envoie des millions d'hectolitres à la distillation, et 
pendant ce temps les Bordelais se gavent en se frisant les moustaches 
!» se plaint Jean Huillet, le très populaire patron des caves 
coopératives de l'Hérault.943 
                                                          
939 ‘Grapes of Wrath’, The Independent  12/06/2005. 
940 'Vin : comment sortir du grand embouteillage', La Dépeche, 16/08/2005. 
941 'Nouvelle action violente des viticulteurs', La Dépeche, 30/11/2005. 
942 'La tension monte dans le Bordelais et le Languedoc', La Dépeche 02/12/2005. 




As the matter reached the National Assembly, the reputation of the CRAV preceded 
the discussion. When one Deputy spoke of Huillet’s involvement in a consultative 
body to look at the crisis and his willingness to work with government, another 
Deputy responded: 
M. Patrice Martin-Lalande: Ou alors il le cache bien! (Sourires.)944 
 
Although the schism between the Bordeaux and the Languedoc was a result of the 
refusal by Bordelais winegrowers to support a nationally coordinated protest 
demanded by syndical organisations in the Midi,945 the animosity between them was 
spurred by differing development strategies and the double standards of Bordeaux 
growers who considered their product inherently better than that of the Midi. This 
played into a traditional mythology arising from 1907, namely the sentiment that the 
Languedoc was being oppressed or victimised by the more affluent centre, whether 
that be Paris politically or the French establishment in the wine world. Such lingering 
beliefs helped demonstrate that a profound part of the Languedoc’s patrimonial 
inheritance was tied to the concept of contestation and rooted in a rejection of 
inequality (regardless of its cause).  
In Bové or Guibert it is possible to see an embodiment of the ideology of 
Défense which has evolved to meet new challenges with a focus on the qualities of 
'local' and 'paysan' initiatives. In the responses to Bordelais growers, however, we are 
able to see the recurrence of a certain '1907 syndrome' or path dependency. This 
                                                          
944 Assemblée Nationale – Compte rendu integral -27/06/2006. 
945 'Bordelais ‘twirl their moustaches’ as Languedoc suffers', Decanter, 23/01/2006. 
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duality of reactions was illustrative of differing approaches to viticultural 
development, wherein the Bordeaux model’s credibility was challenged and the 
traditional Languedocian model continued to be ridiculed by government.  
 
AMAPs versus attacks? 
 This fundamental difference between the actions of the CRAV and that of the 
legitimate Défense movement has seen support for the CRAV falter in recent years. 
Interviewees tended to view them as an outdated institution which had altered since 
its 'golden age' in the 1970s. Some granted that although the CRAV had been a great 
force in pressurising debates on development, "ces méthodes sont dépassées et nuisent 
à l’image qualitative des vins de la région."946 Others stressed that the very character of 
the CRAV had changed, and that attacks which took place after the 1990s were the 
result of "certains vignerons [qui] ont voulu se mettre en avant mais ils n’ont rien 
compris et ils ont fait passer leurs ambitions personnelles avant notre viticulture ce qui 
à causé la perte du CRAV."947  In this vein, support for the CRAV as a contemporary 
organisation seems low, especially when they turn to violence. Anonymity, unclear 
motives and a shift away from the leadership models of the past left them devoid of 
the support on which they could once depend. 
 Now that prominent figures like Huillet are more readily associated with the 
actions of legitimate representation, the avenues of progress which they have pursued 
                                                          
946 Interview with Philippe Vaillé - Domaine Saint Paul de Fannelaure - Castelnau de guers - 
Hérault - 27-07-2010. 




seem to offer more than the commando actions pursued against supermarkets and 
railways. American influence was not entirely unwelcome with the Midi's paysannerie. 
Based on the model of Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) in the United States, 
collective crop shares between producers and local consumer groups were established 
in France. In 2001, the first Association pour le maintien d'une agriculture paysanne 
(AMAP) was founded in Toulon. Over the next few years, this model grew in 
popularity and from 2004 the first AMAPs were founded in the Aude, Hérault and 
Gard. In traditional viticultural areas this practice built upon Vente directe, which had 
seen winegrowers selling their produce locally for more than a century.948 By 2010 there 
were 20 AMAPs operating across the Languedoc-Roussillon.949  
 In the Gard, the Centre des Initiatives pour Valoriser l’Agriculture et le Milieu rurale 
(CIVAM) is one organisation which has encouraged an increase in organic wine 
production amongst growers and cooperatives. Formed in 1986, this organisation 
consists of 150 producers.950 This ‘bio-dynamique’ (or ‘bio’) wine has formed a new 
pole of growth in the Languedoc, where replanting and the turnover of vineyards 
brought about by demographic changes has allowed an increase in the number of 
wines certified as organic. The Languedoc-Roussillon has been the leader in 
conversions to ‘bio’ production since 1996, with about half of France’s total ‘bio’ 
                                                          
948 As shown by a letter written by an Audois cooperative manager in 1909 which identifies 
vente directe as a useful model for growth which nonetheless requires greater investment in 
infrastructure. Photocopy supplied by Michel Coutellier of Chais des Vignerons in Lezignan-
Corbieres, Aude. 
949 National AMAP Resource Network - [URL: http://www.reseau-amap.org] [Accessed: 
25/07/2011] 
950 CIVAM Gard website [URL: http://www.civamgard.fr] [Accessed 15/10/2011]. 
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vineyard area in 2007.951 Such production forms part of a niche sector of the European 
wine market, part of a wider ‘quality turn’ which has taken place. This upturn in the 
consumption of certified organic produce across Europe has accentuated some of the 
Languedoc’s traditional attributes. In particular, the small-scale family owned 
vineyards which have constituted an important part of its vineyard coverage. The 
attraction to this was described by one interviewee: 
The “locals” want to protect their own small (sometimes, very small) 
appellations or territories (there are more than 400 wine appellations 
in France). This is related with the French culture where “small” 
means beautiful (i.e. “when you order a “petit café” it means a great 
coffee or when you say that “this is a petit vin” it means a great wine). 
By opposition, in the American culture people denote a preference for 
everything in “big” sizes (big car, big house, big Mac…). I would say 
that this “theory” relates with French culture where “small” is 
beautiful. Therefore, for all local and small appellations are great 
territories with great wines. In France you cannot dissociate the 
French wines from the regional identity.952 
 
This focus on the specificity of French produce has reinforced ideas like ‘bio’ 
production.953 Likewise, it has given rise to developments like the ‘slow food’ 
movement and other ideas which have fed back into the alter-mondialiste movement, 
notably through the endorsement of José Bové.954 Yet, in reality, ‘bio’ production still 
                                                          
951 T. Bouzdine-Chemeeva and A. Krzywoszynska, ‘Barriers and driving forces in organic 
winemaking in Europe: case studies in France and Italy’ [URL: 
http://academyofwinebusiness.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/5-AWBR2011-Bouzdine-
Chameeva-Krzywoszynska.pdf] [Accessed: 01/12/2011]. 
952 Interview with Alfredo Manuel Coelho - Associate Researcher - UMR MOISA SupAgro 
Montpellier - Hérault - 29-07-2010 (Answers given in English). 
953 See O. Torres, La guerre des vins : l'affaire Mondavi - Mondialisation et terroirs (Paris: Dunod, 
2005). 
954 ‘Slow food’ originally came from Italy, but is championed as an example of the model for 
paysan agriculture in J. Bové and F. Dufour, Food for the Future: agriculture for a global age 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p.136. 
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accounted for only 2.5% of European vine coverage as of 2006.955 The temptation to 
credit ‘bio’ production and AMAPs with too much significance should be avoided, but 
they represent creative ways in which winegrowers in the Languedoc have led and 
responded to innovation. In particular, researchers have identified the use of these local 
networks (or ‘clusters’) of ‘bio’ production and AMAP distribution as one of the most 
sustainable models for the small to medium sized cooperatives which still dominate 
some 75% of the Languedoc’s wine produce.956 These were new solutions for the 
problems of the Languedoc viticole which aligned themselves with the agenda of the 
alter-mondialiste movement, further underscored the anachronism of the CRAV. 
 What remained of the CRAV, operating clandestinely and without the same 
visible leadership of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, took little interest in these new forms 
of collectivism. Instead it continued to deploy historic networks of support in service of 
their traditional aims of halting imports and identifying fraud. This is well illustrated 
by the case of one CRAViste arrested and sentenced in 2008.  
On 25 July 2008 a 34 year old winegrower called Jérôme Soulère was arrested 
by police at his house in Malviès, in the Limoux. Soulère was charged with possessing 
bomb-making material after an accident in his cellar left him badly injured. Materials 
found in the cellar matched those used in incidents previously linked to the CAV 
d'Aude.957 Police accused him of having participated in previous attacks, namely the 
                                                          
955 T. Bouzdine-Chemeeva and A. Krzywoszynska, ‘Barriers and driving forces in organic 
winemaking in Europe: case studies in France and Italy’, p.2. 
956 Y. Chiffoleau, F. Dreyfus, R. Stofer and J.M. Touzard, ‘Networks, innovation and 
performance in a cluster of co-operatives: An empirical evaluation from Languedoc wine 
industry (South of France)’ in K. Karantininis and J. Nilsson (ed.s), Vertical Markets and 
Cooperative Hierarchies (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). 
957 'Malviès. Le jeune vigneron testait des explosifs', La Dépêche 25/07/2008 . 
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bombing of a tax-office in Montréal in 2006, and a threat to plant a bomb in 2007 when 
the Tour de France passed through the Limoux.958 On the attempt to destroy the tax 
office, Soulère claimed that their goal was "montrer l’ampleur qui frappe les vignerons 
et qu’elle soit médiatisée." Likewise, his bomb-threat during the Tour de France was 
intended not to explode and cause damage but to raise awareness of the plight faced 
by winegrowers; he alerted police of the device's location in advance and left alongside 
it "un document détaillant les revendications du peuple vigneron."959  
During his arrest and the investigation into his actions, Soulère received 
support from the militant Occitan movement Anaram Au Patac (a self proclaimed 
revolutionary movement of the Occitan left)960, who cast him as a "victime de son 
engagement pour la cause viticole." This was, to an extent, a revival of the grand social 
alliance which had characterised the CRAV’s strongest moment. Yet the profile of the 
Occitan group and the nature of their solidarity was expressive of not only the distance 
the CRAV had fallen but the calibre of their fellow-travellers in such extreme methods. 
Anaram expressed solidarity with the struggling Midi wine industry and condemned 
industry figures who spoke out against Soulère as "soumis à la domination étatique de 
Paris".961 In supporting these actions both the CRAV and Anaram placed themselves on 
the wrong side of the development debate. 
                                                          
958 'Jérôme Soulère avoue des attentats', La Dépêche 26/07/2008. 
959 'Carcassonne. Il avait fait sauter la perception : 6 mois de prison', Dépêche du Midi 03/12/2009. 
960 Anaram Au Patac were formed in 1992 in Pau and had 3 regional presences in Bordeaux, 
Clermont-Ferrand and Montpellier. They published a review called 'Har/Far' and survived until 
2009, when on the 19 September they joined with Combat d'Oc to form a new revolutionary 
Occitan Party, Libertat. 




This shifting dialectic underlined the ways in which both the region and the 
CRAV had changed. The process begun by the Chirac Plan had enjoyed greater success 
in the 1980s, when the rump of Languedocian syndicalism had committed itself to the 
primacy of development over defence. By buying into this process, local elites were 
given the opportunity to accent development, as seen in the role of Cases and Huillet 
in the legitimate representative organisations. After Colonel Weber’s denunciation of 
the CRAV in 1992, they existed in a political hinterland, stripped of their old 
significance and bearing little resemblance to the grand movement of the 1970s. This 
was accelerated by the development of the paysan movement, which became 
increasingly inclusive in its ideology and increasingly focussed on the inequality of 
global markets. Winegrowers resistant to processes of modernisation could be grouped 
with those who opposed inequality in the global market. Essentially, the groupings 
represented by both FNSEA and CRAV in the 1980s could interact more profitably and 
with greater unity in this new political vocabulary of paysan and alter-mondialisme. 
Figures like Bové and Guibert can be directly linked into the heritage of the CRAV, 
though they represent figureheads in a far more vibrant political current than 
contemporaneous CRAVistes. So too have progressive factors like ‘bio’ production and 
AMAP distribution taken the shine off tired ideas of productivism and traditional rural 
recalcitrance. The alter-mondialiste movement has translated the legacy of the 1970s 
Défense movement into a new force which was neither bound to the Languedoc nor 
reliant on the economic importance of winegrowing. Rather, in recognition of the fact 
that the cause of regional defence has been broadly unsuccessful, contemporary 
debates focus on influencing the dynamics of development. As markets have become 
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global, so too have the movements of those opposed to this trend and the specifically 





Script for Interviews conducted in Summer 2010  
 
 How long have you lived and worked in this region? 
Combien de temps avez-vous vécu et travaillé dans cette région? 
 What is your role in the wine industry? 
Quel est votre rôle dans l'industrie viticole? 
 Are you involved in a Cooperative? 
Etes vous adhérent d'un organisation Coopératif? 
 Are you involved in a Growers/Labour Union? 
Etes-vous  adhérent d'un syndicat ou union des travailleurs? 
 Were your family involved with wine before you? 
Est-ce que votre famille travaille dans l'industrie viticole? 
 Do you think that winegrowers of the past faced greater hardships than today? 
Pensez-vous que les vignerons du temps passé confrontaient des problèmes 
plus difficiles qu'aujourd'hui? 
 Do you think that there have been substantial changes in the wine industry of 
the Midi since the Second World War? 
Pensez-vous que l'industrie viticole a changé depuis la deuxième guerre 
mondiale et comment? 
 Who/What do you feel has been responsible for these changes? 
Qui/quoi était responsable pour cette évolution? 
 Do you feel that wine is an important element of national identity? And 
regional identity? 




 Do you feel more attached to regional or national identity? 
Identifiez-vous plus avec l'identité régionale ou nationale? 
 Do you habitually speak Occitan or any other language than French? 
Parlez-vous quelque autre langue (comme Occitan) que français? 
 Do you feel Occitan? 
Est-ce que vous vous sentez Occitan? 
 
 Were the ‘1968 years’ important in the region? 
Quel a été l’import des années 1968 dans la region? 
 What does the Revolt of 1907 mean to you ? 
Que représente pour vous la révolte de 1907 ? 
 Is it still relevant to today ? 
Est-ce qu’il y a toujours des leçons pour notre époque ? 
 
 Has the memory of 1907 always been important ? 
Est-ce que la mémoire du 1907 reste toujours actuelle ? 
 Do you believe that protest is or has been an effective way of changing the wine 
industry? 
Croyez-vous que des manifestations sont (ou étaient)  des moyens efficaces de 
changer l'industrie? 
 Do you believe that ‘Defense du vin’ organisations are necessary? 
Croyez-vous que les organisations de 'Défense du vin' sont (ou étaient) 
nécessaire? 
 What do you feel the main threats were to the wine industry of the past? 
A votre avis, quelles étaient les plus grandes ménaces pour l’industrie viticole 
dans le passé ? 
 What do you feel the main threats are to today’s wine industry? 
A votre avis, quelles sont les plus grandes ménaces pour l’industrie viticole? 
 What do you think the CRAV’s role is in the Midi wine industry? 
Quel était le rôle du CRAV dans l'industrie viticole? 
 Would you endorse their direct action? 
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